Waterworks damage. Yasuko Kuwata Dept. of Civil Eng., Kobe University

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1 Waterworks damage Yasuko Kuwata Dept. of Civil Eng., Kobe University

2 Ground motion and water outage 1day 1week 2week 3week Seismic intensity(jma)

3 Restoration process (Miyagi Pref.) Recovery 未復旧率 rate (%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% After shocks 大槌町南三陸町大船渡市陸前高田市仙台市石巻市塩竈市多賀城市岩沼市栗原市東松島市亘理町山元町松島町美里町気仙沼市 0% 3/11 3/18 3/25 4/1 4/8 4/15 4/22 4/29

4 Restoration process (except Miyagi Pref.) Recovery 未復旧率 rate (%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% After shocks 福島市いわき市南相馬市鏡石町矢吹町北茨城市鹿嶋市潮来市神栖市行方市旭市香取市釜石市岩泉町千葉市神崎町栄村 0% 3/11 3/18 3/25 4/1 4/8 4/15 4/22 4/29

5 Restoration process in the Kobe EQ 神戸市 東部センター 中部センター 西部センター 垂水センター 北センター 尼崎市 西宮市 芦屋市 伊丹市 宝塚市 川西市 明石市 三木市 洲本市 淡路町 北淡町 東浦町 津名町 五色町 一宮町 緑町 Water outage 断水率 (%) rate (%) 1 月 17 日 1 月 24 日 1 月 31 日 2 月 7 日 2 月 14 日 2 月 21 日 2 月 28 日 3 月 7 日 3 月 14 日 3 月 21 日 3 月 28 日 4 月 4 日 4 月 11 日 0

6 Damage pattern and regional characteristic Tohoku area (Miyagi Pref.) Destructive tsunami damage at coastal area Large diameter pipe damage Local damage due to liquefaction Minor damage to small diameter pipeline 2 週間後 Miyagi Kanto area (Chiba/Ibaraki Pref.) Moderate seismic intensity Wide-area liquefaction damage Ibaragi Chiba

7 Damage to water supply facility Miyagi pref. Destructive tsunami damage at coastal area Large diameter pipe damage Local damage due to liquefaction Minor damage to small diameter pipeline

8 Large diameter pipe damage/ Shiraishi Open channel River under-passing transmission pipeline SPφ2400 After recovery Lateral sliding 70 cm

9 Large diameter pipe damage/ Shiraishi After recovery (March 28, Google Earth) River under-passing transmission pipeline SPφ2400 After recovery

10 Large diameter pipe damage/ Shiraishi Concrete foundation Concrete foundation Joint at SPφ1200, damaged by April 7, aftershock

11 Large diameter pipe damage/ Sendai Water leak at welded part of steel pipe, Sendai: SPφ700 damaged by April 7, aftershock

12 Large diameter pipe damage/ Sendai Underpassing channel Open channel Water leak at welded part of steel pipe, Sendai: SPφ700 damaged by April 7, aftershock

13 Large diameter pipe damage/ Osaki Embankment Original ground Water leak from joints at bending part DIPφ500, damaged by April 7 aftershock

14 Pipe bridge damage/ Misato Titling pier Eai river right side Eai river left side Water leak from joint Slide of embankment at water pipe bridge (φ500) and water leak from flexible joint, after April 4 aftershock

15 Pipe damage, Natori Concrete foundation Before April 7 DIP φ300, damaged by April 7 aftershock Crack on pipe body

16 Pipeline damage due to ground deformation Midorigaoka, Sendai Oritate, Sendai Furukawa, Osaki Land deformation at hill-side land development Liquefaction Sakuragaoka, Sendai Sakuragaoka, Sendai Furukawa, Osaki

17 Temporal repair of water pipe bridge. How much performance is required in temporary repair? Speed? Or performance? Consideration for strong aftershocks Water pipe bridge in Osaki, Miyagi Pref.

18 Water pipe bridge/ adjusted pipe Bearing of water pipe bridge Osaki Minami sanriku Sendai Kesennuma

19 Why does it take long restoration in Miyagi? Minor damage/ Purification plant and distribution plant Regional water transmission supply Sennan-Senen regional water supply / 17 cities and towns Osaki regional water supply Less redundancy of large-diameter transmission pipe No or few water resources in each city //ISSUE// Seismic evaluation of joint and welded part of steel pipe Securing redundancy of main transmission pipeline Securing multi-water resources (Sennan-Senen regional water supply )

20 Damage to water supply facility Ibaraki/ Chiba prefs. Moderate seismic ground motion Wide-area liquefaction damage to facility and pipeline

21 Kasum igaura Kita ura Pacific sea Itako, Ibaraki Wanigawa river Kashima, Ibaraki Kashima port Sawara(Katori), Chiba Tonegawa river Hitachitonegawa river Kamisu, Ibaraki Omigawa (Katori), Chiba

22 Liquefied area around Kamisu/ Kashima (March 12, Google Earth)

23 Wanigawa purification plant (March 12, Google Earth)

24 Damage at Wanigawa purification plant Liquefaction surrounding pump facility

25 Damage at Wanigawa purification plant common duct Liquefaction damage Common duct 50 cm lift up Surround ground 50 cm subsidence

26 Pipe connection to facility Damage to flexible joint, DIPφ600, by subsidence due to liquefaction at the connection to the facility

27 Subsicence/ No subsidence Intake pipe Foundation of Electric power Surrounding facility

28 Distribution reservoir Crack and subsidence due to liquefaction Later leak at joint of DIP(K)φ300 Water leak from bellow s type flexible joint

29 Pipeline damage due to wide-area liquefaction/ Itako, Ibaraki Hinode, Itako Itako Sta., Itako Titled electric poles Hinode, Itako Water leak of VP(TS) Hinode, Itako Lifted up of water pipe (VPφ100) and waster water pipe (VUφ250) Settlement of tank foundation

30 Pipeline damage due to wide-area liquefaction/ Kamisu, Ibaraki Horiwari, Kamisu Horiwari, Kamisu Scoring around embankment Horiwari, Kamisu Horiwari, Kamisu Lifted water drain Temporal transmission pipeline SGPφ400

31 Pipeline damage due to wide-area liquefaction/ Katori, Chiba Sawara, Katori Sawara, Katori River side Sawara, Katori River side Sawara, Katori Above ground temporary pipeline Above ground temporary pipeline

32 Lift up of water storage tank by liquefaction Water storage tank 100m 3, Urayasu, Chiba Storage tank was constructed for disaster

33 Other damage in Ibaraki/ Chiba areas Water storage 100m 3 / Urayasu Firefighting water storage 40m 3 / Asahi Uplifted tanks in liquefied ground Asahi Hitachi Leak of SPφ250 Pipe at sliding bearing of pipe beam bridge hit at walls

34 Other pipeline damage Landslide at baseball stadium Choushi Hitachinaka Pipeline damage,dipφ150, due to landslide Pipeline damage, DIP(A)φ350, due to raised ground surrounding underpass of highway embankment

35 Why does it take long restoration in Ibaraki? Interruption of water transmission because of liquefaction of purification plant and distribution plant Wide-area water transmission supply Rokko wide water supply Less redundancy of large-diameter transmission pipe Difficulty of pipe repair at wide-area liquefaction //ISSUE// Revaluation of liquefaction at coastal area Install of flexible pipe at developed land of residence Rokko wide water supply

36 Future tasks on structural problem Seismic measures of large-diameter pipe Seismic performance of welded part and joint of large-diameter pipe Seismic behavior of underpass, curve, fixed parts of pipeline Seismic performance of water pipe bridge Wide-area liquefaction mechanism and its measures Peak ground motion plus duration of ground motion Evaluation of important facilities against long-period ground motion Intake structure of embankment Subsidence surrounding facilities Uplift measures of common duct and drain Pipe connecting to facilitate Flexible pipe install at liquefaction area Uplift measures of water tanks High-level aftershock measures Damaged earth structures, temporal repaired structures

37 Future tasks on functional problem Black out measures A few days black-out causes delay of water supply (damage identification, filling water in reservoir and large-diameter pipeline. Redundancy of transmission and delivery main pipeline Wide-area water transmission system with less redundancy Two systems (regional and local) Multi water resources No enhancement of small and old systems Water storing by shut-off valves Saving water by automatically or manually Emergency connection pipelines between cities Not efficient in this event, because wide-area disaster

38 Future tasks on recovery in wide earthquake disaster Suffered water department staffs Half of staffs was Isolated in the sea for a night Early response of emergency water delivery Lessons from recent earthquakes. Dispatched from JWWA, other cities. Malfunction of information management by chief government in Tohoku, Kanto district Recovered by local workers, not dispatched workers Securing supply-chain of materials Pipe, equipment, fuel, vehicle, roadway Decision making of recovery strategy in liquefaction zone Repair/ Install with above pipeline Lack of engineers in local government Reducing engineers in last decade.

39 Thank you for your attention!!!