INTSORMIL (Texas A&M) and IER scientists have worked on this in the 80s and 90s. 2

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1 Introducing a New Sorghum Production System in Mali By John Sanders January 10, 2016 bstract Introducing a Caudatum sorghum into zones of principal production of Guineas has been an activity with a long history in Mali. 1 Guineas have open heads hence are less subject to mold with late rains but this same characteristic results in little potential for high yields. Farmer selected Guineas have stable but low yields. Caudatums have compact heads hence high yield potential and are the predominant sorghum type in developed countries. However, this same compactness of the heads results in susceptibility to mold with late rains. Mold reduces yields and in the absence of thorough drying leads to very poor germination in the next production season. To make a substantial yield increase without increasing too much the mold risk Malian breeders have been crossing Guineas and Caudatums in the late 80s and 90s. n open pollinated cross between the two sorghum races was identified in Mali in the early 90s that was successful on farmers fields in Mali with average yields of 1.5 to 2 ton/ha in 2008 and 2009 with the better farmers getting 2 to 3 tons/ha. fter the second year of high sorghum yields USI/Mali financed a scaling up approach for sorghum and millet technologies of the pilot project. This scaling up program was successful in incorporating bank lending and developing contracts between the farmers associations and the wholesalers. However, with the difficulty of renewing the seed and obtaining the recommended fertilizer, there was substantial technology erosion leading to disillusionment with Grinkan. This was combined with a failure of village women to modify traditional processing methods for preparing to. s the word of poor to quality spread, village, regional and major urban markets declined or disappeared. However, in some villages the women adapted different methods of processing to avoid the watery to. We discuss the general process of rapid increase, decline and then recovery we observe with Grinkan in Mali. We dedicate substantial attention to the problems of scaling up technology. Then we consider several second generation problems of introducing a new sorghum cultivar. Finally we make some projections of the future potential of Grinkan and Grinkan types. The Path of Technology and Product Market Introduction New technologies and new products have similar diffusion paths. With the initial push from sponsors as with demonstrations/subsidies or of products with advertising or discounted prices, there is a rapid increase in area or sales. Then the sponsor or advertiser withdraws. t this point () problems with the new technology are often noted and there is a decline in the introduction process. These problems are often called second generation problems. 2 For products the appeal of the newness often declines resulting in sales decrease (B). 1 INTSORMIL (Texas &M) and IER scientists have worked on this in the 80s and 90s. 2 The first generation problems for a new sorghum technology are to increase the yields over local cultivars in an economical manner (often including resistance or tolerance to disease and insects) and to have an acceptable or 1

2 It is typical of a new technology to have a rapid burst of activity as it is promoted, then to decline or even collapse once the innovation promoters leave. fter this the question of revival and long run growth is what we are looking for with Grinkan given its high yields and excellent taste acceptance except for watery to with the traditional food processing techniques. s the processing problem is resolved, do we expect Grinkan or a Grinkan type cultivar to resume the rapid diffusion process (BC)? Figure 1. TECHNOLOGY (and NEW PROUCT) IFFUSION PROCESS RE IN NEW TECHNOLOGY /NEW PROUCT SLES C B Introduction TIME From 2004 to 2009 we worked in Mali with IER (the national agricultural research system in Mali) and the NGOs, ME and Sasakawa uring that time we tested many IER new cultivars and some ICRIST cultivars in our village level, pilot plot activities. The local cultivars were Guineas. We were looking for a Caudatum (densely packed head) or at least a partial (crossed with a Guinea) Caudatum to get high yields. We also excluded over time the taller cultivars that produced mainly stalk and leaves and lodged with moderate fertilization. We recognized that the down side of a Caudatum or partial Caudatum was the susceptibility to head bugs and mold with late rains. But believed that the high grain yield potential of Caudatums was worth that risk for most farmers. The higher rainfall regions in the Sahel are primarily cotton regions. Who cares about raising cereal yields when white gold is available? Unfortunately there have been several problems with cotton in the Sahel. Historically cotton zones have problems with declining soil fertility over time. Cotton yields have been stagnating and even declining in the Sahel in the last decade. Secondly, the introduction of Bt cotton in major cotton exporters (China, India and the US) has reduced the costs of controlling insects and/or given yield advantages to adopting producers. These producers then increase the supply and that results in declining international prices for cotton and increasing difficulty for nonadopters of B t to preferred taste as compared with the local cultivars. Second generation problems of Grinkan are food preparation techniques, storage and field insect control, seed and fertilizer quality and accessibility, and market price differentiation, credit market access, and marketing power of the farmer or farmers association. We discuss these later in the paper. 2

3 compete internationally. This is especially noticeable in the more marginal cotton regions with lower rainfall and greater soil fertility problems such as in Koutiala. From 1998 to 2008 cotton production and area declined by over 60% in the Koutiala subregion of Sikasso, Mali (Figure 2; Coulibaly et al, 2015, p.55). In the 21 st Century increasing amounts of cotton fertilizer allocations provided by the cotton parastatal (CMT) had been diverted to maize and sorghum. Maize yields have substantially increased there. So there has been increasing interest in raising cereal productivity in the cotton zones. Figure 2. Cotton rea and Production in the Koutiala rea from Source: J. Coulibaly et al., 2015, p. 54.ata adapted from the Malian Ministry of griculture. Scaling Up with the IICEM Program, : USI/Mali got excited with the pilot project results for Grinkan and associated production and marketing innovations (See Pictures 13). With the demonstrated high yield potential of Grinkan with moderate fertilization USI contracted IICEM to scale up this pilot program nationally by engaging the national development bank (BN) to finance the inorganic fertilizer. IICEM arranged the contracts between the farmers associations and the BN and put up a guarantee fund for 1/2 of the value of the bank loans made to farmers associations in the first year, To increase credibility of the farmers associations ability to repay the loans, IICEM worked with wholesalers making contracts to buy the sorghum from the farmers associations. The contracts were for the market price at sale plus a premium for quality of 10 cfa/kg. The contracts specified that sale was to be made soon after harvesting when threshing was done. However, most farmers associations delayed threshing to take advantage of some of the price recovery normally occurring after the harvest. Many farmers associations had been engaging previously in storage construction with NGO or donor support 3

4 so that they could obtain some of the marketing margin from the seasonal price variations, from undertaking the collection operation, and by selling in quantity. Picture 1. 4

5 Picture 2. Grinkan in Garasso, Koutiala region of Mali,

6 Picture 3. 6

7 On the financial side the program was very successful as the credit guarantee required by the BN was reduced to 1/3 the second year and was eliminated in the third year of the program. This was an amazing success story of the IICEM program in working with a large number of farmers associations 3 obtaining and then repaying credit over four years. Moreover, IICEM established contacts between the upper levels of the marketing system, ie the wholesalers, and the farmers associations. Financing from the BN was provided for fertilizer but not for seed. The neglect of seed renewal became a critical weakness of the program as there were no systematic efforts to produce and distribute improved Grinkan seed. 4 Some farmers were encouraged to produce seeds. But with the food preparation problem with the to there was a loss of interest in Grinkan quality seed (see the next two sections for further discussion of this problem). In 2012 the IICEM program was disrupted by the war in the north, a coup throwing out the President shortly before the next election, the beating of the transitional President by a mob and French intervention against the rebels as they were preparing to attack south from Sevare on Bamako. The Banks in the north including the Mopti region shut down. In the Mopti region and to a lesser extent in the south, where the banks continued to operate, donors (USI in the Mopti region and the utch in the south) stepped in to maintain the financing of the inorganic fertilizer for the farmers associations. The donors provided loans for the fertilizer purchases to be repaid to the farmers associations in kind. 5 Then the farmers associations were expected to hold onto the sorghum until shortly before the next planting season to sell and then provide fertilizer loans in that crop season. The revolving funds then eliminated the need for bank loans and the contract obligations with the wholesalers. 6 The tendency to fix prices in cartels among the wholesalers was reduced by the activities of PM (UN program to improve nutrition) in buying cereals and giving price premiums for quality to the farmers associations. From the second year of the IICEM program (201112) there was technology erosion as the program stopped promoting either Grinkan or P, two basic technology components of the pilot project. This technology erosion is a chronic problem in moving from pilot projects to scaling up. Program administrators pressed to expand rapidly were faced with input shortages (certified Grinkan seed in this case) or public policy decisions. In government sponsored programs including fertilizer subsidies the higher nutrient level P was set aside for rice production. For the millet and sorghum producers only 3 In the IICEM Koutiala area program there were 174 farmers associations in and this was reduced to 134 as the Feed the Future program attempted to focus more their activities. Unfortunately there was a tendency for these associations to split into smaller units thereby reducing their economic power to negotiate or sell larger quantities. Probably in retrospect IICEM should have done more to avoid this fractionalization and to assist the farmers associations in gaining market power with a larger share of the marketing margin. The institutional development and improved marketing ability are two of the most important components of the technology introduction process.. 4 The costs of the certified seed are still very high as the extension service makes requires repeated farm visits at high costs. 5 In the north (Mopti for millet) the USI provision was that the full value of the fertilizer loans be repaid in kind to the famers association. In the south the utch provision was that only onehalf of the value of the fertilizer loans was to be repaid to the farmers associations. 6 In our interviewing in 2015 in the farmers associations in Mopti and to a lesser extent in Koutiala these revolving funds from 2012 had been maintained in the farmers associations. 7

8 subsidized NPK was available and no subsidized Urea. Even that NPK subsidy was not available to all producers but rotated annually the areas that could obtain the subsidy. To replace the nutrient levels of one sack of P two sacks of NPK would be needed. 7 s only one sack of NPK was substituted per ha this seriously compromised the yield levels of Grinkan (see Figure 3). This shift from Grinkan and P in the IICEM program of is expected to be a principal explanation for the abrupt decline in yields in that year. This also indicates the importance of continuing the pilot program even when the scaling up proceeds in order to flag the technology erosion when it occurs and to demonstrate the yield potential of following well the pilot program recommendations n important objective of both the pilot and the scaling up project was to strengthen the farmers associations especially their ability to claim a share of the marketing margin. The farmers associations became the collectors of cereal and began selling in larger quantities to regional merchants or wholesalers. The farmers associations held the cereal and waited for the price recovery as typically the regional merchants and wholesalers do. In the IICEM contracts with the wholesalers the farmers associations were pressured to supply the threshed grain quickly after the harvest to benefit the wholesalers from the price recovery after the harvest However, in the third year those farmers associations receiving the emergency funding could hold their cereals longer. Moreover, by then they already had contacts with the wholesalers and more bargaining power when there was no bank involvement but continuing use of the revolving fund. Figure 3. Evolution of Grinkan yields for 33 interviewed villages in Koutiala Yields in Kg/ha Yields average (in kg/ha) 2008/ / / / / / /2015 Years Source: unpublished data from village interviews in the summer and fall of 2015, Koutiala. 7 Not only does the substitution of one sack of NPK for one sack of P substantially lower phosphorous levels but costing by bag is not even appropriate. P is 66% nutrient whereas the predominant type of compound fertilizer is only 45%. Costing needs to be by the cost of providing the essential nutrients. 8

9 So what happened to prices and marketing margins? We can consider two periods before and after the war and planned election year of Before this year there were substantial marketing margins of 20 to 30 cfa/kg between the collectors and the regional wholesaler (Figure 4). Figure 4 Prices paid to farmers associations by regional merchants and wholesalers Prices paid for Grinkan in F CF/Kg Collectors Wholesalers Source: unpublished data from village interviews in the summer and fall of 2015, Koutiala. In the months preceding the Presidential election of 2012 the government made contracts with the wholesalers to buy at 220 cfa/kg according to local sources with the understanding that farmers or farmers associations would be well paid. So early in the year (January, February) before the normal price recovery period wholesalers were buying at 190 cfa/ha. The apparent objective was to also sell the cereal at a subsidized price for consumers. Therefore farmers and consumers would benefit from millet and sorghum prices shortly before the elections. Unfortunately for the President there was a coup before the elections. fter the difference between wholesalers and colletors disappeared. The two principal Koutiala sorghum wholesalers regularly visit the farmers associations and the village markets to buy directly from farmers associations and farmers. There are a larger number of farmers associations 9

10 doing the collection function from individual farmers. So now the wholesalers and the regional merchants, who previously financed local collectors, are doing the same function. Prices received by farmers associations were forced up by more competition from various levels of the marketing chain and by the marketing functions assumed by the farmers associations. Taste and Marketing Problems in Introducing Grinkan: In the pilot project stage Grinkan consistently outyielded local sorghums by 50%. Local sorghums are tall and have loose grain formation in the heads. Hence their maximum yield potential is expected to be about 1.2 tons/ha with the expectation that following cotton or maize (both heavily fertilized) in the rotation average yields would be 800 kg/ha to 1 ton/ha (Coulibaly et al.,2015). Farmers following recommendations during normal and good rainfall years expected Grinkan yields of 1.5 to 2 tons/ha with very good farmers getting 3 tons and higher. 8 The combination of poor tô and the effect of that on local and national markets appears to be the major factor for the rejection or price discounting of Grinkan. In the local markets, where farmers sell small quantities of sorghum to get a little cash on market day and make their small purchases, village women started avoiding Grinkan because of the tô quality with traditional processing methods. 9 In turn this information was passed on to larger markets so that merchants began to avoid or price discount Grinkan. Then some individual Grainkan producers began focusing on their own and livestock consumption of Grinkan rather than sales through the farmers associations. So these two related complaints of the food quality and markets resulted in a sharp contraction of Grinkan area. Of the 33 villages interviewed in 2015 in the Koutiala area the area in Grinkan declined from a peak level of 1184 ha to 710 ha in , a decline of 40% (Figure 5). 10 In many villages in Mali Grinkan production has shifted from a group activity to private individuals producing and marketing individually. This private rather than collective activity makes it more difficult for farmers to earn any of the marketing margin by skipping stages in the marketing process and being able to negotiate collectively Grinkan needs moderate levels of inorganic fertilization (one sack of P and one sack of Urea or two sacks of one sack of Urea). lso especially in the lower fertility regions some organic fertilizer is necessary to improve the structure and better retain water and nutrients. For a more complete set of agronomic and marketing recommendations see Ouendeba et al, To the women this meant a watery tô on the second day. To food scientists this is the consistency problem. section follows explaining the scientific basis of this problem and how it is being overcome in some villages in Mali. 10 With the late rains there was a further decline in Grinkan is normally planted late to avoid being mature with the late rains. Cotton and maize are planted earlier. With the late commencement of the rains cotton and maize were planted late and Grinkan largely dropped out of the rotation except for a few individuals committed to Grinkan These individuals followed the recommendations better unless they were just producing Grinkan as a forage. Hence, yields jumped up in (Figure 3). 11 Insuring that farmers gain part of the marketing margin by selling through the farmers associations is a principal objective to increase the profitability of production and thereby afford to pay for higher input levels. The farmers organizations need to be responsible for storage, quality control, and acting as marketing agents for the farmers. The revenue increase from these marketing functions then helps cushion shocks from weather variability and other productionincome shocks. 10

11 Figure 5 Evolution of total cultivated area of Grinkan for 33 interviewed villages in Koutiala Total cutivated area Total cultivated area / / / / / / /2015 Years Source: unpublished data from village interviews in the summer and fall of 2015, Koutiala. In some villages of Mali women discovered how to adjust their traditional processing methods to produce a good tô. Is it realistic to believe in the recovery (BC) of Grinkan? In the next section we review the processing operations and the science behind handling the consistency problem. The Consistency of the Tô and Farmer cceptance of Grinkan If women are unhappy with the basic dietary staple, the cultivar will be rejected. So let s consider the processing process and the characteristics of Grinkan, which are different from the traditional sorghum: ThreshingSeparating the grain from the panicule. Important in producing clean cereal to keep the grain off the ground in the process. ehullingremoving the bran ( son ) now optional with Grinkan processing Milling into flour The traditional West frican sorghums are Guineas with hard (vitrosity range from 2.5 to 3.5) grains. In contrast the Caudatum sorghums are soft and floury (vitrosity range from 0 to 2). Grinkan is 25% Guinea and 75% Caudatum. fter dehulling the traditional sorghums are soaked overnight to facilitate the grinding of the hard grain in the milling process. When Grinkan is soaked overnight, the tô becomes too watery or loses 11

12 consistency. 12 So the overnight soaking needs to be eliminated and the dehulling and milling done in the same day. n alternative is to eliminate the dehulling process as is often done for cereals emphasizing the health food characteristics. In the Koutiala region of Mali where Grinkan has been grown over five years some women have developed one or the other of these two methods of preparation. Either one overcomes the consistency problem and now these women are happy with the tô. These techniques were taught by the extension service (R) in Sikasso in Hence, this consistency problem is now more of a communication problem than a technical barrier to Grinkan introduction. However, the damage to the marketing process had already been done. So a recovery period is necessary. Is this likely to happen? Markets and Grinkan doption Grinkan still outyields the local sorghums and outside of the watery to the taste of other traditional foods made from sorghum and millet (bouillie, couscous) was very much appreciated. nimals also favored the stalks and leaves over other sorghums (the ever green gene). s women began adapting the processing methods either from their own experience or with extension help the demand situation has begun to shift. Evidence for the beginning of the shift, BC, with a movement back to Grinkan comes from the main wholesaler of Koutiala (Siriki Badjan oumbia), who reports that his contacts in Bamako and Kayes are now requesting Grinkan whereas in previous years they did not want it at all or price discounted it. The most basic objection to the quality of Grinkan for everyday food has been resolved and this will also enable expansion of the local and national marketing. However, there is a difference between the technical resolution of a problem and more widespread knowledge leading to substantial increases in demand. So the communication question is how to get this information more generally known in urban and rural areas. The Malian extension service has begun this process in Sikasso but it could be accelerated on TV. Returning to other production problems. We have emphasized earlier that people 13 and animals especially appreciate the taste of Grinkan. Not surprisingly field and storage insects also are really attracted to Grinkan. There are two alternative effective storage methods (Table 2). Both the PICs sacks and the polypropylene sacks combined with Phostoxin are very effective. Farmers complain of the high price for the PICs sacks of 1,200 fcfa/sack in fall Phostoxin needs to be undertaken in a storage facility not the house. In contrast one field insect problem, Cecidomyie, can cause serous losses and is difficult to control but not a problem every year. Table 2. Second Generation Problems Largely Resolved Constraints Status Future ctivity 1. Watery tô Two methods for processing No longer a technical problem. (Consistency) now becoming generally known Now a communication problem 12 In more technical terms this soaking may reduce the amylose content of Grinkan which needs to be above 20.5% on a dry basis.. Ndoye, Notes on Preparation of Tô, mimeo, June, Children break off pieces of Grinkan and suck on it like sugar cane 12

13 2. Village women not buying Grinkan in local markets 3. Wholesalers avoiding or price discounting Grinkan Now a communication issue Now a demand from Bamako and Kayes markets for Grinkan (S. B. oumbia, Conversation, October 2015) 4. Storage Insects Two good solutions available: PICs sacks; Polypropylene sacks and Phostoxin 5.. Field insects Cecidomyie; phids; others Continuing need for extension Improve communication of preparation techniques for to in urban areas. Make farmers associations aware of resolution of this problem and new markets for Grinkan. PICs sacks expensive; for Phostoxin need separate storage facilities, not in the home ifficult but periodic; ecis; Source: unpublished field interviews, October, Continuing gronomic and Institutional Issues in Introducing Grinkan or Similar Plant Types The mold problem reflects the basic tradeoff of more risks to get higher yields. In developed countries where Caudatums predominate, late rains are also a problem. There is now a range of choices of the Grinkan type with higher levels of Guinea including Grinkan Yerewolo (a hybrid developed by IER), Tiandougou, and Tiandougoukoura (the last two varieties developed by IER), and Soumba. Since these cultivars are more open and with harder polycarp they provide more resistance to mold as well as to storage insects. But this openness makes it difficult to compete with Grinkan in years without the late rain problem Table 3. Continuing Problems for Introducing Grinkan Constraints Status Future 1. Mold from late rains Plant later; void poor seed quality by drying or renewing seed; Use more open variations of Grinkan, as Grinkan Yerewolo (hybrid), Tiandougou, and Tiandougoukoura (all three varieties developed by IER), Stagger planting dates; Continuing tradeoff of less tolerance to late rains for greater yield potential from openness 2. Renovate seed Increased farmer training in seed production provided by large scale testing and demonstration trials focused on hybrids in ccess to P and quality control of fertilizers Public sector recommendations of microfertilization and P instead of NPK are not adequate. Have good field data Seed sector experience at farm level. Still need regular good foundation seed production from public sector (IER) Need better response of public sector to farmers demands for P rather than NPK. Quality control by public sector of 13

14 4. Scale of Farmers ssociations and farmer demand for our recommendation of one sack of P and one sack of Urea. n alternative is 2 sacks of one sack of Urea. Larger size (50 to 150 members) critical for performing efficiently marketing functions, storage, quality control, market quantity to exercise market power. inputs especially of fertilizer and other chemicals (a serious problem for NPK in 2015). Need consolidation of farmers associations into larger units. Training for storage, marketing functions and management. By getting more of the marketing margin increase profitability and accelerate diffusion. Probabilities estimated by farmers for late rains and the occurrence of the mold problem range from 10 to 20%. Covering and sun drying are generally attempted but their effectiveness depends upon the extent of the late rainfall and resulting mold. The drying and the separation of the moldy cereals is especially important for seed producers. Seed renewal is an important issue in Mali. In 2015 ICRIST and IER have been implementing widespread demonstration trials of hybrids and training farmer seed producers of hybrids in the Sikasso region. This training will also effect Grinkan seed producers making more frequent seed renewal an option at lower costs. It will be difficult for these hybrids especially the tall Pablo and Fada to outyield Grinkan. We already observed lodging in the field with both. Several other hybrids are related to Grinkan or with similar characteristics including Grinkan Yerewolo and Sewa (intermediate height).these have a much better chance of competing but both have more open heads than Grinkan so they are unlikely to outyield Grinkan unless there is substantial hybrid vigor 14 (Niaba Teme, sorghum breeder at IER, Ph at Texas &M, conversation fall 2015.) The last two issues (Table 3) involve inputs, public policy, and institutional development to accelerate the introduction of Grinkan. uring the scaling up program for Grinkan and associated technologies ( ) it was difficult for most farmers associations to obtain P. Malian public policy has been promoting NPK by itself without the Urea and even microfertilization for sorghum. However, there is evidence of the yield and economic superiority of moderate levels of P and Urea (bdoulaye, T., J.H. Sanders and B. Ouendeba, 2008; bdoulaye, T., and J.H. Sanders, 2006; New Technologies, Marketing Strategies and Public Food Policies for Traditional Food Crops: Millet in Niger, 2008; Coulibaly 2010; Coulibaly et al, 2013; Coulibaly et al., 2014 ; Ibrahim, 2014; Ibrahim et al., 2012 ; Ouendeba et al., 2013). 15 Clearly getting the input markets 14 Note that hybrid seeds must be bought annually and are substantially more expenisve than open pollinated cultivars such as Grinkan. 15 The substitution of NPK for P or even worse micro fertilization have both been shown to substantially reduce yields compared with the above two sack treatment. In 2015 a new low in fertilizer distribution was achieved with the poor quality of the NPK imported from Eastern Europe (Farmer interviews, October 2015).Maintaining farm input quality is a critically important public sector function, which is frequently difficult in developing countries. 14

15 functioning well and responding to farmer demands for P are important concerns to benefit both low income farmers and consumers. The farmers associations need a minimum size to arrange for their own storage facilities and to be a force in the market by selling large enough quantities of clean cereals to interest wholesalers and food processors. Yet in the villages due to personal rivalries or family connections we often observed two to five different farmers organizations. Once attaining sufficient size these farmers associations can benefit from training in marketing, management and transparent behavior. Sorghum in the rotation of the cotton system White gold has dictated most of the terms of what is done in the cotton zone. CMT will provide fertilizer for cereals only if certain yield goals are achieved in cotton and the reimbursement must be in cotton. There is pressure from CMT to use all the farm available organic fertilizer on cotton. Before the 40% price increase in 2011 for cotton, area and production of cotton in the Koutiala area had been decreasing. lso prior to 2011 there was much discussion of the importance of cereals and diversification. In 2011 and thereafter for several years there was a rejuvenation of cotton but now prices and production are falling again (field interviews with farmers in the spring of 2015). In the 21 st Century maize has been cheaper than sorghum and millet. Moreover, the availability of fresh maize for roasting during the hungry season ( soudure ) has established itself as essential during the hardest time of the year for food availability. In the cotton zone the lower cost maize has become the cereal of choice in the cotton zone for to. lso many new maize varieties and hybrids have come out of the international centers (CIMMYT and IIT) and national agricultural research centers. Consequently, maize is the predominant choice to follow cotton and is being fertilized from 2 to 5 sacks of fertilizer. The maize varieties with three sacks of fertilizer (1 sack of 2 sacks of Urea) gave yields of 1.5 to 2.5 tons/ha (J. Coulibaly, 2015, p. 57; also I. Konate, irector of the IICEM scaling up project in the Koutiala region, conversation, ecember 2015).Grinkan yields can compete with maize yields and the price of sorghum is generally 20 % higher than that of maize. With the new maize hybrids and five sacks of fertilizer yields can be 4 to 5 tons and have even been reported higher. There are also a number of sorghum hybrids being field tested and seed being produced, some of which like Sewa come from the IER breeder of Grinkan and have many similar characteristics to Grinkan. So cotton continues to decline again as Mali has not yet even begun to incorporate the Bt gene into locally adapted cultivars and soil fertility problems are getting worse in the marginal cotton areas such as Koutiala. Hence, we expect renewed interest in cereal production here with more Grinkan producers following cotton in the rotation or following a heavily fertilized maize. In either case Grinkan or a Grinkan type will do well in increasing production and area. With more communication about the yields, to preparation, tastes and preference for animals this demand for Grinkan or Grinkan types will accelerate We would also expect increasing diversification in the cotton zone with increased production of soybeans (domestic demand), sesame (foreign demand), and millet (response to increasing soil fertility problems). 15

16 Conclusions: Grinkan is an impressive innovation from both the perspective of potential yield increases and tastes. In spite of the recent focus on hybrids in Mali, Grinkan is expected to outyield them with the possible exception of Sewa (conversations with farmers harvesting the hybrids in 2015 in trials and demonstrations), a Grinkan type cultivar. So we are optimistic about the recovery and expansion of Grinkan and/or Grinkan types. The technical problems are largely resolved especially the different processing techniques to avoid watery tô. The diffusion of knowledge about the to preparation depends upon communication and extension but has already begun. This should lead to market expansion for Grinkan in local and regional/national markets. The technical solutions to storage insect control are also well known now. We need to understand now why farmers are not adopting them more rapidly. Public concern with the functioning of the input markets especially the seed and fertilizer markets are essential for accelerating diffusion. Regular seed renovation and the availability of P make a big difference in yields of Grinkan. Grinkan can be in the 1.5 to 3 ton range with these inputs. The use of P and Urea makes a substantial difference as compared with Urea. nother critical factor is developing the management potential of the farmers associations. They need to be finding financing for storage construction or better use of present storage facilities, increasing the supply of clean sorghum by controlling quality at the storage level, and becoming better at the marketing and management functions. There is a particular problem in developing countries due to the financial problems of the national extension services and the availability of many NGOs often with funding to support activities that the extension service cannot support. s a consequence new technologies that experience problems are often rapidly discarded once the period of outside support ends as village farmers move on to the next program of another funding agency. This is unfortunate because the identification of second generation problems is a natural phenomenon even of a successful innovation as biological systems are dynamic and have many interactions and changing requirements. References: bdoulaye, T., J.H. Sanders and B. Ouendeba, Evaluation of Sorghum and Millet Technology and Market Strategy Introduction: Crop year, INTSORMIL Bulletin No 8 Lincoln Ne 22 pages bdoulaye, T., and J.H. Sanders, New Technologies, Marketing Strategies and Public Food Policies for Traditional Food Crops: Millet in Niger, gricultural Systems 90: Baquedano, F., J.H. Sanders, and J. Vitale, Increasing Incomes of Malian Farmers: Is Elimination of US Subsides the Only Solution? gricultural Systems, 103: Coulibaly, Jeanne, Evaluation des Technologies de Production et de Commercialisation du Sorgho et du Mil dans le Cadre du Projet IERINTSORMIL/Mali, Campagne gricola Bulletin IER INTSORMIL n 10, Purdue University, epartment of gricultural Economics, 36 pages. 16

17 Coulibaly, J. J.H. Sanders, P. Preckel, and T. Baker, 2015 Will Cotton Make a Comeback in West frica Mali? gricultural Economics, 46:5367 Coulibaly, Jeanne, Gautam Kumaraswamy and John H. Sanders, 2013.Economic Impact of Sorghum and Millet Technologies in Mali gricultural Campaign, , Bulletin IERINTSORMIL n 11, Purdue University, epartment of gricultural Economics, 31 pages. Ibrahim, bdoulaye jido, John H. Sanders, and Botorou Ouendeba, 2012.The Economic Impact of New Sorghum and Millet Technology doption in Niger: Performance and Challenges, Cropping Year, INTSORMIL Bulletin No. 12, epartment of gricultural Economics, Purdue University, 42 pages. Ibrahim, bdoulaye, The Economics of an Extension Program in Maradi, Niger, unpublished Ph thesis, epartment of gricultural Economics, Purdue University, Ouendeba, B.,T. Niaba, and J. H. Sanders, Mai 2013, Fiche de Production et de Commercialisation de Sorgho Grinkan, ProductionMarketing Project of INTSORMIL, Purdue University, epartment of gricultural Economics, West Lafayette, IN 17

18 TBLE 1 : Cultivated reas, production and price of Grinkan in the villages Interviewed in KOUTIL (MLI) Years VILLGES INTERVIWE & atas collected Fertilizer Used 1 Garasso area ha Production t P / with OPs or NPK/ 2 Sougoumba (Oumarbougou) rea ha Production t kg de NPK and 50kg 3 Kaniko rea ha Production t kg de 50kg 4 Klé rea ha Production t P, NPK and 5 Sangaba rea ha Production t kg of P and 50kg 18

19 6 Karangana rea ha Production t sacs d engrais donnés à l OP (P, and NPK) 7 N Golonianasso rea ha Production t C 0.5 ha / 0t (seed did not germinate) 8 Koloto rea ha Production t B 5 4t k Ngounthina rea ha ha Kapala Tiandougou Soumba rea ha NTorlani rea ha Molobala rea ha P or NPK and 19

20 Faraola rea ha Nangorola rea ha NTobougou rea ha 35 13, in 2011/ NTola rea ha Togoba rea ha , Mamarila rea ha , ,4 130 Not often 20

21 19 MPessoba 20 Signe rea ha rea ha P or NPK and 21 Zanzoni rea ha , , , , Baramba rea ha Zangasso rea ha P and 24 Sinkolo rea ha Production t / or No fertilizer. Mr. Siriki Bodjan OUMBI, Wholesaler at Koutiala B. Mr. Mamoutou BERTHE, Wholesaler at Koutiala 21

22 C. Mr. Madou COULIBLY, Collector. Village Collectors N.B. : Quantity sold not indicated when Ops not involved Source: unpublished data collected in Koutiala, Mali, October/November 2015 PPENIX 2: Evolution of Grinkan yields for 33 interviewed villages in Koutiala 22

23 Evolution of Grinkan yields for 33 interviewed villages in Koutiala Yields in Kg/ha Yields average ajusted (in kg/ha) Yields average (in kg/ha) 2008/ / / / / / /2015 Years Source: unpublished data from village interviews in Koutiala, fall In the adjusted yield measrment we omitted the extremely low yields on the grounds that they did not follow recommendations for one reason or another. Or it could be considered as the potential yield avarage. So this should be considered as an estimate of the median. The low yields may also indicate that the farmer was not motivated sufficiently to put the sorghum in a good area as following cotton or to use the correct fertilizer dose. Hence, we used in the text the actual means from the village observations. Note that there were a limited number of yield observations taken from the farmers who came to the village meeting and could recall the yield data for Grinkan over the period.see the number of observations for each year below. 23

24 Years Yields average : Number of observations Yields average adjusted considering yields over 800 kg/ha N.B.: Yields less than 800 kg/ha are considered to be explained by : Inappropriate fertilization Excess of water; Poor soils ; Objective of using Grinkan only for animal feed. 24