The Role of the AU in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The experience of South Sudan

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1 The Role of the AU in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The experience of South Sudan Introduction Any peace support (or peace keeping) operation needs an exit strategy. Once the immediate task of securing and keeping the peace is achieved, attention turns to the longer term. Post-conflict reconstruction and development is essential to ensuring that the peace won by peace keepers is sustainable into the future. Nowhere is this truer than in Africa, and the African Union s policy framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) describes key ways in which following an African political and strategic lead can help to prevent a return to conflict and wider stability. But a key issue in delivering sustainable post-conflict reconstruction and development is ownership and leadership. Whose development is sought; and for what purpose? This paper explores these issues and considers the role that the African Union could play in addressing them. It draws on recent experiences in South Sudan for illustrative examples. Security and development whose security; and for what purpose? Post-conflict environments are frequently characterised by insecurity either as a legacy of conflict; or because the political settlement often supported by external actors is contested in some way. Indeed, whilst development is an extremely important goal for postconflict states, the issue of security is often the over-riding issue in the near term. Without security, development remains an aspiration just beyond the reach of ordinary people and their leaders. And without development, security can only be transitory at best. Understanding the symbiotic relationship between security and development is essential to post-conflict planning. Poor people around the world, particularly those affected by conflict, rate their need for security alongside and often above their need for other more traditional services provided by governments. In this respect, the provision of security should be viewed in much the same way as the provision of other basic services such as access to food, water and shelter. It follows therefore that the primary beneficiary of security services should be the citizen. Citizen need should be placed at the heart of planning and executing all service delivery. In this respect the goal for postconflict states and their partners should be the promotion of human security in order to ensure that citizens are both safe and well. 1 P a g e

2 Human security is the extent to which people are both safe and well. The overall goal of security sector reform should be to contribute to the human security of the country s people by working to keep them safe. But it will only be fully effective if security is delivered in parallel with other basic services which combine to keep the population well. Doing so in the immediate aftermath of conflict is difficult and requires a high degree of coordination between all actors. International missions such as those mounted by the African Union or the United Nations can play a decisive role in helping weak states manage the competing demands on their time and resources. South Sudan As a new country emerging from conflict, South Sudan faces a large number of opportunities and challenges. Insecurity is a vital concern for the people, their government and the region. Tackling it, including through ensuring that the country s security institutions are fit for their intended purpose, is vital if South Sudan is to survive as a sovereign and viable state. There is significant international interest in helping South Sudan, including in the development of the security sector. International partners need to be clear on why they want to support security sector development; how it might best be done; and what they should do. Why? Insecurity threatens South Sudan on a number of levels: Local. Inter ethnic violence and external threats lead to local insecurity which contrives to help keep the levels of poverty in South Sudan very high indeed. This insecurity leads to conflicts. And conflict is like development in reverse it damages infrastructure and degrades human and social capital. Without security neither local nor international investors will be willing to risk their resources, further conspiring to keep South Sudan poor and under developed. Regional. South Sudan is in a difficult neighbourhood. It is part of the Horn of Africa regional conflict system a set of inter-related conflicts which have affected the region for many years. A weak and failing security sector will not only fail to keep South Sudan safe but will pose a threat to the region and the rest of Africa too. Global. There are a number of global security threats which thrive in situations of insecurity and conflict. Weak states unable to control their boundaries offer the ideal conditions for trans-national criminal and terror networks to move about unnoticed and with relative ease. In the case of South Sudan, there are some additional factors which are relevant. The country s security sector is very large and expensive - and very ineffective. Almost half a million people are engaged in the security sector (with almost half of these being in the military); and the sector accounts for almost 50% of the country s gross domestic product. But despite this enormous cost almost no security and justice services are available to the population. 2 P a g e

3 Reform efforts to date have centred on the national army, the Sudan People s Liberation Army (SPLA). As a consequence the SPLA is the only reasonably effective security agency in the country and has arguably been supported disproportionately to the wider security need. The original emphasis on the SPLA was because it was thought to be unstable and a potential threat to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). These efforts have paid off and the SPLA is better led and better managed now. But the roots of the next problem are to be found in its growing capability relative to other agencies such as the police which remain weak and ineffective but ought to bear the major burden of the delivery of security to ordinary people. How? A number of basic principles need to underpin international efforts to support security sector reform in South Sudan: National ownership. Reform programmes must respond to an articulated vision for South Sudan s future. In many respects this vision is starting to emerge. The Government led Vision 2040 (2011) process foresees a South Sudan which is safe, secure and healthy in which national security and defence policies promote the welfare of the citizen and the state. And the South Sudan Development Plan (2011) prioritises the need the prevent conflict and promote broad based access to security and justice services including through the urgent establishment of a national security architecture. But the Government lacks a strong, central coordination capacity to plan and prioritise and oversee international partnerships. Without this, there is a real danger that international support will be incoherent and ineffective and largely self-interested. But expecting a weak post-conflict government to lead security sector reform at a time when they are also beset by political and military crisis may be unrealistic. In these circumstances, South Sudan needs strategic support which is not primarily tied to donor short term interests. With not to. To be successful and sustainable for the long term, international security sector partnerships should seek to work with South Sudanese agencies rather than attempt to do anything to them. The problem with this approach is that it is slower and identifying quick wins is hard. Start at the top. There is an understandable desire on the part of international partners to start delivering training and development at the operational and tactical level. But these efforts will only be fully effective and sustainable if they are implemented in the light of an over arching strategy. So work to set the strategic environment should put in place first, followed by operational and then tactical level interventions. 3 P a g e

4 Context. Contrary to popular belief, South Sudan has a surprising number of systems capable of delivering forms of security and justice to ordinary people. Many of these have their roots in traditional society and few are easily discernable when viewed through the lens of the capital city. But at county, payam and boma level security and justice is delivered locally and reasonably effectively. Indeed, many of these traditional mechanisms were incorporated into colonial era regulations and guidelines. When developing new security and justice systems in South Sudan (or elsewhere) it is vitally important to understand what both the modernising and traditional influences are; and to recognise how they are linked often through people who occupy positions in both societies. Harnessing both dynamics is important when seeking to avoid harmful clashes between the two; and for ensuring that future systems are as sustainable as possible. What? As in other countries, security sector reform in South Sudan should aim to deliver a set of accountable, adequate, affordable and appropriate security institutions which contribute towards the full enjoyment of human security by the country s people. This will involve a significant amount of institution and capability building as police services, judicial systems and the military are transformed from their guerrilla past to a civilian, democratic future. But aside from the development of these institutions, other capabilities will be essential: National security architecture. South Sudan s security institutions at national, state and county level need to be able to manage multiple, parallel, complex threats to the safety and welfare of the population; and to the security of the nation in a coordinated fashion. Having a system for providing strategic direction to security sector agencies and for analysing and managing threats will be vital. This system must also be able to coordinate across government; between government and international partners; and between national government and state Governors. Although this task 4 P a g e

5 is large and the full effect only likely to be felt in the long term, the first steps establishing a single place at the centre of government for security sector management and empowering it are straightforward and would immediately reduce the pressure on government. In practice, this will involve the establishment of a National Security Council and the appointment of a Ministerial level person to act as its Secretary and to lead all security sector activity; and the appointment of a suitable staff to support them both. Link to end users. If the purpose of the security sector is to contribute to the human security of the population, then agencies responsible for delivering security and justice services need a clear idea of what the end users of their service actually need. But there is little tradition of open and free discussion about security in South Sudan; nor there is there very much capacity to engage in it. So any package of security sector reform interventions should seek to ensure that ordinary people have the opportunity to shape the design of security service delivery to ensure that it meets their needs and aspirations. Reaching down to the grass roots level is hard almost impossible for international agencies to do. But there is an emerging group of civil society organisations who understand the value of engaging security sector agencies on behalf of communities. Supporting them, along with ensuring that the media are able to understand security issues and to report on them, would be a valuable activity for international partners to explore. Oversight and accountability. Being able to hold the security sector to account for its actions and for the resources which it consumes is a key activity. The executive branch of government needs to be able to direct the activity of the security sector without fear and needs to be able to do so from a position of strength. The notion of civilian oversight is extremely important and one which should not be allowed to become blurred, for example by allowing heads of security agencies to sit on the National Security Council in their own right. And Parliamentary accountability is equally important. Government is ultimately accountable to Parliament, so Parliamentarians need to be able to understand and influence policies and actions. Support to help Parliamentarians understand fully security sector issues is important and will help them to discharge their obligations more effectively. Conclusion In South Sudan, as in so many other post-conflict environments, the Government faces the almost impossible task of working out what to do first when everything is important. They do so with very little capacity; and at a time when foreign donors are also anxious to ensure that South Sudan does not pose a threat to them or their interests in the region. Weak postconflict governments need help to identify and prioritise their own needs, and the African Union s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy framework along with the emerging Security Sector Reform policy framework - offers this potential. But whilst the AU s political legitimacy is high, its technical capacity is low. And international partners fear the creation of a kind of African UNDP. It should therefore limit itself to the policy framework s political goals of promoting African leadership; national and local 5 P a g e

6 ownership; inclusion, equity and non-discrimination; and cooperation and coherence. Visibly working to support a post-conflict government s capacity to make its own choices could well prove to be the single most valuable intervention made by an international partner. And international partners need to acknowledge the value of helping to build a post-conflict state designed first in the best interests of its citizens; and then in the best interests of its partners. Prioritising external development and security interests makes the job of a postconflict government harder and risks further weakening the fragile link between government and citizen. Jeremy Astill-Brown 13 February P a g e