Richard P. Lawless Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Affairs U.S. Department of Defense U.S.-Taiwan Business Council - US-Taiwan

Transcription

1 Thank you, Secretary Cohen, General Huoh, your distinguished delegation and members of the U.S. Taiwan Business Council for the opportunity to address you tonight. It is a sincere pleasure to be with all of you this evening. We are truly among friends. And being among friends, allows us a familiarity, a frankness of discussion that benefits and reinforces a friendship. As in years past, this conference continues to be an important forum to explore areas of mutual cooperation for the U.S. and Taiwan. In gathering here over these three days, we share a common goal: ensuring the self-defense of Taiwan and maintaining peace, prosperity and stability in the Taiwan Strait. There are two themes I would like to develop this evening. First I would like to touch briefly on the Special Budget. And, second, I would like to devote some time to explain my concern that Taiwan has not, and is not, appreciating the magnitude of one particularly serious emerging vulnerability to its national security. With regard to the budget, which we all know so much about, and whose future we are all following so closely, I d like to applaud President Chen and Minister Li for their Herculean effort to bring an unprecedented $18 billion defense Special Budget for PAC3s, P3s and submarines before the Legislative Yuan. And I admire their persistence and determination in lobbying every single legislator, personally, to pass this budget. I sympathize with the President and his cabinet. I understand all too well how difficult it can be to convince legislators to make the right decisions in an election year. The LY has had a lively and spirited debate on the merits of the Special Budget. A few months ago, we took the rare step of inviting Speaker Wang Jin-pyng to the Pentagon so that he and his delegation could ask direct questions of top-level officials. And he told us he supports the budget. We respect the right of each legislator, to ask hard questions and be careful custodians of their citizens money. We also know that each legislator will vote his or her conscience with respect to the Special Budget. In this case, we firmly believe a vote of conscience should lead to a vote in favor of Taiwan s national security. We believe that a vote against the budget risks sending the message that Taiwan s democracy has not matured to the point where national security trumps partisan politics. Each legislator has a duty to protect Taiwan and its citizens, nothing could be more fundamental to this duty than providing for the country s national defense. And while passage of the Special Budget is ultimately the decision and responsibility of the Taiwan people, Taiwan s inability to pass this budget has serious long-term consequences. 1

2 Many in the United States and in the world have questioned Taiwan s commitment to its defense and if the budget fails to pass, I fear these doubters will be proven right to question Taiwan s national will. Make no mistake, the passage of this budget is a litmus test of Taiwan s commitment to its self-defense. And I would be remiss if I did not layout for my Taiwan friends, from the perspective of many in the U.S., some of these potential consequences of not passing this budget. If the Legislative Yuan fails to pass this budget, it will be much harder to convince foreign partners to support your defense. If the LY does not pass this budget, you will be telling Beijing that intimidation is an excellent tool of statecraft. And you will guarantee that Taiwan will experience more of the same. If the LY does not pass this budget, friends and foes alike may well begin to regard Taiwan as a liability, rather than a partner. Taiwan has a formidable economy and has evolved into a vibrant democracy -- that now must mature into a democracy that is willing to defend itself. Taiwan must enhance its ability to sustain and counter-threats to its national security. It must invest in the necessary weapons systems to counter an increasingly lethal and modern PLA threat. We have talked for years with our Taiwan friends about the need to invest in missile defense, command and control capabilities and an integrated anti-submarine and counter blockade capability -- and Taiwan is moving in that direction. We believe that these continue to be the capabilities that merit the most focus. Referencing the budget, but stepping back to view the larger threat profile, I note that the island remains vulnerable to a range of military options. Let me touch on one particular vulnerability that I think merits more of our collective attention. To do so, I need to take you back to Sept. 11, As the United States and the world learned on that dark day, some wars are not waged, in the first instance, against military forces, tanks or aircraft carriers. Rather, our would-be opponents sense other vulnerabilities. In some wars, the first casualties or even the main casualties are not our brave men and women in uniform. In some wars, the structure and coherent functioning of society itself is the primary, the first target. On 9/11, a war was waged against America that we were not prepared to fight. We were not prepared, psychologically-materially-organizationally-for the body blows that were delivered against our society. We have learned our lesson. And are hopefully better prepared to deflect and, if necessary, absorb the next blow. In a similar vein, as we continue to work with our Taiwan friends on investing in necessary weapons systems, we must also focus our efforts over the next few years on a new type of unconventional threat. 2

3 China appears to be exploring a variety of coercion options, any or all of which could potentially be executed in a sequenced, carefully calculated manner. These threats range from computer network attacks to compromising Taiwan s public utilities, communications, operational security and transportation. The intention of such actions would be to paralyze Taiwan s economy, and the government s ability to function. In a word, the target is the functioning of society itself. Taiwan has flourished as an information-based economy. It has a computer savvy populace with a high internet usage per capita and is highly dependent on satellite and cellular communications technologies. But Taiwan must ensure that its advanced technology and its dependency on this technology, does not become its Achilles heel. Taiwan must harden its critical infrastructure to prevent or mitigate the disastrous effects of actions or events which disrupt and shatter its infrastructure. In addressing these vulnerabilities, Taiwan faces geographic challenges. It only has a few physical connections linking its telecommunications to the rest of the world and because of its limited physical and natural resources it has been difficult for Taiwan to create the necessary redundancy to protect its infrastructure. We need only to remember the summer of 1999 to illustrate the vulnerabilities of Taiwan s critical infrastructure and information systems. That summer, the loss of a single transformer station left thousands without power for weeks. A few months later, a massive earthquake left Taiwan dependent on satellite communications to the outside world for more than a month. Many feared China would attempt to take advantage of Taiwan s ill fortune. These fears sent shockwaves through the stock market and were only quelled after Beijing issued a statement that it would not intervene in the situation, unless Taiwan authorities were unable to handle it. These lessons were not lost on China. China is actively developing options to create chaos on the island: to compromise components of Taiwan s critical infrastructure -- telecommunications, utilities, broadcast media, cellular, internet and computer networks. Perhaps, taking a lead from Dr. Lin s carefully developed comments at today s lunch, we should call this acupuncture, or the destruction of a national will but the insertion of a hundred needles. The point is, this is serious business. If China is allowed to successfully execute such tactics, Taiwan could be electronically blockaded -- isolated from the world creating a kind of perfect storm in which the U.S. could not communicate with Taiwan or Taiwan with the world. The summer of 1999 is a vivid example of weaknesses in Taiwan s critical infrastructure to one or more threats. More recently, we witnessed mass confusion on the island after the assassination attempt on President Chen. 3

4 To defeat potential disruptions or even decapitation strikes, Taiwan must protect its national command authority. Police, intelligence agencies, and the military must work together to ensure stability if chaos is PRC s goal. In the U.S., the lead up to Sept. 11 is prime example of a situation in which military officers, local officials and federal authorities were not properly organized to respond to a common threat. As a result of the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States government is re-organizing to better integrate its responses to threats to its infrastructure. DoD is restructuring to better work with local officials, first responders and federal agencies to coordinate emergency preparedness and incident response in the event of an attack or the degradation of critical infrastructure. The U.S. government and businesses can assist Taiwan in safeguarding its critical infrastructure and ensuring that the government is able to function effectively in a crisis. Taiwan should protect the security of it energy supply and enhance the reliability of its pipelines, ports and transportation system. Safeguarding telecommunications, fiber optics, energy supplies and major transportation arteries are areas where U.S. and Taiwan industry can work in concert to strengthen Taiwan s commercial, civil and military infrastructure. By hardening Taiwan critical infrastructure, Taiwan can protect itself from pervasive coercive attacks that could undermine domestic and international confidence in Taiwan s ability to identify, manage and resolve a crisis. Indeed, Taiwan needs to take steps to expand its very definition of national defense. It must think in terms of national security. This first requires a cultural and mindset shift. We have done this in America Taiwan must do it. Other agencies besides the Ministry of National Defense must play a role. Public-private partnerships should be established to help with this evolution. The people of Taiwan, themselves, must be prepared to withstand an unconventional attack. Fortunately, Taiwan is one of the most technologically advance societies in the world, but the expertise and wealth of experience that exist in the private sector remains largely untapped. Private industry can be an invaluable tool in working with the government to protect Taiwan s infrastructure, and ensure critical national security information is safeguarded. Creating public-private partnerships can not only provide the most modern services and equipment for the public, but it can also enhance Taiwan s national security and mitigate weaknesses in Taiwan s vast critical infrastructure. Tonight, I say to my Taiwan friends, the U.S. government stands firmly behind Taiwan in its self-defense, now and for generations to come. We are prepared to honor our commitment to you by assisting you in deterring the use of force. We are prepared to equip you with the necessary tools to maintain your national security. 4

5 We are prepared not just because it is in the interest of the United States. We are prepared not just because it is in the interest of Taiwan. We are prepared because it is in the interest of the world. Having said the above, I would like to conclude my presentation with a suggestion for the consideration of this council. In his opening remarks this morning, Secretary Cohen made reference to the frog on the post, recognizing the sound work of others in organizing this conference. The U.S. government policy managers here today, myself included, also acknowledge that we are able to join with you because council members, the sponsors of this conference, make our meeting possible. Your support and interaction assures the success of this process. However, to give ourselves collectively the best chance to enhance Taiwan s security, we need to take maximum advantage of this established forum. With this in mind, I would suggest that this forum consider expanding its scope, cast its defense net more broadly, to include national security, specifically those systems, technologies, services that assure the survivability of critical infrastructure I have mentioned these vulnerabilities in the nation s critical infrastructure are now being reconsidered for what they are critical non-defense shortcomings. Once recognized, these vulnerabilities must be addressed, mitigated and resolved. I believe this forum is the most appropriate bilateral mechanism to address and help Taiwan resolve these vulnerabilities. We would like to charge you all with this additional, critical task. Thank you. 5