Policy Brief. a focus on current issues. By Uyo Salifu. In the Shadow of Previous COPS: COP17 s Mixed Bag of Outcomes

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1 INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE Issue 94/March 2012 a focus on current issues Policy Brief By Uyo Salifu Uyo Salifu is a researcher for the Environmental Diplomacy Programme. In the Shadow of Previous COPS: COP17 s Mixed Bag of Outcomes Depending on perceptions, South Africa either had the enviable or the unpleasant task of organising, hosting and ensuring a credible outcome for the 17 th session of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP). From 28 November to 9 December 2011 all attention was fixed on South Africa to gauge its performance in spearheading talks that could have resulted in a mutually agreed-upon mechanism for addressing the climate challenge. The fact that South Africa was trying to achieve what other states have either failed or only marginally succeeded in doing within global climate negotiations, added pressure on South Africa to make a difference. As host and president of COP17, South Africa s ability to make a difference hinged on three key issues. The first was whether South Africa could ensure a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol; the second, linked to whether it could facilitate the adoption of legally binding emission reduction targets; and finally, whether South Africa could fundamentally contribute to delivering positive outcomes for Africa such as favourable finance and technology mechanisms. This policy brief argues that South Africa s performance in this regard during COP17 yielded mixed results. The shadow of past COP negotiations Global Insight aims to provide members of the policy community with concise but trenchant analyses of topical issues. Comments and suggestions are invited. A shadow cast on South Africa s hosting of COP17 had to do with the fact that only limited gains had been obtained from the previous 16 COP meetings. Some of these achievements included the Kyoto Protocol agreed at COP3 in 1997, which for all its challenges, has been the only legally binding environmental agreement. COP13 (2007), was lauded for its part in committing states to a long-term shared action plan for emission reductions by the end of COP12 (2006) was notable for generating general commitment to funding for climate change responses for and by developing states. In similar fashion, COP16 (2010) was hailed for officially instituting the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the mechanisms for technology transfer to developing countries. Table 1 below shows the Conferences of the Parties to date.

2 Table of Conferences of the Party to date Conference of the Parties Year Host COP Berlin, Germany COP Geneva, Switzerland COP Kyoto, Japan COP Buenos Aires, Argentina COP Bonn, Germany COP6 (Part 1) 2000 The Hague, Netherlands COP6 (Part 2) 2001 Bonn, Germany COP Marrakech, Morocco COP New Delhi, India COP Milan, Italy COP Buenos Aires, Argentina COP Montreal, Canada COP Nairobi, Kenya COP Bali, Indonesia COP Poznañ, Poland COP Copenhagen, Denmark COP Cancun, Mexico The multilateral process of the UNFCCC has facilitated the gains mentioned due to the fact that it is truly representative of a plethora of state interests in the global arena, and is tasked with addressing common problems in the international sphere. In particular, the voices of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) as well as Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which need ardent adaptation assistance and stringent cuts in GHG targets, due to their particular vulnerability to climate change, 1 have found space in these critical decision-making processes. Emerging powers have also assumed greater roles in fashioning agreements being reached in the COP processes. In particular, the role of BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) in brokering a deal with the United States (US) in Copenhagen in 2009 is a case in point. Through multilateral negotiations, many elements of the Global South agenda including adaptation, finance and technology sharing are filtered into the global climate change agenda. While its inclusiveness is a major advantage for smaller states, the multilateral process of the UNFCCC has also served as a constraint, making it a proverbial double-edged sword in the climate talks. The challenge presented by the UNFCCC negotiation process is that it has stunted efforts that could lead to tangible outcomes for the global environmental regime or for addressing climate change in general. It has generally failed to strengthen the implementation of agreements already reached. Consensus-dependent decision-making procedures, which require that all parties agree to the terms of an agreement before it is enforceable, lead to drawn-out talks that take a long time to agree on solutions to urgent problems facing mother earth. The multilateral process also allows states holding minority positions to stall or frustrate progress during negotiations, such as has been the case with the US and China lately. 2 2

3 While the UNFCCC process has faced many major difficulties, the most damaging weakness has been the failure to adopt a legally binding climate agreement for all parties and a failure to obtain binding targets for Green house gases (GHG) emissions reduction that are seen as fair and equitable by all parties. This is because of the existence of competing domestic and foreign policy interests among UNFCCC member states. For instance, as the main opponent of the Kyoto Protocol and a main contributor of GHG, the US s domestic concerns are linked to the effects that GHG emission reduction would have on overall economic output. A legally binding climate deal could impinge on US domestic economy by obliging the US to limit its GHG emissions. Similarly, China s own domestic energy security concerns influence its decision making as far as climate change is concerned. 3 South Africa too has domestic socio-economic priorities that have seen questions raised in reconciling the country s dirty energy sector with international commitments to significantly reduce its GHG emissions. And although the European Union had been pushing for the larger emerging powers to undertake further commitment, it offered only 20% emissions reduction commitment as a whole. As a result, climate change talks have been plagued by the classic prisoner s dilemma scenario. The dilemma has always been that states unbound by environmental agreements will enjoy economic growth as well as the benefit of environmental protection, whereas states that are bound by environmental obligations will suffer economically at the expense of environmental sustainability. Implications for Durban The limited outcomes from past COPs, coupled with the challenge of addressing the climate challenge in a global setting plagued by the classic prisoner s dilemma scenario, reduced the level of expectation ahead of COP17 by suggesting that only moderate outcomes were feasible. This was due to the tendency for COPs to only make small incremental steps towards the final outcome. Ensuring a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol promised to be no easy feat for South Africa due to the fact that states such as the US, Japan, Canada, Australia and Russia had already indicated a lack of interest in seeing a second commitment period of the Protocol. The consensus-dependent decision-making procedures already alluded to, fortified the opposition to the treaty and, from the onset, narrowed South Africa s chances of single-handedly securing a second commitment period. Although South Africa boasted a track record in facilitating and hosting world conferences and other major events including the recent FIFA Soccer World Cup, this experience was not going to sufficiently enable it to unlock the logjams of one of the most complex multilateral negotiation processes at COP17. This is because the demands of COP17 exceeded the mere ability to act as host or an arena for negotiations; they required South Africa to help narrow major gulfs between the entrenched interests of major and smaller powers, to focus them on the universally desired legally binding climate change agreement. 4 A mixed bag of outcomes came out of COP17 and key amongst these is the fact that, as was the case with a few COPs before it, the multilateral negotiations process was persevered. The Durban negotiations could be lauded for maintaining confidence in the UNFCCC multilateral negotiation process, preventing yet another failed conference and preserving the platform for parties to continue negotiating. South Africa was particularly known for its fortitude in preserving confidence in the multilateral process. In a desperate attempt to build a positive legacy for COP17 and preserve confidence in the multilateral process, South Africa extended the COP by a full day, when key issues had not been resolved on the specified final day of the conference. This made it the longest climate summit to date. COP17 Chairperson and South Africa s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, was persuasive in leading negotiators to accept the Durban Platform, which states that by 2015, nations would begin negotiating a legally binding treaty that would come into effect by Durban also garnered general consensus on a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which is expected to begin in It is significant that the conference reiterated the promise that a legally binding mechanism for emission reduction would take effect by South Africa supported the African agenda to the end by helping to get assurances from the parties that the GCF and a technology transfer mechanism would be made operational during However, against expectations, the Durban conference failed to generate agreement on concrete 3

4 figures for GHG reduction targets neither was there an agreement on a legally binding mechanism for emission reductions, although the parties committed to bring it into force in Furthermore, the strength of assurances that the GCF and a technology mechanism would be made operational in 2012 is uncertain because the details were not fleshed out. That the COP17 was unable to agree on financing sources for the Green Climate Fund disappointed a lot of observers. Equity was largely unaddressed, as developed states, such as the US were not willing to keep equity on the agenda of the negotiations. For now, the difference made by South Africa is that it was resolute in obtaining some sort of agreement and it maintained the confidence in the multilateral process. Beyond this, it may be too soon to adjudge South Africa s presidency at COP17 to have been wholly a success. This is because South Africa will only be perceived to have made a positive difference if the Durban Platform is a forerunner for the adoption of a legally binding global agreement, a GHG emissions reduction target and the adoption of financing and technology for Africa. Policy Considerations In order to ensure that in the long term, South Africa s presidency was a success, the following policy recommendations should be considered. South Africa should work to raise the ambition of member states and incentivize carbon emission reduction As President of COP, South Africa would need to ensure that the incentives for reducing carbon emissions are comparable to those for gaining economic growth. It will have to insist on ensuring that international norms and principles significantly accommodate environmental protection on to the scale of the respect for human rights or the maintenance of peace and security. South Africa should work with others in lobbying more strongly for the adoption of finance and technology mechanisms. South Africa and Qatar should intensify exchanges on their respective interests to ensure a convergence of interests and continuity between the Durban agenda and that of Qatar South Africa would need to work closely with incoming COP President, Qatar to ensure that the issues being carried over from Durban are addressed in COP18. The incoming and outgoing COP presidents would also need to widen the space for the participation of ordinary people in addressing these concerns. Notes 1 Small Island Developing States (SIDS) United Nations General Assembly General Debate Addresses Impacts of Climate Change, SIDS Vulnerability, org/news/unga-general-debate-addresses-impacts-ofclimate-change-sids-vulnerability/#more Depledge, J Against the Grain: The United States and the Global Climate Change Regime, Global Change, Peace & Security, 17(1), Pp Seligsohn, D., Heilmayr, R., Tan, X., & Weischer, L China, the United States, and the Climate Change Challenge World Resources Institute Policy Brief, October change_challenge.pdf 4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Governments recognize current global climate efforts are not enough and need to take next step in Durban, says UN climate change chief Press release (Online), 2 October 2011, press_releases_advisories/application/pdf/pr _ panama_opening.pdf 5 Hone. D In Durban, Neither Salvation nor Failure, The Great Energy Challenge, greatenergychallengeblog.com/blog/2011/12/16/indurban-neither-salvation-nor-failure/ 6 Kartha, S The Clash of Paradigms in Durban, Third World Network, November/December 2011, twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2011/ /cover02. htm 7 Ibid 4

5 Policy Brief The IGD is an independent foreign policy think tank dedicated to the analysis of and dialogue on the evolving international political and economic environment, and the role of Africa and South Africa. It advances a balanced, relevant and policy-oriented analysis, debate and documentation of South Africa s role in international relations and diplomacy. The IGD strives for a prosperous and peaceful Africa in a progressive global order through cutting edge policy research and analysis, catalytic dialogue and stakeholder interface on global dynamics that have an impact on South Africa and Africa. 3rd Floor UNISA Building 263 Skinner Street Pretoria South Africa PO Box The Tramshed, 0126 Pretoria South Africa info@igd.org.za All rights reserved. The material in this publication may not be reproduced, stored or transmitted without the prior permission of the copyright holder. Short extracts may be quoted, provided the source is acknowledged. 5