ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES AND PARTICIPATION

Transcription

1 REFORMS 1 5 Governance (Reforms 1-5) must embrace community and democratic values as well as physical planning. It is agreed that (T)he city has a significance that extends beyond the Park Lands but its potential is not well served by current arrangements (p39). The Panel is suggesting a very different State-wide governance structure with a lot of essential detail still to be resolved. It advocates for a State Planning Commission, Regional Boards and give and take (relinquishing of roles and responsibilities) is expected on the part of Councils and the Minister for Planning in the interests of removing bottle-necks. However, the Ideas will potentially bring more layers and bureaucracy which may contradict system principles like efficiency and navigability, noting that engagement suggested many people find the system impenetrable and difficult to navigate (Expert Panel on Planning Reform, 2014). Significantly, the Panel also supports a Citizens Charter of Participation. Meaningful community participation in planning decisions is essential to ensuring public confidence in the integrity of the system. Community involvement in planning outcomes includes the public exhibition of planning instruments and development proposals as well as planning authorities giving adequate weight to submissions received as part of this process. (NSW ICAC see Appendix 1)

2 REFORMS 1 5 KEY POINTS OF SUBMISSION The concept of a State Planning Commission to plan future development, infrastructure and oversee areas needing renewal, as well as providing advice to the Minister, is supported if it is inclusive, transparent, empowered to make decisions and structured to allow it to exercise a high degree of independence. Our support is also subject to a commission having multi -sectoral membership (including local government). Early establishment of the commission can help shape reform and foster collaboration and buy-in on system and culture. Council is willing and has capacity to work collaboratively on Capital City matters like the Park Lands governance review. Regional boards, as opposed to forums at various scales set up by a commission, is a n unproven planning concept with questions about its workability in a metropolitan context and why it is favoured over other potential approaches. A regional board would be dealing with local matters with risk of disconnect with local strategic planning an d a long-standing democratic tradition. As an organisation with diverse local functions, Council is able to engage and respond in a far less silo -ed manner than specialised planning agencies which can add considerable value and depth in strategic planning. While opposed to the establishment of RPB, case study research does point to a better approach being a joint State-local Capital City planning body, plus partnerships for growth area planning, and temporary regional planning governance arrangements to oversee regional planning reviews. A joint State-local Capital City body would also be well placed to support the promotion of inner city vibrancy. If a regional board was to be established despite our opposition, it must be representative as far as possib le. Council must be well represented as a Capital City custodian with specific local knowledge and representative of a community. The Charter of Citizen Participation is supported as a means of guiding participatory measures over and above minimum requirements enshrined in legislation. A Charter without prescriptive requirements in legislation (e.g. when to notify) or introduction of contestability over non -prescriptive measures (e.g. subjective expression issues) is not supported. Reforms 4 (independent planning review process) and 5 (altering Parliament s role) are supported in principle though we would suggest it would not be necessary for the Parliament to vet development policy if the rest of the system is working.

3 REFORM 1 ESTABLISH A STATE PLANNING COMMISSION 1.1 The State Planning Commission will be the pre-eminent state planning body, established as a statutory authority with specific powers 1.2 The planning commission will provide high-level advice to the Minister and Cabinet on planning, infrastructure provision and services, urban renewal and related issues. The commission should make its advice publicly available wherever possible 1.3 It will have a primary role in advising the Minister on planning policies and directions and in delivering state priorities. 1.4 The minister will maintain overall responsibility for the system, with the support of the planning commission. 1.5 The planning commission will have general responsibility for administering the planning system, including coordinating and overseeing engagement processes 1.6 It will work with local councils and other government agencies to coordinate infrastructure and policies relating to planning issues EVALUATION & In 2012, Council supported further evaluation of this option when put forward by the Opposition (based on WA Model) (opportunity) Commission in WA (only State to have one) is well regarded (opportunity) As in WA, the Commission may tend towards centralisation, reflecting a risk-averse culture and reluctance to devolve matters to a lower level in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity noting there are Ideas about Culture in part 5 (risk) Potential for many decisions to be made at the Commission level, and at a degree of distance (arms length) from Minister. Where the Minister still decides, it would not reduce layering (opportunity and risk) Less adversarial, better coordinated relationship btw SPC and Council would be a good result for the City (opportunity) Has potential to better integrate planning for development, infrastructure and urban renewal. In so doing, to improve the competence of State s planning role and limit political responses (opportunity and risk) Much depends on the type and calibre of appointees to the Commission, whether inclusive or not in style, how resourced etc. This detail is missing (risk) The Commission s forward plan of activities (such as review State Wide Codes in year X, review transport strategy year Y) should be public, this in addition to agenda, minutes and operational detail (opportunity and risk) The Commission should establish community and expert reference groups that operate publicly to enable free discussion of issues and proposals (opportunity)

4 REFORM 1 ESTABLISH A STATE PLANNING COMMISSION EVALUATION & As mentioned earlier, we suggest that the Commission be appointed early and charged with implementing citizen charter reforms as a priority as well as take a lead role in discussing, adapting and implementing other reform ideas (opportunity) The Commission could possibly also be charged with reviewing the 30 Year Plan for Greater Adelaide (due for review in 2015). (Requesting the State Planning Commission to review the 30 Year Plan does not necessarily imply major changes in planning direction, rather, that the updating is led by the peak state planning body and undertaken based on the charter for citizens participation)) 1.7 It will include independent members (including an independent chair) with professional expertise and community standing together with sector officials from relevant government agencies Local government should be represented on the Commission in some form (opportunity). 1.8 It will be administratively supported by the department and report through minister to Cabinet 1.9 The planning commission will subsume the roles of the existing Development Policy Advisory Committee and Development Assessment Commission and their sub-committees. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE IDEAS Metropolitan Planning Authority would warrant further evaluation, if for some reason, a State Planning Commission (which seems a better option) was not accepted by the government of the day. Single Commissioner is undue concentration of power in a single person and is not supported. In a similar vein, an officer of the planning department must not be able to head the Commission (as was the case recently with WAPC) as this would erode independence, real and perceived.

5 REFORM 2 CREATE A NETWORK OF REGIONAL PLANNING BOARDS 2.1 Divide the State into regions and establish a regional planning board for each 2.2 Each board will include members representing local and state government, with an independent chair appointed by the Minister 2.3 Boards will work with local councils to coordinate planning functions in each region and deliver government policy directions with assistance from the state planning commission 2.4 Specific functions of the boards will include preparing regional strategies, approving council rezoning proposals, undertaking public hearings and other engagement, and appointing regional development assessment panels In summary, we are very unconvinced about the proposed Regional Board model The composition of boards needs to be clearer. If Council was not to be appropriately represented then there is a risk of isolating the community and reducing their ability to influence planning outcomes (risk) On the other hand, there are benefits to the City in having a forum (not same as board necessarily) to resolve local and regional issues, and a board could present a valid alternative regional perspective to that of a Minister or agency, yet on the other hand suburban-oriented regional board may lack adequate appreciation of, or skill-set to deal well with City (opportunity and risk) While a regional approach may blunt the effect of remote centralisation (a risk of Idea 1), there is still a risk of disconnect with local strategic planning and democratic tradition. As an organisation with diverse local functions, Council is able to engage and respond in a far less silo-ed manner than specialised planning agencies and this can add considerable value and depth in strategic planning (opportunity and risk) Not enough information on process, transparency, scope for mediation etc vs inadequacy and opaqueness of existing steps such as DPAC review to advise the Minister on a DPA (opportunity and risk) Private proposal or application for a DPA/ rezoning may be considered without council decision or input (risk) Rival interests (local or other) represented and addressed by board may be internally divisive (risk) Panel envisages the commission and regional planning boards playing similar, overlapping roles in strategy and policy which may be inefficient (opportunity and risk) New layer/s and complexity while noting possible scalability as per 2.8, there are limits to how many levels of government can be supported (opportunity and risk)

6 REFORM 2 CREATE A NETWORK OF REGIONAL PLANNING BOARDS Will regional board rely on a technical sub-structure or transfer of professional staff as well as shared local - State funding model yet to be discussed at this stage? (risk) Capacity of board to perform roles assigned is a known unknown and there could be an unfair burden on certain Councils or cross-subsidisation (risk) 2.5 Opportunities to integrate boards with other bodies, particularly in country areas, should be explored to promote efficient decision making and secure integrated policy outcomes for communities 2.6 Boards funded through cocontributions, as agreed by participating councils and the state government 2.7 In the metropolitan areas, boards with be organised on a sub-regional basis. Recognising the special role of the inner city area, there will be a metropolitan sub-region Integration of related functions (planning, public health, environmental etc) potentially beneficial but brings risk of objective overload or lack of focus (opportunity and risk) If a Council is not represented on a board, or feels the board is not performing, why would it fund it? (risk) Complexity of oversight of board performance by both levels of government funding is an issue (risk) A board for central Adelaide would cover potentially 11 councils and with a 50/50 model, raises questions about workability of a large board (risk). 2.8 There will be flexibility in the system to establish boards for special areas or projects.

7 REFORM 2 CREATE A NETWORK OF REGIONAL PLANNING BOARDS EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE IDEAS FROM COMPENDIUM OF IDEAS:- Board limited to precinct or growth area (Option 5) might potentially play a useful coordination and planning role across Council boundaries. Board to address a topic across metropolitan area (Option 5) might potentially play a useful role in a partnership approach to address a particular topic. Metropolitan planning authority (Option 6) would warrant further evaluation, if for some reason, a State Planning Commission (which seems a better option) was not accepted by the government of the day. Establish a capital city planning authority (Option 7) This aligns with our April 2014 submission. Benefits are ability to: Address the desired focus on inner city vibrancy; Address the degree and particularity if State interest in the City balanced with other perspectives and drawing on intimate and specialist local knowledge and experience (placemaking, district planning, urban design framework, public realm incentives and funding models etc) ; Reflect the high degree of State interest in City while allowing room for local solutions ; Provide a platform for respectful collaboration often lacking now and hard to discern in the Panel s Top Ideas for Reform as a priority directly in the City; Address special need for coherent planning within the Capital City growth area / Park Lands; and Scale holistic planning to the CBD or key precincts as needs without relying on a regional body that is likely to be too remote and with much else to do. OTHER IDEAS:- Give State Planning Commission discretion to develop regional governance to assist it in an advisory way (eg. metropolitan and non-metropolitan advisory groups, technical and stakeholder dependent on role) or via delegated decision-making. With regions of different sizes, capacities and needs, it is not a case of determining a structure then working out what the needs are. Structure should follow robust dialogue on needs and options in each region which the commission, as the State s pre-eminent planning body, would be in a good position to lead or facilitate. This might result in adaptation of models already in progress such as District Planning in the City of Adelaide which, logistically, is a local process that is hard to see benefitting from introduction of a regional board. Optional boards Councils in a region must agree to establish a regional board and its roles and purposes. This would encourage formation of boards where interests align and working relationships are sound. Optional review by board - As a democratically elected policy-maker, a Council should be able to by-pass a regional board (which would be consulted) and deal directly with the commission or decide matters itself (eg. local heritage). The content of regional strategy, however, would be the core business of the board not Councils acting individually. Temporary governance structures - Other States use temporary regional planning governance arrangements (including Mayors, State MPs and technical committees) to oversee regional planning reviews (eg. Victoria and Queensland)..

8 REFORM 3 ENACT A CHARTER OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 3.1 Legislate a new statutory charter for citizen participation. The charter will replace existing prescriptive consultation requirements 3.2 Charter based on leading engagement practices eg IAP2 guidelines and will set out principles, benchmarks and suggested approaches 3.3 It will allow for flexible and tailored engagement and foster community debate about planning issues and outcomes 3.4 The charter will encourage use of digital platforms and innovative engagement techniques. For routine matters, it will provide a suite of standard consultation practices 3.5 Agencies and councils will be required to develop engagement plans, consistent with the charter, for planning processes such as a statement of intent for a development plan amendment 3.6 The charter will be developed by the planning commission and subject to regular review to ensure it is up-todate with leading engagement practices 3.7 As a statutory instrument, the charter will be subject to the scrutiny that generally applies to subordinate legislation. Lack of detail but could be shaped to help promote higher incidence of effective engagement. (opportunity and risk) Unclear if charter will improve cross-sectoral engagement as catered for to some extent in the Panel s reference group. Perhaps reference group or similar should remain (opportunity and risk) Unclear if it is a potent remedy to parties exercising discretion to under-consult or shortcomings of culture, resources, skill-sets, legislation etc. For example, contrary to what is suggested on p11 of the Compendium of Ideas, local government is a leader in engagement practice and it is not generally true that it is largely driven by what is in legislation though that could be said of certain Ministerial DPAs. The charter should apply equally to any party and raise the bar (opportunity and risk) The Charter will need to be able to address impediments to effective engagement wherever they occur - a Productivity Commission survey of State planning agency attitudes to engagement found some cause for concern while minimal effort to consult on recent Ministerial DPAs confirm that there are impediments in the SA context (opportunity and risk) As a leading practitioner Council should in theory be well positioned to both comply with the Charter and leverage improvement in performance of other planning bodies affecting the City however, this is subject to detail of the Charter and relevant legislation (opportunity and risk) A Commission (like the present planning department) and Boards may well struggle to comply and may not have access to many of the resources or skill-sets required, including property data-bases to directly notify affected owners and occupiers, while harnessing the role of local government may not be financially viable or valid without ability to exercise local autonomy or clear role differentiation (risk)

9 REFORM 3 ENACT A CHARTER OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION Any wind-back of prescriptive consultation requirements (as implied in 3.1) is of potential concern as these can be an essential safeguard. A statutory right to be notified needs to be upheld where there are significant externalities, eg. tall building at zone edge. Tailored approaches for more complex proposals might be contemplated but to vary a minimum prescribed standard may only be justified if there is like-for-like substitution of engagement activity / rights, and who ultimately determines if this is reasonable and fair, the Courts? (opportunity and risk) Planning assessment notification processes are often the subject of litigation. Will the Charter cover mandatory as well as good practice and best practice engagement in manner that avoids risk of subjective interpretations providing ground for legal chall enge? This links to development pathways (risk) Suggest the Commission partner with local government to draft new notification policy for various types of development / pathways. This would find expression in revised policy ( code ), or revised Regulations (opportunity) Refer Appendix 2 for information regarding the on-line Picture Adelaide engagement undertaken in 2011 acknowledged as a best practice example in the national e-planning strategy. Appendix 2 also analyses the recent DPA engagement undertaken by Council.

10 REFORM 4 ALLOW FOR INDEPENDENT PLANNING INQUIRIES 4.1 Allow for formal enquiries into complex or contentious planning matters to be initiated from time to time 4.2 The minister, planning commission, regional boards, councils or agencies could initiate inquiries, subject to terms of reference and prescribed processes 4.3 Inquiries will harness professional skills and know-how on a sessional basis, providing a way of cutting through deadlocks and resolving issues in an apolitical fashion 4.4 Inquiry reports will be published and require decision makers to formally respond to their recommendations and findings. Could be valuable but need to define scope, criteria and effective process Flagged as an option in Council s April 2014 submission which highlighted that the Planning Panels Victoria process with a trigger (objections-related), open hearings and quick reporting to decision-makers and public is a good model if able to be resourced (opportunity) Further detail is needed about the type of matters that could be subject to an inquiry and at what point in the planning process it should be initiated this should be earlier rather than late in the process like LHAC and DPAC review of a DPA (opportunity) The inquiry process should not be excessively expensive or time consuming to access (opportunity and risk) Provides opportunity to resolve complex or contentious planning matters through inquiries and to improve transparency in the decision making process, particularly if this removes Ministerial intervention (opportunity).

11 REFORM 5 MAKE THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT MORE MEANINGFUL AND EFFECTIVE 5.1 Reframe the role of parliamentary scrutiny around strategic plans and state wide planning policy instruments rather than individual rezoning changes 5.2 The planning commission should align key planning processes with the parliamentary cycle, ensuring more effective scrutiny. The current role of the Environment, Resource and Development Committee in reviewing Development Plan Amendments is ineffective and too late in the process (opportunity) The need for Parliament to review development policy if the rest of the system, including the independent function of the proposed Commission, is working is questioned (risk) Respecting that it is Parliament s role to determine its role in the system, we support in principle reframing the role of parliamentary scrutiny to focus on early and meaningful involvement in higher-level strategic plans and state-wide policy. We also stress the importance of ensuring a streamlined process of amendments to local policy without delays from additional parliamentary scrutiny late in the DPA process, especially if the Commission has been involved in the DPA from early on (opportunity and risk).