The Corporation of Delta COUNCIL REPORT. Regular Meeting. The Public Safety and Economic Imperative for the George Massey Tunnel Replacement Project

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1 The Corporation of Delta COUNCIL REPORT Regular Meeting 8.02 To: From: Mayor and Council Office of the Chief Administrative Officer Date: July 5, 2017 The Public Safety and Economic Imperative for the George Massey Tunnel Replacement Project RECOMMENDATIONS: A. THAT a copy of this report be sent to: The Honourable Christy Clark, Premier of British Columbia; John Horgan, Premier-designate; Dr. Andrew Weaver, leader of the BC Green Party; All Members of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia; with a letter urging the BC Government to proceed, without delay, on the construction of the George Massey Tunnel Replacement Project in view of the potentia"liy devastating public safety and economic implications of a tunnel failure for the entire region. B. THAT a copy of this report be sent to: The Honourable Carla Qualtrough, Minister of Sport and Persons with Disabilities and Member of Parliament for Delta; All Board Members of Metro Vancouver; The Delta, Richmond, South Surrey and White Rock, and BC Chambers of Commerce; The Vancouver and Surrey Boards of Trade; and The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. C. THAT, due to the extremely serious nature of the safety concerns associated with delaying the replacement of the tunnel with a bridge this report and the information contained within it be shared through the Corporation of Delta's social media channels and media advertisements.

2 Page 2 of 11 PURPOSE: The purpose of this report is to ensure that the general public and decision makers associated. with the George Massey Tunnel Replacement Project are acutely aware of the serious safety concerns associated with any potential delay in replacing the George Massey Tunnel with a bridge. The potential for a catastrophic failure of the tunnel is real, supported by many professional engineering reports, and any failure of the structure could have potentially devastating public safety and economic impacts for the entire region. The George Massey Tunnel is a key component of the Provincial transportation network and vital to the Province's economy. As a Provincial asset, the tunnel replacement needs to be viewed from not only a regional but also a provincial perspective. It is imperative that the Province moves forward with the new bridge as soon as possible without delaying any decisions. BACKGROUND: The need to replace the existing tunnel with a new 10 lane bridge along the existing tunnel corridor has been studied in exhaustive detail throughout the three year environmental assessment process. This process included 145 technical and scientific reports and more than 14,000 pages of information pertaining to the project. All of this information is available to the public at The Provincial environmental assessment process included three rounds of public engagement with more than 3,000 participants; more than 35 meetings with Metro Vancouver and TransLink; and more than 110 meetings each with Richmond and Delta. Should the Provincial government re-open the debate and postpone, or even cancel, the George Massey Tunnel Replacement Project, there will be serious implications for the entire Metro Vancouver region. DISCUSSION: Although there are many compelling arguments for the need to replace the aging George Massey Tunnel none are more critical than the public safety concerns associated with the existing crossing. The George Massey Tunnel is a Public Safety concern: Numerous studies undertaken over the last several decades have confirmed that the tunnel is not physically capable of withstanding a moderate to severe earthquake. The 629-metre long tunnel was constructed in the 1950s and opened in 1959, when seismic considerations were in their infancy, and no soil strengthening was undertaken prior to placement of the tunnel's six concrete segments. According to the 2004 study "Value Engineering Study George Massey Tunnel Seismic Safety Retrofit and Rehabilitation Project" by CH2MHILL (Attachment 'A'), the tunnel is "a brittle structure in highly unstable/liquefiable soils". Additionally, the study found that "Analysis has shown that the tunnel structure is fairly certain to be damaged in the design seismic event with or without ground improvements". In 2007 EVM Project Services Ltd. found in their study, "Value Engineering Study George Massey Tunnel Seismic Densification" (Attachment 'B') that "The potential for liquefaction of the upper sand deposits is high in an earthquake. This would lead to major movements

3 Page 3 of 11 of the foundation soils and distortions of the tunnel tube. The expected earthquake scenario is as follows: 1. Earthquake starts 2. Within the first 10 seconds the soils under the tunnel will liquefy 3. Be Hydro power will be cut-off almost immediately, 4. The tunnel will displace upwards and downstream during the quake 5. Some cracking of the tunnel walls will occur during the quake and water will enter the tunnel through the cracks 6. After the quake there will be post liquefaction settlement for 30 to 120 minutes 7. The settlements will increase the cracking and water ingress into the tunnel 8. The emergency pump will start up and should maintain the water level in the tunnel low enough for people to exit the tunnel within one hour. " "There is a possibility of loss of life if the tunnel experiences catastrophic displacements in a seismic event." (Ker, Priestman & Associates Ltd. "George Massey Tunnel No Response to Earthquakes", 1989) (Attachment 'C')., i I r Seismic upgrades to the internal structure of the tunnel were completed in According to the 2007 EVM Project Services Ltd. report, this work was intended to "reduce the extent and width of concrete cracks so water ingress rates are acceptably low to permit the public to escape;" However, the external structure of the tunnel has not been upgraded, nor is it technically feasible to upgrade it to current seismic standards. This means that, although people might be able to escape the tunnel during an earthquake, if the tunnel did not fail completely, it would likely be rendered unusable afterwards. "Time is of the essence both with regard to exposure to a seismic event and escalating costs." (Ker, Priestman & Associates Ltd., 1989) The tunnel currently meets the design standards to withstand a 1-in -275 year earthquake, compared to the bridge, which is designed to withstand a 1-in-2475 year earthquake. The risk is imminent: Every year, the Geological Survey of Canada records more than 2,500 earthquakes in western Canada and off the BC coast. More than 100 of these in the last 70 years have been large enough to cause damage had they been closer to land, and there is little doubt that British Columbia is overdue for a major earthquake. Metro Vancouver is in the zone of greatest risk, with at least a 30% chance of a major earthquake in the next 50 years. (Natural Resources Canada) The 6.1 magnitude earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand that occurred in 2011 demonstrated that even a moderate earthquake can result in damage far out-of-proportion to its magnitude when it occurs in close proximity to an urban centre. The damage to the city was considerable, with the destruction of older, unreinforced buildings that were built prior to modern seismic engineering standards. In addition, earthquake-induced liquefaction and flooding exacerbated impacts and hampered disaster response.

4 Page 4 of 11 Closer to home, the 2001 Nisqually earthquake that occurred northeast of Olympia, Washington with a magnitude of 6.8 caused damage despite originating deep under the earth. According to the US Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Nisquallyearthquake caused more than $2 billion in damages (2001 dollars). The Tunnel poses an unacceptable risk for the travelling public and First Responders: Not only is there a higher than average accident rate at the George Massey Tunnel, vehicular accidents in tunnels also tend to be more severe and result ir more injuries and. deaths than accidents on open roads. A review of ICBC crashes from 2009 to 2013 found an average of more than 300 collisions annually at the George Massey Tunnel and adjacent interchange. Of these, approximately 40% resulted in casualties (injury or death). Based on. data from the Port Mann Bridge a bridge would reduce collision rates by more than 35%. Accidents in and approaching the tunnel exacerbate an already heavily congested traffic situation. This traffic and the lack of a shoulder lane for emergency vehicles make it difficult for first responders to reach and clear accidents. This situation often creates an unacceptable delay in emergency response times and the provision of critical care. Tunnel congestion may require First Responders to access accidents in the tunnel on foot while carrying life saving equipment or delaying entry until the tunnel has been cleared. Accidents involving smoke or fire create additional safety hazards which necessitate a below-grade response similar to a confined space response. These situations would not happen with a bridge. The George Massey Tunnel has approximately ten years left before major components, such as lighting, ventilation and pumping systems need to be replaced. In addition, the design of the tunnel's sprinkler system leaves it susceptible to damage by large trucks. Between June 23, 2017 and July 1, 2017 the tunnel's sprinkler system was damaged twice. In the first incident, a 30 foot long section was damaged, and in the second incident the entire system was rendered inoperable and remains inoperable as of the writing of this report (July 5,2017) leaving the tunnel with no sprinkler or stand pipe fire fighting capabilities. Any time the fire suppression system in the tunnel is out of service, there is an increased and unacceptable risk to both the public and first responders (Police, Fire, and Ambulance). The Highway 99 corridor, including the George Massey Tunnel, is an important emergency response route. In 2016, there was an average of 24.8 ambulance trips through the tunnel each day, with 6.3 of those trips being code 3 (lights and siren) and during that year Delta Fire and Emergency Services was dispatched to 37 events in the tunnel. Losing this vital link across the Fraser River would severely impact emergency response times and critical ambulance transport to Metro Vancouver Regional Hospitals. Additional information on the safety benefit~ of a new bridge is provided in Attachment '0'. Impacts of a tunnel failure for the Metro Vancouver Region: In addition to the loss of life for those caught inside the tunnel, there would be an immediate loss of connectivity between Delta and Richmond which would have implications for transportation across the entire Metro Vancouver region. A seismic event that has the capacity to seriously damage the tunnel will almost certainly impact the Pattullo Bridge which also has

5 Page 5 of 11 Public Safety & Economic Imperative for the GMTRP July 5, 2017 seismic deficiencies. The potential concurrent loss of two Fraser River crossings would have devastating long-term economic impacts across the region with disruption to virtually all aspects of the economy. With the largest container terminal in Canada located in Delta, the tunnel crossing is a critical component of a transportation network that supports the local, regional and provincial economies, as well as facilitating trade through the Asia-Pacific Gateway. The Province has already estimated that the annual cost of congestion at the tunnel was $66 million in 2008 and will rise to over $100 million by The loss of the tunnel by itself or possibly in combination with another river crossing would be crippling to the regional and provincial economy. During peak hour traffic, commercial trucks make up 12% of the traffic moving through the tunnel - more than three times higher than other bridges in the region. This speaks volumes to the economic significance of this crossing. For context, the direct cost of the 1-5 Skagit River Bridge collapse in May 2013 has been estimated by the Washington State Department of Transportation at $320,000 per day. This figure would be much higher for the tunnel given the larger number of vehicles using the crossing, the lack of viable detour routes, the long period of time required to construct a replacement, and the vital economic role of Highway 99 for the region. In total, the four Fraser River crossings - the Port Mann Bridge, Pattullo Bridge, Alex Fraser Bridge, and George Massey Tunnel - carry approximately 400,000 trips per day (see Attachment 'E'). The loss of the tunnel would force approximately 80,000 trips per day to use another crossing, likely the Alex Fraser Bridge. Since there is no spare capacity on the Alex Fraser Bridge, losing the tunnel for any length of time would create traffic paralysis south of the Fraser River dramatically impacting public safety, economic potential, and quality of life for residents and businesses in South Delta, North Delta, Surrey, and beyond. The loss of the tunnel would mean that a typical 16 kilometre trip from Ladner to Richmond Centre would increase to 36 kilometres using the Alex Fraser Bridge or 77 kilometres via the Port Mann Bridge. This grid lock would not only impact the travelling public but businesses would be severely affected by the inability of employees to get to work in a timely manner, possibly leading to the loss of existing employees and the inability to attract new employees. A replacement crossing would take at least 5 years to construct "and the cost premium associated with accelerated delivery of such a structure would be very high". (EVM Project Services Ltd., 2007) Severing the Highway 99 corridor for 5 years or more would only exacerbate the impact on the economy, public safety, particularly related to response times for first responders and quality of life in the region. The tunnel is a major route for public transit: The tunnel carries more transit passengers than any other major non-rapid transit crossing of the Fraser River. During the morning rush hour, approximately 60 per cent of trips to downtown Vancouver by residents of South Delta and South Surrey are made by transit. On average one bus goes through the George Massey Tunnel every 3 minutes during rush hour and transit carries more than 10,000 riders daily through the tunnel. Peak hour transit volume is expected to almost double through to 2045 (see Figure 1).

6 Page 6 of 11 Public Safety & Economic Imperative for the GMTRP July 5,2017 Figure 1. Current and Projected Transit Volumes Through the Tunnel TRANSIT VOLUMES, MORNING RUSH HOURS NUMBER OF BUSES TRAVEL TIMES [MINUTBI" 2014 CURRENT CONDITIONS b5',! 'l bl',! 's\ bl',! \1\ bb',! 's\ b6',! 'S\ WITH NO 'MPROVEMENTS ~',, '0\ Wi',, 'ot bv '! '0\ ~',, 'S\! 5',! '0\ liio!!, '0\ ~p,, '0\ ij!!, '0\ ~u '!,l W'THNEW BRIDGE KING GEORGE BOU~EVARD TO 8P. DG[:PORT RO};D Figure 10: Transil Volumes in rhe Morning Peok The need for the new bridge does not detract from the need to continue to develop and invest in public transit and other alternative forms of transportation. In fact, the Provincial government has made a "Commitment to World Class Transit" in relation to the George Massey Tunnel Replacement Project ( Proposed transit improvements include 50 kilometres of new dedicated transit lanes (dedicated transitihov lanes on bridge), transit stops at key interchanges, a dedicated transit ramp and space for future rapid transit on the bridge. The project will include over $500 million in transit infrastructure. In addition, the new bridge will provide cycle and pedestrian connectivity between Delta and Richmond with the inclusion of a multi-use pathway that will connect to cycling and walking routes on both sides of the Fraser River, providing a continuation of existing cycling networks at the only current crossing with a broken cycling network link. In the absence of a safe route for cyclists, the Province provides a year round shuttle that only operates during the week throughout the winter months. On average, the shuttle transports over 900 people monthly through the tunnel. This system is inefficient and limits the public's use of the cycling network in the area. The need for this connectivity was seen as a strong desire during public consultation undertaken in 2012 and I Much of the criticism about the bridge relates to it being an expansion of car-oriented infrastructure and diversion of funds from public transit and other transportation initiatives that support Metro Vancouver's Regional Growth Strategy. However, with its 1 OO - yea ~ planning horizon, the new bridge cannot be viewed in isolation. The new bridge is needed now to accommodate existing and forecasted traffic growth while providing the necessary infrastructure for this transition to take place.

7 I " Page 7 of 11 A comparative review of project alternatives: Keith Sashaw, President of the Association of Consulting Engineering Companies of BC wrote in his April 13,2016 Vancouver Sun article, titled "Opinion: Massey Tunnel replacement - Learn from the past and look to the future", "Recognizing the need to replace the tunnel, the next consideration is the nature of the replacement. Given the issues surrounding seismic and environmental standards, as well as considering the anticipated usage of the replacement, a bridge is the best answer. Not only would the initial construction costs be lower to build a bridge to the demanding seismic standards of today, but the maintenance and operating costs would be ly lower." A July 2016 multiple accounts evaluation titled "George Massey Tunnel Replacement Project Review of Replacement Options" prepared by WSPand MMM Group used environmental, economic and social impacts to rank the five project alternatives (Attachment 'F'): Scenario 1 - Maintain tunnel The tunnel's electrical and mechanical systems would be replaced and work would be undertaken to improve the tunnel's ability to withstand earthquakes, but the tunnel's traffic capacity would not be changed and modern seismic standards would not be met. Scenario 2 - Replace tunnel with new pridge A new bridge would be constructed within the existing right-of-way, after which the tunnel would be decommissioned. Scenario 3 - Replace the existing tunnel with a new tunnel A new tunnel would be constructed alongside the tunnel, after which the tunnel would be decommissioned. Scenario 4 - Maintain tunnel and build new six-lane crossing along Highway 99 corridor The new crossing could be either a bridge or a tunnel to provide a similar traffic capacity as Scenarios 2 and 3. Scenario 5 - Maintain tunnel and build a new six-lane crossing in a new corridor The new crossing could be a bridge or tunnel located in the Tilbury area of Delta between the tunnel and the Alex Fraser Bridge. The crossing would be accessed via the new Highway 17 on the south side and via a newly constructed connection to the Highway 91 East-West Connector on the north side. The results of the multiple accounts evaluation are summarized in Table 1 and confirm that a. new bridge is the best option.

8 Page 8 of 11 Public Safety & Economic Imperative for the GMTRP. July 5,2017 Table 1 - Multiple Accounts Evaluation of Crossing Options SCENARIO Existing tunnel Achievement of 20% project goals New bridge 90% New tunnel 80% (a) New bridge + existing tunnel (b) New tunnel + existing tunnel 60% Existing tunnel + new bridge on new corridor 40% Risk profile High Medium High Medium-high Medium-high Cost $ millions! 590 3,500 4,300 (a) 3,550 (b) 4,050 5,800 : i I. Assessment Least cost; high risk associated with geotechnical works adjacent to tunnel; very poor achievement of project goals including poor seismic performance. Second lowest cost; risks associated with bridge construction and traffic management; high achievement of project goals; minimal property impacts; minimal environmental impacts. Second highest cost; high risks associated with tunnel construction adjacent to existing tunnel; reasonable achievement of project goals; property impacts; environmental impacts. Medium to high cost and risk; marginal achievement of project goals; property impacts; environmental impact (for tunnel option); poor seismic performance of existing tunnel. Highest cost; high risks associated with tunnel construction and retrofit of existing tunnel; poor achi~vement. of project goals; property impacts including ALR; environmental impacts from tunnel construction; poor seismic perforrtlance of existing tunnel.! Costs include construction, engineering, project management, property, utilities, environmental, escalation, risks, contingencies and financing. 2 Scenario 4(a) is a new six lane bridge adjacent to the tunnel, and Scenario 4(b) is a new six lane immersed tube tunnel adjacent to the tunnel. A more detailed table showing the comparative assessment of project alternatives is provided in Attachment 'G'.

9 Page 9 of 11 Tunnel twinning is not a viable alternative: Many have promoted tunnel twinning as a viable alternative to a bridge. For example, in a letter to the Delta Optimist published on June 23, 2017, Carol Day, City of Richmond Councillor, wrote: "twinning the tunnel could be achieved in two years at half the cost and much of the prep work is done. A twinned tunnel could accommodate rapid transit, which the proposed bridge could not due to the steep climb." These assertions are unfortunate and incorrect. The studies to address these points have been done and are publicly available, including the cost of a second tunnel and the potential for transit. It has been clearly demonstrated that twinning the tunnel is not a viable option, as summarized below: It is not technically feasible to upgrade the existing tunnel to meet current seismic standards, therefore, alternative project options that involve maintaining or upgrading the existing tunnel are not considered viable options. As highlighted in the 2007 EVM Project Services Ltd. report, "the tunnel is submerged which introduces seismic risk unusual for bridge structures". Building a new tunnel to the same seismic standards as the bridge is a much more costly, complex and environmentally damaging process. Various First Nations have indicated concern with respect to impacts to fishing, navigation, water quality and underwater noise related to the potential removal of the tunnel, which would be minor work compared to building a new tunnel. A new tunnel would require an open cut of the river bottom of approximately 150 metres in width, coupled with strengthening of the underlying soils to provide sufficient seismic stability. There would also be risks associated with building in proximity to the existing tunnel. The cost to provide a second tunnel is estimated at $4.3 billion, compared to the new bridge estimated at $3.5 billion. Given the geotechnical and topographic site constraints, it is not considered practical nor financially feasible to undertake a bored tunnel. The bridge project includes over $500 million in transit infrastructure, including dedicated transitjhov lanes, integrated transit stops, and accommodation for future rapid transit, ranking better than twinning for congestion relief, transit capability, trip time reliability, and pedestrian/cyclist accessibility than other options. Implications: Financial Implications - there are no financial implications to Delta. CONCLUSION: There are many reasons why the George Massey Tunnel Replacement Project must proceed: the replacement of the ageing tunnel with a new ten-lane bridge will relieve one of the worst highway bottle-necks in Canada as noted by the Canadian Automobile Association in its (January 2017 report titled "Grinding to a Halt, Evaluating Canada's Worst Bottlenecks. It will also save businesses and commuters millions of dollars lost as a result of

10 Page 10 of 11 congestion, accidents and travel delays; and it will create new opportunities to diversify transportation options, promote healthier, low-carbon travel choices, and promote the transition to a clean growth economy. There is sound logic as to why this project has the overwhelming support of the Metro Vancouver business community. Ultimately, however, the imperative for the new bridge is the risk to public. The chances of a moderate to major earthquake ~mpacting the region in the next 50 years is high, resulting in the failure of the tunnel and probable loss of the Pattullo bridge. This risk cannot be ignored. The immediate impacts would be considerable for emergency response and recovery efforts, and the interim impacts, until a new crossing could be constructed, would be devastating for the entire economy. The new bridge is ready to be constructed - technical studies are complete, public consultation concluded and approvals issued. Preparatory works have already started. The Pattullo bridge replacement project has just started the environmental assessment process, so the timing of the two projects works well - the tunnel replacement should be complete in time to provide the additional capacity needed during the replacement of the Pattullo Bridge. While TransLink has been quoted in the Vancouver Province June 26, 2017 as saying the Pattullo Bridge is its "most urgent major infrastructure risk", there is no doubt that immediately replacing the George Massey Tunnel with a seismically sound bridge will alleviate some of the risk associated with the Pattullo Bridge as that bridge will also need to be replaced. Both crossings are seismically deficient and will likely be ly damaged in an earthquake. Public safety is at risk and the solution is known - moving forward immediately with the new bridge to protect public safety is imperative. It is incumbent upon the Provincial government to act now to address the risks that the region faces, to protect public safety and promote a secure and sustainable economy. "While we cannot forecast which city will be the next. victim of such an earthquake, we can mitigate potential impacts. For the most part, we already know what needs to be. done. Now the challenge is transforming the geoscience knowledge {nto action. Let's not be caught unaware - or unprepared. "The Christchurch Earthquake: Lessons Learned from Disaster, M.W. Hamburger and W.O. Mooney, ,"-. George V. Harvie Chief Administrative Officer

11 Page 11 of 11 ATTACHMENTS: A. CH2MHILL,2004 B. EVM Project Services Limited, 2007 C. Ker, Priestman & Associates Ltd, 1989 D. Safety benefits from an emergency response perspective E. Crossing Volume Maps F. WSP and MMM Group, 2016 G. Comparative Assessment of Project Alternatives This report- has been prepared in consultation with the following listed departments. Concurring Departments Department Name Signature... Corporate Services Sean McGill ~- Engineering Steven Lan.../~-