A"acks on or Sabotage of Nuclear Facili6es

Transcription

1 A"acks on or Sabotage of Nuclear Facili6es Dr. Charles D. Ferguson President, Federa6on of American Scien6sts Presenta6on to Brookhaven Na6onal Laboratory June 28, 2011

2 Outline of Presenta6on What is a Design Basis Threat (DBT) Assessment? Why a"ack or sabotage a nuclear power plant or related nuclear facili6es such as spent fuel pools? Who would a"ack these facili6es? How vulnerable are these facili6es? What are the modes of a"ack? What has been done to improve the security of these facili6es? What more can and should be done to strengthen security?

3 Design Basis Threat Assessment: Four Concepts Understanding the Poten6al Adversaries Analyzing the Capabili6es of Those Adversaries Carrying out Measures to Prevent or Mi6gate the Consequences of A"acks Establishing Performance Requirements for Protec6on of Facili6es

4 Why A"ack a Nuclear Power Plant? Exploit Public Fear of Radia6on Destroy Symbolic Target Contaminate Property Cause Financial Damage Inflict Casual6es Restora6on Ecology?

5 Who Would A"ack? Terrorist group type Apocalyptic Politico- Religious Likely to attack a reactor? YES NO Nationalist/ Separatist?? Singleissue Why? Too few immediate deaths Inflict large-scale psychological stress and social disruption Fear of losing international or constituents support, possible fear of retribution But there is value in the threat of attack Bolster popular resistance to nuclear industry

6 Al Qaeda s Interest in A"acking an NPP? Mohamed A"a reportedly considered targe6ng a nuclear facility in New York a target he called electrical engineering But as stated in the 9/11 Commission Report, the other pilots did not like the idea. They thought a nuclear target would be difficult because the airspace around it was restricted, making reconnaissance flights impossible and increasing the likelihood that the plane would be shot down before impact.

7 Military A"acks Damage the electrical power system of an enemy Destroy a major status symbol Degrade the capability for an opponent to make fissile material for nuclear weapons Cause radioac6ve contamina6on of an enemy s territory About 12 a"ack on nuclear facili6es in the Middle East Ref: Benne" Ramberg, Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy, Univ. CA Press, 1984

8 Where are Nuclear Power Plants Poten6ally Vulnerable? 1. Reactor 2. Reactor infrastructure 3. Spent Fuel Storage

9 Modes of A"ack or Sabotage Airplane crashes Airplane delivered bombs and other military a"acks Truck bombs Commandos Waterborne a"acks Cyber terrorism Insiders

10 Fuel Cladding, Reactor Vessel, Containment Control rods, water, back up cooling Protec6on Defense in Depth Even in the case of a meltdown, the containment structure would likely prevent dispersal Three Mile Island vs. Chernobyl

11 Industry s View Containment Structures: How Vulnerable to A"ack? Independent Experts View Containment structures built to withstand extreme events 9/11- style attack never envisaged Applying maximum force would be difficult because of rounded structure of containments Perhaps a misplaced focus on containments, other targets, i.e. auxiliary buildings more vulnerable Aircraft would have to completely penetrate the containment Even small penetrations could allow fuel leakage which would probably lead to fire and assist in dispersal of radioactive materials Industry studies say safety mechanisms would most likely prevent radioactivity release Outside the Industry, studies indicate that a large-scale attack could overwhelm response capabilities

12 Spent Nuclear Fuel Pools Most of the almost 70,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel stored in deep pools of water No permanent storage available Several u6li6es have sued the U.S. govt to recover costs paid for Yucca Mountain

13 Spent Fuel Storage Depends on NPP Type BWR PWR: Spent Fuel outside reactor building BWR: Spent Fuel inside reactor building PWR

14 Vulnerability of Spent Fuel Pools U.S. Na6onal Academy of Sciences Study in 2004 and 2005 examined spent nuclear fuel (SNF) pool vulnerability at BWR and PWR plants [Response to Alvarez et al. study in 2003] If a"ack causes a propaga6ng zirconium cladding fire, large amounts of radioac6vity could be released NAS study: successful terrorist a"acks on spent fuel pools, though difficult, are possible Possible protec6on measures: Pools are properly secured Effec6ve means of cooling are available under emergency condi6ons As soon as possible, SNF should be stored in dry storage casks Reconfigure remaining SNF in pool to minimize risk of propaga6ng fire

15 Is Dry Cask Storage the Answer? Can withstand crashes, punctures, fires, and water immersion Heavy weight precludes removal by terrorists Worth the cost of transferring the fuel? Need to minimize workers radia6on exposure

16 $3 to $5 billion to transfer all overcrowded spent fuel to dry casks Germany applies this method Used to a limited extent in the United States Dry Cask Storage

17 Whither/Wither Yucca Mountain? President Obama and Secretary of Energy Chu said it was not viable but opened the door for the Blue Ribbon Commission The BRC is expected to release its report this summer. BRC released preliminary recommenda6ons about one month ago favored dry cask storage and finding more than one permanent site

18 Further Protec6on for New Plants February 2007: U.S. NRC Commissioner Gregory Jaczko proposed an expedited rulemaking to include a requirement in 10 CFR Part 52 that any new nuclear power plants built in the U.S. be designed to withstand a large commercial aircraa impact. But was voted down. Feb. 2009: NRC issued new rule to require applicants for new plants to assess the proposed facili6es ability to withstand airplane crashes. But the government took on the responsibility to prevent airplane hijacking.

19 Revised Design Basis Threat Revised within a couple of years aser 9/11 But some independent experts have ques6oned whether it is strong enough. GAO had recommended improvements on forcein force training guards had received too much advanced warning; same company had osen provided the guards and the a"acking force Weak enforcement of some security viola6ons, e.g., sleeping guards at Exelon plant

20 Can Too Many Guards Weaken Security? More guards may increase the chances of introducing rogue insiders Social shirking May increase overconfidence that the system is very safe and secure Ref: Sco" Sagan, The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security Forces May Produce Less Security, Risk Analysis, August 2004.

21 Fukushima Daiichi Plant Design

22 U.S. Plants with Designs that May Pose Safety Concerns 23 U.S. Reactors with BWR Mark I type design and steam suppression system Concerns raised as early as 1972 about the BWR Mark I Recommenda6ons from 1980s to install filters on vent system 6 other reactors with ice condenser emergency cooling system

23 New Plants with Improved Safety? Vendors, including GE Hitachi, Wes6nghouse Toshiba, and AREVA, are including passive safety features that would rely on gravity and natural circula6on

24 Recommenda6ons Need for safety and security teams, along with intelligence agencies, to work closely together in developing and con6nually upgrading the Design Basis Threat Ensure that newer plants have improved safety and security features, including added protec6on against airplane a"acks as well as all other a"ack modes Conduct background checks of plant personnel to reduce likelihood of insider threat Protect against cyber a"acks, especially as plants use more digital control systems Develop rigorous interna6onal security standards but na6onal authori6es are s6ll responsible for security at their facili6es

25 Thank you for your a"en6on