UBC POLI 101 Canadian Politics

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1 UBC POLI 101 Canadian Politics The Executive The Political Executive: The Prime Minister & Cabinet The Permanent Executive: The Public Service 1 The Canadian Executive Cabinet and Bureaucracy Governments do a whole lot who does all this? The Bureaucracy (civil service) is a now such a huge operation, so there has to be some control over it The principle of ministerial responsibility accomplishes this Ministers of government departments are answerable to the legislature for everything their department does This gives ministers an incentive to monitor their department s activities and make the important decisions If mistakes are bad enough, the minister is expected to resign The Prime Minister and Cabinet are responsible collectively to the legislature for all the decisions of their government This is particularly important in the context of the BUDGET This means the Prime Minister wants to be aware of what Ministers and their departments are doing

2 Cabinet (Ministers) and the Policy Process Cabinet ministers are also responsible for the development of policy and the drafting of legislation relevant to their dept The Cabinet is the means by which government can be responsible to the people If the public wants a change in policy, it has to be carried out through proposal of legislation and implementation by departments Cabinet ministers have the authority to do this They make decisions (in theory) within Cabinet (a committee) Ministers political careers depend on approval of the Prime Minister, so ministers have to perform as managers (CEOs) Important policy matters are directed from the Prime Minister s Office and co-ordinated by the Privy Council Office So if the public doesn t like what it gets, it knows WHO IS RESPONSIBLE This also allows for policy leadership 3 Primus Inter Pares: The Prime Minister (and Premiers too!) The Prime Minister is not identified in the constitution But somebody has to form a government name a Cabinet So the G.G. turns to the person who can command the allegiance of a majority of members of Parliament The PM: Has the power to appoint and dismiss Cabinet Ministers (shuffle) Decides when to call an election Appoints ambassadors, judges, senior public servants, etc. Sets the agenda, chairs, and sums up Cabinet Meetings Determines government organization Has a hand in all Cabinet committees THINK OF HOW ALL THIS POWER ADDS UP BY AFFECTING WHAT OTHER PEOPLE DO! To do all this, PMs have enhanced the size & power of: the Privy Council Office (PCO) the Prime Minister s Office (PMO) Does the PM now have too much power?

3 The Central Agencies There is a lot of power combined in 1. the Privy Council Office (PCO) 2. the Prime Minister s Office (PMO) 3. the Ministry of Finance 4. the Treasury Board These four decide how all the other departments relate to one another, especially in terms of gov t spending PCO: directs the operations and agenda of the Cabinet, coordinating policy, taking a broader view of policy and directs the senior public service (recommends DM appointments) PMO: political influence on overall policy used by PM to control ministers and their departments (a source of advice independent of depts) Finance: overall budgetary control must approve spending Treasury Board: the nitty-gritty of spending, how much will programs cost, and how should money be spent 5 The Politics of Cabinet What are the interests of and incentives for Cabinet Ministers? How are these balanced by the PM s interests? 1. Regional: Ministers enhance their reputation by defending the interests of their province / region / city 2. Succession: Ministers fighting for exposure and good Cabinet jobs if they want to be PM 3. Spending Money: To get good coverage, Ministers want to spend money this means convincing the PM & Finance that dept. projects are good PM and Finance minister have to watch the bottom line if the public wants them to balance the budget PM needs to retain loyalty, so he/she can t be too dictatorial Ministerial uprising could force the PM out as party leader Ministerial resignations would shatter the party and doom it in the next election Advent of Cabinet Committees fractured the cohesion of Cabinet, making the PM more powerful

4 Why has the PM become more powerful? The PM tries to keep his/her party together because party division has been seen as electoral suicide (the Tories): balancing regional input naming a representative Cabinet rewarding loyal service with appointment (patronage) nominating (or vetoing) local candidates for MP Technology: PM is obviously the focus of media coverage so the MPs and Cabinet ministers depend on the PM s performance This makes the PM accountable for the actions of his/her government and party more personally accountable than before TV! In a context of executive federalism, the PM makes some decisions behind closed doors with the Premiers Increasing international agreements 7 Consequences of Prime Ministerial Power Diminished representational role for MPs Diminished representational role for Cabinet Ministers Cabinet has become a focus group for the Prime Minister Diminished party democracy What the PM wants done gets done, not much else Bias toward inaction in policy making: NO-ONE WANTS TO MAKE A MISTAKE this is what the PCO & PMO are motivated by BUT: ACCOUNTABILITY We know who to blame

5 The Doug Young Example WHAT HAPPENED TO HIM? HE LOST HIS SEAT IN The Public Service / Departments / Ministries Public service does what government does (administration) half a million of em! Principles of the public service merit hiring not based on politics / party (wasn t always so) neutrality serve the minister, no independent political agenda rationality many possible policies considered, costed, decided on the basis of all available facts continuity one big organization with institutional memory But public servants aren t perfect and, collectively, have immense power SO Ministers have to monitor their bureaucrats to prevent policy and administration from drifting away from their goals This is hard because there s so much for ministers to do, and the public service can control the flow of information to a minister Ministers have appointed political staff to help them do this SO there s administrative responsibility in the Deputy Minister

6 The Tension Neutrality versus Political Control A neutral public service can provide the best advice But an independent public service can do what it wants So ministers have to steer a course between unecessary interference and necessary monitoring Example: Jane Stewart, Human Resources Development Canada, and the so-called billion-dollar boondoggle 11 Accountability Other problems with accountability Less is done by traditional departments Crown corporations and agencies are purposely arm s length Ministers less willing to take responsibility Other Controls Parliamentiary Committees Agents or Officers of Parliament Auditor General Official Languages Commissioner Information Commissioner Privacy Commissioner Chief Electoral Officer Judicial Review Courts can review administrative decisions Charter Guarantees