Action Fiche Democracy and State Building Supporting Yemen s transition

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1 Action Fiche Democracy and State Building Supporting Yemen s transition 1. IDENTIFICATION Title/Number Total cost Aid method / Method of implementation DAC-code Democracy and State Building Supporting Yemen s Transition DCI-MED/2012/ EUR 18 million EU contribution EUR 18 million Project approach centralised and partially decentralised management 15110; 15112; 15130; 15150; 15151; 15152; Sector Public sector policy & administrative management; Decentralisation & support to subnational government; Legal and judicial development; Democratic participation & civil society; Elections; Legislatures & political parties; Statistical capacity building 2. RATIONALE 2.1. Sector context Governance has been identified as a cornerstone of the Government of Yemen s draft Transition Plan, which aims at realisation of the hopes of the society and its expectations to build a modern civil state on the basis of strengthened good governance in all its aspects, including towards strengthening rule of law and improving efficiency and accountability and transparency of the public sector. 1 For the sake of efficiency, two different approaches should be used to make the public sector more accountable and more transparent: a bottomup approach strengthening the demand for accountability, and a top-down approach to ensure that a culture of accountability, transparency and democratic governance takes root at all levels of administration and society. The Yemeni transition process is governed by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative of 2011 and its implementation mechanism. In this context, several areas for reform have been identified. The initiative itself does not cover all these areas, but rather provides a framework within which to start work on building a civil state 2. It needs to be complemented by additional activities. 1 A full final Transition Plan is currently being drawn up; an initial document was drafted in late 2011 (as attached to the Identification Fiche). 2 One of the main objectives of the Yemeni Youth Revolution has been to build a modern civil state, breaking the predominance of the military-dominated patronage system that was in place in past decades. To achieve this goal, the youth movement has been demanding respect for human rights, improved democratic governance, political participation, accountability and transparency. - 1 of 15 -

2 A large burden is being placed on the Ministry of Legal Affairs during the transitional period, as this Government body is in charge of drawing up the revised legislative texts that are to be adopted by Parliament, and taking forward the initiatives launched in the areas of transitional justice and national reconciliation. The GCC initiative proposes various priority areas for reform, including electoral legislation and decentralisation legislation. Although the Ministry of Legal Affairs is ready to take up the challenge of drafting rights-based and democratic legislative texts, it is being hindered by a lack of capacity and experience. This issue therefore needs to be addressed in order to build a true civil and democratic state. The same is true of the House of Representatives and Shoura Council. Reforming the electoral process would help make Yemen s democratic institutions more credible, but only if the institutions themselves similarly strengthen their transparency and accountability. At the same time, existing and new political parties must be democratically developed to foster a culture of democratic awareness within Yemeni society and at various political levels. Under the GCC initiative, a referendum on a revised Constitution is to be held in , followed by Parliamentary and/or Presidential elections (depending on the political system adopted) in The population and political activists currently distrust the performance and impartiality of the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda (SCER). The first step should therefore be to begin reforming and strengthening the capacities of this institution, as a basis for credible democratic reform throughout the country. Over the past decade, there have been numerous attempts to strengthen civil society in Yemen and thus meet the demand for accountability. One of the main results was the emergence of the youth revolution in It is now time to meet this demand for accountability by making Yemen s administration more transparent and re-forging the statecitizen relationship. A process of decentralisation began with district-level local council elections in Although the formal structures have been set up, the local councils have not yet been fiscally or financially decentralised. They, still have insufficient financing and freedom, and thus lack the resources and capacities to respond to local development needs. This in turn adversely affects their credibility and legitimacy vis-à-vis local constituencies. To address these weaknesses, the existing decentralisation strategy is to be revised. This is one of the outcomes of the National Dialogue conference. One of the factors preventing Yemen s administration from functioning in a really transparent way is the absence of reliable vital statistical data. Such data are needed to underpin the planning and delivery of (social) services and to strengthen the rule of law throughout the country. It is therefore crucial that Yemen capitalises on the current momentum for change by building a reliable and credible population register. This register could then be used for a wide range of purposes such as education and health planning, social welfare distribution and electoral administration. It would also improve the performance of the judiciary and increase respect for human rights (e.g. by helping the authorities enforce child-protection legislation 4 ). An initial strategy, drawn up in 2008, already identifies the main gaps and needs in the embryonic civil registry system, and provides a basis for improving the roll-out of the system country-wide. The measures proposed in this Action Fiche are based on this 2008 strategy. They have been drawn up in close consultation with the Yemeni authorities, to ensure that the authorities take full ownership of the final systems developed Lessons learnt The current situation in Yemen is extremely fluid and volatile: political transition is in full swing, with new political forces and established elites trying to build a consensual approach. It is therefore important to maintain a maximum level of flexibility throughout the 3 Initially, the GCC initiative planned this referendum for November 2012 but given that the National Dialogue has not yet started, this will probably be postponed until In particular, specific legislation on safe childhood (setting the minimum age for marriage) and on the rights of juveniles (prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles). - 2 of 15 -

3 formulation and implementation stages of the project. This flexibility will allow us to adjust the project to the evolving transition process and to respond to upcoming new priorities and realities as they are identified by the Yemeni stakeholders. This, in turn, will greatly help the Yemeni authorities to take ownership of this programme and ensure its success. In previous EU projects, the lack of national ownership and delays in providing assistance, have proven the main impediments to successful implementation. This project has therefore been designed in close consultation with the main stakeholders, checking with them at every stage their priorities for support and their absorption capacities. Given the current transition process, the people of Yemen are expecting to see real reforms on the ground. It is essential that the authorities respond rapidly, and we therefore consider it crucial that implementation of the project begins as soon as the Annual Action Programme (AAP) is adopted. In the area of electoral support, the international community's approach so far has been reactive rather than pro-active responding to the electoral commission's ad-hoc demands rather than building lasting capacities. This has not helped to make electoral management more professional and efficient. Consequently, we now propose to take a more pro-active approach and work towards building capacities in the electoral commission independently from any specific electoral event. The aim is to make the institution more transparent and accountable and to ensure that it is politically neutral, thereby increasing the citizens' confidence in the electoral administration. To keep EU assistance as flexible as possible while reflecting the preferences of the current electoral administration, our support will be provided directly to the Yemeni authorities, outside the UNDP multi-donor basket fund set up in 2011 (see section 2.3). Under the heading of 'supporting democratic institutions', it was initially proposed that extra support be given to the House of Representatives, and possibly extended to the Consultative Council (Shoura Council). 5 As EU support for the Parliament (under AAP 2007) was effectively suspended in May 2011, immediately after the project s Inception Phase, it is not possible to make any meaningful evaluation of potential impact and responsiveness in this particular area. Preliminary meetings with the House of Representatives Presidium were rather disappointing: in the current context of transition and instability, the Parliament (like many other public institutions) tends to lack vision and is requesting assistance for nonpolitical expenditure such as new infrastructure 6 and equipment. This falls outside the purpose and priorities of the EU programme on governance and state building. To date, the EU has not been directly involved in the other proposed areas of intervention (i.e. civil registry and decentralisation), and thus has few lessons to draw. As mentioned above, national ownership is deemed crucial. A revised decentralisation strategy is likely to be drawn up following the conclusion of the National Dialogue process, probably in At present, therefore, rather than addressing policy issues we consider it more appropriate to help local authorities increase their capacity for developing participatory democracy. The decentralised approach is also the best way to improve the effectiveness of basic service delivery, particularly since the central government currently lacks sufficient capacity to do so. 5 Under the current political system, most members of the Shoura Council are still appointed by Presidential decree. A minority of them were indirectly elected via local councils which, until now, have been dominated by the General People s Congress (GPC) party the ruling party in President Saleh s time. 6 Work to construct a new building for the Parliament has been going on since at least early A skeleton building has been erected, but has yet to be completed. Parliament maintains that the construction is 100 % Yemeni funded and has not been completed due to lack of financial resources. At the same time, the Presidium did not provide a clear picture of its actual requirements, indicating only that these include all internal work on the building, all the equipment and the internal finishing. Training and capacity building were clearly of less interest to them. 7 According to the GCC initiative, the National Dialogue is to end by summer However, to date (April 2012) the dialogue as such has not started. Given the importance and scope of the issues to be discussed, the timeframe will have to be adjusted. - 3 of 15 -

4 2.3. Complementary actions The main complementary action at EU level is the Sharaka Shabab programme (AAP 2010). This includes a proposal on birth registration considered as a first step towards building a credible civil register. However, this measure is not geared towards providing institutional support for the General Authority for Vital Statistics and Civil Registry (CSA) or addressing the legal framework for registration. Its main objective is to strengthen respect for human rights (e.g. by tackling early marriage and protecting juvenile detainees). It will nevertheless form a major part of the support to be provided under our current action. The 2 nd component of the Sharaka Shabab programme focuses on the inclusive and participatory involvement of youth and women in decision-making and political processes. It thus addresses the demand side of accountability by strengthening the bottom-up demand for transparency. It does so by promoting the consultation of different civil society groups and involving them in (local) governance structures. The Democracy and State-building project complements this approach by helping district-level authorities to carry out effective consultations and to organise the participatory drafting of local development plans. The combined efforts of the two programmes should strengthen the social contract between the Yemeni state and its citizens, helping create a modern civil state based on democracy, transparency and accountability. Throughout the project design phase, extensive consultations took place with the broader international community, enabling us to tentatively map the expected donor support for the areas covered by this project. In particular, the area of electoral assistance will receive substantial funding from various donors, given its importance in the transition process. The majority of this support is likely to be channelled through a Multi-Donor Basket Fund (MDBF), managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and set up in December 2011 for the early Presidential elections (February 2012). An evaluation of phase 1 of this fund leading up to the 2012 elections - will determine which areas the MDBF intends to support, partly depending on UNDP s ability to raise funds for this mechanism. The Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda (SCER) has committed itself to coordinate EU and other support, to avoid any overlap between election-related activities. Potential contributors to the MDBF include UNDP, Germany and Japan. The USA is likely to provide additional assistance to the electoral process through direct arrangements with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Federation for Electoral Support (IFES). 8 The UK has identified electoral support as one of its priority areas for the transition phase and has contributed to the 2012 elections through the MDBF. For further assistance to the electoral process in the next two years, the UK is considering alternative options in addition to the MDBF, and might be interested in working more closely with the EU on the electoral component of the project proposed here. For decentralisation, the World Bank (WB) and UNDP are currently setting up a Trust Fund to support the decentralisation process in the Republic of Yemen. At the time of writing this Action Fiche, no project document is yet available and support remains to be specified. UNDP is still involved in an older decentralisation programme, most of which has now been suspended by the Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA). Discussions with MoLA indicate that the programme is to be re-activated once a revised strategy has been adopted. 9 In addition, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) runs a capacity-building programme for local authorities, strengthening their management and financial capacities as well as their participatory approaches to local development plans. Following a training programme, local councils are licensed to receive (external) core funding to implement their local 8 The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) are both US-based organisations with a proven track record in providing electoral and political support programmes. 9 MoLA has asked the UNDP to help it identify possible options/models for local governance structures, to be presented to the National Dialogue Conference. - 4 of 15 -

5 development plans in a transparent, accountable and participatory manner providing a potential model for future decisions on local governance structures and financial resource allocation. The programme is currently running a pilot exercise in 90 districts, supported by among others the EU, which contributes around EUR 1.7 million. 10 Minor activities directly supporting local authorities (LAs) are being implemented through the Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA-LA) thematic programme. This mainly concentrates on capacity building and establishing partnerships between civil society organisations (CSOs) and LAs for the purposes of participatory development planning. It also supports district health plans and efforts to get young people involved in the local economy. Direct support from the French Government to the Ministry of Local Administration ended in On the question of the civil registry, the SFD has also been supporting the expansion of the CSA s offices in a number of regions ('governorates'). 11 Likewise, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is currently working on a birth registration proposal. The intent is to establish 106 birth registration locations across the country, jointly with the CSA. Activities are to start in the 2 nd quarter of 2012, by embedding one or more management and IT experts who will help assess and build or upgrade the CSA s registration systems. Additionally, Germany has been funding a local NGO, the MADAR Legal Foundation, with the overall goal of helping women obtain identification documents. Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior plans to roll out a national biometric ID card system with United Arab Emirates (UAE) assistance of up to USD 61 million. We have not been able to confirm with the UAE Embassy in Sana a whether this programme has yet been launched or how far it has been implemented. In the absence of Yemeni co-funding there are serious risks that this proposal may not actually be implemented. In addition, the United States has expressed interest in improving the CSA s information systems, and a project is being identified by USAID with support from the Departments of Homeland Security and Narcotics/Law Enforcement departments. The main aim of this support will probably be to introduce a biometrics system to help tackle international crime/drugs trafficking and terrorism. 12 The Ministry of Legal Affairs (MLA) has not received real donor support in the past. With the arrival of the newly-appointed Minister (end 2011) who is a former human rights activist, the role of the Ministry has become more prominent particularly in the debate on transitional justice and national reconciliation. The NDI has given the Ministry some support for arranging focus group discussions with different categories of (community) leaders on the draft proposal. More structural support is to be provided through the Netherlands Embassy, starting in May 2012, to help build the MLA's general capacities. The Dutch support is intended to bridge the gap until EU support comes on stream. It will be designed and implemented in full coordination with the EU Delegation Donor coordination Responsibility for the overall donor coordination process lies with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). However, this Ministry has not yet established a structured donor coordination forum, and it works on an ad hoc basis. The overarching coordination structure remains the monthly Donor Forum, which is donor-led and co-chaired by the World Bank and the United Nations Resident Coordinator. 10 Contract MED/2011/ under AAP 2007 (19-212) provides EUR 1.68 million towards institutional support and training in three governorates (approx. 15 districts). The programme s implementation period is April 2011-September In 2009, four local offices were set up with SFD support. The staff concerned were trained in using IT equipment and in database maintenance. In 2010, another local office was established. In 2011, SFD support was suspended; however, it is to be resumed in 2012 in four different governorates (18 offices). CSA will coordinate the proposed SFD and EU support and ensure compatibility between the IT systems. 12 The US project is still at the identification stage, and this provides an opportunity to coordinate their forthcoming support with the project proposed in this paper, throughout the implementation phase. The US has expressed a keen interest in closer coordination between donors in this area, under the chairmanship of the Ministry of the Interior. - 5 of 15 -

6 For elections, several ad hoc coordination bodies have been set up around specific electoral events, such as the donor-led Elections Working Group chaired by UNDP and the High- Level Donor Coordination on Elections, chaired by the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda. Outside electoral events, there is no specific coordination on electoral issues or support. The General Authority for Vital Statistics and Civil Registry (CSA) used to chair (pre-2011) an intra-government coordination group to discuss issues of mutual concern and to coordinate registration efforts. However, there has been no dedicated donor support for this authority or for registration in general. Consequently, no coordination mechanisms of a more formal nature have yet been set up. Given the increasing interest in supporting the CSA, the project we are proposing will help create a formal structure to coordinate (in particular) the EU, SFD and forthcoming US initiatives. EU development counsellors meet regularly to discuss overall cooperation policies and issues of mutual concern. In February 2012 Germany set up a donor working group to coordinate activities focusing on the transition process (constitutional reform, national dialogue and transitional justice). With the resumption of donor support to the Republic of Yemen as the transition process moves forward, closer donor coordination is likely. 3. DESCRIPTION 3.1. Objectives The results framework as proposed in the Identification Fiche has been adapted to reflect more accurately the findings of the Formulation Phase. The corresponding logical framework has been adjusted accordingly. Overall objective: Enhance state building and democratic development in the context of Yemen s political transition. Project Purpose: Strengthen accountability and transparency in key areas of government administration at central and local levels. Specific objectives: (1) Help make the electoral process more transparent, in line with international standards, and improve the electoral administration's capacity to deliver free and fair elections as provided for in Yemen's legislation. (2) Help strengthen civil registry systems. (3) Support the establishment of a democratic political culture in Yemen by strengthening the country's capacities for drafting legislation and by monitoring political party activities. (4) Support accountable and transparent local governance structures Expected results and main activities The project described in this paper aims, in general, to improve the transparency, efficiency and credibility of core democratic processes and institutions at central and local levels of the Yemeni administration. We consider it crucial that the Yemeni Government be able to manage elections correctly and that reliable vital statistics are available. By promoting outreach and consultation on legislative reform and on registration, the programme supports increased popular interest and participation in political decision-making processes. Component 1: Democratisation: electoral assistance & political party development. Expected Results: 1.1 Improved ability of the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda (SCER) to perform as a competent, independent and transparent electoral management body in the Republic of Yemen. - 6 of 15 -

7 Provide coaching and capacity building at all levels of the SCER ahead of scheduled electoral events, to improve its handling of those events. Undertake a baseline survey of the SCER's institutional performance, and develop indicators for monitoring that performance for the purposes of accountability and institutional reform. 1.2 Increased credibility of the (existing) Voter Registry 13 within the SCER and support for upcoming electoral events. Evaluate the existing system of voter registration and help make the SCER s voter register more credible. 14 Provide strategic planning, capacity building and advisory services (including in the area of field security) for forthcoming electoral events and, if necessary, help the SCER procure equipment. Encourage more women to become involved in scheduled electoral events as electoral staff, voters and candidates. 1.3 Improved transparency and communication capacities within the SCER, to make electoral processes more credible. Improve the quality of media monitoring and of SCER messages by making the SCER Media Department more efficient. Improve the functioning of the SCER's CSO/Political Parties Department, in particular by ensuring the transparent accreditation of domestic monitors. 1.4 Strengthen popular demand for accountability and increase popular participation in electoral events. Small grants scheme for CSOs to support their civic education and domestic monitoring activities. A specific point of attention in calls for proposals will be building networks and/or platforms to increase the impact of messages and make CSO action more credible. This activity will include a prior stakeholder analysis covering CSOs. 1.5 A more democratic political culture, stronger political parties and greater public participation in political processes. 13 Although Yemen s policy documents state that the voter register should be drawn from a reliable civil register, it is highly unlikely that such a civil register will be established in the short term. It will therefore remain necessary to maintain a separate voter register at least for the transition period.. 14 This will be achieved by updating the current register or by developing a new (fully electronic and/or biometric) register, depending on the findings of an evaluation (which will include a data quality review and targeted feasibility studies). Support for the register is provided through a combination of technical assistance and targeted procurement. - 7 of 15 -

8 Strengthen the capacity of the Committee for Political Parties (under the Minister of State for Parliament and Shoura Council Affairs) to monitor the (financial) performance of political parties and to provide citizens with sufficient, transparent and accessible information. Provide training and networking opportunities for political parties to strengthen their democratic awareness, principles and functioning. Component 2: Civil Registry. Expected Results: 2.1 Improved capacity of the General Authority for Vital Statistics and Civil Registry (CSA) to maintain and update a fully-fledged civil registry. 15 Carry out a baseline survey of the CSA's institutional performance; develop indicators for monitoring its performance and draw up options for restructuring. Build the capacity of CSA staff at all levels to improve the registration services. Support the development of a suitable legal framework for civil registration. Strengthen the CSA's capacity for coordination with other Government institutions. 2.2 Improved coverage of the civil registry (% of registered population) throughout the Republic of Yemen. Expand CSA activities country-wide to improve public access to CSA services to the extent allowed by actual control of Yemeni authorities over the country's territory. 2.3 Improved public awareness of the civil registry. Build the CSA's capacity for public outreach and for informing citizens about the benefits of and need for registration. Help civil society organisations (CSOs) to provide civic education about registration. A specific point of attention in calls for proposals will be building networks and/or platforms to increase the impact of messages and make CSO action more credible. Component 3: Accountability & decentralisation. Expected Results: 3.1 Adoption of a new legal framework for local governance and support given for creating effective local governance structures that can implement local development plans in a transparent, accountable and participatory manner. 15 The current civil registry includes records of approx. 10 % of Yemen s population and is largely a manual register. - 8 of 15 -

9 Support the drafting of revised local governance legislation, based on the outcomes of the National Dialogue conference, the (revised) Constitution and international best practices. Support the development of mechanisms to involve more citizens in identifying local development needs and in drawing up development plans within selected local councils. Implement local development plans in selected districts, in a participatory, accountable and transparent manner. 3.2 Greater capacity of the Ministry of Legal Affairs to ensure a rights-based legal framework is adopted, in line with international standards and following popular consultations. Give the staff of the Ministry of Legal Affairs (MLA) opportunities for capacitybuilding and networking in areas such as public consultation and outreach. Undertake a baseline survey of the MLA's institutional performance, assess its organisational effectiveness and draft proposals for improving its organisational structure Risks and assumptions Assumptions Risks The proposed project is ambitious (in particular in the area of procurement and contracting) and therefore places considerable demands on the Delegation's (limited) human resources and its operational and financial management capacities. However, throughout the design phase, possible alternative implementation mechanisms were assessed and found to be even less appropriate or to carry greater risks to the successful implementation of the proposed activities. Delay in implementing the transition process. Continued/increased civic unrest and violence is destabilising the country. * Greater accountability, transparency and citizen s participation remain priorities of the Yemeni authorities. * Overall security situation in the country does not deteriorate. * Local communities share the values and principles promoted by the project. Mitigating Measures The EU Delegation proposes to engage the services of a dedicated procurement agent to facilitate supply contracts and help follow up the financial aspects of this project. In addition, contracts will be grouped where possible to limit tendering/contracting procedures. The risk is currently assessed as moderate, given that the people of Yemen still have a great appetite for further democratic reform and for more participatory structures. The project proposes activities that are not directly linked to the transitional process. Proposed activities have been confirmed with stakeholders during the project's design stage, thus helping build a democratic culture in Yemen s administration and a civic culture among the population. As a last resort, activities might need to be suspended or remote-controlled if international Technical Assistance cannot remain in the country. However, this project will help mitigate the risk of civic unrest by fostering continued dialogue among the players. It aims to improve - 9 of 15 -

10 Delay in deciding on the legal and policy framework for elections. Lack of willingness to engage in registration activities. General perception that registered data are used to control the population. Lack of coordination among relevant agencies leads to duplication of registration efforts. Lack of implementation of revised decentralisation policies. The project's success may be hampered by the fragmentation of civil society actors and political groups further exacerbated by recent political developments Cross-cutting Issues the accountability and transparency of key government agencies, thus responding to commonly-expressed grievances. The project has been designed in good time and is sufficiently flexible to respond to delays by helping the SCER prepare and consolidate contingency plans. In parallel, the EU and the international community will continue a policy dialogue with Yemeni stakeholders on the transition process and on elections. The project may also set up a specific coordination group to coordinate Yemen's policy on elections and the transition. Context-sensitive awareness campaigns on the benefits of a well-developed and established civil registry should address this risk. Involving local authorities and/or civil society could help bring about greater public acceptance of the need for registration. Context-sensitive awareness initiatives can again address this risk and clearly explain the limitations and the legal boundaries of the civil registry, as well as the benefits of registration. The project will enhance or establish an effective mechanism for coordination between the relevant authorities and ensure that there is a legal framework for avoiding duplication of effort. The EU will engage in sustained policy dialogue to monitor and encourage the enforcement of existing/revised decentralisation policies. The project will provide targeted support for setting up an appropriate legal framework for revised local governance measures. Through other initiatives, the EU will actively encourage civil society to foster a continued popular demand for decentralisation. The project does not target a specific political movement or group. It mainly supports public institutions in order to enhance democratic principles and values in Yemeni society. Calls for proposals will be accessible to actors from different political streams, thus mitigating the danger of being misused. The project will not engage in political discussions on sensitive topics, e.g. unity or secession, but will focus on institutional developments essential for strengthening State legitimacy regardless of political decisions on government systems and/or the administrative division of regions/districts. The project addresses cross-cutting issues of interest to the EU, in particular good governance, respect for human rights and gender equality. The project will directly support democratic governance reform and greater respect for human rights. It will contribute greatly to improving child rights by helping authorities to enforce legislation relevant to child protection, on such issues as setting the minimum age for marriage and improving juvenile justice. Environmental issues will be mainstreamed in capacity- building and training activities, while improved governance will also make for better management of the environment and natural resources at local and central levels. The rights of indigenous peoples and HIV/AIDS issues are not concerned directly by this action Stakeholders The project has identified certain institutional stakeholders as the main beneficiaries and partners for the proposed activities. The bodies listed below are regarded as key contributors to current efforts to transform Yemen into a democratic civil state of 15 -

11 The Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda (SCER) is the independent electoral management body of the Republic of Yemen. SCER as an institution has been receiving international support since 1990, yet the public still view it as lacking impartiality and transparency. The current SCER will probably remain in operation throughout the transition phase, and this justifies efforts to strengthen its transparency and credibility. Following the adoption of a revised Constitution, changes could be made to the SCER's composition, structure and internal organisation. Project activities geared towards restructuring the SCER are mainly long-term. They aim to propose restructuring options that could be implemented once a political agreement on the SCER's composition and legal framework has been reached through the National Dialogue. The General Authority for Vital Statistics and Civil Registry (CSA) operates semiindependently under the umbrella of the Ministry of the Interior. Despite the comprehensive strategy adopted in 2008, the CSA has been hampered in efficiently implementing its mandate by an overall lack of capacities and resources, and by the absence of a comprehensive legal framework to support it. The Ministry of Legal Affairs (MLA) is mandated to draft (new) legislative texts and to ensure that those draft laws are compatible with the Constitution and with international conventions. Following the Arab Spring, the MLA intends to ensure the establishment of a rights-based legal framework, but this will require initial efforts to strengthen the institution and to build its capacity. Contrary to past practice, the MLA also intends to engage in transparent consultation with the population, to increase the legitimacy of government authorities and legislation. The Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA) is the central government agency responsible for setting policies and monitoring implementation of the decentralisation agenda. The current legal framework for decentralisation has been only partially implemented, and local structures lack local credibility. As the process of local governance has been identified as one of the main topics for discussion in the National Dialogue, the Ministry is at present rather passive while awaiting a political decision on the new policy framework. The Social Fund for Development (SFD) was set up by the World Bank as part of the social safety net. SFD engages in four main types of activity: community development, capacity building, small and micro-enterprise development and labourintensive programmes. The Community Development programme centres on participatory approaches and includes a capacity-building programme for local councils, to strengthen their credibility and to get more local people involved in local decision-making. The Committee for Affairs of Political Parties and Organisations (CAPPO) under the chairmanship of the Minister of State for Parliamentary and Shoura Council Affairs is mandated to receive applications from political parties and organisations for formal approval by the authorities. (This makes them eligible for a small amount of core funding when participating to electoral events). The CAPPO sees an opportunity, during the current transition phase, to expand its mandate to include helping establish a more democratic culture among political parties and ensuring that transparent information on political options is available to the public. Civil society organisations (CSOs) including political parties are another group of stakeholders that play a mediating role between formal institutions and society. Currently, over 5000 CSOs are registered with Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, in addition to 21 political parties. Both CSOs and political parties generally lack adequate institutional structures, vision and a broad (grass-roots) basis. The absence of real networks and coordinating bodies hampers the effectiveness of CSOs - 11 of 15 -

12 in influencing public debate or opinion. Political parties lack credibility as they were largely co-opted by the former regime. 4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 4.1. Method of implementation The project will be implemented through centralised and partially decentralised management. A Financing Agreement will be signed with the Republic of Yemen in accordance with Articles 53c and 56 of the Financial Regulation. The Commission controls ex ante all the procurement procedures except in cases where programme estimates are applied, under which the Commission applies ex ante control for procurement contracts > 50,000 EUR and may apply ex post for procurement contracts 50,000 EUR. The Commission controls ex ante the contracting procedures for all grant contracts. Payments are executed by the Commission except in cases where programmes estimates are applied, under which payments are executed by the beneficiary country for operating costs and contracts up to the ceilings indicated in the table below. The responsible Authorising Officer ensures that, by using the model of financing agreement for decentralised management, the segregation of duties between the authorising officer and the accounting officer or of the equivalent functions within the delegated entity will be effective, so that the decentralisation of the payments can be carried out for contracts up to the ceilings specified below. Works Supplies Services Grants < EUR < EUR < EUR EUR Most of the activities under this project will be implemented through centralised management. Three service contracts for technical assistance and a supply contract will be indicatively signed following calls for tenders. Approximately two grant contracts of a maximum amount of EUR each will be awarded following calls for proposals. Component 3.1. in support of local governance is to be implemented through programme estimates with the Social Fund for Development, a national body governed by public law. The change of management mode constitutes a substantial change except where the Commission re-centralises or reduces the level of tasks previously delegated to the beneficiary country, international organisation or delegatee body under, respectively, decentralised, joint or indirect centralised management. A Steering Committee is to be set up for each component, involving all the main stakeholders concerned. A representative of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation will be appointed to each Steering Committee and will ensure overall coordination of the project at the level of the Government of Yemen Procurement and grant award procedures/programme estimates 1) Contracts All contracts implementing the action must be awarded and implemented in accordance with the procedures and standard documents laid down and published by - 12 of 15 -

13 the Commission for the implementation of external operations, in force at the time of the launch of the procedure in question. Participation in the award of contracts for the present action shall be open to all natural and legal persons covered by the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) Regulation. Further extensions of this participation to other natural or legal persons by the concerned authorising officer shall be subject to the conditions provided for in articles 31(7) and (8) DCI. 2) Specific rules for grants The essential selection and award criteria for the award of grants are laid down in the Practical Guide to contract procedures for EU external actions. They are established in accordance with the principles set out in Title VI Grants of the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget. When derogations to these principles are applied, they shall be justified, in particular in the following cases: - Financing in full (derogation to the principle of co-financing): the maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants is 90 % of total eligible costs. This 90 % co-financing rate is similar to the ceiling applied under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which is currently 95 %. The purpose is to encourage smaller and grassroots organisations to apply for these grants. Most smaller Yemeni CSOs (apart from the well-established national NGOs based in the capital) lack capacities and have no experience of working with EU funding. Their lack of co-financing abilities makes it hard for them to meet a higher ceiling. Full financing may only be applied in the cases provided for in Article 253 of the Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of the Financial Regulation applicable to the General Budget. 3) Specific rules on programme estimates: All programme estimates must respect the procedures and standard documents laid down by the Commission, in force at the time of the adoption of the programme estimates in question. (i.e. the Practical Guide to procedures for programme estimates). The EU financial contribution covers the ordinary operating costs deriving from the programme estimates Budget and calendar EU Categories contribution EUR 1 SERVICES Indicative Timeframe Implementation Duration 1.1 TA Democratisation rd/4th quarter months 1.2 TA Civil Registry st semester months 1.3 TA Accountability & Decentralisation th quarter months 2 SUPPLIES Equipment for elections and civil registry 3 PROGRAMME ESTIMATES Support to the Social Fund for Development for decentralisation Depending on needs assessment 4 th quarter 2012/1 st quarter - 13 of 15 -

14 4 GRANTS Call for Proposals Monitoring, Evaluation, Audit Monitoring, Evaluation, Audit CONTINGENCIES * Contingencies TOTAL Depending on implementation of other components/needs Implementation contracts will include specific financial allocations for visibility requirements (see section 4.6). The expected implementation period is 60 months as from the signature of the Financing Agreement. The timing of components depends on political progress made in the transition process and the schedule of electoral events. * The European Union s contribution to the Contingencies heading may be used only with the prior agreement of the Contracting Authority. The use of contingency funds provided for in the financing agreement is not considered an amendment to the initial financing decision, provided it does not entail a change in the objectives or technical solutions originally proposed. It therefore does not require a rider to the corresponding financing agreement Performance monitoring Monitoring of performance of the different components of this project will be a routine task of the EU Delegation, combined with proactive coordination of technical assistance providers and of beneficiary authorities. Organisational improvements in those authorities and their growing capacity to steer relevant systems will be analysed both as achievements of EU-funded technical cooperation contracts and as benchmarks for future support. Progress will be measured against baseline data established at the outset of the implementation phase Evaluation and audit The Delegation will sign a service contract with an independent external evaluation team to assess the project's performance half way through its implementation period. If appropriate, the project activities will be adjusted at that stage, in consultation with the various stakeholders. At the end of the overall implementation period, a Final Evaluation will be carried out, again via a service contract. The aim will be to draw lessons for future support and to measure the impact of the completed activities against the baseline data gathered at the start of the project. In addition to the Final Evaluation report, there will be a Final Audit of the various activities undertaken within the scope of this project. Service contracts are to include a provision for regular audit reports within their budget breakdown. Civil society grant contracts should include a provision to allow for a final audit of the overall action financed under this project. In addition, the Delegation may contract an independent auditor to do a Final Audit report if deemed appropriate Communication and visibility Each project component will follow closely the communication and visibility requirements laid down in the Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions 16. A communication plan must be sent to the Delegation for approval, and so that the Delegation can coordinate visibility actions throughout their implementation period. Specific of 15 -

15 financial allocations will be included in each implementation contract to ensure that they comply with visibility requirements of 15 -