Provisional programme NATO and Russia: managing the relationship Wednesday 21 Friday 23 October 2015 WP1437

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1 Provisional programme NATO and Russia: managing the relationship Wednesday 21 Friday 23 October 2015 WP1437 Russia s annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in Eastern Ukraine, together with its insistence on the right to take action on behalf of Russian-speaking populations outside its own borders, have dramatically changed the political and security environment in Europe. NATO and its member states have already responded in significant ways to this aggressive Russian strategic posture through the decisions taken at the 2014 Summit in Wales and their continuing implementation. While the Wales Summit declaration strongly condemned Russian aggression in Ukraine, there remains significant debate among NATO member states and within the expert community over the extent of Moscow s geopolitical objectives, its hybrid conflict strategy, and military capabilities. There are similar divergences over how NATO and its members should respond to the new security challenges emanating from Russia. In the run up to the July 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO needs to determine how to transition from the immediate reactions and responses agreed in Wales to shaping and sustaining a longer-term comprehensive strategy towards Russia, encompassing deterrence, defence and political engagement. This Wilton Park meeting will assess: Russian objectives, strategy and capabilities and help gain a more complete and deeper understanding of the challenges NATO is confronting in Europe; the longer term political, programmatic and operational adaptations NATO may need to make in order to meet these challenges; and how to achieve greater political agreement and unity of effort and purpose within the Alliance on meeting the new challenges from Russia. In association with NATO Public Diplomacy Department; NATO Defence College; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of the Netherlands; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland (Speakers invited and themes proposed) In association with: SJH

2 Wednesday 21 October Participants arrive and buffet lunch available 1500 Welcome and introduction Robert Grant Programme Director, Wilton Park, Steyning Threat assessment: what are the key areas of agreement and disagreement between member states? What are the major different strands of thinking between members of the Alliance about the threat that Russia presents, including on: the causes of Moscow s shift to an aggressively nationalistic strategic posture; how deeply rooted that shift is and how enduring it is likely to be; the extent of Russia s geopolitical objectives; and the vulnerabilities from stemming from Russia s use of hybrid conflict strategies? What are the key areas of agreement and disagreement between NATO member states on these questions? How much of a constraint are the areas of disagreement on NATO decision-making? Are there any means of bridging these disagreements? Kim Traavik Ambassador; Special Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo Vincenzo Camporini Vice President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome Michael McNerney Associate Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation, Washington DC Photograph followed by tea/coffee The impact of decisions taken at the Wales Summit Will implementation of the initiatives launched at the 2014 Summit in Wales go far enough in establishing credible forward deterrence and defence, including against hybrid threats? What messages has NATO tried to send to Moscow from the decisions taken at Wales? Have they had a deterrence impact on Russia? Has Moscow read them in a particularly escalatory way? Or does Russia regard NATO s response as indicative of a lack of Alliance commitment? What reassurance have the Wales initiatives provided for threatened NATO member states? Julian Lindley-French Director, Europa Analytica; Senior Fellow, Institute of Statecraft, Alphen Alexandre Kokcharov Principal Analyst, Europe and CIS, Country Risk, IHS, London Jonatan Vseviov Undersecretary for Defence Planning, Ministry of Defence, Tallinn 1900 Reception followed by conference dinner Alexander Vershbow Deputy Secretary General, NATO Headquarters, Brussels Thursday 22 October Breakfast

3 What next for NATO s capability responses? Tea/coffee How should NATO transition from the immediate responses decided in Wales to a longterm sustainable response? How should NATO balance deterrence/assurance versus the concern to avoid unnecessary escalation? Overall, what does NATO need to prioritise in key capability areas to be most effective? Is this in new adjustments to conventional force posture (bases, deployment of troops, pre-positioning of equipment)? Should NATO continue to step up its training and exercise programmes? Should anti-access/area denial (A2AD) become a focus of conventional force planning and exercises? How effective is NATO-EU cooperation and coordination on hybrid threat issues, including in areas such as early warning and situational assessment, resilience of critical infrastructure, cyber defence, and strategic communications? Participants will identify priority capability areas and these will provide the specific topics for the breakout groups in session five. Neeme Väli Director, Policy and Capabilities Division; Deputy Director General, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels Julianne Smith Senior Fellow and Director, Strategy and Statecraft Programme, Center for a New American Security, Washington DC The political relationship with Russia Lunch How should NATO balance deterrence, defence, and political engagement with Moscow? On what issues should NATO attempt to engage politically with Moscow, and through what mechanisms? Are there political overtures towards Russia that NATO should consider making, and if so under what conditions? Is some new grand bargain with Russia possible without fundamentally compromising Western principles and values? What could a smart mix of resistance and engagement towards Russia look like? Is it possible to establish informal understandings over red lines? Are there lessons that NATO can draw from how various member states manage their bilateral relationships with Russia? Michael Tatham Director, Eastern Europe and Central Asia Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London Tony van der Togt Senior Research Fellow, EU/NATO-Russia relations, Wider Europe and Eurasian Union, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague Arkady Moshes Programme Director, The EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia research programme, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki Breakout groups on next steps and priorities after Wales Four breakout groups will meet in parallel, each using one of the topics generated during session three in order to delve more deeply into them and outline concrete policy options and recommendations. Group 1 Bruno Lété Senior Officer, Foreign and Security Policy, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels

4 Tea/coffee Group 2 Paul Cornish Research Group Director, RAND Corporation, Cambridge Group 3 Andrew Michta Professor, National Security Affairs, US Naval War College, Newport Group 4 Caterina Becker Desk Officer, Department of Security Policy, German Armed Forces, Berlin Breakout groups on the political relationship with Russia 1930 Dinner Group 1. Reviving the NATO-Russia Council? Should the NATO-Russia Council be revived in some form as part of a political engagement strategy with Russia? If full arms control agreements are not an option, could the NATO- Russia Council begin discussions on confidence building measures? Are there areas, for instance exercise notification, in which the Council could be useful in the short term? Radoslava Stefanova Head, Russia and Ukraine Relations Section, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Headquarters, Brussels Group 2. Strategic Communications and messaging towards Russia How can NATO calibrate the clarity of its messaging towards Russia? In communicating the nature of the new security environment to a wider audience, is there a need for a stronger interface between those charged with NATO public diplomacy and strategic communications with the political and military elements of NATO? Are there public communications lessons to draw from other issue areas where it has been important for policymakers to reach out beyond the expert community? How much impact is Russian propaganda having in NATO member states? Is there a need for a more effective counter narrative? Robert Pszczel Acting Head, NATO Information Office Moscow, Brussels Group 3. NATO-EU cooperation on managing the relationship with Russia How does Russia perceive NATO, EU and the US? Does it still make meaningful distinctions between NATO and the US, and NATO/EU? Is there scope for deeper NATO- EU collaboration on managing the relationship with Russia such as through a joint strategic assessment? Would there be value Is there a need for a major initiative on deeper EU/NATO cooperation and synergy to deal with hybrid threats? Ian Bond Director, Foreign Policy, Centre for European Reform, London Group 4. NATO and EU engagement with non-member states To what extent does Russia perceive NATO and EU engagement with non-member states through an enlargement prism? How vulnerable are non-member states in Russia s neighbourhood to hybrid pressures? How significant are the strategic interests of NATO/EU and its members in helping these states build resilience against Russian pressures? How much political and financial capital are NATO and EU willing to put into this effort? How important and effective are NATO/EU capacity building programmes in helping nonmember states? Anna Wieslander Deputy Director, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm

5 Friday 23 October Breakfast and checkout Working group synthesis Tea/coffee Purpose of the session: This session will draw on the breakout group output from sessions 4 and 6, synthesising the ideas generated and feeding them back into plenary discussion. i. Towards Warsaw: next steps and priorities for capability responses Guillaume Lasconjarias Researcher, NATO Defence College, Rome ii. The West and Russia: the political dimension Mel McNulty Head of Politics, UK Joint Delegation to NATO, Brussels 10 minutes: equestionnaire completion Options for Warsaw & Conclusions 1300 Lunch 1400 Participants depart Should the Warsaw Summit decide on the elaboration of a comprehensive new strategy towards Russia, with terms of reference encompassing a carrot and stick approach? If NATO were to launch at Warsaw a major review of its strategy towards Russia what kind of structure and process would be most effective for doing so? Would it be feasible to establish a joint NATO-EU review of strategy towards Russia, bringing together instruments where the one organisation or the other is responsible, such as NATO for deterrence/defence and the EU for trade and financial relations, with areas where both organisations have responsibilities, such as capacity building and information management? Malgorzata Kosiura-Kazmierska Deputy Director, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw This is a preview programme and as such may be subject to change. This conference is open to those with expertise to share or an interest in the theme; our aim is to have a broad spread of nationalities and institutions represented. The full cost of participation is 1,460. This covers 2 nights accommodation, all meals during the conference and attendance at all sessions. Special rates may be available for those from non-oecd countries and also academics and NGO representatives. Enquiries about participation to: Gemma McDonald, Project Manager T: +44 (0) F: +44 (0) E: Gemma.McDonald@wiltonpark.org.uk Enquiries about the programme to: Robert Grant, Programme Director T: +44 (0) F: +44 (0) E: Robert.Grant@wiltonpark.org.uk