Sveinung Legard Representation and The Economy of Participatory Democracy

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1 Sveinung Legard Representation and The Economy of Participatory Democracy

2 Point of departure The «economy» of decision-making processes is a frequently used argument against participatory democracy. Question of time and scale have been central in legitimising representative government. Theories of participatory democracy have to a lesser extent dealt with the question of representation. «Economic» perspectives are often seen as vulgar or antithetical to participatory democracy.

3 Law of time and numbers The more citizens a democratic unit contains, the less that citizens can participate directly in government decisions and the more they must delegate authority to others. (Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy 2000)

4 Dilemma of democratic participation and system effectiveness The impact of an individual on a decision decreases with the number of citizens, whereas the effectiveness of the whole body of citizens, the collectivity, often (but by no means invariably) increases with the number of people and extent of area within its jurisdiction. (Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution 1990)

5 Dahl s solution Primary democracy is possible and should be enhanced in very small political units. Representative control mechanisms such as fair and regular elections, freedom of speech and association and access to information.

6 Mandate theory of representation A representative must/should do what his constituents want, and be bound my mandates and instruction by them. (Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 1967)

7 Central concepts Accountability to democratic assemblies Mandated delegation Recallable representatives Frequent elections (short term mandates) Rotation of representatives

8 Bookchin s confederalism A confederalist view involves a clear distinction between policy making and the coordination and execution of adopted policies. Policy making is exclusively the right of popular community assemblies based on the practices of participatory democracy. Administration and coordination are the responsibility of confederal (delegated) councils. (Murray Bookchin, From Urbanization to Cities 1995)

9 Barber s strong democracy Ensuring the accountability of officials is generally the responsibility of the press, the media, and the opposition party. Neighborhood assemblies would shift some of this responsibility directly to the citizenry, permitting individuals to question their representatives on a regular basis in their own home territory and according to their own rules of procedure. (Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy 1984)

10 Participatory budgeting as basis for discussion + Large-scale participation (big cities). Attempt at combining direct participation with representation. PB structure itself inspired by mandate view of representation (libertarian council socialism). Do not provide «ideal» circumstances as assumed by the theories. Only one of several possible configurations of participatory democracy, and hence representation.

11 1. Local assemblies: Investment proposals & election of delegates 5. City council ratify budget BUDGET CYCLE 2. Delegate meetings: concretization of proposals, negotiations 4. Representative council of delegates design final budget 3. Assemblies: ranking of priorities, voting

12 Similarities with mandate theories of representation Delegates are elected with predefined mandates (investment proposals). Local associations (organized around investment proposals) hold delegates responsible. Results of negotations are «ratified» by assemblies. Delegates are formally subject to recall and often rotated.

13 Dissimilarities with mandate theories of representation Due to unforseeable outcomes of negotiations, mandates are more suggestive than binding. There is no strict division in between policy-making (assemblies) and administration/coordination (delegates). Coordination give signficant decisionmaking powers, and assembly ratification is often superficial. The more direct participatory processes, the less the scope of decision-making powers.

14 Is Dahl right? Dahl overlooks other possiblities of controlling representatives (especially provision of mandates, ratification of proposals) and local assembly structures. Even in large-scale political units, PB provides a minimum level of direct participation and mandated representation as a response to the economy of time and scale.

15 Is Bookchin/Barber right? The economy of time and scale affects opportunities of control of representatives more than the delegate view of representation admits. There are limits to mandated representation, since it is impossible to provide instructions for all possible outcomes of decision-making processes. The stricter the mandate, the less opportunities for greater good outcomes. Coordination and negotiation always involves significant decision-making powers. The delegate is also a representative..

16 In conclusion: some problems Problems in conventional political theory: The need for representation due to the economy of time and scale does not rule out direct participation in decision-making processes, nor alternative mechanisms for control of representatives such as mandated delegation. Problems in theories of participatory democracy: The economy of time and scale affect opportunities for control of delegates and involves significant elements of representation.