The Rising Power of the Prime Minister in Finland

Transcription

1 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 26 No. 3, 2003 ISSN Nordic Political Science Association Blackwell Oxford, SCPS Scandinavian X ORIGINAL 2003 Blackwell UKPublishing ARTICLE Political Publishers Ltd Studies Ltd. The Rising Power of the Prime Minister in Finland Heikki Paloheimo* During the past two decades, the Finnish political system has gradually changed from a semipresidential to a nearly parliamentary one. This process was finalized with the drafting of the new constitution in Four factors in particular contributed to the parliamentarization of the Finnish constitution. Firstly, the breakdown of the Soviet Union also broke down the tradition of highly personalized, presidential rule in Finnish Soviet relations. Secondly, Finnish membership of the European Union increased the need to integrate the Finnish cabinet in decision making on foreign affairs. Thirdly, because of the stabilization of cabinets, based on the increased coalition elasticity and coalition capacity of the political parties, there was not as much need, or room, for presidential intervention as in earlier decades. Fourthly, after the highly personalized tenure of President Urho Kekkonen, there was, among the political parties, a reaction against personalized presidential rule. The new constitution is to a large extent based on cabinetcentred governance, although steps towards ministerial governance have also been taken. There are, however, many non-constitutional factors giving rise to a new kind of prime-ministerial governance. Among these are: (1) internationalization of politics, (2) growth of the public sector, (3) convergence of party ideologies, and (4) a new kind of personalized political publicity. Introduction Political leadership in the Finnish political executive has radically changed during the last twenty years. From the first years of its independence, Finland had a semi-presidential political system with both a powerful president and a government responsible to parliament. From the late 1980s on, minor constitutional changes were made that reduced the powers of the president. This process was finalized by the drafting of a totally new constitution in The new constitution radically reduces the powers of the president and strengthens the parliamentary side of the Finnish political system. However, the president still has some prerogatives of her or his own, and based on these prerogatives, there remain some minor qualities of semipresidentialism in the Finnish political system. * Heikki Paloheimo, Department of Political Science, University of Turku Turku, Finland. heikki.paloheimo@utu.fi 219

2 Several factors contributed to the parliamentarization of the Finnish political system. Firsty, the role of president was very important in Finnish Soviet relations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was no longer a need for that kind of highly personalized, president-led foreign policy. Secondly, Finnish membership of the European Union (EU) increased the need to integrate the Finnish cabinet in decision making on foreign affairs. Thirdly, because of the stabilization of cabinets, based on the increased coalition capacity and coalition elasticity of the political parties (Nousiainen 1991; 2001), there was not as much need or room for presidential intervention as in earlier decades. Fourthly, after the strong presidential rule during Kekkonen s presidency, there was, among the political parties, a reaction against strong presidency. Change from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system is also a change from a personalized (presidential) leadership towards a more collective (cabinet-centred) leadership. At the same time, in many parliamentary democracies, there seems to be a trend towards more personalized leadership (Foley 1993; Poguntke & Webb 2002). The power of the prime minister seems to be rising. Several factors have been said to contribute to this development. Prime ministers are more and more involved in international cooperation and summit politics. They are more and more in the focus of the media. General elections seem to be more personalized and focused on potential prime-ministerial candidates. What about Finland? The division of power between president and government already varied in the former semi-presidential system (Nousiainen 1985; Anckar 2000). The new constitution increases the powers of parliament and cabinet at the expense of the president. It increases collective, cabinetcentred governance at the expense of personalized, presidential governance. But are there also trends towards a more prime-ministerial governance, as in some parliamentary democracies? According to Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, models of cabinet decision making may be classified into six different types (Laver & Shepsle 1994, 5 8): 1. In a party government model ministers are subordinate to the discipline of well-organized, disciplined political parties. In the government, ministers represent and promote the interests and goals of their political parties. 2. The rationale of the model of bureaucratic government depends upon the assumption that effective power both to make and to implement public policy is located in the permanent civil service. William Niskanen has elegantly analysed how the knowledge and information controlled by the civil servants can effectively be used to form a bureaucratic government (Niskanen 1971). 3. If the executive is assumed to be constrained by the legislature rather than by the bureaucracy, we may talk about the model of legislative 220

3 government. Under this assumption, all important policy decisions are made by the legislature, and the role of the cabinet is limited to implementation. 4. A cabinet government model implies a powerful executive that takes collective decisions binding all members of the cabinet. In this model, ministers in the cabinet are seen to have the real political power. They are not much constrained by parliament, political parties or the bureaucracy. 5. In a prime-ministerial government there is a powerful collective executive dominated by a powerful prime minister. Several factors may enhance prime-ministerial power. Many constitutions designate the rights and duties of the prime minister in a far more extensive way than those of other ministers. In the government formation procedure the formateur (prime-ministerial candidate) often has much autonomy in the making of the new government. Prime ministers usually can actively affect the agenda of government decision making. In some cases they have the power to hire and fire ministers. During the last few decades it has often been assessed that the internationalization of political life, growth of the public sector, convergence of party ideologies, the rising role of media in politics, and personalization of politics have all contributed to the rising power of prime ministers in democratic nations. 6. Ministerial government implies a powerful executive in which individual ministers, by virtue of their positions as the political heads of their ministries, may quite independently make decisions in their policy areas. Research Questions and Data In this paper, I will analyse changes in the division of power in the executive of the Finnish political system. Both constitutional and non-constitutional changes will be analysed. The main focus is the changed role of the prime minister. Other changes in the executive will also be analysed to the extent that they are relevant to the analysis of the prime minister s power. The main research questions are as follows: 1. In what way has the model of decision making in the Finnish political executive changed as a result of the new constitution? To what extent have there been changes towards cabinet governance, prime-ministerial governance, ministerial governance or legislative governance? 2. What kinds of non-constitutional change have there been in the Finnish political system which change the model of governance? To what extent do these changes enhance the role of prime-ministerial governance? The questions are analysed using expert interview data collected for this research project, as well as public documents and earlier research on the division of power in the Finnish political executive. 221

4 Division of Power in the Executive in the Semi-presidential Era: President in the Lead The semi-presidential political system in Finland was a result of social development before Finnish independence, the intentions of conservatives to counter the revolutionary pressures of the socialist labour movement, and compromises between conservative and liberal politicians concerning the division of power between different state organs. Conservatives wanted to have a monarchy or at least an executive vested with strong powers. Liberals were in favour of a parliamentary democracy. According to the constitution enacted in 1919 (Act No. 94/1919), executive power was divided between the president and government. The president was elected by an electoral college. Every sixth year, citizens elected 300 electors to elect the president for the nation. The president had supreme executive powers. For the general government of the state, there was the government (cabinet) or council of state (valtioneuvosto), as it is called in Finland. It is headed by the prime minister and is politically responsible to parliament. According to the old constitution, the president appointed governments, presented government bills to parliament, ratified laws accepted in parliament, gave decrees, led Finnish foreign policy, appointed judges of the supreme court, supreme administrative court and courts of appeal, as well as senior civil servants, was the head of the armed forces, could grant pardons, had the right to dissolve parliament and call early general elections, and could convene extraordinary sessions of parliament. These duties included legislative, executive and judicial powers. One peculiar feature of the old Finnish constitution was the strongly guaranteed rights of minorities in parliament. In the original version of the 1919 constitution, a minority of one-third of the members of parliament could quite effectively block legislation in parliament. According to section 66 of the Constitution Act, a law enacted in parliament was postponed if one-third of all the members of parliament (67 MPs) voted for the postponement. A postponed law could then be considered anew in the first session of parliament after the next general election, and it came into force if it was then supported by a majority of MPs. The intention of these strong minority rights in legislation was to prevent radical socialist reforms and revolution being effected by a simple majority in parliament. In the former semi-presidential system, the president was the incontestable executive head of Finland. However, the division of power varied from one period to another, even without there being any changes in the constitution. The Finnish semi-presidential system was, as Dag Anckar puts it, for the presidents like a buffet table (Anckar 2000). It was up to the president to choose which constitutional powers vested in the president they wanted to pick up from the constitutional buffet table for their active use. Some 222

5 presidents were quite moderate in using their powers, leaving much room for the parliamentary side of the executive body. Some others used their powers more actively. President Kekkonen was, as Anckar puts it, a gourmand. But none of the Finnish presidents has been a real ascetic in using the powers of the presidency, not even those presidents who had a highly parliamentary ethos. During the semi-presidential era, prime ministers could not assume the role of a national leader in the same way as their colleagues in pure parliamentary systems. Instead, their role was to supervise the day-to-day politics, taking into consideration the policy preferences of both parliament and president, and, in the Second Republic ( ), accepting the president s sovereign leadership in foreign policy. With good reason, some governments (including their prime ministers) could be called president s governments (Nousiainen 1992, ; Murto 1994, ). There has been variation in the independence of the prime minister in relation to the president. After the Second World War, Presidents J. K. Paasikivi ( ) and Urho Kekkonen ( ) were strong leaders. However, they had already been strong leaders during their tenure as prime minister (Paasikivi: ; Kekkonen: ). According to Seppo Tiihonen (1990, ), there was a low tide in the prime minister s power during President Kekkonen s first period as a president ( ). When President Kekkonen had stabilized his own position as president, there gradually came more room for the prime minister s independent activity. From the late 1960s on, the stabilization of government coalitions gradually increased the power of the cabinet and prime minister in relation to the president. But in the 1970s the stabilization of governments also gave the president better opportunities to steer the functioning of the Finnish parliamentary system, since parliamentary party groups were humble and willing to obey the instructions given by the president (Arter 1981). In the period of parliamentarization ( ), the power of the prime minister clearly increased (Paloheimo 1994). At that time, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa to some extent raised the prime minister s profile in foreign policy too. But as late as 1987 the president selected a new prime minister (Harri Holkeri, in office ) from the political reserve against the intentions of the party leaders. Finally, during the presidency of Mr Ahtisaari ( ), prime ministers challenged the president as the effective executive head. The New, Nearly Parliamentary Constitution: Prime Minister Takes the Lead The constitution enacted in 1919 was in force for 80 years, the first 60 years without any significant alterations. From the 1980s on, there were growing pressures to strengthen the parliamentary features of the Finnish political 223

6 system, and to reduce the powers of the president as well as the power of a parliamentary minority to postpone legislation. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several changes were made to the constitution to strengthen the parliamentary features of the Finnish political system (see Nousiainen 2001; Paloheimo 2001). A summary of the changes made in the constitution is presented in Table 1. Finally, in 2000, a totally new constitution was enacted. It came into force on 1 March 2000 (Act No. 731/1999). On the same day the eleventh president, Tarja Halonen, came into office as the president. The new constitution cut out most of the prerogatives of the president that were typical of the earlier semi-presidential system. The president s active powers over government formation have been eliminated. The facility for the president to make changes in government bills has been eliminated. If the president does not make his or her decision in accordance with the proposal made by the government, the matter is returned to the government for further preparation, and the bill is then given to parliament in the form decided by the government (section 58). Parliament may now walk over the president s veto upon legislation without delay. If the president does not in three months countersign a law passed in parliament, it is returned to parliament. If parliament readopts the act without material alterations, it comes into force without the president s confirmation (section 77). In state finances, the president no longer has any power of veto (section 83). The new constitution retains the duality in the leadership of Finnish foreign policy which was established when Finland entered the EU. According to the new constitution, the foreign policy of the nation is directed by the president in cooperation with the government. However, the government is responsible for the national preparation for decisions to be made in the EU, and decides on the concomitant Finnish measures, unless the decision requires the approval of parliament. Parliament also participates in the national preparation of decisions to be made in the EU (section 93). The president appoints senior civil servants (section 126), is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and may grant a full or partial pardon from a penalty imposed by a court of law (sections 105 and 128). A charge against a member of the government is made in parliament and is treated in a special high court of impeachment. The president no longer has the power to raise a charge against a minister (section 114). A comparison of the prerogatives of parliament, government and president in the old and new constitutions is presented in Table 1. Arenas of Decision Making In the Finnish divided executive, there still are two kinds of sessions of government. There are presidential sessions, where the president takes the chair 224

7 Table 1. Prerogatives of Parliament, Government and President in the Finnish Constitution in Three Time Periods Division of power according to the constitution Duty Old constitution, Old constitution, late 1990s New constitution from 2000 on General authority in executive decision making Appointment of the government Resignation of the government Dissolution of the parliament and calling early general election Government bills Legislation: power of veto Legislation: decrees Leadership in foreign policy Leadership in foreign policy: decisions to be made in the EU Commander-in-chief of the armed forces Appointment of senior civil servants President President Government President has autonomous power Parliament, or prime minister, or president indirectly by dissolving parliament President President may change government bills President may postpone to the first diet after next general election President and government President, after hearing parliamentary party groups Parliament, or prime minister President after an initiative by the prime minister President may change government bills President may postpone to the next diet President and government Parliament; president s role purely formal Parliament, or prime minister President after an initiative by the prime minister President s opportunity to change government bills has mostly been eliminated Parliament may immediately break down president s veto Government President President President in cooperation with government Government Government President President President President appoints quite a large proportion of senior civil servants; other civil servants are appointed by government or ministries The number of senior civil servants appointed by the president is reduced President appoints only a very limited group of highest civil servants Source: Act No. 94/1919; Act No. 731/

8 and makes his or her decisions upon the government s proposals. On the other hand, there are general meetings of the government, headed by the prime minister, where the government s decisions are made. When a bill is given to parliament, when a law approved in parliament is ratified, or when the president makes a decree or appoints a civil servant, she or he makes the decision in the presidential session of the government. Each issue on the agenda is presented by the minister concerned. The presentation includes a proposal for decision making. But in contrast to the general meetings of the government, there is no voting in the presidential session. As in the presidential system, the president makes the decision, and she or he is not tied to the opinion of the government. The president may make a decision against the opinion of a unanimous government. In the general meetings of the government, decisions are made collegially, as is typical in cabinet governance. In minor issues, ministerial governance is used, single ministers being responsible for making decisions in their own ministries. In the mid 1990s, decision making in government was decentralized and, as a result, the policy space of ministerial governance became larger. For the preparation of government policies there are five permanent ministerial committees (foreign and security policy; state finance; economic policy; EU affairs; neighbouring areas) and several ministerial working groups for special policy areas. Government Formation Government formation includes several steps: (1) selecting the formateur, (2) choosing parties to be in the government, (3) deciding on the programme of the government, (4) deciding on the distribution of portfolios, (5) choosing ministers, (6) appointment of the government, and (7) vote of investiture in parliament. Selecting the Formateur Under the old constitution, presidents were quite free in selecting the government formateur. There was not even a tradition that the prime minister should be a party leader. In fact, before the Second World War, it was exceptional that prime ministers were leaders of their party. After the Second World War, it gradually became more typical that the prime minister was the leader of his party. But as late as 1987 President Koivisto nominated the formateur (Mr Holkeri) against the intentions of the parliamentary party groups. According to the new constitution (section 61), parliament nominates the prime minister, who is thereafter appointed to office by the president. The 226

9 president appoints other ministers according to the prime minister s proposal. Before the selection of the prime minister, the parliamentary party groups negotiate on the political programme and composition of the government. The formateur is elected prime minister if his or her election is supported by more than half of the votes cast in an open vote in parliament. These rules increase the power of parliament and totally eliminate the power of the president in government formation. Choosing Parties To Be in the Government The formateur has much power in choosing parties to be in the government. She or he may call some parties to the negotiations, and may not call some others. From the 1980s on, it has been a practice in Finland that two big parties and a couple of smaller ones have formed the government, while the third of the big parties has been left in opposition. Any two-party combination between the three biggest parties is possible. The possible coalitions are not as rigidly limited as in Sweden and Norway. The most dramatic question of the bargaining is which one of the three big parties will be left out of the coalition. The high coalition elasticity of Finnish political parties owes partly to the convergence of party ideologies, and partly to the earlier tradition of cohabitation between government and opposition (expert interviews 2002). In the 1990s, all the prime ministers were party leaders of the biggest party in parliament. If this tradition continues, in circumstances where the president no longer has an active role in government formation, the power of the formateur will increase. She or he may bargain on the party complexion of the government in a situation where the two other big parties are played off against each other. The decision about the party complexion of the government is to some extent policy dependent. If questions of political and economic integration are important, it is probable that the Social Democratic Party and Conservative Party will be close to each other, and a left right coalition will be formed, with the Centre Party in opposition. If traditional issues about income distribution and the welfare state are most prominent on the agenda, there will be cooperation either between the Social Democrats and the Centre Party (a left centre coalition) or between the Centre Party and the Conservative Party (a centre right coalition). The policy space of contemporary Finnish coalition bargaining is presented in Figure 1. The contemporary Finnish coalition game is highly centripetal. The three biggest parties, the Social Democrats, Centre Party and Conservatives, all have a centre-orientated, consensus-prone policy stance so as to maintain their coalition capability with both of the other big parties. This strategy involves an optimal mixture of vote seeking and office seeking. 227

10 Figure 1. A Two-Dimensional Policy Space of Coalition Bargaining in Finland. Source: Paloheimo & Wiberg (1997, 304). Deciding on the Programme of the Government Finland is one of the countries that has detailed and specific government programmes (Nousiainen 1991). Parties contribute papers for negotiations, and the negotiators bargain in several subgroups. Schemes for the government programme are prepared in many different arenas. Several interest groups keep in contact with the political parties bargaining on government formation. Departments of public administration (ministries) have plans for their own future development. From the 1980s on, the role of the public administration has been prominent in programme negotiations. Secretaries of state (civil servants on the highest level) from the main ministries have been heard in negotiations (expert interviews 2002). The programme of the government is a result of these multi-level negotiations. Negotiators from the political parties will settle all political disagreements. The role of the public administration can be seen in many details of the programme (expert interviews 2002). 228

11 From the 1940s to the early 1990s, sections on foreign policy in the government programme were written in the ministry of foreign affairs on the advice of the president. These were then without alteration included in the government programme written in the government negotiations. In foreign policy, all governments were president s governments. Since the mid 1990s, sections on foreign policy in the government programme have been prepared in the same way as other parts of the government programme, but allowing the president the opportunity to present his comments. This kind of cooperation between government and president will probably continue in the future (expert interviews 2002). Over time, government programmes have become longer and longer. The four latest governments have written the four longest government programmes in Finnish history, the current Mr Lipponen s second government the longest one with 6,670 words. Political disagreements between coalition parties are to a large extent settled in the preparation of the detailed government programme. Therefore, severe internal disagreements are rare in the life cycle of contemporary Finnish governments. Distribution of Portfolios The distribution of portfolios is bargained between allied parties, bigger parties taking the most important portfolios. Bigger parties usually take responsibility, for example, for state finances, foreign affairs and social welfare issues. Since the late 1970s, the minister of finance has always come from the other big party in office. We may conclude that, in the period of the welfare state, the ministry of finance has been the most important portfolio after that of the prime minister. Choosing Ministers During the last few decades, it has become a tradition that political parties independently choose their ministers after the distribution of portfolios has been decided. The formateur/party leader has much autonomy in choosing ministers from his or her own party (expert interviews 2002). However, she or he must take into consideration different groups inside the party. For instance, it is typical in contemporary Finland that roughly half of the ministers should be women. Appointment of the Government According to the new constitution, the role of the president in the appointment of the government is purely formal. Parliament elects the prime minister, who is thereafter appointed to office by the president. The president appoints other ministers in accordance with the prime minister s wishes. 229

12 Vote of Investiture In 1991, it was made compulsory for a newly appointed government to present its programme in parliament for a legislative investiture. This amendment increased the power of parliament and limited the autonomy of the president in the formation of new governments. The vote of investiture is restated in the new constitution (section 62). However, its relevance to the division of power is not as great as it was earlier, because the whole process of making a new government lies in parliament. Division of Power between President and Cabinet The new constitution strengthens the prerogatives of the government at the expense of the president. The president still formally gives government bills to parliament. However, if there is a disagreement between the government and president, the government may consider the bill anew, and give it to parliament without the president signing it. The process of presenting government bills has thus been parliamentarized. The president may use actively his or her power to appoint senior civil servants. In two cases, President Halonen has appointed a bank manager to the Bank of Finland against the proposal of the cabinet. The partial parliamentarization of decision making in foreign policy can be explained by two factors: Finnish membership of the EU and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Membership of the EU made it necessary to open up methods for parliamentary decision making in international affairs. The collapse of the Soviet Union made it easier for Finnish politicians to give up the authoritarian foreign policy leadership exercised in the Second Republic. In this area Finland has not yet gone the whole way towards parliamentarism. Among the EU s member states, only France and Finland send both president and prime minister to EU summits, but the Finnish system is not quite the same as that of France. In the Finnish case, the prime minister is supposed to be responsible for community affairs and the president is supposed to be responsible for foreign policy issues (second pillar). The prime minister always participates in EU summits. The president participates if he or she thinks his or her participation is needed. Since the beginning of Finnish membership of the EU, the Barcelona summit in March 2002 was the first EU summit where the Finnish president was not present. The division of power in international affairs between the president and government is the Achilles heel of the contemporary Finnish constitution (Jyränki 2000). The government should take the lead in EU community affairs. The president should take the lead in other international affairs. But 230

13 in the EU the borderline between community issues and other issues is becoming more blurred as plans for the further development of the EU become more ambitious. If the Finnish president and government were to disagree about international issues, there might be a constitutional crisis if both the president and the government claimed that they had the last word in making decisions. During the first two years of the new constitution, both the president and the prime minister have been Social Democrats and there has been a consensus-prone cohabitation on foreign policy. The Achilles heel of the Finnish constitution will be tested in the future in situations where the president and prime minister come from different political parties and have different opinions on foreign policy. The changing power relation between the president and prime minister can also be seen in presidential elections. Under the old constitution, six presidents out of ten were prime ministers at the moment of their election to the presidency. It has usually been an honour for party leaders to be nominated as a presidential candidate. Under the new constitution things have changed. When Mrs Halonen was elected president in 2000, both the Social Democratic Party leader, Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, and the Conservative Party leader, Minister of Finance Sauli Niinistö, refused to be nominated as presidential candidates. Both of them preferred to work in the government rather than have the opportunity to be president. Division of Power between Parliament and Cabinet According to Andrew Heywood, legislatures in democratic states may be divided into three types: (1) policy-making parliaments, (2) policy-influencing parliaments and (3) executive-dominated parliaments (1997, 306). Most legislatures in parliamentary systems are policy-influencing parliaments, and Finland is no exception. In earlier decades, two factors strengthened the power of parliament in relation to the cabinet. Between the world wars, and still in the 1950s, governments were mostly weak and unstable and parliamentary party groups frequently had to bargain on coalition formation. Until 1991, a one-third minority in parliament could effectively veto legislation. This strange constitutional arrangement gave rise to a Finnish version of cohabitation between government and the parliamentary opposition (Paloheimo 2001). In a comparative analysis undertaken by Michael Laver and W. Ben Hunt in the late 1980s, Finland, along with Italy and other Nordic nations, counted among the democratic countries having a strong parliamentary opposition (Laver & Hunt 1992). When the facility for a one-third minority to postpone legislation was eliminated in 1991, the power of the parliamentary opposition in the Finnish parliament collapsed. 231

14 With the stabilization of majority governments and the elimination of a minority s power to postpone legislation, the Finnish parliament has become an executive-dominated assembly, which exerts marginal influence on most current policy issues. About 99 percent of legislation is based on government bills, and ministerial party groups are active in supervising the reading of government bills in parliament. Nearly 100 percent of MPs initiatives fail. The high tide of parliament s power is in the formation of a new government. At that stage, parliamentary party groups can make policy proposals, which, if included in the programme of the government, are politically binding guidelines for the government. Division of Power in the Cabinet Cabinet Decision making in the Finnish cabinet is formally highly regulated, as in Sweden, and contrary to the situation in Denmark. In Finland, there are detailed legal norms clarifying where different kinds of issues should be decided and in which ways decisions should be made. Decisions in the Finnish government may be made collegially in the general meeting of the cabinet (cabinet governance) or, for minor issues, ministers make decisions as the head of their department (ministerial governance). Traditionally, decision making in the Finnish government was highly centralized. A large number of decisions were made collegially in the general meetings of the cabinet (Nousiainen 1975). In the 1920s and 1930s cabinet meetings were long lasting when ministers were discussing the details of government bills. From 1937 on, the cabinet began to organize informal discussions before general meetings, the socalled evening schools of the cabinet. Evening schools were an arena for informal strategic planning and for the regulation of disagreements between parties in office. From the 1960s on, when the number of issues on the agenda was rising all the time, informal arenas of decision making became even more important, and the general meeting of the government became an arena just for making formal decisions. As a result of the crowded agenda, the formal decision making of the government was decentralized in the mid 1990s. The number of issues decided in the general meeting of the government was reduced, and the number of issues decided by single ministers as the head of their ministry was increased. In late 1980s, about 2,000 decisions a year were made in the general meeting of the government. In late 1990s, between 500 and 700 decisions annually were made in the general meetings (Statistics Finland 2000). 232

15 Cabinet Committees Decentralization of decision making in a multi-party government increases the need for policy coordination. In the Finnish political system, this is done in preparatory cabinet committees and ministerial groups. There are cabinet committees for state finance, economic policy, foreign and security policy, EU issues, and issues concerning neighbouring areas. In spite of this, in the current second Lipponen government there are nine ministerial working groups for special policy areas. All coalition parties are represented in all cabinet committees as well as in all ministerial working groups. The prime minister has the chair in all cabinet committees, and the party leaders of other coalition parties are also generally members of these cabinet committees. Ministerial working groups are chaired by the minister responsible for the policy area concerned. Conflict Regulation Cabinet committees and ministerial working groups are arenas of policy preparation. For the settlement of internal disputes, there are two other informal arenas: informal meetings of the (coalition) party leaders, and informal meetings of the whole cabinet. The prime minister s office is the nerve centre for the monitoring of internal disputes. The secretary of state for the prime minister s office chairs monthly meetings of all the secretaries of state (the highest civil servants in the ministries). If troubles are signalled, the secretary of state for the prime minister s office will report to the prime minister, who thereafter will call a meeting of the party leaders or a meeting of the whole cabinet (expert interviews 2002), As a result of the parliamentarization of the Finnish political system, this informal role of the prime minister has clearly strengthened. The prime minister is the effective executive head and a kind of managing director of the state. Prime Minister s Office Since 2000, the prime minister and his office have become responsible for the coordination of the national preparation of EU issues too. During the first five years of Finnish membership of the EU, this coordinating responsibility was in the ministry of foreign affairs. The coordination of community affairs increases bilateral relations between the prime minister s office and various ministries. But membership of the EU may also emphasize the importance of those ministers who have the biggest responsibilities in the Council of the EU, for instance the minister of finance as a member of the Ecofin Council. The increased coordinating capacity of the prime minister s office can be seen in the resources available in the prime minister s office. In 1990, there 233

16 were about 150 civil servants working in the prime minister s office. In 2000, there were 227 civil servants. In a decade, personnel resources have grown about 50 percent (prime minister s office). The prime minister cannot directly control the agenda of government decision making. However, she or he can indirectly control the agenda by steering the working of cabinet committees and the informal meetings and networking in the cabinet. Inner Circles In the informal preparation of government policies, there surely is some kind of inner circle in the cabinet (Nousiainen 1992, 153 9; Murto 1994; 1997). According to expert evaluations, the party leaders of the parties in office form the inner circle of cabinet decision making. They occupy the most important government committees and ministerial working groups, and in this way supervise the functioning of the ministerial governance too. The core of this inner circle consists of the prime minister and the leader of the other big coalition partner. They are the two most important muscle men in Finnish government. If these two party leaders, commanding two big parties, have made an informal deal, the bargaining power of the smaller coalition parties is rather limited (expert evaluations 2002). To sum up, the Finnish style of governance is a mixture of reduced presidential rule, increased room for cabinet governance combined with reduced scope of cabinet governance, increased ministerial governance supervised by increased prime-ministerial governance, based on networking in government committees, ministerial working groups, and the informal meetings of cabinet and coalition party leaders. In contemporary Finland, the role of the prime minister as the leader of this informal network controlling the agenda of the government is much more prominent than the role of the prime minister in the former semi-presidential system. Government Termination Finnish governments have retired for several reasons. In the semi-presidential era, presidents could indirectly dismiss governments by dissolving parliament and calling an early general election. This prerogative of the president was eliminated with an amendment made to the constitution in According to that amendment, the president cannot dismiss the government without a vote of no confidence by parliament or an initiative of the government (Act No. 1974/1991). According to the same amendment, neither may the president dissolve parliament and order an early general election without the initiative of the prime minister. Both of these amendments were 234

17 transposed into the new constitution (sections 64.1 and 26 in the new constitution). Since 1983 all governments have been in office for the whole electoral term. Governments have no longer retired as a result of internal disagreements, as many governments did in the First Republic. However, on three occasions a small coalition partner has left the government in mid term because of political disagreements (the Rural Party in 1990, as a result of disagreements on the state budget; the Christian League in 1994, because it did not accept Finnish membership of the EU; and the Greens in 2002, because of disagreements about the building of a new nuclear power plant). Neither have governments fallen because of a vote of no confidence. And governments have not resigned after presidential elections, as they sometimes previously did, to give the president the opportunity to appoint a new government. According to the old constitution, the prime minister had no prerogative to dismiss ministers, but in some instances he could do so indirectly. The prime minister could ask for the retirement of the whole government, and then form a new government without the dissidents. This was the method that prime ministers sometimes used in order to put pressure on dissident ministers (expert interviews 2002). In 1991 the prime minister gained the formal prerogative to present to the president a proposal on the retirement of a minister. This prerogative was transposed to the new constitution (section 64) but has not formally been used. In normal conditions, the Finnish prime minister may not dismiss ministers from the government. In cases of severe disagreement, the prime minister puts pressure on the dissident ministers and asks them to resign. In 1994, the only minister of the Christian League resigned from the government when Prime Minister Esko Aho did not give him the opportunity to vote against Finland joining the EU (expert interviews 2002). The Dual Role of Party Leaders in the Cabinet There is much research on the effect of electoral rule on the internal structures and strategies of political parties (for example, Duverger 1967; Ware 1996). There is much less research on the relation between the structures of the political executive and party organizations (see, however, Epstein 1967; Samuel 2002). In a presidential system, office seeking is first and foremost based on vote seeking in presidential elections. As a result, the leadership of party organizations becomes highly personalized. In a parliamentary system, office seeking is mainly based on vote seeking in parliamentary elections, where there are lots of candidates. In a situation like this, collective arenas of internal decision making in political parties have been important. 235

18 In a multi-party government, ministers then always face the cross-pressure of different roles. On the one hand, they are representatives of their parties, and in the cabinet they are supposed to promote the policy stance of their own party. On the other hand, ministers in a multi-party government form a team, which is supposed to reconcile the different opinions of coalition parties, and to create the effective policy style of the cabinet (Nousiainen 1994). According to expert evaluations, trends towards the catch-all party (as defined by Kirchheimer [1966]) as well as towards the cartel party (as defined by Katz and Mair [1995]) will also be found in Finland (Nousiainen 1996; expert interviews 2002). Parties are appealing more and more to floating voters. Membership of party organizations is declining. The vertical ties between party leaders and party members have become weaker (Sundberg 1995; 1996). Relationships between party leaders and supporters of the party are more and more mediated by the national mass media at the expense of the local party organizations. People do not meet politicians in local political meetings as often as they used to. They meet politicians on television. These trends strengthen the role of party leaders, and make party leaders more autonomous in relation to the extra-parliamentary party, maybe also in relation to the parliamentary party group. Opinions and statements of party leaders (extra-parliamentary party, parliamentary party group, ministers) are publicized in the media on a daily basis. In the semi-presidential era, the president could quite easily leave party leaders out of the government. Since the 1980s, it has become a rule that the leaders of the parties in office are also ministers. Their role as a minister in a coalition government is at least as important as their role as a party leader. The need for consensus in a coalition government increases the autonomy of party leader ministers in their party. The prime minister s role as the prime minister is clearly dominant over his role as a party leader. In contemporary Finland, the prime minister s party seems to accept this mixture of roles. A general idea in the prime minister s party seems to be: if the government succeeds, then the prime minister s party will succeed. However, the most militant ideologists in the prime minister s party often complain about the compromises made by the government. According to the former prime minister Kalevi Sorsa, the prime minister must digest the gastric juices in his own stomach (expert interviews 2002). In addition to the trends mentioned above, there are some other factors tending to increase the autonomy of the prime minister in his or her party. Firstly, as a result of the parliamentarization of the Finnish constitution, the prime minister has become the effective executive head. Secondly, the prime minister is highly involved in international cooperation and summit politics. Thirdly, prime ministers in contemporary Finland lead stable majority coalitions that are in office for the whole electoral term. Fourthly, prime ministers are nowadays quite free in their selection of ministers coming from their own 236

19 party, although, contrary to British practice, they usually cannot reshuffle ministers in mid term without very important reasons. Meetings of the extra-parliamentary party executive of the prime minister s party are often meetings where the prime minister and other ministers of the same party, that is, trusted politicians selected by the prime minister, are reporting to the party executive on the government s current activities. In day-to-day politics, the party executive of the prime minister s party seems to be subordinate to the party s ministerial group. But the prime minister does not have a free hand. In the meetings of the party executive, the prime minister always has to monitor the limits of his autonomy (expert interviews 2002). Trends Towards Personalized Leadership There are several trends towards the personalization of political leadership. Among these trends are: (1) personalization of political publicity in the media, (2) personalization of electoral competition, (3) personalization of party leadership and (4) personalization of electoral behaviour. Personalization of Political Publicity The mass media give us information about political issues and politicians. During the last few decades, individuals have been put more and more in the spotlight at the expense of, or along with, the issues. There are several reasons for this personalization. Ideological differences between the political parties have become smaller. In the contemporary world, political issues are often technical and complex. National decisions are often made in the complex framework of global development. The agenda of political decision making is more crowded than ever. By describing the current opinions of political leaders and current disagreement between political leaders, the media avoid the hard job of describing the complexity of the issues. In the commercial markets of the media it is more rewarding (profitable) for the media to put much of the focus on individuals (expert interviews 2002). All these changes have contributed to the rising visibility of the prime minister in the media. Between the world wars, and still in the 1950s and 1960s, the activities of the Finnish parliament were quite extensively reported in the Finnish mass media. Parliament was more attended to by the media than was the government. In the 1930s, the chairman of the Finnish parliament was mentioned in the media as often as the prime minister. Under the semipresidential system, the president was more attended to by the media than was the prime minister (Murto 1994, 364 5). From the 1960s on, the publicity given to the government began to rise at the expense of parliament. The president was still as visible in the media as 237