MANAGING BRITAIN'S DEFENCE

Transcription

1 MANAGING BRITAIN'S DEFENCE

2 Also by Malcolm Mcintosh ARMS ACROSS THE PACIFIC JAPAN RE-ARMED

3 Managing Britain's Defence Malcolm McIntosh M MACMILLAN

4 Malcolm McIntosh 1990 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1990 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 33-4 Alfred Place, London WC1E 7DP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 1990 Published by MACMILLAN ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world Filmset by Wearside Tradespools, Fulwell, Sunderland British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data McIntosh, Malcolm, Managing Britain's defence. 1. Great Britain. Defence. Policies of government, history I. Title 355'.0335'41 ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI /

5 To Louise

6 Contents Acknowledgements Introduction ix xi 1 Setting the Scene Introduction 1 Setting the scene : defence decisions 5 2 The Decision-making Process 33 Introduction 33 Democracy and the British Constitution 34 Secrecy 38 Secrecy and defence decision-making 49 The Public Accounts Committee, the National Audit Office, and the Commons Defence Select Committee 54 The Civil Service 62 Whitehall 78 Threat assessment 81 Public relations, propaganda and the media 93 3 Francis Pym, Secretary of State for Defence, Introduction 97 Financial control and open Government 98 Rayner 100 Chevaline 102 TridentC4 108 Conclusion John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, Introduction 111 Financial Control and a Defence Review 112 The Nott/Lewin Central Reorganisation 119 Trident C4 to DS 121 The Falklands War 124 Conclusion 136 vii

7 viii Contents s Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for Defence, Introduction 137 Management and MINIS 138 Central reorganisation 150 The central components of the MOD after January Heseltine the publicist: DS 19, Cruise and Montebello 177 Westland Helicopters pic 188 Conclusion Thatcher's Defence: Command and Control? Reforms 202 Introduction 202 Reforms 206 Freedom of information 207 Parliament 211 Specific Parliamentary Reforms 213 Ministerial Control 222 Conclusion 228 Summary of reforms 228 Appendices 231 Notes and References 240 Select Bibliography 262 Index 267

8 Acknowledgements Writing this study has been a long process which began with a year spent researching a television series for BBC television on the Ministry of Defence. The five-part series was transmitted in spring 1986 under the title 'MOD'. My primary thanks, therefore, go to David Taylor, reporter and producer on the series, and Charles Bruce and Steve Anderson, assistant producers. Much of the material quoted in this study comes from the many hours of recorded interviews with members of the government, civil servants, politicians, former civil servants and politicians and other outside observers. In the notes this is indicated with a reference to David Taylor in each case. A year after the series had been transmitted I again approached the Ministry of Defence with the idea of writing a study of the defence decision-making process. With a few exceptions, they were very helpful, and I spent a further year in the main MOD building just off Whitehall talking to officials about their work. I also returned to many of those people interviewed for the television series - to them also I extend my gratitude. Most civil servants and serving officers in the MOD must remain anonymous but I must thank Gloria Franklin, at the time head of Policy Studies, for her time and patience in dealing with my many queries and requests to see numerous personnel. This study would not have been possible without the support of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. I would particularly like to thank its secretary Stephen Burkeman for his help and guidance. From September 1983 until December 1989 I was attached in varying degrees to the School of Peace Studies at Bradford University and to Malcolm Chalmers, Malcolm Dando, Paul Rogers and James O'Connell I am grateful for academic guidance and support in this project. Personal thanks go to Nicholas Gillett for his initial enthusiasm for this study, and for his support during the writing of it. My interest in issues of peace and security stems from my father and mother. Finally, my greatest thanks go to my wife Louise for her love and support. Bath, England MALCOLM MciNTOSH ix

9 Introduction The central defence organisation in Britain has been reformed many times since The intention of the reforms has been to increase ministerial control of defence planning by creating a more centralised structure with a defence-wide, rather than single-service, perspective. The central problem of post-1945 defence planning has been matching declining resources to Britain's continuing global commitments. The situation has been exacerbated by the growing sophistication and expense of modern military equipment and the intransigence of the single services, particularly the Royal Navy, against participation in long-term strategic planning on a defence-wide basis. This study argues that both Ministerial control and Parliamentary oversight need to be increased to improve defence decision-making in Britain. Very few of the post-war reforms have been concerned with increasing Parliamentary access and accountability of defence decision-making. Parliament has been largely excluded from both the policy-making process and scrutinising the work of the Ministry of Defence. Since 1979 the Thatcher government has published more information relating to defence than any previous government with the avowed aim of raising the level of defence debate in Britain. It is certainly true that the quality of information relating to some aspects of defence planning have shown marked improvement. However, this study argues, this more open policy has been selective in topic, partial in coverage and designed not so much to raise the level of the defence debate as to convince the British public that the government's defence policies, particularly where they relate to the nuclear deterrent, are correct. Of course, the government should be able to communicate its intentions to the public where defence is concerned. But this study, by looking specifically at the period 1979 to 1986, sets out to show that while the intention was to increase ministerial control of defence decision-making and raise the level of the defence debate the government has not been totally successful. There are specific problems which relate to all post-1945 defence planning. First, there has been an imbalance between the long-term process of defence planning and the short-term nature of ministerial xi

10 xii Introduction postings and resource management. Second, the defence planning bureaucracy is so monolithic and has so much momentum that in order for government to check its progress, Prime Minister and Defence Secretary must be as one. Third, and most important, Parliament's help has generally not been enlisted by government in overseeing defence spending and policy-making except at a very cursory level. One of Parliament's primary functions is to oversee the raising of money for government and the subsequent use of that money. In defence, Parliament has been unable to satisfactorily fulfil that function because government has denied MPs access to information. This study argues that if Parliament had been allowed a greater role in overseeing defence spending and resource planning it would have been to the benefit of government. Successive governments would have found it easier to fulfil both the intention of increasing ministerial control of central defence planning and of raising the level of defence debate in Britain. However, there is a central problem in this argument in that the secrecy that surrounds defence planning, and excludes Parliament from overseeing it, is the result of the development of Prime Ministerial government and the British constitution. In order that defence planning becomes more accessible to Parliament and the mistakes of the post-1945 era are not repeated, there needs to be a fundamental reappraisal of the relationship between government and Parliament, and between Ministers and the Ministry of Defence. This study argues that both Ministerial control and Parliamentary oversight need to be increased to improve defence decision-making in Britain and that these two aims can be compatible. However, it has to be recognised that these two aims are not always necessarily compatible. If in the whole period from 1945 to the present the central issue of matching resources to defence commitments on a long-term basis is understood to be the most important area for defence decision-making, then the two aims espoused here, increased Ministerial control and Parliamentary oversight, are compatible. When, however, other issues in defence decision-making, such as the procurement of weapon system, short-term financial management and news information manipulation, are considered, increased Ministerial control and increased Parliamentary oversight are not necessarily compatible. While any Minister might support the two aims in the long term, in the short term, and particularly while in office, government

11 Introduction xiii would (and is shown here to have done) find increased Parliamentary oversight detrimental to Ministerial control. In other words if Parliament had greater access to defence decision-making the shape of that decision-making, and the decisions made, might be different. It is when the democratic ideal, as described in Chapter 2, is practised and a long-term perspective applied to defence policymaking, that increased Ministerial control and increased Parliamentary oversight are shown to be compatible. This book emphasises Parliamentary oversight at the expense of increased Ministerial control, while advocating an increase in both.