Formalizing Rural Land Rights in West Africa: Results from a Randomized Impact Evaluation in Benin

Transcription

1 Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, April 26, 2012, Washington DC Formalizing Rural Land Rights in West Africa: Results from a Randomized Impact Evaluation in Benin Harris Selod (presenter) Michael O Sullivan (presenter) Markus Goldstein Kenneth Houngbedji Florence Kondylis WORK IN PROGRESS PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE / DO NOT DISSEMINATE 1

2 Outline Motivation Context and (ongoing) program Data and identification strategy Results Policy implications 2

3 The Plan Foncier Rural (PFR) approach What is it? Clarification of rural land rights followed by formalization (land use certificate, CFR) based on village-level mapping and surveying of land uses Management and issuance of certificates by communal structures Stated objectives: Improve tenure security of landholdings and stimulate agricultural investment Originality: Identification of rights recognizes existing customary land arrangements 3

4 The Benin context Customary law typically holds sway Low investment in land Thin rural credit markets Conflicts over and unequal access to land Tenure insecurity 4

5 The PFR process in Benin Main steps in each village: Information campaign Parcel surveying and identification of rights holders Preparation of village land use plans Public review of village land use plan (60 days) Review and approval of land use plan CFR delivery 5

6 Marking of boundary corner Measurement of GPS coordinates Signature of plot owner and neighbors 6

7 Example of a PFR 7

8 Impact evaluation research topics Conflict and perceived tenure security Land use arrangements / land market activity Land improvements and investments Agricultural production Labor and off-farm activities Possible differential gender effects 8

9 Measuring program impact Program targeted 300 villages in 40 of Benin s 77 communes (started in 2006) Random selection of villages that submit a proposal and meet eligibility criteria (through commune-level lotteries) Phased-in implementation Survey data collection before and during program (follow-up planned) 9

10 The data: World Bank survey 3,500 HH + community survey (2011) Rich set of data on: Community Households Parcels/landholdings (about 6,500) Agricultural plots Subsample of program 291 villages (193 treatment and 98 control) Justification: link to nationally representative panel household and community (EMICoV 2006 and 2010) 10

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12 Preliminary results Preliminary analysis of World Bank survey (parcel level): Strong demarcation effects: 18% increase (13 pct points) in parcels with clear borders in treated villages No observed effects on land conflict Initial evidence of land consolidation and reduced land market activity during implementation: 26% drop in sharecropping and 83% drop in renting out of land in PFR villages Some evidence of a short-term spike in tenure insecurity during the PFR process: 4 pct point increase in the fear of land being occupied by someone else 2 percent point (17.5%) increase in perennial crop planting Evidence of increased maize and peanut yields (plot-level analysis) disappears after controls are introduced (results not shown) Mixed evidence on the PFR s initial effects on female-headed households: FHH in PFR villages experience a drop in conflicts (relative to MHH) yet they are more likely to fear land re-allocation and less likely to leave land fallow in next 12 months 12

13 Conclusion and next steps Initial effects are observed before the certificate is delivered (less than 1,000 certificates handed out by end of 2011) Consolidation phase : evidence of drop in land market participation and concern over landholdings during implementation But signs of clearer land demarcation in PFR villages Increase in perennial crop planting What are the longer-term effects? Ongoing data analysis aims to uncover the PFR s effects Ag plot level, HH access to credit, off-farm activities And on intra-household bargaining between women and men Need for further wave(s) of data collection to track PFR effects over time (2013 envisioned) Possibility for experimentation of program variants? In particular: facilitation of formal, written records of secondary land rights (using contract templates) 13

14 Thank You 14

15 Annex Tables 15

16 Balance test: Parcels, EMICoV 2006 Variables Sample size T-test OLS Treated (1)-(0) Significance Treated Significance Title Duration of tenure Bought Inherited *** Sharecropped in *** Rented in ** Rented out Fallow ** Sharecropped out * Conflict Conflict settled Customary conflict settlement

17 Parcel level mean comparisons: WB 2011 survey VARIABLE TREATED CONTROL TREATED - CONTROL t-statistic p-value Tenure security / conflict HH has a document for this parcel Parcel conflict in last 12 months Farmer-pastoralist conflict Number of conflicts on parcel Fear of losing land if left unused Fear of land re-allocation Fear of land being occupied Parcel has clear borders Parcel has trees to define terrain border Parcel has stones/cement to define terrain border

18 Parcel level mean comparisons : WB 2011 survey (cont.) VARIABLE TREATED CONTROL TREATED - CONTROL t-statistic p-value Land market participation Ever sharecropped out Sharecropped out (last 12 months) Currently on loan/rented out Investment Perennial crops planted Has at least 1 irrigation/soil/tree investment Planted trees on parcel (last 12 months) Ever fallowed Plans to leave fallow in next 12 months

19 Model specification for impact estimates OLS with standard errors clustered at the village level: Parcel i, Village j, Commune (Municipality) k t jk = Village was randomly assigned to PFR treatment (intent-to-treat) X ijk = Vector of household and parcel controls C k = commune dummy emicov j = lottery dummy (villages covered by EMICoV2006 vs other villages) ε ijk = error term 19

20 Impact on tenure security & conflicts OLS regressions with household / parcel / geographical / lottery controls VARIABLE HH has a document for this parcel Parcel conflict in last 12 months Farmerpastoralis t conflict Number of conflicts on parcel Fear of losing land Fear of land reallocation Fear of land being occupied Parcel has clear borders Parcel has trees to define terrain border Parcel has stones/ce ment to define terrain border Treatment - PFR village ** 0.13*** -0.11*** 0.25*** (0.51) (-0.77) (-0.72) (0.14) (0.30) (-0.75) (2.21) (5.53) (-4.18) (10.78) Observations 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,497 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 Outcome mean Standard errors clustered at village level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 20

21 Impact on land market participation & investment OLS regressions with household / parcel / geographical / lottery controls VARIABLE Ever sharecro pped out Sharecro pped out (last 12 months) Currently on loan/rent ed out Perennia l crops planted Parcel has clear borders Parcel has trees to define terrain border Parcel has stones/c ement to define terrain border Has at least 1 irrigation/ soil/ tree investme nt Planted trees on parcel (last 12 months) Ever fallowed Plans to leave fallow in next 12 months Treatment - PFR village -0.02** -0.01** -0.01** 0.02* 0.13*** -0.11*** 0.25*** (-2.12) (-1.99) (-2.38) (1.78) (5.53) (-4.18) (10.78) (1.11) (1.61) (-0.76) (1.24) Observations 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 5,510 Outcome mean Standard errors clustered at village level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 21