Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, U.S. Response and Used Fuel Management

Transcription

1 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, U.S. Response and Used Fuel Management June 2, 2011 Steven P. Kraft Senior Director Special Projects Nuclear Energy Institute

2 Tsunami Initiates Nuclear Accident On March 11 a magnitude 9 earthquake occurred off the east coast of Japan -- All nuclear energy facilities shut down safely An hour later, a massive tsunami about 45 feet high struck the east coast Critical backup power equipment at Fukushima Daiichi plant was destroyed

3 Earthquake and Tsunami

4 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Before the Accident Units 5, 6 Unit 2 Unit 1 Dry Cask Facility Unit 3 Common Spent Fuel Pool Unit 4 At the time of the earthquake Reactors 1, 2 and 3 operating; Reactor 4 shutdown for maintenance and all fuel removed; 5 and 6 shutdown for and refueling

5 Following the Accident

6 Tsunami Damage Looking Toward the Plant

7 Boiling Water Reactor Design Boiling Water Reactor Design at Fukushima Daiichi Secondary Containment Spent Fuel Pool Steel Containment Vessel Reactor Vessel Primary Containment Suppression Pool (Torus)

8 Accident Sequence in Brief Cooling systems eventually stopped working due to lack of off-site power and backup power systems Fuel in reactor heated to very high temperatures Fuel cladding reacted with water at high temperature, generating hydrogen gas Hydrogen venting delayed large build up Hydrogen explosions occurred in secondary containment Units 1 and 3 above operating floor Unit 2 probably near bottom of plant Unit 4 throughout plant below operating floor Plant operators injected sea water into reactors to cool fuel, prevent further damage

9 Hydrogen Explosions at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 Unit 3

10 Best Estimate of Current Conditions Units 1-3 significant fuel damage including partial core melt Radiation levels in reactor buildings for units 1-3 suggest reactor vessel leakage Unit 4 spent fuel pool appears to be intact with little or no fuel damage; structural re-enforcement underway. Secondary containment explosion believed due to hydrogen generated in unit 3 (other theories) Airborne radiological release occurred in the first days of the accident Site is heavily contaminated which complicates recovery efforts

11 Continual Recovery Efforts Continue to cool and stabilize reactors 1-3 Provide additional cooling water to used fuel pools in reactors 1-4 Build long-term cooling systems for reactors and pools Process radioactive water Conduct detailed evaluation of event Decommission damaged reactors

12 No Negative Health Effects Anticipated Protective actions (per emergency planning procedures) ensured safety of the public Worker exposure not expected to result in any measurable health effects based on available data Food and water sampling ongoing Restrictions imposed when regulatory limits exceeded Drinking water restrictions lifted with exception of exclusion zone Releases concentrated northwest of the plant site

13 Long-term Radiological Impacts Residents in select locations northwest of plant site may not return to homes for a year or more Agricultural restrictions will be implemented in select locations indefinitely Seafood monitoring will be ongoing

14 U.S. Industry Taking Steps to Make Safe Nuclear Energy Facilities Even Safer Nuclear energy industry committed to take short-term and long-term actions TMI, Chernobyl, and 9/11/01 are precedents Short-term action: Verify readiness to manage extreme events Long-term action: Exhaustive analysis of Japanese accident and how reactors, systems, structures, components, fuel and operators performed Incorporate lessons learned into U.S. reactor designs and operating practices

15 Short-Term Industry Actions to Ensure Safety Verify each plant's capability to respond to major challenges, such as aircraft impacts, loss of large areas of plant due to natural events, fires or explosions Verify each plant's capability to manage loss of off-site power Verify capability to mitigate flooding and the impact of floods on systems inside and outside the plant Inspect important equipment needed to respond to extreme events

16 U.S. Nuclear Energy Facilities Prepared for Extreme Events Industry is prepared for the unexpected exceeds NRC requirements U.S. industry dedicated to continuous learning Can respond to maximum credible earthquakes, floods, other natural events at each site Plans, equipment, and training to cope with beyond design basis events Loss of off-site power and station black-out Post 9/11: response for aircraft impact, large fires and loss of large areas of the plant

17 Examples of Differences Between U.S. and Japanese Reactor Operations United States 1. Post 9/11/01 actions to address large fires and explosions 2. Independent regulatory agency with 4,000 employees and $1 billion budget 3. Industry organization for oversight and sharing operating experience (INPO) 4. Site-specific simulator for each reactor; operators train one week out of five 5. Command and control in the hands of highly trained operators Japan 1. No similar action taken 2. Regulator is part of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 3. No similar industry organization 4. Shared simulators for multiple plants 5. Command and control in hands of government and corporate management

18 Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Energy Facilities 10-mile emergency planning zone; 50-mile monitoring zone for environment and food Comprehensive industry and local, state and federal response to emergency events Radiation monitoring by industry, NRC, and state and local government personnel Protective action measures recommended state/local authorities, based on recommendations from plant operator and NRC Emergency response exercises among state, local, and federal officials are evaluated by NRC and FEMA

19

20 U.S. Nuclear Plants Are Safe Our nuclear power plants have undergone exhaustive study, and have been declared safe for any number of extreme contingencies. President Barack Obama March 17, 2011 I want to reiterate that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko April 12, 2011 Testimony before Congress

21 U.S. Government Response Government task force supporting Japan recovery efforts Nuclear Regulatory Commission Department of Energy Department of Defense President Obama directed the NRC to perform a comprehensive review of U.S. reactors NRC established agency task force to develop lessons learned from Japan to provide analysis of the events Short-term and long-term analyses

22 NRC Task Force Reviewing Japan Events To date the task force has not identified any issues that undermine our confidence in the continued safety and emergency planning of U.S. plants NRC Task Force May 12, 2011 NRC is reviewing seismic, flooding, station blackout, severe accident management and other guidance for U.S. reactors Task force will provide recommendations for near-term action and topics for longer-term review Final task force briefing mid-july; near-term report issued in July

23 Outlook for U.S. Nuclear Industry Nuclear energy remains vital part of U.S. and global electricity portfolio Updates to equipment, training and operational procedures will include lessons learned from Japan Four to eight new reactors expected to be operating by 2020 Demand for electricity will continue to increase Nuclear energy will remain a vital part of our portfolio to provide low-carbon, reliable, affordable electricity U.S. reactor manufacturers and suppliers will continue to participate in the $400 billion global market for nuclear energy

24 Nuclear Energy Vital to the Clean Energy Economy And it s important to recognize that nuclear energy doesn t emit carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. So those of us who are concerned about climate change, we ve got to recognize that nuclear power, if it s safe, can make a significant contribution to the climate change question. President Barack Obama America s Energy Security remarks at Georgetown University March 30, 2011

25 NRC Licensing Actions after March 11, 2011 Power uprates approved for Limerick and Point Beach reactors License renewals approved for Vermont Yankee and Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 Final environmental impact statements approved for 7 new reactors in Georgia, South Carolina, Texas and Maryland Design certification for the GE-Hitachi advanced reactor design (ESBWR) issued for public comment

26 Nuclear Industry Policy Priorities Stability at the NRC: re-nomination and confirmation of two commissioners this year Full response to Fukushima accident Alignment of U.S. government agencies to support export of U.S. nuclear energy technology and services Constructive congressional oversight Ensure loan guarantee program is workable financing platform for new reactors and fuel cycle facilities

27 Integrated Used Fuel Management Requires National Policy Used fuel is safely and securely stored at reactor sites in pools and dry casks Older used fuel rods pose little additional risk due to declining heat and radiation over time Federal government responsible for used nuclear fuel disposal Temporary fuel storage at 1 or 2 locations important step toward moving fuel from reactors

28 Used Fuel Management: New Strategic Direction Recycled Nuclear Fuel Used Fuel Used Fuel Recycling, Interim Storage Nuclear Waste Advanced Recycling Reactors Disposal

29 Used Nuclear Fuel Storage January 2010 Used fuel December 2010 Approximately 65,200 MTU Add 2,000 2,400 MTU annually Dry storage thru ,600 MTU Over 1200 casks loaded 49 Operating facilities Dry inventory by 2020 Estimating 26,200 MTU 2,600 casks loaded At 75 dry storage facilities Fuel from 118 units Harris lone plant site w/o dry storage 29

30 Used Fuel Stored in Pool

31 Dry Storage Facilities Horizontal Casks Vertical Casks

32 Integrated Used Nuclear Fuel Management Interim Storage At-reactor sites Central locations Recycling (and enhanced fuels use) Research and development Deployment at the right time Disposal Yucca Mountain terminated (litigation and congressional investigations on-going) Federal corporation to manage fuel cycle back-end Blue Ribbon Commission will make recommendations 32

33 Centralized Interim Storage Near-term consolidation of used fuel (Interim Storage) Volunteer sites NRC Licensed Preliminary Recommendation by Blue Ribbon Commission Benefits of central interim storage Earliest way to move fuel from sites Demonstrate ability to manage used fuel Cost effective Increased security Clean up decommissioned sites

34 Artist Rendition of an Away From Reactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

35 Information Sources Nuclear Energy Institute ( U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( U.S. Department of Energy ( International Atomic Energy Agency ( American Nuclear Society ( Health Physics Society ( Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency ( Japan Atomic Industrial Forum ( Tokyo Electric Power Company (

36 Nuclear energy and safety NCSL Nuclear Legislative Work Group Session Scott Bond Manager, Nuclear Development

37 CALLAWAY PLANT DESIGN FEATURES Callaway Plant was licensed, designed and built to withstand: A worst-case seismic event for our area Worst case natural hazards including flooding, tornados, precipitation, etc.

38 CALLAWAY PLANT DESIGN FEATURES Emergency Safety Systems include six emergency power sources: 2 Ameren power lines to the site 2 Emergency Diesel Generators (onsite) 1 power line from local Electric Co-op 4 Standby Diesel Generators (offsite) Additional Emergency Safety Features: Steam powered cooling water pump with DC battery powered controls system A 30-day cooling water supply stored on-site in a seismically designed retention pond Severe Accident Management Procedures developed for beyond design events

39 Callaway Plant Safety Features Inside Containment Offsite Emergency Generators

40 Callaway Alternate Power System

41 NUCLEAR FUEL SAFEGUARDS Nuclear fuel has three barriers to protect the public: 1. Fuel pellets are sealed in zirconium tubes 2. Fuel assemblies are enclosed in a steel pressure vessel that is 8-inches thick 3. Reactor is enclosed in the concrete containment structure that is 4-feet thick

42 REACTOR VESSEL AND FUEL ASSEMBLY 17x17 FUEL ASSEMBLY Revised Date:

43 Containment Wall Construction

44 SAFETY AND SECURITY Safety is our highest priority three types: 1. Nuclear Protect the public and our environment 2. Radiological Limit our employees exposure to radiation 3. Industrial Protect our employees from injury

45 SAFETY AND SECURITY Highly-trained personnel including Licensed Operators Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors work at each plant for daily inspections Stringent physical security barriers & armed guards protect the plant Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved Radiological Emergency Response Plan to protect the public should an event

46 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE

47 INSTITUTE of NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS (INPO) HAS ISSUED IMMEDIATE ACTIONS FOR ALL U.S. NUCLEAR PLANTS Consistent with U.S. Nuclear industry principles: Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination Organizational learning is embraced The following actions are being taken: Verify the capability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond design basis events committed to in licensing documents and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). Verify the capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions required by station design is functional and valid. Verify the capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events required by station design. Perform walk downs and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify any potential for equipment function to be lost during seismic events appropriate for the site.

48 316(b) Advocacy Webinar May 26, 2011 William Skaff, Manager, Policy Development Marshall Cohen, Senior Director, State and Local Governmental Affairs

49 EPA Regulations Implementing Clean Water Act Section 316(b) CWA Section 316(b) Phase II and Phase III regulations apply to existing power plants and industrial facilities 428 power plants around the country affected Law requires intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impacts EPA considers fish mortality at the intake structure as adverse environmental impact

50 Preferred Regulatory Approach Site-specific analysis to determine the best technology available (BTA), considering: Feasibility of installing particular protection technologies Costs and benefits of installing particular protection technologies Range of proven fish protection technologies, in addition to cooling towers, eligible for consideration

51 EPA Proposed 316(b) Regulation Entrainment requirements for fish drawn through cooling system allows for site-specific variability and cost-benefit analysis Impingement requirements for fish caught on water intake screens NO site-specific variability or cost-benefit analysis Installation of costly, unnecessary, ineffective technologies may be required Regulation Costs to Benefits $383m to $18m according to EPA (annualized)

52 Entrainment Requirements Generally Acceptable Site Specific Flexibility State environmental agency determines best technology available for each site according to: Number/types of organisms entrained Impacts on energy reliability Entrainment impacts on waterbody Comparison of social cost to social benefit Impacts associated with thermal discharge Emission of pollutants Land availability Remaining plant life Impacts on water consumption

53 Entrainment Requirements Necessary Revisions Define required cost-benefit analysis cost dollar value must not be significantly greater than benefit dollar value Clarify social costs to include facility costs (CapEx and O&M) for compliance technologies Require no further measures for entrainment or impingement for plants with cooling towers or cooling ponds

54 Impingement Requirements Unacceptable One Size Fits All, No Site Flexibility One technology is BTA for all sites traveling screens with collection-return system All plants must meet single performance standard 12 percent annual mortality per species, 31 percent limit monthly Only other compliance alternative is reduced water intake velocity not widely available No consideration of total impingement reduction already achieved

55 Impingement Requirements Necessary Revisions For Unique Sites, Fish, Waterbodies No valid environmental justification to treat impingement differently from entrainment Give states ability to perform site-specific assessments and determine BTA according to a range of factors, including feasibility and required cost-benefit analysis Provide compliance flexibility for any national impingement mortality limits or water intake velocity limit, allowing states to take sitespecific variability into account

56 Revised 316(b) Regulations Timetable for Comment Letters Revised draft Phase II and Phase III regulations formally issued in April 2011 Comment letters due to EPA by July 19, 2011 (public comment period is 90 days) Final rule expected to be promulgated in July 2012

57 Comment Letter Issue Summary Require cost-benefit analysis for impingement as well as entrainment define as benefits exceeding costs Allow states to determine BTA for impingement according to site-specific assessments Provide compliance flexibility for impingement national mortality percentage limit or intake velocity limit

58 Fish Protection Technologies For Once-Through Cooling Systems Physical Barriers Collection and Return Systems Diversion Systems Behavioral Deterrents Advanced Technologies: Wedgewire Screens Fine Mesh Screens