THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE

Transcription

1 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking by Tereza Hořejšová Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz Jeff Lovitt Věra Řiháčková

2 This publication has been made possible by the support of the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) of Open Society Foundations. THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Authors: Tereza Hořejšová, Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz, Jeff Lovitt, Věra Řiháčková Editor: Jeff Lovitt Illustrations: Tereza Nozarová, Printed in Prague, Czech Republic, by GÖFI-PRINT s.r.o., January PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society), Sdružení pro podporu otevřené společnosti - PASOS ISBN PASOS Těšnov Praha 1 Czech Republic Tel/fax: info@pasos.org

3 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking by Tereza Hořejšová Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz Jeff Lovitt Věra Řiháčková

4 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking About the Authors Tereza Hořejšová is an associate research fellow at EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague, Czech Republic. She received her PhD in International Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, in Prague. She worked as a lecturer at the Charles University in Prague teaching Scandinavian Politics and later as a senior lecturer at Middlesex University in Dubai, where she taught courses on citizenship, comparative politics and international development. Tereza is currently based in Switzerland. Her main fields of interest include Euroscepticism and the democratic deficit of the EU; her regional focus concentrates mainly on the Nordic countries. Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz is a policy analyst at the Institute of Public Affairs in Warsaw. A political scientist, graduate of Southern Oregon University and Central European University, he is author and editor of publications related to European development policy, East European migration trends and policy, relations between the EU and Eastern Partnership states, and future EU enlargement. He is a policy analysis trainer and consultant with a record of collaboration with PASOS, Open Society Foundations, the European Commission, the United Nations Development Programme, and the International Organization for Migration. Jeff Lovitt is Executive Director of PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society). From , he was Director of Communications at the international secretariat of Transparency International. From , he was a journalist and editor in London and Central Europe, working for The European, the Sunday Times, and other publications. In 2007, he was co-editor of a PASOS report for the European Parliament on The Challenge of European Development Co-operation Policy for New Member States. He was co-editor in 2008 of Democracy s New Champions. European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement, a PASOS study into the democracy assistance policies of the Visegrad Four countries. Věra Řiháčková is a Senior Research Fellow at the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, and a former member of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum Steering Committee. She graduated from the Faculty of Social Science in Political Science and International Relations and from the Faculty of Humanities, Charles University in Prague. She studied political science at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Her main areas of expertise include EU institutions, European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership and EU democracy promotion.

5

6 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking

7 CONTENTS Introduction: Setting Your Sights on Influencing EU Policymaking by Jeff Lovitt 4 PART I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION by Věra Řiháčková and Tereza Hořejšová 9 (i) Overview of Main Decision-Making Procedures in the EU 11 Ordinary Legislative Procedure 12 Special Legislative Procedures 18 (ii) EU Institutions: Organisation, Roles, and Entry Points for Advocacy 21 European Commission 22 Council of the European Union (EU Council, Council) 28 Presidency of the Council of the European Union 34 Member States 40 European Council 44 European Parliament 48 European External Action Service 54 National Parliaments 58 (iii) Additional Mechanisms for Participating in EU Policymaking 65 European Citizens Initiative. Can Civil Society Directly Influence the EU s Agenda? 66 European Transparency Initiative and Transparency Register 74 PART II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES 77 Advocacy: Getting Right the Basics by Jeff Lovitt 78 Advocacy Case Study 1: EU Financial Instruments in Support of Democracy and Human Rights by Věra Řiháčková 82 Advocacy Case Study 2: Migration and Visa Policies by Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz 92

8 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Introduction: Setting Your Sights on Influencing EU Policymaking by Jeff Lovitt There is more than one approach to reaching a summit - even if the principal reason for the attempt is just to see the view from the top. For interest groups intent on approaching policymakers, there are usually many approaches, but rarely is it sufficient to travel one route, nor even to travel the same route over and over again; it is usually necessary to cover a lot of ground through different approaches from a variety of angles. When it comes to influencing policy and legislation at the level of the European Union - decisions that affect its population of more than 500 million (not to mention the impact on neighbouring countries) living in an economy that accounts for 20 per cent of the world s gross domestic product - the approach is very complex, but the results of a successful approach can be far-reaching. Managing the labyrinth of committees, levels and structures is essential; but it is equally important to know the context and different interests in the policy area where change is being sought. The power and reach of the voice of civil society is not enough; it is essential to know your subject, know your audience, and to interact with the right players in the policymaking cycle at the right time. The Right Approach to Europe. An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking - written and peerreviewed by analysts from the PASOS network of independent think-tanks with indepth experience of the workings of EU policy - is primarily targeted at think-tanks and other policy-focused civil society organisations or networks. 4

9 Introduction: Setting Your Sights on Influencing EU Policymaking For civil society actors working to promote the values of an open, democratic society where human rights are defended and nurtured, where fundamental freedoms of movement and expression are respected, and where tolerance and a plurality of perspectives and beliefs are cherished, an understanding of EU policymaking is essential. Advocacy is about influencing public-policy outcomes, from budget allocations to the introduction of new policies governing the freedom to travel, trade, or work in different countries. This handbook is an introduction to the subject at a snapshot in time, written in January 2012, just as another new treaty was under debate among the EU member states: the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union - or fiscal compact - that will require signatory member states to maintain national budgets in balance or surplus. It would be an understatement to say that the EU is a very fluid policymaking environment. Just as political initiatives from a diverse array of EU governments set changing priorities, so also the structures of decision-making in the EU have gone through many changes, as highlighted in Part I of this publication, and will continue to do so. Once an understanding of EU institutions and the decision-making processes has been acquired, it is important to know how these processes will work in a given context and policy area. Part II illustrates the challenges facing civil society organisations seeking to influence EU policymaking in two areas: (a) EU financial instruments in support of democracy and human rights; (b) migration and visa policies. As one of the chapters in Part I explains, there is now a European Transparency Register, where interest groups that lobby the EU should disclose their lobbying activities and sources of funding. Civil society organisations should register there, because accountability is not a one-way street. It is important to be transparent about who you are, whom you represent, and who provides the resources for your advocacy efforts - just as it is essential in an open society that public policymaking is conducted in a transparent, accountable manner. 5

10 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking The right approach to Europe should rarely be a solitary expedition. Just as there are many stakeholders in the EU member states, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and, of course, the European Parliament, so there are many interest groups (business lobbies, civil society platforms, and others), and it is often just as important to know your competitors as it is to find potential coalition partners - within the EU institutions and without. The politics of the EU is of course as multi-faceted as it is unpredictable, so no approach to the summit can guarantee either access or results, but I hope that this handbook will make the approach to Europe a little easier to navigate in even unfavourable conditions. 6

11 Introduction: Setting Your Sights on Influencing EU Policymaking 7

12 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking 8

13 PART I HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION by Věra Řiháčková and Tereza Hořejšová To be able to influence EU policymaking, it is important first to understand how the various EU bodies are organised and their role in the decision-making process. This section provides an overview of the EU s legislative procedures, the different EU institutions, policymaking processes, and decision-makers, the entry points for advocacy, and the sort of outcomes that can be expected from advocacy efforts. 9

14 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking 10

15 (i) Overview of Main Decision-Making Procedures in the EU 11

16 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Ordinary Legislative Procedure After the Lisbon Treaty came into force, Ordinary legislative procedure became the principal method of legislating in the EU. It applies to 83 policy areas. 1 The procedure starts with the Commission proposal that emerges after consultations both with external actors (entry point for advocacy: European Commission) and intrainstitutionally (among the relevant Directorates-General of the Commission), and after its adoption by the college of commissioners. The proposal is published in the Official Journal of the European Union ( C Series). The Commission has a very strong role within this procedure while keeping control over its proposal throughout the process. Until the end of the second reading (see below), it is entitled to modify or withdraw its proposal any time. The proposal is forwarded to the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, all National Parliaments and, where applicable, to the Committee of the Regions (CoR) 2 and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). 3 These two institutions can issue opinions on the legislative proposal; these opinions, however, do not bind the Commission to act (modify the proposal). Lobbying of the EESC or CoR can be a complementary activity within a complex advocacy strategy; these two institutions do not have enough decision-making power to be a primary target of advocacy efforts, but can act as an ally in putting the Commission, in particular, under pressure. At the first reading, the European Parliament delivers a position prepared by a rapporteur (entry point for advocacy: European Parliament). The position is discussed and amended within the relevant committee of the Parliament, then debated in 1 For full list see 2 Committee of the Regions (CoR) is the political assembly that provides local and regional authorities with a voice at the heart of the European Union. 3 The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is a consultative body that gives representatives of Europe s socio-occupational interest groups, and others, a formal platform to express their points of views on EU issues. 12

17 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Ordinary Legislative Procedure SCHEME OF THE ORDINARY LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE Source: The European Commission, 13

18 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking plenary session and adopted by a simple majority. There is no time-limit for delivering the position (it usually takes months, but can take even longer), which allows for long-term advocacy efforts. On the basis of the European Parliament s position, the Commission can amend the proposal. The first reading in the Council runs in parallel to the activity in the European Parliament (entry point for advocacy: Council of the European Union). However, the Council can adopt a position only after the European Parliament has acted. The Council finalises its position on the basis of the Commission s proposal, amended where necessary in the light of the European Parliament s first reading. There are three possible scenarios: The Council accepts without alteration the Commission s proposal, which the European Parliament has not amended, and the act can be adopted; The Council accepts all the European Parliament s amendments that the Commission has incorporated into its amended proposal, and the act can be adopted; In all other cases, the Council adopts a common position. When the European Parliament has introduced amendments, adoption of the act is dependent on the Council approving all the amendments by a qualified majority (QMV) if the Commission has incorporated them into its amended proposal or by unanimity if the Commission has refused to do so. When the Council adopts a common position, it is prepared by the working parties (groups) for the Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union (COREPER), comprising the heads or deputy heads of mission from the EU member states in Brussels (the Council of the European Union), and formally adopted as a common position by the Council of Ministers at a subsequent meeting. No time-limit is laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 for the adoption of a common position by the Council; it usually takes between months. The European Parliament is notified of the common position at the next plenary session following its 1 Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, drawing on all EU treaties to date. 14

19 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Ordinary Legislative Procedure formal adoption. The time-limits laid down by the Treaty for the subsequent stages of the procedure start to run after the European Parliament announces the receipt of the common position in plenary. In parallel to a common position, the Commission issues and sends to the European Parliament a communication explaining whether it supports or opposes the common position of the Council. About 70 per cent of EU legislation is adopted at the first reading. The second reading in the European Parliament must take place within the 3+1 month limit; 1 the time slot for effective advocacy is thus limited. The adoption procedure is similar to that at first reading (preparation in committees, adoption at the plenary), but there are some differences. As a general rule, the amendments must: Include amendments adopted at first reading and not accepted by the Council; or Concern a part of the common position that did not appear in the Commission s initial proposal, or is substantially different from the Commission s initial proposal; or Introduce a compromise between the positions of the co-legislators. The amendments adopted in parliamentary committee constitute the recommendation for second reading, which is normally defended by the same rapporteur as at the first reading. The proposed amendments are put to the vote in the parliamentary committee responsible, which takes a decision by simple majority. The plenary adopts amendments by absolute majority (majority of all members). If the European Parliament endorses the common position of the Council, fails to adopt amendments as a result of not obtaining an absolute majority, or does not take a decision within the stipulated time-limit, the President of Parliament declares the common position approved and the act is adopted in accordance with the common position. This is also the case when trialogue meetings 2 have taken place after the first reading in the 1 The date of receipt of the Council s position at first reading marks the beginning of the three-month timelimit for the second reading. At the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council, this period may be extended by one month. The vote in plenary must take place no later than the end of the fourth month. 2 Negotiation meeting ( trialogue ) between representatives from the Council, Commission and Parliament. 15

20 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Parliament and before the Council adopts its common position. Such an agreement is called negotiated common position or early second reading. Rejection of the Council s common position requires an absolute majority in the European Parliament, whereupon the act is not adopted. The European Parliament can propose amendments to the common position. When adopted by an absolute majority, the amended text is then forwarded to the Council and the Commission. The Treaty then specifically requires the Commission to deliver an opinion on the European Parliament s amendments. The Commission s position on the European Parliament s amendments determines the type of vote necessary in the Council: if the Commission has given a negative opinion on at least one amendment, the Council will have to act unanimously as regards acceptance of the European Parliament s position overall. The Council has the same time-limit for its second reading (3+1 months), following receipt of the European Parliament s amendments that have to be approved by QMV or unanimously if the Commission has delivered a negative opinion. If the Council agrees to accept all the amendments of the European Parliament, the act is adopted. If the Council does not approve the amendments to the common position, the President of the Council, in agreement with the President of the European Parliament, convenes a meeting of the Conciliation Committee within six weeks (this can be extended by two weeks). The Conciliation Committee is composed of 27 member states representatives (usually COREPER I level - deputy heads of missions) and the same number of MEPs. The period between the end of the Council s second reading and the convening of the Conciliation Committee is used to prepare the work of the latter, through informal meetings between the three institutions. These informal trialogues bring together small teams of negotiators for each co-legislator, with participation by the Commission. Each team reports to their delegation within the 16

21 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Ordinary Legislative Procedure Conciliation Committee. The Conciliation Committee produces a joint text that is either approved by the Council and European Parliament delegations and the legislation is adopted; or not approved by the delegations and the legislative process ends without a legislative outcome. The last option is that the Conciliation Committee does not agree on a joint text and the legislative procedure is ended. The non-adoption of legislation at this stage is, however, rather rare (three cases since 2001). Ordinary legislative procedure in detail at: Statistics on adoption of legislative proposals: Cross-references European Commission (page 22) European Parliament (page 48) Council of the European Union (page 28) 17

22 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Special Legislative Procedures The consultation procedure The consultation procedure, as stipulated in the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), includes three stages: the Commission submits a proposal to the Council; the Council consults the European Parliament; and the Council adopts the measure in question acting either by qualified majority or by unanimity (more often), depending upon the policy field (for example, social security and social protection, visas, asylum and immigration legislation, indirect taxation, state aid, employment policy, family law with cross-border implications). The central feature of the consultation procedure is the Council s duty to consult the European Parliament. The European Parliament can approve the proposal, reject it, ask for amendments, or abstain from giving an opinion. The Council is obliged to re-consult the European Parliament if the text is amended. The Council, however, is not bound by the Parliament s opinion, but it may not adopt legislation before having received it. If the matter is urgent and the European Parliament fails to gives its opinion in reasonable time, the Council may legislate without waiting for its opinion. Budgetary procedures Annual budgets All the institutions, with the exception of the European Central Bank, draw up estimates of expenditure, and send them to the Commission, which consolidates them into a draft budget. The draft budget is sent to the Council and the European Parliament. The Council adopts a position and forwards it to the European Parliament, fully informing the Parliament of its reasons. If, within 42 days of such communication, the Parliament either adopts the proposal or does not act, the budget is deemed to have been adopted. 18

23 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Special Legislative Procedures Otherwise, the Conciliation Committee is convened, and a complex procedure follows. If within 21 days of the Conciliation Committee being convened there is no agreement, a new budget must be drawn up by the Commission and the procedure must be followed again. Multiannual Financial Framework The Multiannual Financial Framework is adopted for at least five years. It takes the form of a regulation. The Commission drafts the proposal, and the Council acts unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which must be given by a majority of MEPs. The European Council may, unanimously, adopt a decision authorising the Council to adopt this regulation by QMV. Throughout the procedure leading to the adoption of the financial framework, the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission must co-operate on facilitating its adoption. Assent procedure The Council acts after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, and legislation can be passed only in the event that they both agree. The procedure applies in a limited number of areas, including membership of the European Union (enlargement) and functioning of the European Central Bank. 19

24 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking 20

25 (ii) EU Institutions: Organisation, Roles, and Entry Points for Advocacy 21

26 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking European Commission The European Commission is the EU s executive body. In a narrow sense, it is composed of the commissioners (college); at the moment, the principle of one commissioner per member-state applies. The commissioners are supposed to act in the interest of the whole Union and not take any instructions from governments. The Commission in a wider sense means the administrative apparatus of about 20,000 EU officials who are running the EU. The Commission is organised as a centralised bureaucracy (see the chart) along the policy areas into the Directorates General. 1 The increasingly important Secretariat General serves as the right hand of the Commission President and involves about 200 top officials and advisers close to the President. It has a procedural and co-ordination role (increasingly political). The commissioners cabinets are another key power structure within the Commission, each comprising six members and a chef de cabinet. Powers The Commission enjoys the right of legislative initiative (with the exception of Common Foreign and Security Policy, in other policy fields - such as Justice and Home Affairs - EU member states can request legislation; the European Citizens Initiative is a new tool that can prompt the Commission to legislate). As a body with legislative initiative, the Commission is responsible for drafting legislative proposals and proposals of various decisions including those of the Council - a role that requires a substantive amount of external expertise. As a Guardian of the Treaties, it performs control powers, making sure that member states respect their obligations under EU law. It drafts the EU budget (Multiannual Financial Frameworks as well as annual budgets) and administers 97 per cent of the budget. The Commission administers EU external competencies (negotiating international treaties and agreements, running enlargement negotiations). The Commission also sets up and 1 For the list, see 22

27 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Commission runs the committees (comitology) that discuss the implementation of legislation already agreed upon by the EU institutions; within the comitology procedure, between 3,000-4,000 executive decisions are taken each year. The Commission s legitimacy is largely based on technical expertise. To some extent, it can initiate new policies (like consumer protection or climate change in the past). Due to its position at the beginning of the decision-making process and its powers, the European Commission has traditionally been the primary target of advocacy and lobbying. It is generally believed that approximately 90 per cent of the Commission s policy outputs stem from external inputs - both member-states and interest groups. Entry points The fragmentation of responsibilities within the Commission is far-reaching, and the entry points need to be defined in relation to each given policy area, the advocacy aim (to influence legislation, etc.) and advocacy means (policy paper, conference). A bottom-up approach (approaching Commission officials) is generally much more realistic in terms of gaining access, and more effective, than a top-down approach (lobbying commissioners directly). The Commission is responsible for drafting legislative proposals; the final enacted legislation usually retains 80 per cent of the text of the first draft, and the Commission official responsible for drafting is thus a focal point of advocacy aiming at influencing the legislation. In reality, the official concerned is not a passive target as he or she actively seeks external input and expertise, too, given the limited resources of the European Commission. The pre-drafting phase (little is documented about this phase) is a crucial access point for influencing the draft; if the proposal is already made a subject to inter-institutional deliberations, the chances to advocate successfully are reduced. Once the draft has been approved by the college of commissioners, the advocating civil society organisations should shift their attention to other bodies active in the procedure (European Parliament, Council of the European Union). 23

28 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Besides contact with the responsible official, there are formalised consultation procedures for the pre-drafting period. The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1 December 2009, envisages that the Commission consults widely, but no specific procedure was foreseen. The Commission adopted General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties 1 already before the Lisbon Treaty, and engaged in the intra-institutional European Transparency initiative. Currently, there are three forms of consultation used most often by the European Commission: Consultative expert committees in different policy areas: civil society organisations and platforms (most often Brussels-based) can act as advisers/experts together with other stakeholders before the legislation is published; inclusion in these committees is a very effective channel for influencing legislation. Structured on-going dialogue with civil society in some policy areas: it is up to each Directorate General (DG) to organise this, and practices vary (DG Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid, for example, organises extensive structured dialogue with civil society on EU external action instruments); the impact on the future policy of a given DG varies, and can be ascertained on a case by case basis. Consultation processes where the policy or legislative proposal is put on the web page of the respective DG, and where public contributions are invited (via the web site or seminars): probably the least effective for advocacy out of all three (see below). There are more than 1,000 expert groups involved in the drafting phase of the Commission s legislative proposals; these include advisory committees (industry, professionals, consumers, governments, and civil society organisations), scientific committees, and social dialogue committees (social partners). The Commission s highlevel groups are also considered expert groups. These groups provide mainly technical expertise. Expert groups (during the drafting phase) are highly influential. Commission DGs can establish expert groups whenever they see a need. Participants in these groups can

29 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Commission either be appointed as representatives of a public authority or civil society group, or in a personal capacity. There are both formal and informal groups. Formal groups are established by a Commission decision. For informal groups, there is no public document announcing or acknowledging their existence. Even for professional lobbyists, ascertaining the existence and activities of expert groups is not an easy task. Some lobbyists suggest to lobby for the creation of a new expert group in order to control the agenda. In contrast to most other expert groups, the names of the participants of scientific committees are available online. 1 The consultation procedure enables the Commission to obtain the necessary expertise and legitimacy in exchange for access. However, access does not always imply influence. The structured dialogue or web-based consultations or questionnaires can help the Commission to secure a smoother path for the legislation by adding legitimacy through the consultation process. Access to the Commission s official consultation mechanisms can be actively sought by civil society organisations on the basis of information from the European Transparency Register or the Commission websites. Similarly, when preparing a consultation, the relevant DGs send out invitations to recognised networks and allocate a certain number of seats to each of them. The participation of member organisations is left to the discretion of the networks. Individual organisations can also participate, but the Commission clearly prefers to work with networks in the light of the large number of individual organisations. The consultation process is quite open for new networks, which can simply ask the Commission to be involved in the procedure. The implementation phase committees are the final stage in EU decision-making (comitology). The Commission chairs these committees, which are composed of national delegates, and takes the final decisions. The system of decision-making within these committees is complicated (the Commission can, for example, push through regulatory measures, when neither the relevant regulatory committee nor the Council can reach a qualified majority decision for or against a Commission proposal), and varies according 1 For more details, see Lobbying the European Union by Committee, Briefing Paper, Corporate Europe Observatory, July 2007, 25

30 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking to the type of committee. The system underwent reform in 2006, following which the European Parliament emerged with a right of veto, but only on measures defined as quasi-legislative ; 1 many important issues are not covered by this definition. An advocacy strategy aiming at the implementation of legislation should primarily target the Commission, a large number of member states, and the European Parliament on a quasi-legislative issue if the aim is to scrap the proposed measure. When advocating higher up the Commission ladder (Heads of Departments or DGs, commissioners cabinet members, or commissioners themselves), it is advisable not to aim at influencing a specific piece of legislation-in-making, but rather at promoting a more general policy issue or idea that can penetrate the official discourse or become a policy buzzword. Once this aim has been achieved, it can be translated into specific measures (legislative, funding) to be taken by the Commission. At the highest levels, the target agenda might fall within the overlapping powers of several commissioners or DGs, and it is necessary to make sure that corresponding advocacy efforts involve all relevant actors within the Commission. The Commission also has an important role as the Guardian of the Treaties. It performs a control role over member states fulfilment of their obligations and compliance in accordance with EU laws, which includes the possibility that the Commission might bring the issue before the Court of Justice. The impact of successful lobbying at the EU level can be diminished in the event of (sometimes deliberately) incorrect or poor national implementation. Civil society organisations and all stakeholders with an interest in the correct implementation of a particular EU measure should not hesitate to inform the Commission about any failure by a member state to fulfil its obligations under EU law, or bad national administrative practices contrary to EU norms and standards. For finding contacts and persons responsible, the two following tools can be used: Commission s Directory (searching by name, sector or keyword): 1 Executive measures are divided into quasi-legislative ones and stricto sensu ones. If there is a disagreement on the definition of a measure, it is resolved by the Court of Justice that resolves it. 26

31 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Commission Contact Guide (searching by activity): Outcomes Effective advocacy in influencing draft legislation or decisions within the Commission carries a high chance of success that the initiatives or policies proposed will go on to be introduced in EU legislation or EU decisions. Cross-references Council of the European Union (page 28) European Parliament (page 48) Ordinary Legislative Procedure (page 12) European Transparency Initiative and Transparency Register (page 74) 27

32 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Council of the European Union (EU Council, Council) The EU Council gathers representatives of the member states at different working levels. It is a hybrid institution, as it possesses both legislative and executive powers; it is the main decision-making body of the EU. All EU legislation, including the EU budget, goes through it. It is the most influential institution of the EU institutional triangle (Commission, Council of the European Union, European Parliament). At the level of ministers of member states, the Council currently meets in nine configurations 1 (General Affairs Council; Economic and Financial Affairs Council; Justice and Home Affairs Council; Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council; Competitiveness Council; Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council; Environment Council; Agriculture and Fisheries Council; Education, Youth, Culture and Sport Council). The Council also meets under another configuration: the Foreign Affairs Council, which is chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Catherine Ashton, whose first term continues until 2014) - who is also a Vice-President of the European Commission,. There are around 200 working groups, working parties, and special standing committees staffed by the member states civil servants. The working groups are usually chaired by staff from the member states ministries, and standing committees are usually chaired by the staff of a member state s permanent representation to the EU (Member States). These Council preparatory bodies operate under different chairmanship (Presidency, elected chair, fixed chair, etc.). 2 The most important Council preparatory body is COREPER (Committee of permanent representations) which, under two different formations, negotiates all agenda items (legislation, agreements, foreign policy) and 1 The number can change, and is subject to the decision of the European Council. 2 For full list of the preparatory bodies and their chairmanship, see en/11/st11/st11903.en11.pdf 28

33 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Council of the European Union (EU Council, Council) prepares the Council meetings at the ministerial level: COREPER II consists of member states ambassadors to the EU, COREPER I of deputy ambassadors; the whole agenda is divided between these two high-level preparatory bodies. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, in most policy areas the Council decides under the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system (in the rest by unanimity, i.e. in foreign policy or tax harmonisation (Ordinary Legislative Procedure, Special Legislative Procedures). QMV has been subject to constant debate and negotiations throughout the history of the EU. Its various versions strived to address the fundamental question of how best to balance the representation of small and big countries, as well as how to reflect the EU s dual identity as both a Union of States and a Union of People. 1 According to the Lisbon Treaty, QMV is based on the principle of the double majority: approval by 55 per cent of member states (currently 15 out of 27 EU countries) representing 65 per cent of the EU s population is necessary in order to pass legislation in the Council. A blocking minority must comprise at least four member states. 2 Powers Alongside the adoption of legislative acts, the development of common foreign and security policy, the conclusion of international agreements, and discussion of the EU budget, the Council can also co-ordinate the national macroeconomic policies of the member states. 1 The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional Innovations, Joint Study, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), EGMONT THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, European Policy Centre (EPC), Belgium, This provision will take effect from November 2014 with a transition period until October 2017 (the formula will be adjusted after Croatia enters the EU). Until then, the Nice Treaty formula rules: 55 votes out of a total of 345, representing a majority of the member states, are required; a verification criterion is that the QM represents at least 62 per cent of the total population of the EU, and can be requested during voting. 29

34 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Entry points Unlike the European Parliament and the Commission, which actively seek contact with civil society and other lobby groups possessing relevant know-how, access to the Council is rather complicated, especially at higher levels where issues tend to be politicised and lie beyond the reach of interest groups due to complex bargaining among the member states. The Council is not obliged to consult civil society and, given its vast resources, is not compelled to do so. There are several other reasons that make the Council a challenging target for advocacy. First, it is extremely hard for civil society to identify the locus of the actual preparatory work, which takes place in a system of preparatory bodies. Moreover, building a longterm relationship, which is necessary in contact with Commission officials or the MEPs, is nearly impossible in the changing environment of the Council (with the exception of the standing committees). Finally, the agenda of the committees is often not made public, and the positions of the member states are not disclosed. There are, however, several access points, which can prove very fruitful in influencing decisions. One possible route to gain information on the agenda and participants of the committees is through contact with member states permanent representations (Member States). Nationality is key, and the relation is highly trust-based. The information obtained has only a limited scope of usage due to its sensitivity. Once approached, the members of the Council working group will expect to be delivered expertise that is relevant for their respective country. The national route proves to be especially efficient when smaller states are approached by their interest groups. The administrations of the smaller states tend to be in much closer contact with domestic groups, and can thus facilitate their access to Council structures. In some cases, national administrations actively seek input from domestic civil 30

35 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Council of the European Union (EU Council, Council) society on various issues. Activity in a domestic network focusing on a given area of interest can help to gain access to relevant national stakeholders that can multiply the arguments advocated at the EU level. If not approaching the Council via the national route, a bottom-up approach is generally much more effective than a top-down approach (lobbying ministers directly). By taking a bottom-up approach, a civil society organisation can deal with experts who take part in various committees and working groups behind the scenes, and base advocacy efforts on expertise: technical arguments usually have to be put forward, and experts have to be targeted at a very early stage. When unanimity exists on a particular issue, the proposed measure is adopted in a working group without ministerial negotiation. In such cases, ministers are simply required to sign on the dotted line. The official role of these committees is to save time for ministers. In theory, advocacy for support from just one member state for rejecting draft legislation can result in decisions being delayed or transferred to ministers. In practice, a critical mass of four or five countries willing to challenge a proposal at this stage is needed, as one government would rarely go alone and risk being labelled non-constructive. The Council committees adopt on average 30 to 40 legislative acts per year. The General Secretariat of the Council can be another interesting entry point. It prepares the dossiers, provides legal service, and carries the institutional memory. There are more than 3,000 officials dealing with the full spectrum of EU policy areas. The General Secretariat also provides service for the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Presidencies or ministers come and go, but the officials of the General Secretariat stay. The officials conduct the follow-up to each incoming Presidency, and they can provide useful information on the margins for manoeuvre, even if they decline to give information on the position of a specific country. 31

36 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Outcomes Despite the restrictions mentioned above, the outcome of advocacy and lobbying of the Council can be very effective. Given the strong position of the Council within the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, EU legislative acts (regulations, directives, decisions) can be targeted and substantially modified in the process of their adoption. The same goes for instruments in the foreign policy area (common positions, joint actions, common strategies, Special Legislative Procedures) where unanimity is required. Cross-references Presidency of the Council of the European Union (page 34) Member States (page 40) European Council (page 44) European Commission (page 22) European Parliament (page 48) 32

37 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Council of the European Union (EU Council, Council) 33

38 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Presidency of the Council of the European Union Under the Lisbon Treaty, EU member states still rotate in holding the traditional six-month presidencies of the Council of the European Union, but more focus is now at least on paper placed on the so-called trio presidency, where three consecutive presidencies are supposed to work together. In order to bring more consistency to the individual countries focus and priorities, the 18-month programme of the trio needs to be presented. Furthermore, the three member states hold the councils together (except for the Foreign Affairs Council), and the other two presidencies assist the presiding country in the framework of the common programme. The individual presidencies are still able to set their own priorities for the six-month period, but the trio needs to find a baseline and to compromise on a common framework for 18 months. In general, the leadership role of the presiding country has been somewhat reduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The President of the Council chairs meetings of members of government. However, since Foreign Affairs Council meetings are chaired by the High Representative, only sectoral ministries are left to the classical Council formations. Powers The real powers of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union should not be overestimated, even though six months in the spotlight of EU politics doubtless have PR value for the presiding country. The possibilities of massively advancing civil society s interests on the EU level through the Presidency are limited, but not impossible. Very typically, the agenda for the particular period is beyond the control of the presiding country -determined either by current circumstances or unexpected incidents and emerging challenges. There is only a limited degree of agenda-setting in the hands of 34

39 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Presidency of the Council of the European Union the presiding country, little can be completed in a six-month period, and the programme should furthermore involve a compromise among the trio presidency. Bargaining about policy proposals is a time-consuming process that usually stretches across more than one presidency. On the other hand, there are certain areas where the Presidency can provide opportunities for the advocacy efforts of civil society. The preparation phase of a presidency is particularly interesting: every presidency strives to give its six months in the spotlight its own signature or added value something it will be remembered for and that will increase the PR effect. For civil society actors, this may offer a suitable route, through which they can influence the agenda and utilise the consultation processes on the national level to try to push forward a certain agenda. These consultations can be formal or informal - in either case, it is necessary to build on contacts in state administration, to present visions on the potential signature topics or pet issues the Presidency may wish to use in distinguishing its tenure. Even just the act of raising attention to a fresh new topic on the EU agenda can later develop into an accepted proposal. An example of this has been the European Endowment for Democracy launched by Poland s Presidency of the Council in the second half of During the presidency itself, the presiding country does have a certain room for manoeuvre in setting the agenda, and indirect influence can be achieved through setting the agenda of Council meetings. Nevertheless, the main role of the Presidency is to facilitate and administer as impartially as possible. While this limits its scope for initiative, a presiding country can facilitate a compromise in line with its own political positions, which may reflect civil society interests. Unfortunately, the differing weight of players has certain significance (for instance, big versus small member states, or countries outside the integration core ). 1 1 For instance, during the Polish Presidency from July-December 2011, the tandem of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy clearly took charge of the economic agenda. Poland failed to advance its proposals for resolving the economic crisis, as Poland is not a member of the Eurozone. 35

40 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Entry points Pressure and influence should be mainly concentrated in the preparation phase of the Presidency (at the national level). Preparation for this period is a complex and lengthy process, which usually starts some years before the actual Presidency. At the beginning of the preparatory process, the exact topics that will emerge on the agenda are not fixed yet, so there is an opportunity to influence the general debate about the underlying priorities. Later during the process, it is necessary to take into account the general policy questions that have emerged or been set as priorities for the particular period and to check possible agenda topics against the common priorities of the trio of presidencies. It is important to remember that many topics are inherited from the previous presidency, and the space for manoeuvre is extremely narrow. It is worth paying attention to the General Secretariat of the Council because presiding countries often rely on the Secretariat to a certain degree. The chances of success in influencing policy are likely to be higher if the issues selected are already firmly on the presidency agenda (or are expected to emerge there). Likewise, it is advisable to follow closely the programme of the European Commission, and to establish whether there is a policymaking process to influence. At the beginning of a country s preparation for its rotating Presidency, it is usually the government, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that prepares a document with starting points - and, initially, it is very likely to be an internal document. Later, this document will be typically presented to the national parliament and other stakeholders. Various countries will differ in the timing of opening up the consultation process to external stakeholders but it is important not to miss this stage and to use also other stages, even the preceding one, for executing informal pressure. 36

41 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Presidency of the Council of the European Union Procedures Member states themselves have very limited opportunities to influence the Presidency agenda. Since it is not realistic to expect a high level of success in advocacy efforts being realised through the Presidency as such, this channel could be used as a complementary one to other means of influence. The following basic advice applies. First, identify key advocacy targets. If possible, know who are the key people in the decision-making process well in advance. Second, co-ordinate with other like-minded partners, use networks, and form coalitions to build better advocacy capabilities over a longer period of time - and do this long before the Presidency actually starts as miracles cannot be expected in a six-month-presidency. If this channel of influence-seeking is used, efforts should be concentrated at the national government level, rather than EU level and, if possible, should be co-ordinated with the other two presidencies in the trio, and concentrated in the preparatory phase. In the preparatory or agenda-setting phase, the Presidency is able to raise awareness about a specific problem and use its pressure to persuade the Commission to take action within the regular policymaking process. Lobbying efforts promoting particular policy positions to the Commission through the presiding Presidency country do have a chance of success,. However, they should be directed from the government of the member state, not from a lower level (civil society organisations). A two-tier process of influencing from the civil society side is therefore necessary. 37

42 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Outcomes Civil society actors can conduct advocacy efforts towards the Presidency in two principal ways. For both cases, though, it is necessary to concentrate efforts mainly in the preparatory phase of the Presidency and to focus them further on the national level. It is possible to influence the resulting agenda that is given for a particular Presidency due to various internal and external circumstances or, alternatively, to identify a new issue or topic, which the presidency may use to distinguish itself. Rotation of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union Denmark: January-June 2012 Cyprus: July-December 2012 Ireland: January-June 2013 Lithuania: July-December 2013 Greece: January-June 2014 Italy: July-December 2014 Latvia: January-June 2015 Luxembourg: July-December 2015 Netherlands: January-June 2016 Slovakia: July-December 2016 Cross-references Council of the European Union (page 28) European Commission (page 22) Member States (page 40) 38

43 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Presidency of the Council of the European Union 39

44 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Member States In a well-founded advocacy and lobbying strategy, every possible channel that could help your idea to move forward must be used. The individual member states play a crucial role in the EU s decision-making process. They are key players who influence the way the future trajectory of the EU, and it makes sense to concentrate on this particular channel of influence, i.e. promoting an issue with EU-wide focus through a member state. Powers Member states are important due to a number of factors: heads of state/government come together in the European Council, their government representatives sit in the Council of the EU, perhaps the most important body in the EU s decision-making process, and civil servants from national administrations are present in the working groups of the Council or in comitology committees, sometimes referred to as the kitchen of EU decision-making. Furthermore, each member state has its permanent representation in Brussels. Although European Commissioners should not per se represent the interests of their countries, a civil society organisation that exerts pressure through the Commissioner from its own country has a better chance of success. Commissioners naturally maintain contacts with groups from their own countries, and may intend to enter, or return to, domestic politics in the future. This is even more valid in the case of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Some of them care solely about their national (or constituency) interests without pretending otherwise. MEPs who have more influence in the European Parliament are inclined, however, to combine EU and political group interests with those of their countries. 40

45 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Member States Entry points When talking about lobbying individual governments in the member states, this de facto means lobbying the Council of the European Union due to the crucial role of member states in EU decision-making. If a member state is in favour of a specific initiative, this raises the chances that it will go through in one of the most important bodies in EU decision-making. Moreover, lobbying the Council directly is extremely difficult or even impossible; it is necessary to start with the national governments, which can then play a crucial role in influencing the Council s decision. Each member state has its permanent representation in Brussels, which serves as a linkage between member states and EU institutions, as this is the place where the national bureaucrats (responsible for various policy areas) are located. These people with a direct link to the EU at the same time contribute significantly to preparation and co-ordination of EU-related topics in their respective governments. They can serve as a very useful source of information and further contacts. Every member state has an ambassador to the EU who represents the country in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER II), the main preparatory laboratory for Council meetings. COREPER has a crucial role and, importantly, influences the position the Council will adopt towards each proposal. This is a crucially important route of influence. As the permanent representations represent a link between EU institutions and national administrations, it is also advisable to approach the link from the inside, i.e. the national level usually in ministries of foreign affairs and government offices. Quite often, representatives of the permanent representations attend only the standing committee of the Council; other committees and working groups are attended by staff from the ministries. Therefore, while building a network of contacts, it is unwise to limit efforts to connecting with people from the state administration that attend the Council meetings; it is important to target also other figures in the state machinery who take decisions concerning a member state s position in Council meetings. 41

46 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Furthermore, member states are responsible for the implementation of EU norms, so it is worth considering paying attention in this direction, too. For instance, a civil society organisation that is not fond of a certain piece of legislation might try to lobby its homegovernment structures to weaken implementation or, on the contrary, gold-plate it in order to reach higher standards. Procedures Logically, the chances of success are higher when a civil society organisation lobbies representatives of its own member state. However, co-ordination of efforts with other like-minded organisations in other countries - in various networks or platforms - brings opportunities also to address representatives of other member states. It is useful to pay attention to which countries will be holding the upcoming presidencies, as they should of course deserve more attention. Building coalitions and thematic networks inside one member state is also desirable as the resulting voice will be much stronger. Lobbying is a time-consuming process so, as has been the advice in the case of targeting other institutions, it is important to start early, not to wait until the topic is already on the negotiation table. A well-prepared strategy should start with identification of the relevant contacts, addressing those at the national level before they liaise with the permanent representations, and liaising with those at permanent representations before they present their country s position in one of the Council s working groups. Outcomes Almost all advocacy efforts towards the EU should be initiated at the national level of a member state. This route of influence should complement any other more direct approaches to various EU institutions, maximising the chances of influencing the outcome of decision-making. 42

47 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Member States Cross-references Council of the European Union (page 28) European Commission (page 22) European Parliament (page 48) Presidency of the Council of the European Union (page 34) 43

48 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking European Council The European Council is often confused with the Council of the European Union. They both co-operate quite closely, but their purpose and role are different. In spite of the fact that the European Council is now a real EU institution of its own (see below), it mainly serves as a summit of heads of member states (i.e. prime ministers or presidents, depending on each country s constitutional practices), assisted by ministers of foreign affairs. The European Commission is also part of the European Council setting. The European Council serves as a platform for consultations among top member-state representatives and discussions on crucial and essential future developments of the European integration project. Generally, no voting mechanism is used in the European Council (except for specific cases mentioned in the Treaty), as the body normally needs to reach a political compromise/consensus to move forward. The position of President of the European Council was established by the Lisbon Treaty (a term of two-and-a-half years, renewable once), and the main function of the President involves preparation of European Council meetings. The European Council elected Herman Van Rompuy to become the first permanent president (his first term extends until 31 May 2012). The function does not allow for assumption of a national mandate. The President is elected by the European Council by qualified majority voting. Powers Although it would be an exaggeration to say that the EU has finally answered the question whom do I call if I want to speak to Europe? - posed by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger - the Lisbon Treaty significantly strengthened the role of the European Council, which now has its own President and budget. The European Council has gained a firmer place in EU policymaking, and has become a full-fledged institution. 44

49 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Council It does not have powers to pass any laws, but serves as a platform for EU leaders to meet and decide on broad political priorities, directions, and major initiatives. It can, however, and often does, informally assign tasks to the Commission or the Council of the European Union. Owing to the political weight of the body, such tasks are then undertaken. The European Council often discusses complex or even sensitive issues. In 2011, for instance, its discussions were largely dominated by efforts to strengthen the EU s economic governance and to address the sovereign-debt crisis. The meetings of the European Council are not open to the public. Entry points The European Council meets twice every six months, although special informal meetings may be organised on the President s initiative. In order to lobby the European Council, as with many other EU institutions, it is necessary to start at the national level. Heads of state or government remain in the position to represent their respective countries at the European Council during their whole tenure of office, so the timing of addressing these figures can stretch over a longer period. Naturally, direct lobbying of the European Council, or even national prime ministers or presidents, is unlikely to be an available avenue. The prospects of impact can be higher when efforts are developed during the early preparatory phase of various European Council meetings, for instance while refining the national positions on a specific topic. To achieve this, it is advisable to identify the key players way down the ladder reporting to the head of state/government, including advisers. It is necessary to study in depth the structure of people around the head of state/government in the area of policy interest and to plan an advocacy strategy accordingly. As the European Council President is expected to work closely with the country holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, national pressure from the administrative structures of the presidency country can be effective. The European Council President also works closely with the President of the European Commission. 45

50 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Procedures There are three main routes of influence-seeking that civil society organisations can use in their advocacy efforts - approaching the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union (through national channels in particular). Not much has been written and said about lobbying the European Council directly. In many respects, advocacy efforts directed at the European Council (or the European Council President) will use very similar procedures to approaching the Council of the European Union - as both of these bodies represent a platform for national representatives. Even though the goal of advocacy efforts might be to influence EU policy, it is necessary to start at the national level. However, at the same time, it is important to undertake research to find out about like-minded states and to build coalitions with other civil society actors in other countries who can lobby their own governments. Identification of allies makes it possible to combine advocacy efforts to influence a high-level body such as the European Council. Outcomes To achieve success in influencing the European Council, it is necessary to follow many indirect routes. This institution is not directly lobbied as much as the others. Advocacy efforts need to concentrate on the national level, but at the same time must be coordinated with other EU institutions, primarily the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. Unco-ordinated efforts have nearly no chance of success in securing the policy outcomes sought. 46

51 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Council Cross-references Member States (page 40) Council of the European Union (page 28) European Commission (page 22) European Parliament (page 48) Presidency of the Council of the European Union (page 34) 47

52 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking European Parliament With its 754 members, the European Parliament is the largest democratically elected parliament in the world. It is the only directly elected EU institution (the first direct elections were held in 1979), a fact that provides the body with democratic legitimacy, albeit one often disputed due to low turnout and the prevalence of national issues in the elections to the European Parliament. Designed to directly represent the EU citizens, the European Parliament is the most open EU institution in terms of advocacy and active involvement. Nevertheless, it is the weakest one in the EU institutional triangle, even though its powers have been significantly strengthened over time (for instance in the Lisbon Treaty), and the impact of its actions is in reality lower than Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) themselves would like it to be. The workings of the European Parliament are organised through committees (gathering usually in Brussels) and plenary sittings (taking place in Strasbourg). The European Parliament is the most political body of the EU in terms of party politics. It is organised according to the political orientation of its members and elected political parties who join political groups ranging from far-left, through Greens, Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian Democrats (currently the biggest group) and the Conservatives and Reformists group, to far-right parties. Although protecting national interests is a strong ambition, (pan-european) voting patterns according to political group have become increasingly important. Successful lobbying and advocacy within the body should take into account the multiple and overlapping affiliations of MEPs. Powers Like the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament is a legislative body. Almost all EU legislative acts - ranging from the single market, agriculture, EU funds, 48

53 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Parliament environment, consumer protection to energy, transport, or justice and home affairs - have to go through the European Parliament. There are a few areas where the European Parliament has little say owing to its lack of legislative or decision-making powers. They include: trade, tax harmonisation, and Common Foreign and Security Policy. Even in these areas, however, it can play an informal bargaining role vis-à-vis the Council of the European Union and the Commission, as it can use other issues as leverage and is authorised to pass resolutions on every single issue it considers relevant and worthy of parliamentary debate. Furthermore, the Parliament has full budgetary powers (approving the EU budget and final accounts). Its consent is required with any EU enlargement and to approve a newly appointed Commission. It also has the theoretical right to force the Commission to resign, but such a power has never been used (although it was close to being exercised when the Commission led by Jacques Santer resigned in 1999). The European Parliament appoints the European Ombudsman and awards the annual Sakharov Prize to human rights/democracy defenders. Entry points The European Parliament has many formal and informal procedures, and they are all quite open and transparent. Any advocacy strategy should start with individual MEPs who care about a particular issue or cause. MEPs are easily accessible via their offices in Brussels or in their constituencies. Given their democratic legitimacy requirement, they are usually more open to external inputs than their colleagues from national parliaments. As they are more detached from national party politics, they are inclined to be more open to knowledge-based reasoning. It is important to differentiate between MEPs. Some are more influential than others, some of them care more about national issues (trying to be present in domestic national politics), and some focus primarily on EU issues. An influential MEP is usually a long-serving one (some have been members since 1979), and usually chair of an important committee or 49

54 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking political group, or the holder of another important function within a committee or political group (e.g. co-ordinator for a specific theme). Some MEPs have major influence in a particular area, given their experience and expertise, and their colleagues - especially within the same political group - are inclined to follow their lead. The politically most important body in the Parliament is the Conference of Presidents, which gathers the President of the European Parliament and the chairs of all political groups. This body determines the agenda, resolves sensitive issues, and assigns legislative tasks to committees and individual MEP (rapporteurs - see below). A top-down approach - lobbying the Conference of Presidents directly - is very difficult and, as with other EU institutions, it is unlikely to succeed. Every single text debated in the European Parliament (declaration, resolution on the budget, or legislative act) takes the form of a report and has its own rapporteur an MEP in charge of the particular text. The political groups also assign the role of shadow rapporteurs who are supposed to negotiate with the main rapporteur on behalf of their group. Rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs (and respective committee chairman) are natural partners in advocacy efforts concerning a particular issue or piece of legislation. The appropriate advocacy strategy depends on the political importance of the issue. Highly sensitive topics tend to be controlled (under stricter voting discipline) by the political groups and their whips, whereas others give more room to MEPs to act freely. There are also more informal ways to work with MEPs. They can organise (with the back-up of the committee or political group) hearings or expert roundtables where invited stakeholders can present their views. Like-minded MEPs also gather (usually around influential, well-known MEPs) within informal, cross-political groups, which are also very accessible for outsiders and which push through particular ideas (e.g. the European Democracy Caucus, 1 the Kangaroo Group 2 (Advocacy Case Study 1: EU Financial instruments in Support of Democracy and Human Rights)

55 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Parliament As with the other institutions, successful advocacy towards the European Parliament requires good knowledge of the workings of the Parliament and also forward planning, mainly in relation to the agenda of committees and plenary sittings. Dialogue with MEPs is often more fruitful if relevant background information is provided for the concerned MEP to use as a basis for her/his oral interventions or voting. The importance of developing closer or even personal long-term relationships with MEPs should not be underestimated. The database of voting records (how MEPs have voted in the past), accessible on the European Parliament s website, is a very useful indicator as to which MEPs to address on a given policy area. Outcomes It is necessary to bear in mind that the European Parliament cannot propose a new piece of legislation, but can amend the Commission s proposals. As regards legislation, lobbying the European Parliament, therefore, should logically follow earlier engagement with the Commission (for instance, following up to ensure amendments secured in the Commission s text are not amended in Parliament, or to push for amendments if efforts were not successful with the Commission). Besides legislative acts and other binding instruments (such as budget approval), the European Parliament does produce other texts with lesser impact, sometimes only symbolic. MEPs can present their own initiatives in the form of written declarations if they manage to gather a sufficient number of signatures of fellow MEPs. In the area of foreign policy, the European Parliament passes resolutions, which invite the Council (or the Commission) to take certain steps. Even though they have no biding force, such resolutions can have symbolic influence and can be (sometimes mistakenly) perceived in the target countries as an expression of the EU s stance. The so-called Sakharov Prize should also be considered as a symbolically (and also financially) important message to human rights defenders in the world. 51

56 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Cross-references European Commission (page 22) Council of the European (page 28) National Parliaments (page 58) European Transparency Initiative and Transparency Register (page 74) Advocacy Case Study 1: EU Financial instruments in Support of Democracy and Human Rights (page 82) 52

57 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Parliament 53

58 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking European External Action Service The Lisbon Treaty set in motion the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which in principle serves as a Foreign Ministry and diplomatic corps for the EU, implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other areas of external action and representation. It functions under the authority of, and provides assistance to, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In addition, it is also required to assist other actors in EU foreign policy - the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission. The EEAS became fully operational in December It works in co-operation with the diplomatic services of the member states and comprises officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and of the Commission, as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services. Powers The main function of the EEAS is to support the work of the High Representative. In reality, this complicates understanding of the exact scope of the External Action Service. The High Representative needs to liaise with a number of bodies and institutions, including to a large extent the Commission and the Council of the European Union, some aspects of EU foreign policy are out beyond the remit of the EAAS. Domains such as enlargement or the European Neighbourhood Policy remain the responsibility of the Commission, but are still subject to the co-ordinating role of the High Representative who serves as one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. The High Representative and EEAS implement the policies agreed by the member states and the Council of the European Union. The EEAS works within these restrictions. The role of EEAS delegations (EU delegations) is similar to the role of classical national embassies. Delegations are located in a number of third countries as well as at the 54

59 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European External Action Service headquarters of international organisations, for example the UN offices in New York and Geneva. The role of the delegations to a large extent involves - but is not limited to - collection and analysis of political and economic information. Furthermore, they intermediate between third-country governments and the EU by providing necessary background information for negotiations with the host-country government, they brief EU officials ahead of, and during, visits to the EU of host-country officials, etc. Entry points The creation of the EEAS presents a new focus for the lobbying and advocacy work of civil society organisations working in relevant policy areas. Due to the wide and fragmented role of the High Representative, the management structure of the EEAS itself is quite complicated, but it offers an interesting potential as a number of EU institutions can be reached through it. There are close links between the High Representative and respectively the European Commission, 1 the Council of the European Union, and the member states, so for policy areas in the scope of the EEAS, this channel of influenceseeking can be a fruitful one. The EEAS personnel (nearly 4,000) are drawn from the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, as well as diplomats from the 27 member states (they must represent at least one-third of the total number of staff). 2 In Brussels, the body is organised according to directorates-general that cover countries and regions, multilateral and thematic affairs, administration, budget, security and communication, crisis management, a civilian planning capability, and Military Staff and Situation Centre. There are also departments for planning and legal affairs. Outside the headquarters, it includes more than 130 EU delegations in third countries and international organisations. 1 For instance, the EEAS supports not only the High Representative, but also Commissioners with external relations responsibilities, such as multilateral trade, enlargement and European neighbourhood policy, environment, energy, agriculture, or justice and home affairs). 2 From 1 July 2013, access to EEAS posts is due to be opened up to officials from other EU institutions, such as the European Parliament. 55

60 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking However, the EEAS needs to be considered only as a complementary factor to support a civil society organisation s advocacy strategy alongside concentrating on the main triangle of the Commission, Parliament and Council of the European Union, as the EEAS does not have real policy responsibility, and decision-making power rests with the traditional EU actors. When identifying the key figures for an advocacy strategy, it is advisable to approach the EEAS from both directions - the member state as well as EU level. Advocacy at the national level can enlist support from national players to influence EU foreign policy. If the proposed policy concerns a particular country or region, it is advisable to address directly both the EEAS responsible desk and the respective EU delegation as the EU staff there have room for manoeuvre to advance some policies and take minor decisions which can have impact on the ground. EU delegations are an important contact point for civil society organisations in third countries as they can provide various types of support (ranging from financial to diplomatic). It is also an important channel for sending across political messages. Civil society organisations can alert the delegations to violations of human rights or irregularities in democratic process. Statements issued by EU delegations carry symbolic power - in the same way that statements by EU member states do. Procedures The EEAS, as a new institution, suffered from a number of teething troubles. Its establishment was influenced by painful negotiations among the member states, particularly related to staffing of the new service. Given its recent launch, it has not been among the to-belobbied actors for long, but its interconnectedness to other EU institutions means it is likely to be an important channel for influencing policy in the field of external relations. 56

61 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European External Action Service Outcomes The EEAS still needs to establish its place in EU decision-making. A genuine external action strategy of the EU does not exist yet. Through the EEAS, the EU aspires to possess a coherent face for its foreign both in Brussels and in third countries around the world. In time, it is hoped that it can contribute to more decisive EU action in international affairs. Furthermore, it offers a platform for EU officials to work alongside national diplomats. Even though this relationship might be delicate in certain aspects, it could be conducive to greater integration of national and EU foreign-policy perspectives at the diplomatic level. Opportunities are likely to emerge for a range of entry levels at national and EU level for civil society advocacy efforts. Cross-references European Commission (page 22) Council of the European Union (page 28) Member States (page 40) Advocacy Case Study 1: EU Financial instruments in Support of Democracy and Human Rights (page 82) Advocacy Case Study 2: Migration and Visa Policies (page 92) 57

62 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking National Parliaments The Lisbon Treaty has significantly strengthened and formalised the involvement of national parliaments in EU decision-making. Their input can now be of a very direct nature. That is why the European Commission needs to pay close attention to enhancing dialogue and co-operation with national parliaments. The main buzzword describing this specific relationship is the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity refers to the shared competences between the EU and its member states, and basically means that whatever can be done more efficiently at the national level should not be done at the EU level: decisions should be taken as close to the citizen as possible. 1 National parliaments now serve as an early-warning mechanism to indicate whether any proposal is in breach with this principle. Powers National parliaments have plunged into using the new powers attributed to them by the treaty reform. They have become a player in their own right in EU decision-making and, consequently, a very important partner in advocacy efforts for civil society organisations. The European Commission must let the national parliaments review all legislative proposals that fall within the subsidiarity control mechanism. Entry points Approaching national parliaments should form a part of a successful EU advocacy strategy, complementary to other routes of influence-seeking. As national parliaments have an opportunity to block a draft EU legislative proposal, or to force the Commission to modify it, their importance cannot be underestimated. They have become a formalised 1 Except for areas that fall within the exclusive competences of the EU. 58

63 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION National Parliaments stakeholder in the EU decision-making process and an approachable channel of communications for civil society. Furthermore, due to national parliaments scope for even blocking a proposal, they represent an opportunity for co-ordinating the pan- European interests of civil society. Transnational co-operation and co-ordinated lobbying and advocacy strategies may prove to be very beneficial for a common cause. 1 Various actors are important within the setting of national parliaments, and it is worth considering which route of influence is most beneficial for a particular cause. The following approaches are not mutually exclusive. One route is to lobby political parties represented in the parliament that can be expected to be receptive to the policy perspective or cause you want to promote. Another approach is to persuade political parties that are hesitating about their position on the issue. Alternatively, it can be beneficial to concentrate on the members of a specific committee responsible for the subject. The committee to be targeted will depend on the co-ordination mechanisms of EU affairs that each member state has adopted, and even the level of importance the parliament in question itself has in co-ordinating EU issues. Typically, this will involve European committees, but the general trend should progressively involve sectoral committees. Another route of influence is to concentrate on key figures in the parliament - chairs of relevant committees, chairs/speakers of the chambers, etc. Some chambers have proven to be more active than others (see the statistics below), so it might be more useful to concentrate on the chambers that send more opinions. For example, even within one member state, it can be more reasonable to work with the upper chamber than lower chamber given their roles in the political system or the current political constellation in them. The national parliaments have an eight-week time-frame for review of draft EU legislative acts. Efforts to influence the review cannot wait until the beginning of the eight-week 1 The InterParliamentary EU information exchange hosts a website/database set up by the national parliaments containing parliamentary scrutiny documents and information about the EU. 59

64 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking period it is necessary to follow the development of a new legislative proposal at the EU level before it is sent out to national parliaments, to identify key stakeholders before they actually need to take a decision, and to inform them about the forthcoming legislation, and your proposed course of action. The Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) 1 is another important formation where the Commission and MEPs meet with members of national parliaments who work in EU committees. Moreover, committees of the European Parliament regularly invite members of the national parliaments to discuss new Commission legislative proposals. Ties are even more intensive with the parliament of the country holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union. From the Commission s side, a unit in the Secretariat-General is dedicated to relations with national parliaments. In addition, every Directorate-General and the office of each Commissioner has a designated co-ordinator for relations with national parliaments. However, these are technical functions in nature, and do not have impact on the content of legislation. Procedures National parliaments can become involved in decision-making on the EU level in various ways. As partners for political dialogue (concentrating on the substance of a draft piece of legislation) and within the framework of the subsidiarity control mechanism, they may send so-called reasoned opinions in which they explain why from their point of view the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. They have the possibility to use a yellow card and orange card, 2 which implies a threshold that would force the Commission to either amend or withdraw its proposal. If There is no veto, or red card - to continue the football metaphor - available to national parliaments. 60

65 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION National Parliaments one-third (or one-quarter in the area of justice and home affairs) of national parliaments submit negative opinions, the Commission must review its proposal. In the event that more than half of all national parliaments oppose an act subject to co-decision, the EU legislator (a majority of the European Parliament or 55 per cent of the votes in the Council of the European Union) must decide whether or not to proceed with the legislative process. Each chamber of the national parliaments also has the option of turning to the European Court of Justice for a ruling on any violations of the subsidiarity principle. Outcomes National parliaments have acquired a crucial role in EU decision-making. Their positive opinion is very important for any legislative proposal to continue forward, and the European Commission must take their opinions into account. The principle of subsidiarity has in the shape of national parliaments an established watchdog at its service. This extra check in the EU legislative process carried out by members of parliament elected in the member states can assist citizens in their own efforts to participate in EU decision-making. For the advocacy efforts of civil society organisations, national parliaments are potentially great allies. Members of parliament have to state their opinions about, and vote on, an extremely wide range of topics that reach beyond their expertise. This is a crucial entry point for civil society organisations, and favourable outcomes can be achieved by those that are well-informed and have a clear strategy to pursue their goals. In principle, organisations located in a given state are more likely to be effective in influencing their national parliaments whereas multinational coalitions should strive to combine influence at the EU level with preparatory advocacy work at the member-state level. In the first two years after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, national parliaments issued mainly reasoned opinions, and were less successful in presenting yellow and orange cards. This, however, may change in the future. A good starting point would be much more intensive co-ordination among national parliaments across the member states. 61

66 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Between January and the end of November 2011, 1 national parliaments sent 544 opinions in the context of political dialogue and the subsidiarity control mechanism. Of these, 45 were reasoned opinions. Cross-references Member States (page 40) European Commission (page 22) European Parliament (page 48) Presidency of the Council of the European Union (page 34) 1 At the time of preparation of this publication, data for December 2011 had not yet been made public. 62

67 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION National Parliaments National Parliament Chamber Total number of opinions (received from 1 January 2011 to 30 November 2011) Portugal Assembleia da Republica 149 Italy Senato della Repubblica 64 Czech Republic Senát 48 Sweden Riksdagen 33 Italy Camera dei Deputati 29 Romania Senatul 28 Romania Camera Deputaţilor 28 Germany Bundesrat 26 United Kingdom House of Lords 17 Bulgaria Narodno Sabrania 11 Denmark Folketinget 10 Luxembourg Chambre des Députés 10 United Kingdom House of Commons 10 Poland Sejm 7 The Netherlands Eerste Kamer Staten Generaal 6 Germany Bundestag 5 Austria Nationalrat 4 Poland Senat 4 Czech Republic Poslanecká sněmovna 4 Greece Chamber of Deputies 3 France Assemblée Nationale 3 Austria Bundesrat 2 Lithuania Seimas 2 Spain Congreso de los Diputados and Senado (both chambers) 2 France Sénat 2 The Netherlands Both Chambers 2 Latvia Saeima 2 Slovakia Národná rada 2 Finland Eduskunta 2 Belgium Chambre des Représentants 1 The Netherlands Tweede Kamer Staten Generaal 1 Ireland Oireachtas (both chambers) 1 Cyprus House of Representatives 1 Belgium Sénat 1 Malta Kamra tad-deputati 1 Estonia Riigikogu 0 Hungary Országgyűlés 0 Slovenia Državni svet 0 Slovenia Državni zbor 0 Total 521 Source: European Commission 63

68 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking 64

69 (iii) Additional Mechanisms for Participating in EU Policymaking 65

70 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking European Citizens Initiative Can Civil Society Directly Influence the EU s Agenda? Discussions about ways of enabling EU civil society to have a right of initiative in the EU s legislation process have been underway since the early nineties, if not longer. However, these efforts gained particular attention and impetus during the preparation of the draft constitutional treaty after concentrated pressure from a number of active EU civil society organisations and interested MEPs. The EU constitutional treaty never came into being, but cherries were picked and incorporated into a new document - the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December One of the main proclaimed goals of the Lisbon Treaty was to improve the EU s democracy and to strengthen the engagement of EU citizens. With this in mind, the EU is striving to mitigate a growing perception of its democratic deficit - the wide gap between the EU and its citizens. The Lisbon Treaty is intended to reinforce democracy and genuinely promote the interests of its citizens - through both new and existing capacities. Even before the establishment of the European Citizens Initiative (ECI) in the treaty framework of the EU, civil society actors had concrete opportunities to participate in EU policymaking. However, to a significant degree, this was passive involvement, which took place through established means in the policymaking process, such as consultations or hearings. With the launch of the ECI (starting on 1 April 2012, EU citizens can register a European Citizens Initiative with the European Commission), civil society actors have 66

71 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Citizens Initiative. Can Civil Society Directly Influence the EU s Agenda? much broader means of becoming involved: they can suggest the agenda, approach the European Commission directly, and make EU policymakers address the proposed agenda. A rather passive process turns into a process with many more active elements. So what is the European Citizens Initiative? According to Article 11 of the amended Treaty of the European Union, not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of member states may take the initiative of inviting the [European] Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the treaties. In other words, if across the EU, groups of citizens manage to organise the collection of one million signatures for a specific cause, EU citizens themselves may have the right of legislative initiative. Through the ECI, elements of direct participatory democracy are being introduced as a part of EU decision-making. It is useful to examine the concrete potential this has for the engagement of civil society actors and active EU citizens in EU policymaking, how the process works, what to concentrate on when preparing an initiative and collecting signatures, and what are the real chances of success at the end of the process, i.e. transforming an initiative into a real topic for decision-making on the EU agenda and eventually becoming enshrined in EU legislation. What is the European Citizens Initiative, and how does it work? Through the ECI, EU civil society and citizens have a means of influencing the EU decisionmaking process directly and have the right of initiative. Civil society representatives led the lobbying for such an initiative to be introduced, and indeed the possibility has opened up for the voice of civil society to be heard much more loudly, so the potential is enormous. It is too early to evaluate the impact of the ECI, as further clarifications regarding the ECI (i.e. relevant regulation) were approved only after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. Given that the starting-date for registering an ECI is 1 April 2012, it is also too early to 67

72 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking assess how frequently the instrument will be used. This will depend mainly on practical issues that arise, to a large degree also on the quality of proposals, which will partly determine the level of seriousness and attention the instrument will gain from the European Commission. As the Commission is not compelled to adopt the suggested legislative piece on its agenda, civil society actors will need to lobby effectively to ensure their initiative is given priority. All civil society actors and, more broadly, EU citizens have a responsibility to work together to establish the ECI as a part of the regular agenda-setting process in the EU, and to ensure that it does not turn out to be just a soft public-relations gesture from the European Commission towards EU citizens. Procedures: ECI step by step How does the ECI work in practice? What steps need to be taken to submit a proposal, and how do members of the public call upon the Commission to bring forward a legislative proposal? The Lisbon Treaty did not specify in detail the practical rules of the game beyond the need for collection of at least one million signatures from a significant number of member states. Subsequent elaboration refers to one-third of member states, which currently corresponds to nine countries. The European Citizens Initiative should serve as a pan-european effort, so proposals from one or two countries - no matter how many signatures - have no chance of success. Smaller countries will need proportionately more signatories than bigger states. After the European Commission has evaluated the proposal, including verification of signatures, it has a number of ways as to how to proceed. As elaborated further below, the Commission is by no means obliged to accept the legislative proposal and take necessary action. The Commission can either come forward with the proposal or can seek inspiration from the proposal, explore the topic further, and take alternative 68

73 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Citizens Initiative. Can Civil Society Directly Influence the EU s Agenda? measures. Alternatively, it can simply decide it will not take any action. To make the process transparent, the European Commission is required in all cases to explain its reasoning. The following instructions on how to proceed are adapted from the ECI Campaign group, or Initiative for the European Citizens Initiative, 1 and EU Regulation 211/ that specifies the ECI in more detail: Phase 1: Deciding to use the ECI 1. Identify and develop the idea as much as possible. Determine if it is really necessary to change EU law in order to accomplish the desired goal. 2. Verify legality. Check whether or not EU law allows for the type of legislation proposed. Explore the likely political reception to the idea, ideally with those who are familiar with how the given policy area has been handled in the past by the EU institutions. 3. Consider alternatives. Compare all available alternatives for reaching the goal, then choose the instrument that best suits the goal. It may not be the ECI. 4. Research ECI procedures. Request information from the Commission s General Secretariat. Study the implementation rules as outlined in the ECI regulation (EU Regulation 211/2011). 5. Write the initiative. Write in an understandable way and recruit legal assistance. Make sure the wording is complete, but does not provide a target for those who may oppose the goal

74 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking 6. Build a multinational citizens initiative committee. It must have members from at least seven EU member states, and is required to officially organise the ECI and communicate with EU institutions. 7. Build an alliance. Contact like-minded groups and individuals in at least nine different countries. Alliance-building is an absolutely critical task. 8. Evaluate opposition. Analyse the strength and validity of opposing viewpoints and organisations. 9. Develop a budget. Consider costs for staff, translation, office equipment, online services, signature collection, advertising, printing, phones and postage. Political campaigns, especially at transnational level, can cost a lot of money. Phase 2: Preparing a detailed ECI campaign plan It will be necessary to develop plans for: 1. Signature collection. Up to 20 per cent of signatures could be invalidated by national authorities in the event of incomplete or inaccurate information, so plan to collect more. Furthermore, decide on the means of signature collection - online or paper or both? For online collection, determine the software needed in order to meet both legal requirements and the needs of the campaign. For paper signature collection, determine how many signature forms, and in which languages, are needed for distribution to organisations and volunteers. 2. Organisation. Identify and assign key tasks and responsibilities within the ECI committee, as well as among paid and volunteer staff. 3. Volunteer management. Decide how to manage volunteers. 4. Fundraising. Estimate how much money will be needed to complete all the tasks listed 70

75 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Citizens Initiative. Can Civil Society Directly Influence the EU s Agenda? in the campaign plan. Contact potential large donors, use direct mail, and organise fundraising events to reach the fundraising goal. 5. Communications. Make use of all relevant media to inform the maximum number of potential signatories, contributors and volunteers. Prepare a plan for how to use paid and unpaid media, speakers, events, endorsements, etc. 6. Signature return management. Signatures from different sources must be assembled in time for submission to national authorities in the different member states. 7. Signature submission. It is important to follow EU rules to protect both paper and online signatures and personal data. Check national rules and regulations for signature submission for each member state. The first date for registration of an ECI is 1 April Please note that before proceeding with signature collection, the proposal must first be registered with the European Commission, which will carry out a check to determine whether an initiative is well-founded and has a European dimension. Practical concerns While preparing an ECI proposal, a number of practical issues will emerge. As the ECI is a new instrument, a range of issues will surface, probably including problems concerning signature verification. It is important to be aware of national rules of signature verification in each respective country. Other concerns are likely to arise regarding data protection and the whole issue of fraud during collection of signatures. Higher-level issues include questions such as how seriously the efforts underlying an ECI will be taken in Brussels, and what the real chances of success will be. It will take a lot of time and money to prepare a quality ECI proposal, so is important to know what the chances are. As there are no lessons from the past or other countries in the world to refer to, advice at this stage can only be of a very general nature. 71

76 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking What should be avoided when preparing a proposal? First of all, research the issue very thoroughly. Secondly, do not expect to succeed with a proposal that runs directly against the EU s values or brings no apparent added value at the EU level. Further benchmarks will emerge once there is a track record, enabling observers to identify patterns for success and failure. Outcomes and relevance The ECI experiment has the potential to develop into an instrument that may indirectly help to foster a vibrant European civil society focused on EU decision-making. Besides the direct positive effect it may have on improving the democratic life of the EU, there could be a number of indirect effects. EU-focused policy institutes should explore the possibilities of using an ECI to complement their regular advocacy efforts towards influencing EU policy. Networks of civil society organisations and policy institutes, such as PASOS, could serve as useful platforms for building the requisite pan-european base for an ECI. At this stage, however, it is too early to evaluate the impact of the instrument. Civil society actors will have to test its limits for themselves - to assess how seriously the EU means its proclaimed openness, and to serve as a watchdog to ensure that the Commission really acts on the proposals. 72

77 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Citizens Initiative. Can Civil Society Directly Influence the EU s Agenda? 73

78 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking European Transparency Initiative and Transparency Register In 2005, Siim Kallas, the then European Commissioner for Administrative Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud, launched the European Transparency Initiative designed to regulate lobbying and increase the transparency of policymaking in the EU. It focused on three key areas: Increasing the financial accountability of EU funding (disclosure of information on beneficiaries, including beneficiaries of subsidies under the common agricultural policy via a central web portal); Strengthening the integrity and independence of EU institutions, and; Imposing stricter controls on lobbying. One of the outcomes of the first six years of the initiative is the Transparency Register. In June 2008, the Commission set up a register of interest representatives, which was replaced by the Transparency Register, a joint initiative established by the European Commission and the European Parliament in June The Transparency Register provides information, including financial data and sources of income, on those who seek to influence EU policy, including a wide spectrum of actors beyond traditional lobbyists, and sets up a Common Code of Conduct 2 obliging the registrants to follow transparent practices in advocacy and lobbying. All organisations and self-employed individuals, including those that are not Brusselsbased, engaged in activities carried out with the objective of directly or indirectly 1 For instance, PASOS was registered first in the Commission s register of interest representatives in January 2010, and continues to be registered in the joint Transparency Register in Code of conduct: 74

79 Part I: HOW POLICIES ARE MADE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION European Transparency Initiative and Transparency Register influencing the formulation or implementation of policy and decision-making processes of the EU institutions, are expected to register. These activities include: Contacting members or officials of EU institutions; Preparing, circulating and communicating letters, information material or argumentation and position papers; Organising events, meetings or promotional activities (in the offices or in other venues). Activities that are part of formal consultations on legislative proposals and other open consultations are also included, and registrants are required to update their information once a year. If the information is not updated, the registrant s information will no longer be publicly accessible and, after a short delay, the registrant will be deleted from the database. All data entered into the Register is public (with the exception of the information on the contact person). Relevance Registration increases the credibility of an organisation engaged in advocacy and lobbying in Brussels, but it does not constitute accreditation and does not lead to access to any privileged information. However, when signing up, registrants can indicate the policy areas in which they are interested. When the Commission launches public consultations in those areas, registered organisations receive an alert (nonregistration does not constitute exclusion of an organisation from Commission s public consultations). As far as the European Parliament is concerned, the access cards to the European Parliament s buildings for individuals representing organisations falling within the scope of the Transparency Register are issued only if those organisations or individuals have registered. However, registration will not confer an automatic entitlement to such a card. The Transparency Register website: 75

80 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking 76

81 PART II ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES 77

82 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Advocacy: Getting Right the Basics by Jeff Lovitt The goal of advocacy is to effect change in public policy and, in practice, advocacy must address power relations and secure access to decision-making. Public participation in decision-making thrives on open, accountable government with a consultative policymaking process. But, however open and accountable the apparatus of policymaking, it will always be necessary for those who seek to influence policymaking to first understand how and when they can engage in the process if they want to propose a new policy direction (agenda-setting) or to propose reforms to an ongoing policy. As highlighted in Part I, EU decision-making continues to evolve. Likewise, the cast of players in EU institutions are in a state of flux. There is regular rotation not only of Commissioners and their Cabinets, and also of key staff in the Directorates of the European Commission. In 2010, the European External Action Service - the new diplomatic corps of the EU - was launched, but many posts remain unfilled, and changes in personnel and structures will continue through at least Just as EU officials and MEPs are very busy, and independent think-tanks seeking to influence them have to compete with a wide range of lobbyists and NGOs, so too the challenge to set up the right meeting at the right time requires the policy analyst to have built up contacts in Brussels who can identify when a particular policy will appear before a given meeting, e.g. a Council meeting, a hearing at the Parliament, or when the European Commission will issue a Communication, and how to ensure that suggested policy recommendations are inserted into the Communication before a tight window of opportunity has been closed. 78

83 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy: Getting Right the Basics Not only is it important to make such an approach or intervention at the right time in the policy process, it is also important to set up meetings in a professional way, being very precise about the point of an initiative, and to present any policy recommendations in a clear, understandable manner. This of course also makes it more likely that one will be able to build a long-term relationship with the policymakers and officials in question, as they will want to meet again if clear arguments are brought to their attention, and they are shown a clear understanding of how and when such ideas can be inserted into the policymaking process. To set up a meeting with an EU policymaker or official in a way that can maximise the scope for influencing EU policies, the following are essential: Set and communicate clear objectives, and a well-formulated policy recommendation with a precise understanding of when and how the recommendation can be introduced Well targeted communications, correctly identifying and then targeting those who are actually drafting a policy, or who are well-placed to introduce amendments to a policy draft Good timing in your approach, so that you seek a meeting at a point when a decision or policy is about to be formulated or addressed Show an understanding of existing research and analysis, and the policy context (competing political priorities that might conflict with your initiative) Be constructive and proactive, and very concrete (for example, not merely saying the EU should spend more money, but rather explaining how and where the EU should spend more, on a given issue, the added value and impact, etc.). It is worth thinking about assembling a toolbox of instruments, strategies and actions for effectively influencing EU decision-making processes. The tools might include: Policy briefs, with clear, and prominently placed, policy recommendations One-to-one meetings with key players (Commissioner s cabinet, ministers of key EU member-states, influential MEPs), preceded by a short one-page communication summarising your recommendations, showing the added value you bring through fresh 79

84 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking research/data you have collected or generated on the policy question, and explaining clearly who you are, what interests you represent Campaigns (using a variety of actions, e.g. public meetings, statements, media articles, co-ordination across different EU member states (from April 2012, this might include the European Citizens Initiative, working in coalition with other civil society organisations/chambers of commerce/other stakeholders) Third-party endorsements for a policy (op-ed/speech by supportive politician, analysis in FT by influential opinion-shaper, key Foreign Minister s speech) Effective co-ordination with own country s government (e.g. in the case of non-eu country) In short, like all decision-making structures, the different institutions and stakeholders in EU policymaking require a deep understanding, and are to be handled with care. Likewise, contacts need to be identified and their positions and relevance regularly checked and updated in a fast-rotating environment. HOW TO LOSE RESPECT AND INFLUENCE NOBODY ARRIVING TOO LATE - presenting policy recommendations after a policy review process has just been completed LOSING THE MESSAGE - visiting a member of the Cabinet of an EU Commissioner, armed with long policy papers or, even worse, a volume of research studies, where the policy recommendations are hidden inside dense text that they will never find MISSING THE TARGET - skipping research on whom to meet, targeting the wrong stakeholders, annoying them and failing to even address the correct decision-makers MAKING NOISE WITHOUT SUBSTANCE - organising an event with loud protests, using a megaphone to communicate what you are against, but presenting no clear policy recommendations for a constructive alternative policy NOT KNOWING YOUR COMPETITORS - going into a meeting without conducting in advance a situation analysis, knowing what other research and analysis has been conducted, or having submitted your own proposals to a viability study, or having identified which interest groups will be pressing for competing policy solutions. 80

85 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy: Getting Right the Basics The following two case studies illustrate the challenges for independent think-tanks seeking to build on their analytical work to influence EU policymaking in two areas: (a) EU financial instruments in support of democracy and human rights; (b) migration and visa policies. As the case studies show, there are many hurdles to face, but the EU does have many consultative processes and windows of opportunity. If in a given policy field an independent think-tank can stay ahead of the policy cycle, and initiate innovative, wellresearched policy solutions, there is scope for influencing the policymaking process. And, once the doors are open, effective, professional presentation of clear, well-drafted policy recommendations can keep those doors open. 81

86 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Advocacy Case Study 1: EU Financial Instruments in Support of Democracy and Human Rights by Věra Řiháčková European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) A major success of civil society and the European Parliament The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) - successor to the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights following its 2007 reform - was in its earlier guise one of the EU s external action instruments that was omitted by the European Commission when designing its proposal for the financial perspective (reasons: budgetary constraints and a need to rationalise external cooperation). The EIDHR was supposed to continue solely as a thematic programme, mainstreaming the agenda of democracy and human rights support within all other geographic instruments of EU external action. The decision not to retain the EIDHR as a separate instrument sparked an immediate reaction from the European Parliament (especially the European Democracy Caucus, a cross-political grouping of like-minded MEPs committed to the promotion of democracy worldwide). The Democracy Caucus - together with relevant civil society organisations - started pressing for the preservation of the EIDHR. As a result, in June 2006, the European Commission agreed to retain the EIDHR as a separate instrument. This was 82

87 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 1: EU Financial Instruments in Support of Democracy and Human Rights perceived as a major success for the European Parliament and civil society organisations; nevertheless, the primary decision of the Council working group was crucial to create the critical institutional mass support necessary to keep the instrument as a self-standing tool. Key factors determining the advocacy impact around inclusion of funding for EIDHR The exclusion of the EIDHR as a self-standing instrument of EU external action in the Commission proposal was to some extent an expression of the fact that the Commission was facing constant criticism from the European Parliament and civil society concerning the way the instrument had been managed during the preceding programming period. An advocacy campaign aiming at significant and complex changes of an EU policy or instrument must be preceded by indepth analysis of the possible impacts of criticism of the existing situation as this can turn counterproductive. To get the very point (the self-standing EIDHR in this case) back on the EU agenda requires much more effort than re-shaping the points already included within the starting proposal of the Commission. 83

88 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking The relevant working groups of the Council of the European Union (COHOM, CODEV) 1 not only regarded the separate instrument as a guarantee of the visibility of the EU in the field of human rights and democracy promotion, but were especially concerned to retain the unique feature of the instrument - the right to act without the consent of the thirdcountry government and authorities. The strategic framing of the information submitted to each of the actors/entry points has to have a sense of urgency, carrying a specific tailored appeal. The European Parliament also argued that there was a need to have a visible and clear EU profile in the field of human rights and democracy promotion. The European Parliament s original ownership of the EIDHR 2 (and, in particular, the personal ties of some MEPs to the subject matter) played an important role. To work with a group of MEPs who would eventually form a single-issue caucus cutting across the political groupings proved beneficial. This can work well when tackling issues of low political urgency as the political groups usually strive to discipline their members over important agenda points. The individual MEPs within the Democracy Caucus were left to act more or less freely as the issue (EIDHR) was on the margins of the priority interests of the main European political party groupings. The loose policy network of civil society around the EIDHR was diverse and rather complex to the point that some civil society actors were working at cross-purposes. When the goals, priorities, eligibility and programming reached the table, there were many conflicting interests, and civil society was not able to agree on common positions towards implementation issues. Competition is usually present among the members of an advocacy network. Therefore, possible conflicts should be pre-empted by agreeing clearly stated goals of action and an advocacy strategy. A single-issue advocacy network should be at least partly institutionalised in order to avoid paralysis, as negotiations on specific details (programming, eligibility, goals, and themes) can otherwise spark substantive clashes of interests. 1 The Human Rights Working Group (COHOM) and the Working Group on Development Co-operation (CODEV). 2 The original European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights was conceived by the European Parliament. 84

89 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 1: EU Financial Instruments in Support of Democracy and Human Rights Political foundations (especially the influential German political foundations) became a specific actor in Brussels-based civil society in this case, as they were interested in receiving co-financing for their projects through EU programmes. In 2006, the political foundations - encouraged by the consultation requirements of the European Commission - formed the European Network of Political Foundations (ENOP) and entered the Commission consultations on the EIDHR. As a politically neutral body thanks to participation of the whole spectrum of political parties, ENOP was a suitable interlocutor for the Commission, which generally prefers non-partisan partners. Due to its size, scope of activities and political leverage, ENOP immediately gained a pre-eminent position in the EIDHR policy network. 1 Their lobbying was highly successful. Their leverage was based on their close relations with several MEPs, as well as very good linkages with their governments. Political foundations are a strong force that needs to be taken into account when lobbying for any civil society funding. The relationship between ENOP and other civil society networks remains highly competitive, and there is only very limited communication among them. Over the years, relations became strained between some civil society organisations and the political foundations, not least because of the latter s perceived interest in EU funds as well as their explicitly political activity. Generally speaking, such a communication breakdown can prove damaging - primarily for civil society organisations reluctant to consider working with highly relevant and influential actors as partners for negotiations. 1 The main interest of ENOP in EIDHR consisted in broadening the range of funding possibilities for political actors and for big projects, as well as making their local branches eligible for funding within the national calls for proposals. 85

90 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking European Foundation for Democracy through Partnership (EFDP)/ European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) A lost opportunity The idea 1 to establish a foundation through which a certain part of EU democracy and human rights assistance would be granted to civil society emerged in connection with the debate on the EIDHR reform, with the direct involvement of the European Democracy Caucus of the European Parliament, together with NGOs and some EU member states. The final initiative for establishing the European Foundation for Democracy through Partnership was tabled by The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), backed by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). 2 The idea was inspired by the US National Endowment for Democracy. An informal group of like-minded countries emerged in the Council of the European Union (the Czech Republic, Sweden, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia) promoting the foundation idea, backed by several high-profile personalities including former Czech President Václav Havel, former Commission President Jacques Delors, and former President of Germany, Richard von Weizsäcker. The idea was to provide the foundation with a direct allocation under Objective 3 of EIDHR, 3 and the member states involved also agreed to contribute to the foundation s budget. However, the idea of direct funding from the EU budget was scrapped in the 1 The idea was not new. In the mid-nineties, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights was run by an external agency - the European Human Rights Foundation (EHRF) - which enabled the initiative to avoid the lengthy processes typical for programmes administered directly by the European Commission. The EHRF at first provided solely technical assistance, but later it took over the complete management of the initiative. However, in 1999 the swirl of events radically changed the ownership of the instrument. The decision to make the EIDHR an in-house project of the European Commission was partly also a consequence of suspicion towards the so called submarines - outside agencies independent of the European Commission, to which the Commission outsourced some of its operations. Such aversion was a repercussion of the resignation of the Santer Commission amid mismanagement of EU funds. 2 Later on, WFD removed its support, possibly due to pressure from the other political foundations. 3 Objective 3: Supporting actions on human rights and democracy issues in areas covered by EU Guidelines, including on human rights dialogues, on human rights defenders, on the death penalty, on torture, and on children and armed conflict. 86

91 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 1: EU Financial Instruments in Support of Democracy and Human Rights Council (and opposed by the Commission, too). The dissenting member states pointed to the fact that the funding could be obtained through regular funding (grants and tenders). When the EIDHR regulation was adopted, the informal group supporting the EFDP idea had shrunk to the Czech Republic and Poland. The German Presidency of the Council of the European Union (January-June 2007) was heavily lobbied by the German political foundations, and played a crucial role in the bargain. In April 2008, the foundation (later re-named as the European Partnership for Democracy, EPD) was nevertheless launched in Brussels, without any regular EU institutional funding commitment. Key factors determining the advocacy impact around the establishment of the European Partnership for Democracy This case demonstrates the key role of the member states. A critical mass of supporting member states was not achieved and, furthermore, all the old member states originally involved in the like-minded group gradually backed away. The group of supportive member states within the Council has to be mixed (old/new, small/big) in order to maximise the chances for successful advocacy. It is necessary to bear in mind that it is almost impossible to play against a strong Presidency of the Council of the European Union pursuing a particular interest - even after the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. The German government was reluctant towards the idea from the very beginning, and the lobbying by the German political foundations was a major factor behind the elimination of the foundation s aspirations). The foundation idea was pushed forward by several MEPs (Edward McMillan-Scott, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Jan Marinus Wiersma). However, the situation in the European Parliament changed during 2006, and the window of opportunity closed. The informal European Democracy Caucus turned out to be politically overstretched, and the political foundations lobbied MEPs against the idea of the EFDP. With the Council and Commission allied to block this initiative, its fate was sealed. Significant support from at least two institutions from the EU institutional triangle is highly recommended for successful advocacy. The division of powers within the EU institutional structure is 87

92 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking subject to constant change. Under such conditions, those who advocate can either fall prey to inter-institutional turf wars, or receive support from an institution seeking an alliance in the inter-institutional deliberations. The active or passive profile of an institution in the given policy area or issue, and its particular interests, are of crucial importance for those advocating, since it can limit or enhance the ability to influence the target. The proponents of the EFDP underestimated the influence of the political foundations. Confident of the support of the relevant EU decision-making bodies, the EFDP representatives did not enter into negotiations with the political foundations, and failed to realise that otherwise the EFDP would automatically be perceived by them as a competitor. It is necessary not only to develop a comprehensive coalition and reputation-building strategy vis-à-vis the EU institutions, but also to involve major non-institutional players in Brussels (civil society networks and think-tanks like the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), European Policy Centre (EPC), etc.) in order to be successful. The involvement of former political heavyweights and important personalities can add further appeal to the issue and open access to top-level officials. The Brussels environment is highly complex, and networking is crucial for any civil society organisation that wants to deliver on advocacy. Based on the experience of the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), it is a major disadvantage to be an independent actor on the Brussels scene without the immense resources needed to invest in penetrating networks and in reputation-building. There has been a subsequent development, however, showing that the pendulum can swing both ways. The idea to establish a European Endowment for Democracy (EED) - in many ways along the same lines as proposed in was promoted by Poland as one of the flagship initiatives of its 2011 Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The initiative was supported by the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EED concept was drafted by the EEAS and the Commission, approved by the Council of the European Union at the beginning of December 2011, and sent to the European Parliament. It seems likely that the EED will be launched in the 88

93 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 1: EU Financial Instruments in Support of Democracy and Human Rights course of 2012, although with limited funding provided by interested member states, a core start-up contribution provided from the EU budget, and with its initial focus on the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy. 1 The involvement of civil society into this agenda was crucial during the Polish Presidency preparations, and some organisations were consulted and commissioned in order to contribute to the debate on the EED s structure and its implementation mechanisms. In this case, a number of endorsements were key to success, namely the strong support of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the favourable position of the Commission (especially of the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle) and the EEAS (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton). The Commission and EEAS incorporated the idea into their review (Communication) of the European Neighbourhood Policy presented in May Change of financial regulation and implementing rules Recognising the importance of the reform of the Financial Regulation and Implementing Rules to be implemented in 2006 (legislation regulating management of all EU funding programmes), an alliance was formed of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and platforms - the Platform of European Social NGOs (Social Platform), CONCORD (European NGO confederation for Relief and Development), the European Women s Lobby and the Brussels office of the Open Society Institute. Due to their extensive membership and a certain level of institutionalisation within Brussels, the alliance had the means and leverage to run a two-year campaign aimed at multiple relevant actors at the EU level. 1 The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004, and concerns EU relations with 16 of the EU s closest neighbours: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. See: 89

94 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking The argumentation of the alliance was drawn directly from their experience with project funding. Moreover, their proposals were supported by member states with well-developed mechanisms of financial aid (such as the UK and Sweden). Moreover, the alliance was able to receive support from MEPs, prevalently based on their territorial interests, as the major argument concerned EU instruments of external action. The well-prepared initiative succeeded at many points. Key factors determining the advocacy impact around the reform of the Financial Regulation and implementing rules Lobbying for the reform of the Financial Regulation was a significant challenge for the NGOs, since the Commission s responsible Directorate-General (DG Budget) had not developed a culture of consultations with civil society and relied mainly on intra- Commission consultations. Moreover, the discourse of DG Budget could be described as anti-ngo, emanating from mainly fraud-related information on NGO activities. Another challenge was to translate the policy-driven message of the alliance into the bureaucratic language of DG Budget. Every part of the EU bureaucracy has a specific culture, and different levels of difficulty of access. It is necessary to assess the challenges posed by the various actors, and to prepare relevant strategies in order to secure access. The network was able to deliver expert input based on practical knowledge of the subject matter. Summary of lessons learned The more reliable and institutionally relevant policy goods (expert knowledge) the advocating organisation possesses, the higher the chance it will secure access. The expertise, however, cannot be rigid and must be amenable to framing strategies that can sell it in a way that matches institutions needs. 90

95 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 1: EU Financial Instruments in Support of Democracy and Human Rights It is highly recommended to secure significant support from at least two institutions from the EU institutional triangle (European Commission, Council of the European Union, and European Parliament). The division of powers within the EU institutional structure is subject to constant change, while the active or passive profile of an institution in the given policy area or issue, and its particular interests, are of crucial importance since they can limit or enhance the impact of advocacy. The information put forward needs to carry a specific actor-tailored urgency and to be framed strategically. When working with the Member States in the Council of the European Union, it is advisable to create a mixed group of supporters (old/new, small/big) in order to maximise the chances for successful advocacy. It is important to bear in mind that it is almost impossible to play against a strong Presidency of the Council of the European Union (even after the Lisbon Treaty) that follows a particular divergent interest. It is generally beneficial to work with a group of MEPs cutting across the European Parliament s political groups in such a way that they can form a single-issue caucus. It is, however, always better to pick those MEPs who have more influence in the Parliament or in their political group owing to their long-term experience in the Parliament or their specific expertise. Co-operation with MEPs often works best on policy issues of low urgency on partisan agendas, as the political groups usually strive to discipline their members over important agenda points. Competition is usually present among the members of an advocacy network, so possible conflicts should be pre-empted by agreeing clearly stated goals and a joint advocacy strategy. Poor relations and lack of contacts with highly relevant and influential actors (political foundations) as partners for negotiations can prove damaging for advocacy efforts. The Brussels environment is highly complex, and networking is crucial to the success of any civil society organisation s advocacy strategy. It is necessary to develop a comprehensive coalition and reputation-building strategy vis-à-vis the EU institutions, and also to involve major non-institutional players in Brussels (civil society networks and think-tanks) in order to be successful. The involvement of former political heavyweights and important personalities can generate further appeal for the policy issue in question, and open access to top-level officials. 91

96 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking Advocacy Case Study 2: Migration and Visa Policies by Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz Overview of the specificity of EU migration and visa policies as a target for civil society advocacy For a number of reasons, visa regimes and migration policies are a relatively difficult field for civil society organisations from outside the EU seeking to influence EU policies. Firstly, the traditional areas of civil society activism within the field have been those governed either by international norms (asylum and refugees) or delegated to local authorities (socio-economic integration of foreigners). Until the adoption of the Border and Visa Codes, applicants for Schengen visas and third-country nationals crossing EU borders were not viewed as groups in need of Community regulation as the refusal of a visa or border entry was a matter for member states administrative procedures. Secondly, decisions on the relaxation of rules for entry, residence and employment remain firmly in the competence of the member states and, when decisions are taken at the EU level on the abolition of short-term visa requirements for nationals of third countries, the unanimous consent of all EU member states is required. At the same time, civil society organisations are gaining new opportunities for entry into this field as links with other policies are becoming increasingly apparent. Firstly, growing attention has been paid to the place of fundamental civil freedoms. Secondly, the internal mobility of EU residents and the influx of migrants meeting the demographic and economic needs of the member states are recognised as necessary for achieving the core EU 92

97 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 2: Migration and Visa Policies objective of a single market (and realising the Lisbon Strategy). 1 Thirdly, facilitation and eventual liberalisation of the EU s visa policies toward the neighbouring states have been shown to play a role in the promotion of the EU s democratic values and the furthering of people-to-people contacts. Finally, co-operation with the governments of key countries of origin on managing migratory flows (through such initiatives as readmission agreements and the Mobility Partnership) 2 has resulted in greater security for both sides. A major barrier to proposing effective measures in the field of migration and visas is posed by the dual-track character of this policy area - respectively technical and political 1 The European Council held a special meeting on March 2000 in Lisbon to agree a new strategic goal for the Union in order to strengthen employment, economic reform and social cohesion as part of a knowledge-based economy. 2 In 2007, the European Commission proposed the negotiation of mobility partnerships between the EU and third countries ready to work actively to better manage migration flows, and in particular to fight illegal migration, in partnership with the EU, in exchange for enhanced possibilities of mobility between their countries and the EU for their citizens, in terms of legal migration opportunities and of short-stay visa issues. 93

98 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking criteria. Thus, it requires on the one hand knowledge of emerging legal standards and administrative procedures and, on the other hand, awareness of the changing political environment and public discourse. Another feature of this field is its dynamism. It is undergoing rapid change: legal norms once scattered across laws of varying force are being more clearly expressed in Community codes, approximation of national policies in areas belonging to national competence (residence and employment conditions, integration) continues, and certain policy areas are taking on greater importance, calling for adequate responses to problems such as the low participation of migrants in the political life of their host countries, inter-community conflicts, and the position of vulnerable groups, such as women and minors. Secondly, unlike other technical issues, migration is a subject of heated political discussions, frequently becoming victim to populist rhetoric, feeding on fears of an uncontrolled influx of migrants, concerns over competition in the labour market or over the perceived burden that migrants place on welfare systems. It is an area where experts and advocates of migrants rights need to lay these arguments to rest not only by reference to facts, pointing to the benefits of migrants presence and putting the concerns into perspective, but also by tackling broader concerns, appealing to societal values and aspirations transcending particular interests. For effective advocacy in this area, it is essential to possess expertise in the legal and procedural foundations while also keeping a close eye on the political environment, watching for opportunities for advancing a civil society agenda by advocacy interventions at the right time. It is thus crucial to identify allies, to decide which initiatives to support, and also to understand the rationale behind the opposition and respond on the most appropriate level - providing fact-based evidence and appealing to values. Of course, success cannot be easily achieved where access to statistics is limited, controversies are deep-rooted, and fact-finding gives way to political slogans used for the purpose of generating support. Nonetheless, moving the discussion to the EU level offers some opportunities for dealing with the politicisation of migration and visa matters, 94

99 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 2: Migration and Visa Policies not least through offering examples from some member states that manage to reconcile the need for sustained immigration and openness to newcomers with necessary controls preventing abuse of entry and residence regimes. Key stakeholders New opportunities arising with a change in decision-making from intergovernmental to Community approach The evolution of decision-making in the area of freedom, security and justice presents other opportunities to civil society groups defending migrants rights and advocating freedom of movement. Co-operation within the field was originally intergovernmental, as was the case with the Schengen Agreement that only became part of the EU body of law with the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty (which entered into force on 1 May 1999). Other regulations were initially adopted by some member states without going through the EU legislative framework, but were then picked up by the Council of the European Union, setting regulations binding on all member states. This policy area has witnessed a shift from intergovernmental co-operation, once requiring unanimous consent of the states, towards the greater involvement of EU institutions and majority voting in the Council. The Lisbon Treaty placed EU and national decisions in this area under the review of the Court of Justice. The Lisbon Treaty reduced the possibilities for member states to veto motions in the Council. Unanimity is required only in the areas of passports, identity cards, family law, and operational policy co-operation (where the European Parliament is still merely consulted). The Treaty extended a list of issues, governed by the ordinary legislative procedure, where the European Parliament has full powers, while the Council decides by qualified majority voting. Apart from short-term visas and residence permits, asylum policy and rules on illegal immigration, a host of other issues no longer require unanimity 95

100 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking in the Council, including notably the regulation of legal immigration and decisions on the lists of third-country nationals who must be in possession of visas and those exempt from this requirement (the so-called black and white visa lists). These changes are good news for civil society organisations as the enhanced role played by the Parliament and the Commission increases the opportunities for putting issues to public debate, making the decision-making process more transparent, and requiring that policy proposals take into account multiple perspectives. A field once dominated by the agenda of internal security, guarded by member states as their unique competence, has been opened to new actors expressing different perspectives. The growing role of the European Parliament in setting the parameters of EU migration and visa policies A key institution, which should be targeted by civil society advocacy efforts, is the European Parliament, which acts as a guardian of fundamental freedoms (especially in the fields of asylum, rights of irregular migrants and detainees, and protection against discrimination) both through its legislative initiatives and the use of non-binding instruments (such as resolutions). Although the latter cannot be directly enforced, they set the agenda for long-term EU policy, highlighting the need to adhere to a set of standards. This was exemplified in the Parliament s resolution of 5 April 2011, 1 in which it responded to the unilateral decisions by France and Italy to deal with the uncontrolled migratory flows from North Africa: the resolution reiterated the principles on which the EU should respond to migration and urged the Commission to develop further instruments to establish a common immigration policy. A notable link was made in the resolution between the level of migration and the social, economic and political development of the countries of origin. In effect, the Parliament called on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to make 1 Resolution of the European Parliament of 5 April 2011 on migration flows resulting from instability: scope and role of EU policy (2010/2269 (INI)). 96

101 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 2: Migration and Visa Policies further efforts with regard to the development and democratisation of countries of origin and to promote the rule of law, in order to tackle the problems associated with migration at their root (clause 14 of the Resolution). The Parliament has played a vital role in guiding relations with third countries in the sphere of migration. On 1 December 2011, a European Parliament resolution recommended that the Council, the Commission and the EEAS take active measures towards the establishment of a visa-free regime between Ukraine and the EU so as to avoid delay. The resolution pointed to the fulfilment of the technical conditions set out in the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation as the primary criteria to consider in the decision to waive visa requirements, and recommended waiver of visa fees as an intermediate incentive. It is expected that the European Parliament will remain an important actor in maintaining the momentum driving visa liberalisation talks with the Eastern Partnership countries, 1 emphasising that the ultimate outcome should be strictly tied to demonstrable progress in meeting technical criteria. However, the Parliament s competence in the area of migration and visa policies is limited in a number of ways. Firstly, as noted above, policy influence in this area is dependent on command of in-depth technical knowledge of migration management and access to statistics on migratory flows, which are primarily available to member-state governments, the Commission (and its agencies, including the EEAS, responsible for the collection of information on the situation in the country of origin). The European Parliament should not be targeted so much for technical and specialised proposals, but rather for support to broader appeals, rooted in values, and political, rather than technical, arguments. Secondly, the extension of the Parliament s competence following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has not led to an immediate increase in activism of this body in the new area. One reason could be the low visibility of the European Parliament in the member states and the fast-changing architecture of EU institutions matching the restructuring of this policy area (the division of the Commission s Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) into two Directorates, and the formation of the EEAS). 2 1 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine 2 EU s area of Freedom, Security and Justice: from post-lisbon Tactics to EU-Oriented Strategy, Ivo Šlosarčík, 2011 TGAE Report, Notre Europe, 15 June 2011, available at: fileadmin/img/pdf/tgae2011_4d_slosarcik_1_ 97

102 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking At the same time, the European Parliament is a natural entry point for civil society organisations, running campaigns around fundamental freedoms and EU values. The Parliament can be a useful gateway both at the stage of raising a new point in the policy agenda or drawing attention to a broader ongoing problem, and also during the parliamentary review of the specific Council and Commission proposals. Newcomers to the EU decision-making process on migration and visa policies, such as non-brusselsbased advocates for migrants rights or civil society organisations from third countries, should seek to participate in alliances with organisations with a record of successful participation in EU consultation processes. Tensions over decision-making on EU migration and visa policies: the member states, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission The reduction under the Lisbon Treaty of the scope for a member state exercising the veto power in the Council of the European Union, and the extension of the areas in which the Parliament and the Commission have the initiative, signalled the pre-eminence of the Community method in the area of migration and visas. However, initially, the Commission was preoccupied with reorganisation (the separation of the Directorate- General for Justice and Home Affairs into two directorates, with DG Home taking over the responsibility for migration and visas, alongside the establishment and staffing of field offices of the EEAS). When it did engage in a spate of legislative proposals, the Commission managed to codify norms in border and visa management in Community codes, ensuring minimum standards for visa applicants and for persons crossing the border. The Commission encountered resistance, however, in 2011 when it failed to push through a set of rules for the re-establishment of border controls - which, if approved, would have required the Commission s approval for the reintroduction of checks on Schengen area internal borders for a period exceeding five days. This attempt was blocked by some key member states (including France), which guarded national jurisdiction, and had in fact attempted to set up mechanisms allowing for broader application of frontier checks. 98

103 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 2: Migration and Visa Policies While the Commission managed to exert effective pressure on the Danish government, which eventually backed down from an initiative to restore controls on its borders, a more subtle proposal along similar lines was put into effect by the Dutch government a few months later. It is clear from the responses to the migration crisis emanating from the Mediterranean at the time of the Arab Spring in 2011 (the unilateral decisions of France and Italy to suspend the free-movement regime in the Schengen area) that the Commission is pitted in a systemic tension against member states that seek to introduce barriers to freedom of movement within the Community in the name of the protection of national security. Within the Commission, tensions are likely to persist between the position of the Directorate-General for Home Affairs, which tends to accommodate the concerns of Ministries of Interior of the member states, while seeking to communitarianise this field, and those Directorates that uphold the single market and are concerned that any reestablishment of controls within the Schengen area poses a threat to internal mobility. Another potential conflict could surface between DG Home and the EEAS in negotiations with third countries over the requirements to be met in visa facilitation and readmission agreements - DG Home is likely to be more intransigent, while the EEAS is more interested in overall relations with third countries. The stalemate over the procedure for reintroducing border controls, and the Council s rejection in 2011 of the recommendation of the Parliament and the Commission to grant Romania and Bulgaria integration into Schengen, testify to the determining role of member states in this policy area. At the level of the Council of the European Union, the member states maintain the right to approve changes in the EU s visa and migration policies, in particular wielding ultimate decision-making power on the conditions of entry for nationals of third countries, with the Commission serving only in an advisory capacity. The centrality of the Council of the European Union and the retention by the member states of significant competences in the management of migration matters represent serious barriers to civil society organisations trying to influence the EU-wide agenda. New member states, committed to the agenda of friendly borders, carry relatively little clout in the Council and have not managed to overcome the strong push towards 99

104 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking securitisation of the agenda. A clear example of such failure was Poland s inability during its Presidency of the Council of the European Union to oversee the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into Schengen. At the same time, the new member states have failed to build a coalition in the Council, which is understandable, given the conflicting interests between some of them (e.g. the Czech Republic is often more interested in the strengthening of controls on its external borders than are some states with long external frontiers, such as Poland). Furthermore, contrary to declarations, Eastern Partnership states such as Ukraine have not sought strong alliances with their advocates within the EU and, as the Yulia Tymoshenko case 1 has shown, have proved to be immune to criticism and prodding from the side of those advocates. Within the Council of the European Union, a clear division exists on the scope and format of negotiations with third countries. France, Italy, Spain, the Benelux countries, Denmark, and to some extent also Germany and Austria favour a more extensive and deeper set of requirements, while Central European states (plus Greece and Cyprus as well as to some extent Sweden) would like to see the negotiations over visa liberalisation based on a much narrower set of demands. In short, for the skeptics, visa and migration matters in talks with third countries are a function of internal security concerns, while for the liberals they are closely tied to the foreign policy agenda of the EU, serving the cause of people-to-people contacts, trade, human rights and democracy promotion. Differences among states are as pronounced in their own visa administration and migration control mechanisms. As shown in numerous studies on visa practices, applied by various EU states, the same framework standards (Visa Code) can be applied in a 1 Beginning in May 2010, a number of criminal cases were opened against Yulia Tymoshenko, twice prime minister of Ukraine, who had been narrowly defeated by Viktor Yanukovych in the Presidential election on 7 February On 11 October 2011, the court found Tymoshenko guilty of abuse of power over a natural gas imports contract signed with Russia in January 2009, sentenced her to seven years in jail, and ordered her to pay the state $188 million. The judge also banned her from seeking elected office for her period of imprisonment (disqualifying her from participation in the 2012 parliamentary and 2015 presidential elections). The European Commission and EU member states have issued protests to the government of Ukraine, objecting that the trial constituted selective prosecution of political opponents. 100

105 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 2: Migration and Visa Policies more conservative or liberal manner, basically reflecting the domestic consensus on the function of visa policies -either as a tool of protection of the territory and the labour market or as an instrument for facilitation of trade, neighbourhood relations and goodwill in bilateral relations. Visa liberalisation between the EU and the Western Balkans and between the EU and Eastern Partners - conclusions and recommendations for civil society advocacy Lessons from Western Balkans advocacy efforts Liberalisation of the regime for entry of nationals of third countries involves a process in which the Parliament, the Commission and the Council of the European Union all play a role. The process itself is a good illustration of the twin character of governance of matters within the area of migration and visas: technical and political. In the case of lifting Schengen visa requirements for the Western Balkans states, the applicant countries needed to meet technical criteria in the course of negotiations and through checks carried out by the European Commission on the basis of the mandate granted by the Council of the European Union and upon the decision of the European Parliament. Demonstrating progress in meeting technical criteria was not sufficient, however, to ensure success, as the visa liberalisation process was part of the broader political agenda of accession to the EU. This was also reflected in the procedure for taking the ultimate decision on lifting the visa requirement: the Council of the European Union voted on the removal of Western Balkans states from the visa list in response to the Commission s technical opinion and the Parliament s political recommendations. Although the EU member states put the Commission in charge of the process of verification of technical progress, they nonetheless closely watched the performance of the applicant states, sending national experts on field assessment missions. Their eventual decision took into account criteria going beyond the parameters of the negotiations, such as the impact of the visa-free movement on the migratory balance in the region, as well as on 101

106 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking the level of irregular migration and asylum claims filed with EU member-state authorities. These broader criteria proved to be very sensitive for the governments and the publics of the member states. Citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina with biometric passports became able to travel to the Schengen area without the need for a visa from 15 December The citizens of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were granted visa-free travel to the Schengen area on 19 December Following the lifting of visa requirements, reports cited a rise in the number of asylum applications from nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European Commission acknowledged the increase in the asylum pressure that had been reported in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden. The issue was then raised at the Council Justice and Home Affairs meeting with interior ministers from the Western Balkans states. At that meeting, the EU made it clear that unless these countries authorities took necessary measures to reduce the uncontrolled migration flow, the visa liberalisation achievement might be put at risk. The European Stability Initiative (ESI), civil society advocates of visa-free travel for the Western Balkans, acknowledged this new threat, responding in the following ways: Admitting the existence of the problem but weighing it against the greater benefit of improved security for the EU, an issue of high priority in the national policies of the Member States. Using factual data to show that the response of the EU was based on false premises. Civil society experts demonstrated that the Western Balkans governments had in fact addressed the problem and done all the homework required by the EU. This message was essential to demonstrate the utility of the approach used by the European Commission, in which by meeting the strict but fair technical conditions, monitored by the EU, the applicants reaped tangible rewards. Pointing out the root of the problem, which in this case were flaws in the asylum systems of the selected EU member states and insufficient incentives for return of irregular migrants. 102

107 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 2: Migration and Visa Policies Doing so, the advocates grounded the technical issue in the context of fundamental EU values, thus appealing to the attention of the European Parliament. 1 The advocacy strategy adopted in this case was effective since it had the right timing -addressing current concerns within the EU, accompanied by correct target identification -member states and their policies - and appropriate use of arguments and appeal to values, familiar to and shared by the respective stakeholders (the Council, Commission and the Parliament). Thus, the advocacy efforts acknowledged the twin character of the process, involving both reference to technical standards and the identification of wider societal concerns relating to migratory flows. Lessons for the case of visa liberalisation with Eastern Partnership states Both aspects of the governance of migration are pertinent in the case of the ongoing process of visa liberalisation between the EU and some countries of the Eastern Partnership. Upon the insistence of several EU member states, concerned over the potential impact on the scale of irregular migration of dropping visa requirements toward nationals of countries such as Moldova or Ukraine, the process was divided into two stages. The first stage is similar to that involving the Western Balkans states, consisting of a structured review under the supervision of the European Commission of the legislative and institutional foundations of the Eastern Partners migration management systems. As with the Western Balkans case, the Council of the European Union takes an ultimate decision on the successful completion of the review process. However, unlike in the Western Balkans case, the Eastern Partners negotiations with the EU are not carried out in the context of the applicants accession to membership of the EU, and are thus in principle open-ended. The vulnerability of the applicants is compounded by the fact that the technical review is followed by a second stage, covering broader issues of actual institutional capacity for control of migratory flows, 1 Freedom of movement in a populist age: Why Balkan visa liberalisation is (still) a success, ESI presentation at the Robert Bosch Stiftung, Brussels, 30 June

108 THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EUROPE An Advocacy Handbook for Civil Society: Understanding and Influencing EU Policymaking going beyond issues of strict migration management, such as combating corruption, inter-agency co-ordination and access to relevant information. The agenda for the EU s relations with neighbours in the field of migration and visa regime will continue to be determined by the member states, reflecting their preoccupations and concerns - going far beyond the issue of migration. The decision to advance a country to the second stage of the visa liberalisation process, and progress toward the ultimate objective of dropping the visa requirement, is influenced by the interplay of arguments advanced by opponents and supporters of fast relaxation of controls on the movement of persons into the EU from neighbouring countries. The division lines have already been drawn. In 2011, on two occasions the ministers of interior of several EU Member States interested in strengthening internal controls managed to build successful coalitions, involving such key member states as Germany, to block the entry of Bulgaria and Romania into Schengen. The arguments advanced against admission into Schengen of the two south-eastern European states echoed the rhetoric used in support of the push for the re-introduction of a visa regime towards Bosnia and Herzegovina: namely, the demand to show that the reforms were irreversible and that, prior to the relaxation of controls, an impact assessment must be carried to demonstrate that the liberalisation would not result in the additional burden of irregular migration to the EU. In contrast, the EU member states supportive of visa liberalisation with Eastern Partner countries have already made their position clear on the cases of the Western Balkans and Schengen area enlargement. New EU member states are committed to the principle of basing the evaluation process of the applicants capacity on an exhaustive list of measurable indicators, resenting attempts at expanding the list of requirements. Another argument tabled by the supporters, shared by both civil society organisations and some governments, pointed to the opportunity a visa waiver would bring for reducing corruption and abuse of migrants rights. Finally, both civil society groups and governments of the countries neighbouring the Eastern Partnership states argue that the removal of barriers to movement represents an 104

109 Part II: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES AND CASE STUDIES Advocacy Case Study 2: Migration and Visa Policies opportunity for promoting people-to-people contacts and democratisation. All these arguments are present in the resolutions of the European Parliament, which is likely to continue to advocate for a process as transparent, predictable and fact-based as possible. These arguments also represent opportunities for advancing the civil society agenda, making the European Parliament, supportive member states and the European Commission potential allies for civil society organisations. 105

110

111 How to become a PASOS member To be eligible for PASOS membership, an organisation should accept the PASOS mission and goals, share and promote open society values, and not be related to any political party or political movement. The organisation must have been in existence for at least two years and have established a credible reputation in public policy as determined by the Board of PASOS. To apply, the applicant should submit to the Board (via the Executive Director): 1. An application supported by the written recommendation of at least two members (as listed at demonstrating the reputation and the credible track record in public policy of the applicant. 2. A copy of the applicant organisation s charter in the original language, and a translation into English of the Charter or a summary of the Charter. 3. The mission of the policy centre, and an account of its main areas of research and activities. There is an annual membership fee of EUR 500. For more information, contact PASOS Executive Director Jeff Lovitt at jefflovitt@pasos.org PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society) Těšnov 3, Praha 1, Czech Republic Tel./fax: info@pasos.org 62

112 A network of independent policy centres in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society) aims to promote and protect democracy, human rights and open society values including the rule of law, good governance, and economic and social development by supporting civil society organisations that individually and jointly foster public participation in public policy issues at the European Union level, in other European and global structures, and in the wider neighbourhood of Europe and Central Asia. PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society) Těšnov 3, Praha 1, Czech Republic Tel./fax: