FB external report for w1, 2017

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1 FB external report for w, 27 Contents of the report Subject Page Comments Market analysis 2 Socio-economical welfare 3-5 Cross-border capacities 6-2 Congestion rent 3 Non-intuitive flow 4 Net positions 5-6 Prices 7-2 System Price 2 Border flows Power system impact analysis 2-3 Comments Highlights - Social Economic Welfare (SEW) increases on for the Nordics as well as external markets - Denmark and Finland have the highest increase in SEW during the week - Norway experiences a marginal loss in SEW while Sweden experiences a marginal gain in SEW Known errors Missing hours Some hours are missing in the weekly simulations. This can be due to different issues: -The input data for this hour was not available. -They were differences in the available input data for NTC and FB, which made the comparison between the two impossible. These missing hours appear either as zero values or gaps in the figures of this report.

2 Market analysis Summary of market analysis Nordic Denmark The SEW for the Nordic area is positive for the week. Almost all areas experience positive SEW, it is only Norway that has a slightly negative SEW, however this is marginal. Continental Europe also experiences a gain in SEW where France has the biggest gain. The Nordic net position is slightly lower in FB compared to NTC, however this is due to the fact that the power is better distributed within the Nordic area. Denmark experiences a relatively high gain in SEW this week, where it is the producer surplus that increases more than the loss in consumer surplus. The gain is primarily experienced in the late hours of January 3rd and the early morning hours of January 4th. The net position for Denmark is higher in FB than NTC, which is mostly due to the fact that Denmark is able to export more during January 3rd and 4th. This in turn raises prices in both DK and DK2 during high wind hours. Norway Norway experiences a marginal loss in SEW this week. The net position for Norway is higher in most of the hours in FB compared to NTC. The loss of SEW is due to price convergence within the Nordics in FB, which means that Norway has lower congestion income. This can be seen on the following borders DK-NO2, NO- NO2, NO-NO5 and NO4-SE. Finland In Finland experiences an increase in SEW this week. It is especially in the early morning hours of January 4th where Finland experiences higher SEW from FB compared to NTC. However also during the 2nd and 3rd there is an increase of SEW. The increase of SEW is due to higher consumer surplus compared to the decrease in producer surplus. Finland is able to import more in FB compared to NTC, which in turn lowers prices. Sweden The week for Sweden is very mixed in terms of SEW losses or gains, however the overall week ends with a marginal gain in SEW. The prices in Sweden are generally lower during the week, which increases SEW on days where consumption is relatively higher than production and vice versa. The net position for Sweden is lower in FB compared to NTC, this is due to the fact that higher imports from e.g. Denmark is allowed in FB compared to NTC 2

3 k M k M Socio-economical welfare The socio-economical welfare, i.e. the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and congestion rent, for Flow Based (FB) compared to Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) are shown in the following charts. Nordic socio-economic per stakeholder and country DK NO SE FIN Congestion rent Consumer surplus FB-NTC Producer surplus External socio-economic welfare per stakeholder Congestion rent Consumer surplus FB-NTC Producer surplus Total Nordic socio-economic welfare per country DK NO SE FIN FB-NTC Total External socio-economic welfare FB-NTC 3

4 k k M M k k M M The weekly socio-economical welfare per day and in total are shown in the following charts Nordic socio-economic welfare per stakeholder and day FB-NTC Congestion rent Producer surplus Consumer surplus total FB-NTC Total Nordic socio-economic welfare per day...and in total FB-NTC FB-NTC External socio-economic welfare per stakeholder and day FB-NTC Congestion rent Producer surplus Consumer surplus...and in total FB-NTC -4-6 Total External socio-economic welfare per day total FB-NTC FB-NTC 4

5 SEW per stakeholder k Sum k SEW per stakeholder k Sum k SEW per stakeholder k Sum k SEW per stakeholder k Sum k The hourly socio-economical welfare for each country are shown in the following charts Denmark, socio-economic welfare per stakeholder and hour FB-NTC Congestion rent Producer surplus Consumer surplus Sum Finland, socio-economic welfare per stakeholder and hour FB-NTC Congestion rent Producer surplus Consumer surplus Sum Norway, socio-economic welfare per stakeholder and hour FB-NTC Congestion rent Producer surplus Consumer surplus Sum Sweden, socio-economic welfare per stakeholder and hour FB-NTC Congestion rent Producer surplus Consumer surplus Sum

6 Maximum cross-border flows The graphs below show the maximum cross-border flows with FB and NTC. The maximum cross-border flows with FB are computed considering all CNE constraints. The maximum cross-border flows with NTC can differ from the actual cross-border NTC capacities due for example loop flows. When orange lines (FB) are not visible, maximum cross-border flows with FB are equal to that with NTC. 2 DK-DE border - -2 DK-SE3 border DK-NO2 border - -2 DK-DK2 border

7 DK2-DE border DK2-SE4 border FIN-EE border

8 FIN-SE3 border FIN-SE border NO-NO2 border NO-NO5 border

9 NO-SE3 border NO2-NL border NO2-NO5 border NO3-NO4 border

10 NO3-NO5 border NO3-SE2 border NO4-SE border NO4-SE2 border

11 SE-SE2 border SE2-SE3 border SE3-SE4 border SE4-DE border 5-5 -

12 SE4-LT border SE4-PL border

13 Congestion rent The total congestion rent, i.e. the product of flow volume and price difference, per border is shown in the following chart. Some borders are experience negative congestion rent with Flow Based due to non-intuitive netflows from a higher priced bidding area to a lower priced bidding area. A decrease in congestion rent is due to less border flow and/or smaller price area difference. FB NTC M BE > FR DE > DK DE > FR DE > SE4 DK > DK2 DK > SE3 DKA > SE3 EE > ERI EE > LV FIN > NO4 FIN > SE3 GB > GB2 LBE > LT LRE > LV LT > LV LT > SE4 NO > NOA NO > NO3 NO > SE3 NOA > NO5 NO3 > NO4 NO3 > SE2 NO4 > SE2 PLA > SE4 SE2 > SE3 3

14 DE > DK DE > DK2 DE > SE4 DK > DK2 DK > NO2 DK > SE3 DK2 > SE4 FIN > NO4 FIN > SE FIN > SE3 LT > SE4 NL > NO2 NO > NO2 NO > NO3 NO > NO5 NO > SE3 NO2 > NO5 NO3 > NO4 NO3 > NO5 NO3 > SE2 NO4 > SE NO4 > SE2 PL > SE4 SE > SE2 SE2 > SE3 SE3 > SE4 h/week k /week Non-intuitive flow The number of hours with "non-intuitive flow", i.e. hours with flow from a high priced area to a low priced area, and the sum of the resulting negative congestion rent is shown in the following diagram. Hours with non-intuitive flow and sum of negative congestion rent per border Number of hours with non-intuitive flows Sum negative congestion rent Number of Nordic borders with non-intuitive flow per hour

15 GWh GWh GWh GWh Nordic net position The Nordic and External countries daily net position, i.e. the netted sum of electricity export and import for each market time period,is shown in the following charts along with the change of buy and sell volymes Nordic net position per hour 3 4 FB 5 NTC total 3 2 Nordics FB NTC External net position per hour and in total External FB NTC FB NTC Nordic buy and sell volume per country DK NO SE FIN Buy volume FB-NTC Sell volume FB-NTC Buy volume of FB compared to CNTC, External Buy volume FB-NTC Sell volume FB-NTC 5

16 GWh GWh GWh GWh The hourly net position per Nordic country is shown in the following charts Denmark, net position per hour 3 4 FB 5 NTC total Denmark 3 2 FB NTC Finland, net position per hour total Finland FB NTC FB NTC Norway, net position per hour 3 4 FB 5 NTC total Norway FB NTC Sweden, net position per hour 3 4 FB 5 NTC total 5 5 Sweden FB NTC 6

17 NTC, Unique prices and price difference The number of Nordic bidding areas with unique hourly prices, and the price area difference is shown in the following charts. The number of uniquely priced bidding areas is increasing with FB but the price differences between the bidding areas are lower in FB compared to NTC. In the shatter diagram below the price with FB and the price with NTC for each hour are plotted. The straight line represent the outcome if FB-price would be equal NTC-price. The plotted prices show more frequent above the straight line which indicates a decreased electricity price with Flow Base. 5 5 Number of Nordic bidding areas with unique price FB NTC FB NTC Nordic hourly prices FB NTC FB NTC Lower price difference with FB Lower price difference with NTC FB, 7

18 Area Price The hourly area price for FB and NTC for each Nordic bidding area are shown in the following charts DK hourly prices FB DK NTC DK FB DK NTC DK DK2, hourly prices FB DK2 NTC DK2 FB DK2 NTC DK FIN, hourly prices FB FIN NTC FIN FB FIN NTC FIN NO, hourly prices FB NO NTC NO FB NO NTC NO 8

19 NO2, hourly prices FB NO2 NTC NO2 FB NO2 NTC NO NO3, hourly prices FB NO3 NTC NO3 FB NO3 NTC NO NO4, hourly prices FB NO4 NTC NO4 FB NO4 NTC NO NO5, hourly prices FB NO5 NTC NO5 FB NO5 NTC NO5

20 SE, hourly prices FB SE NTC SE FB SE NTC SE SE2, hourly prices FB SE2 NTC SE2 FB SE2 NTC SE SE3, hourly prices FB SE3 NTC SE3 FB SE3 NTC SE SE4, hourly prices FB SE4 NTC SE4 FB SE4 NTC SE4 2

21 Capacity [MW] System price The Nordic system price is calculated without network constraints within the Nordic area, i.e. copper plate. In the parallel simulations of FB and NTC the Nordic system price is not calculated. The different modelling approach can though have an impact of system price due to different allocation of capacity to the interconnectors between the Nordics countries and the rest of Europe. The system price is calculated locally at Nord Pool after PCR, area price calculation. Calculated flows between the Nordics and the Netherlands/Germany are taken into account as either price independent import or as price independent export for NO2, DK, DK2 and SE4. System price calculation has a different area configuration compared to areas price calculation. Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland constitute one bidding are. Baltic countries and Poland are configured as one area each, just as when calculating area prices. Between the Nordic region and the Baltic region + Poland the same capacities as in the PCR, area price calculation, are used when calculating the system price. Average capacities in and out from the Nordics per interconnector 7 total NO2 <- NL NO2 -> NL LT -> SE4 SE4 -> LT SE4 -> PL PL - > SE4 SE4 -> DE DE -> SE4 FI <- EE FI -> EE DK2 <- DE DK2 -> DE DK <- DE DK -> DE Capacity FB Capacity NTC NTC FB NTC FB Capacity [MW] Capacity from the Nordics Capacity to the Nordics 2

22 Border flows The flow on the borders between bidding areas are shown in the following charts DK > DK2 FB DK > DK2 NTC DK > NO2 FB DK > NO2 NTC DK > SE3 FB DK > SE3 NTC DK2 > SE4 FB DK2 > SE4 NTC DK2 > SE4 NTC physical -4 22

23 FIN > NO4 FB FIN > NO4 NTC FIN > NO4 NTC physical FIN > SE FB FIN > SE NTC FIN > SE NTC physical FIN > SE3 FB FIN > SE3 NTC NL > NO2 FB NL > NO2 NTC NL > NO2 NTC physical -4 23

24 NO > NO2 FB NO > NO2 NTC NO > NO2 NTC physical NO > NO3 FB NO > NO3 NTC NO > NO3 NTC physical NO > NO5 FB NO > NO5 NTC NO > NO5 NTC physical NO2 > NO5 FB NO2 > NO5 NTC NO2 > NO5 NTC physical -5 24

25 NO3 > NO4 FB NO3 > NO4 NTC NO3 > NO4 NTC physical NO3 > NO5 FB NO3 > NO5 NTC NO3 > NO5 NTC physical NO3 > SE2 FB NO3 > SE2 NTC NO3 > SE2 NTC physical NO4 > SE FB NO4 > SE NTC NO4 > SE NTC physical 36

26 NO4 > SE2 FB NO4 > SE2 NTC NO4 > SE2 NTC physical PLA > SE4 FB PLA > SE4 NTC PLA > SE4 NTC physical SE > SE2 FB SE > SE2 NTC SE > SE2 NTC physical DE > DK FB DE > DK NTC -6 26

27 DE > DK2 FB DE > DK2 NTC DE > SE4 FB DE > SE4 NTC SE2 > SE3 FB SE2 > SE3 NTC SE3 > SE4 FB SE3 > SE4 NTC 24 27

28 EE > FIN FB EE > FIN NTC LT > SE4 FB LT > SE4 NTC -3 28

29 Overloads [] Max overload [] Overloads [] Power system impact analysis Sum of CNE overloads systemwide per day NTC - Market relevant FB - Market relevant NTC - Not market relevant FB - Not market relevant Max CNE overloads systemwide per day NTC - Market relevant FB - Market relevant NTC - Not market relevant FB - Not market relevant Sum of CNE overloads systemwide per hour Sum of NTC overloads Sum of FB overloads 2

30 Net increase in welfare (FB welfare - NTC welfare) [k ] The figure below shows the net increase in welfare against the net reduction in overloads when using FB instead of NTC. Each dot represents one hour of the week addressed in this report. Values in the quadrant A correspond to higher welfare and larger overloads with FB. Values in quadrant B correspond to higher welfare and smaller overloads with FB. Values in the quadrant C correspond to lower welfare and smaller overloads with FB. Values in the quadrant D correspond to lower welfare and larger overloads with FB. Average welfare gain: 235 k Median welfare gain: 82 k Average reduction in overloads: -37 Median reduction in overloads: -27 Increase in welfare and reduction in overloads A B D C Net reduction in overloads (NTC overloads - FB overloads) [] Hourly results Average Median 3