An Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization *

Transcription

1 An Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization * Michael Jensen, Ph.D. Health Approaches in Community-Level Strategies to Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization Workshop, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Washington DC, September 7-8. *This research was supported by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate s Office of University Programs. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication/program/exhibition are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice or the Department of Homeland Security.

2 What is the Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) project? Multi-methods research project housed at START, University of Maryland, that seeks to provide an empirical understanding of extremism in the United States. Quantitative component: Cross-sectional dataset with information on 1473 U.S.-based extremists (PIRUS) Qualitative component: life-course narratives for 110 individuals who radicalized in the U.S. The goals of the project are to: 1. Provide policy-makers, CVE practitioners, intelligence analysts, law enforcement officers, researchers, and the general public with representative data on extremism in the US, including information on key radicalization mechanisms/processes; 2. Provide analyses using rigorous methods that help us better understand how radicalization in the US works, how it has changed over time, and how it may evolve in the future; 3. Produce empirically derived policy recommendations for counter-terrorism and CVE.

3 The EADR project contains data on: Identification Variables Number ID Name and aliases Plot and Consequences Activity description Location of plot Date of exposure Violent/non-violent Criminal charges Group information Group name(s) Role in group Name of group leader Group dynamics Demographics - Ethnicity - Age - Gender - Marital status - Religious background - Citizenship Radicalization details - Ideologies - Recruitment - Role of internet/media - Event influence Socioeconomic Status - Education level - Finances and employment - Military background Personal details Abuse and psychological concerns Family and relationships Drug and alcohol use Social life Previous criminal activity Mindset prior to radicalization Foreign fighter information Pre-travel behaviors Group preference Activities in the conflict zone Return information Plot involvement

4 What has the project revealed about extremism in the U.S.? 1. Extremism in the U.S. is not limited to Islamist radicalization.

5 Radicalization over time: ideologies National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Exposure date by ideology (by percentage) Ideological distribution in PIRUS: Islamist Far Right Far Left 43% Far Right 21% Far Left 21% Single Issue 15% Islamist

6 What has the project revealed about extremism in the U.S.? 1. Extremism in the U.S. is not limited to Islamist radicalization. 2. Important differences exist across ideologies.

7 Comparing Extremist Ideologies Far Right Far Left Islamist Age (average) 38 years 28 years 30 years % Female 5% 25% 4% Education 45% some college 75% some college 59% some college Military Experience 30% of cases 11% of cases 10% of cases Previous Crime 63% of cases 51% of cases 40% of cases Rad. Duration (average) 5 years or more 1-5 years 1-5 years Group Competition 50% of cases 35% of cases 14% of cases

8 What has the project revealed about extremism in the U.S.? 1. Extremism in the U.S. is not limited to Islamist radicalization. 2. Ideology matters. 3. Extremists are more often acting alone, and they may be radicalizing quicker, in part due to increased online activity

9 Lone Actors Over Time 100 LONE ACTORS v. GROUP ACTORS (PERCENTAGE) Lone Actors Group Actors

10 Radicalization Duration and Online Activity* * From subset of PIRUS which looks at U.S. foreign fighters

11 What has the project revealed about extremism in the U.S.? 1. Extremism in the U.S. is not limited to Islamist radicalization. 2. Ideology matters. 3. Extremists are more often acting alone and they may be radicalizing quicker now than in the past. 4. Most individuals with extreme views do not engage in violence, but those who do often share some key characteristics.

12 Likelihood of engaging in an act of political violence* Previous criminal record: 1.5x more likely Far Right or Islamist: 2x to 3x more likely Radical Social Network: 2.5x more likely Mental Illness: 2x more likely Stable Employment History: 2x less likely * Figures represent a comparison between non-violent and violent extremists

13 What has the project revealed about extremism in the U.S.? 1. Extremism in the U.S. is not limited to Islamist radicalization. 2. Ideology matters. 3. Extremists are more often acting alone and they may be radicalizing quicker now than in the past. 4. Most individuals with extreme views do not engage in violence, but those who do often share some key characteristics. 5. Radicalization is complex.

14 Radicalization Pathways An in-depth examination of 56 cases of extremists in the U.S. using fs/qca methods revealed: A sense of community victimization and a fundamental shift in cognitive frames are almost always present in radicalization pathways Many pathways begin with emotional vulnerabilities (often brought on by traumatic experience) and progress when extremist narratives/causes appear to provide a sense of identity Common cognitive biases, such as group-think, ingroup/out-group bias, and perceptions of threat, are very common, especially when individuals are embedded in radical social networks

15 Implications for CVE Effective CVE requires programs/policies across the ideological spectrum Programs need to be tailored to the ideological group or sub-group that they target Windows of opportunity for intervention exist, but they may be shrinking CVE must tackle the online space CVE policies should take advantage of existing community outreach programs, especially those that focus on juvenile crime, job assistance, and mental health Counter-narratives/programs should address feelings of community victimization, but we also must be aware that because of common biasing mechanisms, certain audiences may not be responsive to the message

16 Thank you! Questions? Contact Information Michael Jensen, PhD Principal Investigator Patrick James Project Manager William Braniff Executive Director