Deepwater Horizon Gulf Oil Spill: More Resilient Response

Transcription

1 Deepwater Horizon Gulf Oil Spill: Translating Lessons Learned into More Resilient Response Nancy E. Kinner Co-Director, Coastal Response Research Center Director, Center for Spills in the Environment Professor, Civil/Environmental Engineering University of New Hampshire Coastal Response Research Center Rutgers University March 14, 2012

2 Coastal Response Research Center (CRRC) NOAA s Office of Response and Restoration (ORR)/UNH Spill Partnership in 2004 NOAA = National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration THERE WILL BE ANOTHER MAJOR SPILL IN U.S. Many Research Needs Exist Regarding Spill Response, Recovery and Restoration Expertise to Call Upon During a Spill Independent voice Honest broker Coastal Response Research Center 2

3 Why UNH? Marine Science & Environmental Engineering Strengths UNH ranked nationally in both areas No Oil = No Oil Politics Senator Gregg NOAA Appropriations Coastal Response Research Center 3

4 CRRC Mission Conduct and Oversee Basic and Applied Research and Outreach on Spill Response and Restoration Transform Research Results into Practice Serve as Hub for Oil Spill R&D Educate/Train Students Who will Pursue Careers in Spill Response and Restoration Coastal Response Research Center 4

5 Today s Topics U.S. Oil Spill Response System Deepwater Horizon (DWH) Accident DWH Spill Response Key Issues of DWH Response Resilient Response Going Forward Coastal Response Research Center 5

6 Phases of Oil Spill Emergency Response Immediate to few years after Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) Determine damage to and compensation of natural and human resources by responsible parties (RPs) Not civil suits Restoration/Recovery Months to years funded by RPs Coastal Response Research Center 6

7 Today s Focus = Response Not NRDA or Restoration Coastal Response Research Center 7

8 U.S. Oil Spill Response (National Response System) Coastal Response Research Center 8

9 Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA 90) Within 1 Year of Exxon Valdez Tanker Accident in Alaska Mandates Spill Organization and R&D R&D Never Fully Funded Planning, Preparedness, Response, Damage Assessment and Restoration Systems Mandated Major Federal Agencies: Minerals Management Service (Leases and Safety/Environmental Regulation) Coast Guard, EPA, NOAA Coastal Response Research Center 9

10 Oil Spill Classification Table DWH = 200 Million Gallons An FOSC s Guide to Environmental Response (USCG, Gulf Strike Team, 7/1/2008) Coastal Response Research Center 10

11 National Incident Management System: Standardized On-Scene Incident Management Coastal Response Research Center 11

12 Unified Command: Management When Multiple Jurisdictions Coastal Response Research Center 12

13 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSC) U.S. Coast Guard (Coastal or Major Navigable Waterways) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Inland Areas) Coordinate federal efforts with local l response National Response Team (NRT) Planning, policy, & coordination Does not respond directly to incident Provides advice and resources to FOSC Coastal Response Research Center 13

14 NCP (cont d) Regional Response Teams (RRTs) 13 RRTs (state and federal members) Maintain regional contingency plans Planning, policy & coordination Provide guidance to FOSC Assist state & local gov t in preparation, planning and practice Coordinate with local Area Committees Detailed local contingency plans Coastal Response Research Center 14

15 NCP (cont d) Special Force Components Specially trained to help in major spills USCG Public Information Assist Team Public affairs specialists US EPA Environmental Response Team Scientists / engineers specializing in sampling / analysis and technical support Scientific Support Coordinator NOAA provides support on spill trajectory, natural resources at risk, environmental tradeoffs Coastal Response Research Center 15

16 Incident Management Discovery & Notification Preliminary Assessment Initiation of Action Responsible party Federal assets (e.g., Strike Force) Containment, Countermeasures, Cleanup, Disposal Documentation & Cost Recovery Coastal Response Research Center 16

17 Spills of National Significance (SONS) Decided by Commandant of USCG Size, severity, location, impact on public health & welfare and environment, complexity SONS Drills Required March 2010: Tanker accident Portland, Maine DWH was SONS!!! Coastal Response Research Center 17

18 DWH Accident Coastal Response Research Center 18

19 Oil Wells in U.S. Waters of Gulf of Mexico Coastal Response Research Center 19

20 Coastal Response Research Center 20 ~4,000 offshore platforms in Gulf of Mexico

21 Crude Oil Production in U.S. Total: 79.8 billion gallons/yr (2009) Gulf of Mexico (GOM) produces 23.9 billion gallons/yr (30% of total domestic crude) Coastal Response Research Center 21

22 Crude Oil Imports into the U.S. Total: 10.4 million barrels/day = 159 billion Gallons/Yr (2010) Imports Through Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) Facility Handles 13% of imported oil = 20.7 billion gallons/yr Coastal Response Research Center 22

23 Deepwater Horizon (DWH) Coastal Response Research Center 23

24 Deepwater Horizon Rig 33,000 Ton Drilling Rig on Pontoons Built 2001 for $350M Derrick = 20 stories above top deck Held in position using GPS thrusters Crew = 126 Owner: Transocean Coastal Response Research Center 24

25 Mississippi Canyon Block 252 BP Lease Site (MC252) Cost = $34M Transocean s Marianas rig started drilling in October 2009 Damaged in Hurricane Ida November 9, 2009 Drill pipe 5,000 ft of water + 4,000 seabed (9,000 ft total) (Macondo Site) DWH Coastal Response Research Center 25

26 Macondo Site Drilling History ~ 9,000 ft more to drill to gas and oil reservoir (~ 18,000 ft total) DWH arrives at Macondo site Jan 31, 2010 and starts putting down pipe p Estimated cost = $1M /day fee BP and partners budgeted 51 days and $96.2M for this well Coastal Response Research Center 26

27 DWH Well Blowout Occurred on April 20, 2010 DWH Rig had drilled into oil/gas reservoir 6 weeks behind schedule and $58M over budget Coastal Response Research Center 27

28 DWH Well Blowout Put in Temporary Cement Plug 3,000ft Below Top of Well Positive Pressure Test Check casing and seals intact Negative Pressure Test No fluids should leak into well Coastal Response Research Center 28

29 DWH Well Blowout (cont d) Positive Pressure Test Acceptable Results Negative Pressure Test Began 5 pm, April 20 Pressure repeatedly increased fluids leaking in? Decided to try again using kill line on blowout preventer (BOP) Results ok no pressure increase Likely kill line was not working properly (clogged) Decision OK to open BOP and replace heavy drilling mud in drill pipe with seawater Coastal Response Research Center 29

30 DWH Well Blowout (cont d) 9:15 pm (April 20) Begin Adding Seawater into Bottom of Well (Annulus) ~ 9:40 pm Hissing and High-Frequency Vibration Then Mud Shooting Out of Gas Buster on Rig Then Explosion All Saved Except 11 Killed in Explosion Coastal Response Research Center 30

31 DWH Well Blowout (cont d) 1:30 am (April 21) DWH Rig Listing; Secondary Explosions & Fire 2:50 am Rig Spins 180 ; GPS Dynamic Positioning Dead DWH moved 1600 ft from well 3:15 am DWH Listing Heavily, Fire Continues & Fire Boats Spraying Water on Rig Coastal Response Research Center 31

32 DWH Blowout 1:27 am (April 22) DWH Sank Along with 5,000 ft pipe Turbidity in Water High Due to Accident/Sinking Oil Leak Not Confirmed for Few Days Coastal Response Research Center 32

33 DWH Blowout Causes Lots of Individual Mistakes Several Excellent Sources of Information: Presidential Commission o Report ( llco ss o.gov) Final Report to BOEMRE: Forensic Examination of DWH BOP Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the DWH Coastal Response Research Center 33

34 DWH Spill Response Coastal Response Research Center 34

35 Overview of DWH Spill Response 87 Days of Continuous Release of Oil and Gas Numerous Attempts to Stop Flow No spill response plan for large blowout July 15 Well Killed from Top Ending Release Bottom Kill Sept 19, 2010 Total Oil Release (est.) = 200 Million Gallons Biggest Accidental Oil Spill in Recorded History! Coastal Response Research Center 35

36 Priority #1 = Stop Fire, Rescue People Human Health and Safety Paramount Coastal Response Research Center 36

37 Priority it #2 - Stop Source of Leak Start Relief Well Install Cap to Stop Flow High ambient water pressure, cold and dark 2200 psi High exit pressure of oil, hot (212 o F) 6500 psi Well W Head ~ 7 inches diameter; 1 mile below water s surface Coastal Response Research Center 37

38 Relief Wells Coastal Response Research Center 38

39 Capping Well Coastal Response Research Center 39

40 Coastal Response Research Center 40

41 Priority #3 Identify Natural Resources at Risk Crabs, Shrimp, Oysters, Blue Fin Tuna, Charismatic Marine Mammals Recreational Beaches Commercial Fishing Subsistence Fishing Shorelines on ESI maps are color-coded by sensitivity to oil. Symbols mark localized areas for biological and human-use resources. Coastal Response Research Center 41

42 Priority #4 Minimize Damage to Natural Resources Purpose of Response Technology Key Is Select Most Appropriate Response Techniques Unique to Each Spill and Each Day of Spill Weather Coastal Response Research Center 42

43 DWH Response Coastal Response Research Center 43

44 Oil was in patches, not one continuous slick Oil plumes were on surface and at depth Coastal Response Research Center 44

45 Response: Sorbents Coastal Response Research Center 45

46 Oily Waste Collected Landfills and Burned Coastal Response Research Center 46

47 Booms and Skimmers Capture and Concentrate Oil, Deflect Oil from Critical Area Coastal Response Research Center 47

48 Coastal Response Research Center 48

49 Coastal Response Research Center 49

50 Coastal Response Research Center 50

51 Coastal Response Research Center 51

52 Use of Dispersants & Other Alternate Response Technologies Pre-authorization Plans Regional or local contingency plans No Pre-authorization Plans FOSC gains concurrence from EPA rep on RRT Coastal Response Research Center 52

53 Response: In Situ Burning Coastal Response Research Center 53

54 Coastal Response Research Center 54

55 Response: Chemical Dispersants Surface Application Coastal Response Research Center 55

56 Response: Dispersants Sub-Surface Application Coastal Response Research Center 56

57 Coastal Response Research Center 57

58 Why Use Chemical Dispersants? Wind and Waves Often Too High to Allow Mechanical Removal (Booms & Skimmers) or Burning Kept Oil Out of Nearshore Waters and Marshes Where organisms were breeding and juveniles Marshes hard to clean if repeatedly fouled with oil Coastal Response Research Center 58

59 Dispersant Controversy Exposure/Toxicity of Dispersants to Marine Life, Humans, Seafood Exposure of Marine Organisms Below Surface to Dispersed Oil Proprietary Mixture Where Did Oil Go? Coastal Response Research Center 59

60 Coastal Response Research Center 60

61 Nature s Response Function of Environmental Conditions Temperature (H 2 O, Air) Wind Oil Type Currents, Tides Coastal Response Research Center 61

62 Coastal Response Research Center 62

63 Response: Biodegradation Every Year, ~ 20 Million Gallons of Oil Enter GOM from Natural Seeps Naturally Occurring Bacteria Live in GOM Use Oil as Food Source DWH Oil is More Food Takes <10 days to Degrade Oil Mass by Half 10 g 5 g Coastal Response Research Center 63

64 Gulf of Mexico Oil Degrading Microbes T. Hazen, LBL, 2010 Coastal Response Research Center 64

65 Coastal Response Research Center 65

66 Biological Impacts of Spill Coastal Response Research Center 66

67 Key Biota in DWH Spill Coral Oysters Shrimp Crabs Blue Fin Tuna Intertidal/Marsh Vegetation (Marsh as Nursery Grounds) Biota That Cannot Swim Away Are Most Impacted Coastal Response Research Center 67

68 Biological Impacts of Spill What Are the Biological Impacts of this Spill? GOM: 100 s of spills per year Lethal (acute) vs. Sublethal (chronic) effects When Has Complete Recovery Occurred (if ever)? Is Recovery to Organisms and Community Before Spill? How Clean is Clean Enough? All Compared to Natural Variation Coastal Response Research Center 68

69 Impact of Deepwater Horizon on Gulf of Mexico Short Term, Acute Toxicity (Immediately Lethal) = Lower Than Expected (>4,000 birds DWH 200M gal vs. >100,000 birds in Exxon Valdez 11M gal) Long Term, Chronic Toxicity =???? Only Time Will Tell Months to years of data needed Coastal Response Research Center 69

70 Key Issues During DWH Coastal Response Research Center 70

71 Failure = Engineering Breakthroughs h Concept Recognized in Engineering (e.g., H. Petroski, 1982 ) Coastal Response Research Center 71

72 Initial Mistakes = Lack of Trust Oil Leak Not Confirmed for Few Days Turbidity and debris in water Estimates of Leak Poor Multiple leaks along pipe and at well head No Blowout Spill Contingency Plan for High Flow Never required as part of drilling permit Coastal Response Research Center 72

73 Facing the Reality: MILLION GALLON SPILL WILL CAUSE DAMAGE-- (Exxon Valdez Spill = 11 Million gallons) --RESPONSE MINIMIZES DAMAGE, BUT THERE WILL BE SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE!!! Public Perception DWH: Poor response Responders Perception DWH: Successful Coastal Response Research Center 73

74 The Imbroglio Explosion of Public s Science and Limited Engineering i g Scientific Complexity and Scientific Engineering Politics: Local, State, Federal, Interagency Coastal Response Research Center Research + Response Efforts + NRDA Data Literacy 24/7 Information Can we believe it? 74

75 imbroglio \im-brohl-yoh\, noun: 1. A complicated and embarrassing state of things. 2. A confused or complicated disagreement or misunderstanding. 3. An intricate, complicated plot, as of a drama or work of fiction. 4. A confused mass; a tangle. Coastal Response Research Center 75

76 The Imbroglio Explosion of Public s Science and Limited Engineering i g Scientific Complexity and Scientific Engineering Politics: Local, State, Federal, Interagency Coastal Response Research Center Research + Response Efforts + NRDA Data Literacy 24/7 Information Can we believe it? 76

77 Scientific / Engineering g Complexity Oil spill scientists/engineers Very small & underfunded community Oceanographers & ocean engineers Limited it knowledge of oil/response issues Safety and response protocols at spill site Misunderstandings resulted between two groups Coastal Response Research Center 77

78 Science/Engineering g Literacy Complex response & science concepts to convey Sometimes answers unknown Literacy issue for public, government officials and reporters Responders and scientists are not always best teachers River of oil in subsurface Coastal Response Research Center 78

79 24/7 Information (Is it True?) Experts everywhere in the spotlight Some data reported before QA/QC What gets reported? Seconds of interview used (from minutes of taping) Is what reported true? Credentials of bloggers Misunderstanding by reporters Coastal Response Research Center 79

80 A Model Misunderstood Coastal Response Research Center 80

81 Politics Survey of GOM coastal residents Public does not trust government or industry Public trusts scientists (especially those who report data that supports THEIR world view) Hurricanes Katrina/Rita aftermath Skepticism and discontent towards gov t Politicians exploit the DWH situation Louisiana berms Coastal Response Research Center 81

82 Politics Congressional intervention: U.S. can never have another major oil spill! Legislation cannot prevent human error Interagency turf wars Science roles and decision making lines not clear Dispersants example Agencies are headed by political appointees Less experience with emergency environmental response Coastal Response Research Center 82

83 Will DWH Really Change Anything? Continuing Deepwater Drilling in GOM, Brazil, Africa Other U.S. Coastal Waters(?) Coastal Response Research Center 83

84 Will DWH Really Change Anything? Federal legislation = BOEM/BSEE created from MMS Improved command structure More drills and exercises Industry liability increased Better on site capping and blowout prevention equipment developed $1+ Billion Industry Effort Coastal Response Research Center 84

85 Will DWH Really Change Anything? Arctic Drilling Harsh environment (cold and very dark) Oil in & under ice Minimal response equipment or personnel Fragile/Unknown natural resources/ecosystem Indigenous subsistence and cultural practices Desire to drill vs. environmental preservation R&D underway, but contentious Industry, NGOs, Academia Coastal Response Research Center 85

86 Cuban Oil Drilling Coastal Response Research Center 86

87 Cuban Drilling Started 18 Miles Off Havana Arrived in January Drilling started this month Spanish Company Repsol U.S. Coast Guard Has Contingency Plans for Spill Oil spill response companies Will Be Activated in case of spill Coastal Response Research Center 87

88 Will DWH Really Change Anything? R&D Flash in the Pan effect for Exxon Valdez R&D Funding vs. Time $ $ e kt t o Coastal Response Research Center 88

89 Resilient Spill Response Going Forward: Recommendations Coastal Response Research Center 89

90 Recommendations: Response Broader Involvement of Scientists/Engineers in Spill Contingency Planning Especially in areas with high spill potential (e.g., Arctic, GOM) Develop Strategies for Co-Operation of Response and Science Activities at Spill Sites Update Response/Recovery Based on DWH Experience Revise guidance documents/protocols Response affects recovery Coastal Response Research Center 90

91 Recommendations: Risk Communication Strengthen risk communication skills of: Journalists/Correspondents (AAAS Awards) Scientists/Engineers Gov t Officials Explain tradeoffs of response Can t do it all; minimize risks to most vulnerable; human health and safety Directly admit when answer is unknown Avoid pre-releasing releasing data Common Operating Picture Tools DWH = ERMA /Geoplatform Coastal Response Research Center 91

92 Recommendations: Education Educate public, especially in spill- vulnerable regions, about response Response management, scale and tradeoffs during disasters Convey concept that We don t know yet disaster Educate next generation of scientists & engineers in spill response and restoration Coastal Response Research Center 92

93 Recommendations: Politics Minimize potential for political interference during spill response Can this be done? Overcome misconceptions/unrealistic perceptions When the next big spill occurs.. : It already has We must be ready for the next spill.. : Unlikely to be DWH repeat They should have done that.. : Victim, perpetrator, rescuer paradigm not helpful during spill Coastal Response Research Center 93

94 Recommendations: R&D Numerous R&D plans in wake of DWH Human dimensions focus should not be overlooked (e.g., social & health impacts) Coordination among researchers and consortia essential Industry, gov t, NGOs, academia National/International Model for multi- stakeholder design teams Including controlled field release Translate R&D into practice Coastal Response Research Center 94

95 Coastal Response Research Center 95