COPING WITH BIOSAFETY IN EXTREME FIELD CONDITIONS?

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Arline Kennedy
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1 COPING WITH BIOSAFETY IN EXTREME FIELD CONDITIONS? Herwig Leirs Department of Biology, Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium Danish Pest Infestation Laboratory, Aarhus Universitet, Denmark 1

2 Background no biosafety specialist, activities unlike usual lab-stuff Biosafety concerns during field work containment and environmental protection operator protection decontamination and waste disposal transport of material Logistic and other problems Conclusions 2

Reproductive ecology Small mammals as models in nature

3 ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH Population biology Taxonomy Habitat use Dispersion and dispersal Population dynamics Demography Reproductive ecology Small mammals as models in nature conservation Rodents as pests in agriculture Small mammals as carriers of infections 3

4 Ecology of rodent-borne zoonoses Puumala hantavirus risk class 3 Ebola/Marburg virus risk class 4 African arenaviruses, incl. Lassa c.s. risk class 2-4 Plague risk class 3 Leptospirosis risk class 2 Borrelia burgdorferi risk class 2 Buruli ulcer risk class 3... Questions reservoir and vector species? prevalence? transmission mechanisms? seasonal patterns? ecological correlates?... 4

5 5

6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAINMENT limited concern: pathogen is already present in environment research does not increase pathogen presence field work: no concern laboratory manipulations work: field laboratory? facilities questionable? wild animals: often in situ no transport needed escaping animals no added risk 6

7 Buruli Ulcer, Benin (L.Durnez) 7

8 Buruli Ulcer, Benin (L.Durnez) 8

9 9

10 Buruli Ulcer, Benin (photo L.Durnez) 10

11 Puumala virus, Belgium (K.Tersago) 11

12 Lassa fever, Guinée (E.Calvet) 12

13 OPERATOR PROTECTION serious concern general assessment - no routine protocols - often pathogen poorly known, incl. reservoir/transmission - often no vaccination available - often no best treatment known - limited or no medical care nearby + awareness, work very focused on target pathogen + (sometimes) physicians on the team + mainly own safety, less staff to be responsible for 13

14 specific assessment field work limited risk? how frequent do infections occur? what is the transmission mechanism? what is the risk behaviour? what activities will be carried out? what protection is possible? vaccination/profylaxis? personal attire barriers between animals and operator no independent scrutiny by biosafety officer... 14

15 Plague, Kazakhstan 15

16 does infection occur in the field? Lassa fever, Guinée (E.Calvet) 16

17 no precautions when surveying forest no precautions when placing traps gloves when picking up traps traps with animals in plastic bags Ebola HF R.D. Congo 17

18 dedicated overall, plastic trousers rubber boots heavy duty outer gloves dust mask Marburg HF R.D. Congo 18

19 in villages, moderate protection gear risk assessment socio-cultural acceptability Plague, RD Congo (A.Laudisoit) Lassa fever, Guinea (E.Calvet) 19

20 Ebola HF, R.D.Congo 20

21 sample manipulations: more similar to conventional conditions risk assessment likelihood of infection transmission routes severity of disease possibility for vaccination/treatment general screening, R.D.Congo (A.Laudisoit) 21

22 Plague and anthrax, Kazakhstan (V.Ageyev) Plague, Madagascar (L.Rahalison) 22

23 Marburg HF, R.D.Congo Lassa fever, Guinée (E.Calvet) 23

24 Decontamination and waste disposal decontamination with (depending on situation): 70% ethanol sodiumhypochlorite Virkon Dettol... single use materials (?) no autoclave daily burning in pit (ignited with petrol) 24

25 Transport of materials no cold chain for fresh or frozen materials: sometimes research problem preservation liquids, e.g. ethanol 95% RNA-Later tubes in ziplock bags dry blood samples cultures? packed biohazard bags adsorbents added in hard container transport rules adhered to? 25

26 LOGISTIC AND OTHER PROBLEMS general facilities transport consumables difficult environments climate health social tension interest from public security no electricty, no running water, no worries... 26

27 water availability? generator possible, fuel available? 27

28 Ebola HF, R.D.Congo 28

29 finding vehicles bad roads long transport time 29

30 30

31 low temperatures Puumala virus, Belgium (K.Tersago) 31

32 high temperatures Plague, Kazakhstan 32

33 Health: we know what we are looking for we don t know what we might be exposed to food and water quality 33

34 Uncomfortable living conditions Plague and anthrax, Kazakhstan (V.Ageyev) 34

35 Social stress Marburg HF, R.D.Congo 35

36 Interest from local public... 36

37 ...or global public Ebola HF, R.D.Congo 37

38 Other dangers than biological risks... Marburg HF, R.D.Congo 38

39 Civil unrest, war (AP Photo/Jerome Delay) 39

40 CONCLUSIONS Is it responsible to work under such conditions? This is where the infection is... Proper ad hoc assessment of risks unusual activities unusual conditions Experienced staff (in biosafety AND field work) Strong efforts on logistics 40

Laboratory Research Ethics, Conduct and Safety

Laboratory Research Ethics, Conduct and Safety Biohazards and Biosafety Guidelines & Standards Human Pathogens Public Health Agency of Canada Canadian Food Inspection Agency Animal Pathogens Definition: