PRESENTATION FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON THE CONVERSION OF RESEARCH REACTORS TO LOW ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL JEFF CHAMBERLIN, NNSA GTRI

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1 NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE CHALLENGES POSED BY RESEARCH REACTORS THAT CANNOT BE CONVERTED (U.S. VIEWPOINT) PRESENTATION FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON THE CONVERSION OF RESEARCH REACTORS TO LOW ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL JEFF CHAMBERLIN, NNSA GTRI 1

2 GTRI Mission and Goals DOE STRATEGIC GOAL 2.2 Prevent the acquisition of nuclear and radiological materials for use in weapons of mass destruction and other acts of terrorism Convert Remove Protect GTRI MISSION Reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI is: Convert research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) Remove and dispose of excess nuclear and radiological materials; and Protect high priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft and sabotage A part of President Obama s comprehensive strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism; and The key organization responsible for implementing the U.S. HEU minimization policy. These efforts result in permanent threat reduction by minimizing and, to the extent possible, eliminating the need for HEU in civilian applications each reactor converted or shut down eliminates a source of bomb material. These efforts result in permanent threat reduction by eliminating bomb material at civilian sites each kilogram or curie of this dangerous material that is removed reduces the risk of a terrorist bomb. These efforts result in threat reduction by improving security on the bomb material remaining at civilian sites each vulnerable building that is protected reduces the risk until a permanent threat reduction solution can be implemented. 2 2

3 GTRI Reactor Conversion Program Status: 200 reactors to be converted or shutdown prior to conversion by 2020; 74 completed (37%) Intensified international and domestic efforts have resulted in significant acceleration of HEU research reactor conversions Since May 2004, 23 HEU research reactors have been converted This includes 16 international and 7 U.S. conversions Most recent conversions were the Czech Republic s Rez Reactor in April 2011 and Japan s Kyoto University Research Reactor in March In December 2010, DOE and Rosatom signed an Implementing Agreement to perform feasibility studies for the possible conversion of six HEU research reactors in Russia July 6, 2009 Presidential Joint Statement Preparing HEU for removal from a research reactor core to allow for conversion to LEU All U.S. HEU research reactors that can convert with existing LEU fuels have now been successfully converted to the use of LEU fuel 3

4 HEU Minimization at the Highest Levels Obama-Medvedev Moscow Joint Statement July 6, 2009: We declare an intent to broaden and deepen long-term cooperation to further increase the level of security of nuclear facilities around the world, including through minimization of the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications and through consolidation and conversion of nuclear materials. UN Security Council Resolution 1887 September 24, 2009: Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets; Nuclear Security Summit April 13, 2010: Participating States, as appropriate, will collaborate to research and develop new technologies that require neither highly enriched uranium fuels for reactor operation nor highly enriched uranium targets for producing medical or other isotopes, and will encourage the use of low enriched uranium and other proliferation-resistant technologies and fuels in various commercial applications such as isotope production; 4

5 Reactor Conversion Principles Perform feasibility study to determine if a reactor can be converted and still achieve its mission. Satisfy fuel assembly criteria for LEU conversion for each reactor, LEU fuel provides a similar service lifetime as the HEU fuel; There is no significant penalty in reactor performance; Safety criteria are satisfied. Develop schedule based upon operational requirements, capabilities, regulatory processes, Achieve LEU fuel conversions without requiring major changes in reactor structures or equipment, Demonstrate the conversion and subsequent operation can be accomplished safely, Determine, to the extent possible, that the overall costs associated with conversion to LEU fuel do not increase the annual operating expenditure for the owner/operator, and Obtain/verify agreement and authorities are in place to proceed 5

6 If Feasibility Study Results are not Positive A feasibility study could conclude that conversion of a particular reactor is not feasible: Fuel necessary to maintain performance or mission without significant impact may not be commercially available; An LEU fuel may not be available to fulfill the mission of the reactor; Available fuels may result in a significant, unacceptable impact on performance or operating costs; A unique fuel development effort may be technically or economically unfeasible; Possible examples: some fast-spectrum reactors, fast critical assemblies, or HEU reactors with very small core volumes; GTRI Policy: All that is reasonably possible should be done to convert facilities and reduce the use of HEU. 6

7 Options for Facilities that Cannot Convert There are several potential options for facilities that cannot convert: Option 1: Assess possibility of changing facility mission such that it can be accomplished with LEU fuel; Option 2: Reduce HEU enrichment; this may be technically feasible in some cases where LEU conversion is not. Reduced HEU enrichment to above 20% is not considered HEU minimization under current accepted international norms or GTRI policy. Option 3: Facility consolidation or shutdown if facility is underutilized or if facility can be consolidated with similar facilities. Option 4: If no other options exist for the facility other than to run on HEU, removal of all excess material and enhancement of physical protection measures can achieve certain level of threat reduction. **GTRI considers each of these options of last resort to be decided on a case-by-case basis and does not endorse them as matters of policy. 7

8 Conclusions HEU minimization and reactor conversion have unprecedented high-level support worldwide, including from the presidents of Russia and the United States. HEU minimization objectives can be and must be achieved in a manner that is compatible with facilities performance of their intended missions Conversion can have technical and economic impacts the United States and many other countries have concluded that minimal impacts are more than offset by nuclear threat reduction achieved. Options for facilities that cannot be converted are decisions that must be discussed and implemented jointly by relevant government agencies and reactor organizations. 8