Deepwater Horizon Gulf Oil Spill: More Resilient Response

Transcription

1 Deepwater Horizon Gulf Oil Spill: Translating Lessons Learned into More Resilient Response Nancy E. Kinner Co-Director, Director, Center for Spills in the Environment Professor, Civil/Environmental Engineering University of New Hampshire February 19, 2012 AAAS Annual Meeting

2 Today s Topics U.S. Oil Spill Response System Deepwater Horizon (DWH) Accident DWH Spill Response Key Issues of DWH Response Resilient Response Going Forward 2

3 Phases of Oil Spill Emergency Response Immediate to few years after Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) Determine damage to and compensation of natural and human resources by responsible parties (RPs) Not civil suits Restoration/Recovery Months to years funded by RPs 3

4 Today s Focus = Response Not NRDA or Restoration 4

5 U.S. Oil Spill Response (National Response System) 5

6 Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA 90) Within 1 Year of Exxon Valdez Tanker Accident in Alaska Mandates Spill Organization and R&D R&D Never Fully Funded Planning, Preparedness, Response, Damage Assessment and Restoration Systems Mandated Major Federal Agencies: Minerals Management Service (Leases and Safety/Environmental Regulation) Coast Guard, EPA, NOAA 6

7 Oil Spill Classification Table DWH = 200 Million Gallons An FOSC s Guide to Environmental Response (USCG, Gulf Strike Team, 7/1/2008) 7

8 National Incident Management System: Standardized On-Scene Incident Management 8

9 Unified Command: Management When Multiple Jurisdictions 9

10 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSC) (see supplemental slides) U.S. Coast Guard (Coastal or Major Navigable Waterways) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Inland Areas) Coordinate federal efforts with local l response National Response Team (NRT) Planning, policy, & coordination Does not respond directly to incident Provides advice and resources to FOSC 10

11 NCP (cont d) Regional Response Teams (RRTs) 13 RRTs (state and federal members) Maintain regional contingency plans Planning, policy & coordination Provide guidance to FOSC Assist state & local gov t in preparation, planning and practice Coordinate with local Area Committees Detailed local contingency plans 11

12 NCP (cont d) Special Force Components Specially trained to help in major spills USCG Public Information Assist Team Public affairs specialists US EPA Environmental Response Team Scientists / engineers specializing in sampling / analysis and technical support Scientific Support Coordinator NOAA provides support on spill trajectory, natural resources at risk, environmental tradeoffs 12

13 Incident Management Discovery & Notification Preliminary Assessment Initiation of Action Responsible party Federal assets (e.g., Strike Force) Containment, Countermeasures, Cleanup, Disposal Documentation & Cost Recovery 13

14 Spills of National Significance (SONS) Decided by Commandant of USCG Size, severity, location, impact on public health & welfare and environment, complexity SONS Drills Required March 2010: Tanker accident Portland, Maine DWH was SONS!!! 14

15 DWH Accident (See Supplemental Slides) 15

16 Oil Wells in U.S. Waters of Gulf of Mexico 16

17 DWH 17

18 DWH Rig Facts 33,000 Ton Drilling Rig on Pontoons (Built 2001 / $350M) Derrick = 20 Stories Above Top Deck Held in Position Using GPS Dynamic Positioning i i Controlled Thrusters Crew = 126 Owner: TransOcean Oil Reservoir: 5,000 ft water 13,000 ft strata 18

19 DWH Blowout April 20, 2010 Explosion and Fire Onboard Rig Killing 11 People All rest onboard rescued April 22: Rig Sank Along with Drill Pipe Turbidity in Water High Due to Accident/Sinking Oil Leak Not Confirmed for Few Days 19

20 DWH Blowout Causes Lots of Individual Mistakes Several Excellent Sources of Information: Presidential Commission o Report ( llco ss o.gov) Final Report to BOEMRE: Forensic Examination of DWH BOP Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the DWH 20

21 DWH Spill Response 21

22 Priority #1 = Stop Fire, Search/Rescue, Human Health and Safety Paramount 22

23 Priority #2 - Stop Source of Leak Start Relief Well Install Cap to Stop Flow High ambient water pressure, cold and dark 2200 psi High exit pressure of oil, hot (212 o F) 6500 psi Well W Head ~ 7 inches diameter 23

24 Priority #3 Identify Natural Resources at Risk Crabs, Shrimp, Oysters, Blue Fin Tuna, Charismatic Marine Mammals Recreational Beaches Commercial Fishing Subsistence Fishing Shorelines on ESI maps are color-coded by sensitivity to oil. Symbols mark localized areas for biological and human-use resources. 24

25 Priority #4 Minimize Damage to Natural Resources Purpose of Response Technology Key Is Select Most Appropriate Response Techniques Unique to Each Spill and Each Day of Spill Weather 25

26 DWH Response: 200 million gallons of oil released over 87 Days Oil was in patches, not one continuous slick Oil plumes were on surface and at depth 26

27 Natural Weathering 27

28 Response: Sorbents 28

29 Response: Booms and Skimmers Capture and Concentrate Oil, Deflect Oil from Critical Areas 29

30 Use of Dispersants & Other Alternate Response Technologies Pre-authorization Plans Regional or local contingency plans No Pre-authorization Plans FOSC gains concurrence from EPA rep on RRT 30

31 Response: In Situ Burning 31

32 Response: Chemical Dispersants Surface Application 32

33 Response: Chemical Dispersants Sub-Surface Application 33

34 Why yuse Chemical Dispersants? Wind and Waves Often Too High to Allow Mechanical Removal (Booms & Skimmers) or Burning Kept Oil Out of Nearshore Waters and Marshes Organisms breeding, larvae/juveniles present Marshes/shallows hard to clean if repeatedly fouled with oil 34

35 Chemical Dispersant Controversy Exposure/Toxicity of Dispersants to Marine Life, Humans, Seafood Exposure of Marine Organisms Below Surface to Dispersed Oil Proprietary Mixture Where Did Oil Go? 35

36 Key Issues During DWH 36

37 Failure = Engineering Breakthroughs h Concept Recognized in Engineering (e.g., H. Petroski, 1982 ) 37

38 Initial Mistakes = Lack of Trust Oil Leak Not Confirmed for Few Days Turbidity and debris in water Estimates of Leak Poor Multiple leaks along pipe and at well head No Blowout Spill Contingency Plan for High Flow Never required as part of drilling permit 38

39 Facing the Reality: MILLION GALLON SPILL WILL CAUSE DAMAGE-- (Exxon Valdez Spill = 11 Million gallons) --RESPONSE MINIMIZES DAMAGE, BUT THERE WILL BE SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE!!! Public Perception DWH: Poor response Responders Perception DWH: Successful 39

40 The Imbroglio Explosion of Public s Science and Limited Engineering i g Scientific Complexity and Scientific Engineering Politics Local, State, Federal Research + Response Efforts + NRDA Data Literacy 24/7 Information Can we believe it? 40

41 imbroglio \im-brohl-yoh\, noun: 1. A complicated and embarrassing state of things. 2. A confused or complicated disagreement or misunderstanding. 3. An intricate, complicated plot, as of a drama or work of fiction. 4. A confused mass; a tangle. 41

42 Scientific / Engineering g Complexity Oil spill scientists/engineers Very small & underfunded community Oceanographers & ocean engineers Limited it knowledge of oil/response issues Safety and response protocols at spill site Misunderstandings resulted between two groups 42

43 Science/Engineering g Literacy Complex response & science concepts to convey Sometimes answers unknown Literacy issue for public, government officials and reporters Responders and scientists are not always best teachers River of oil in subsurface 43

44 24/7 Information (Is it True?) Experts everywhere in the spotlight Some data reported before QA/QC What gets reported? Seconds of interview used (from minutes of taping) Is what reported true? Credentials of bloggers Misunderstanding by reporters 44

45 A Model Misunderstood 45

46 Politics Survey of GOM coastal residents Public does not trust government or industry Public trusts scientists (especially those who report data that supports THEIR world view) Hurricanes Katrina/Rita aftermath Skepticism and discontent towards gov t Politicians exploit the DWH situation Louisiana berms Congressional intervention: U.S. can never have another major oil spill! Legislation can t prevent human error 46

47 Will DWH Really Change Anything? Continuing Deepwater Drilling in GOM, Brazil, Africa Arctic: Russia, Norway, Canada, Alaska Other U.S. Coastal Waters(?) Cuba Impacts for U.S. waters 47

48 Will DWH Really Change Anything? Federal legislation = BOEM/BSEE created from MMS Improved command structure More drills and exercises Industry liability increased Better on site capping and blowout prevention equipment developed $1+ Billion Industry Effort 48

49 Resilient Spill Response Going Forward: Recommendations 49

50 Recommendations: Response Broader Involvement of Scientists/Engineers in Spill Contingency Planning Especially in areas with high spill potential (e.g., Arctic, GOM) Develop Strategies for Co-Operation of Response and Science Activities at Spill Sites Update Response/Recovery Based on DWH Experience Revise guidance documents/protocols Response affects recovery 50

51 Recommendations: Risk Communication Strengthen risk communication skills of: Journalists/Correspondents (AAAS Awards) Scientists/Engineers Gov t Officials Explain tradeoffs of response Can t do it all; minimize risks to most vulnerable; human health and safety Directly admit when answer is unknown Avoid pre-releasing releasing data Common Operating Picture Tools DWH = ERMA /Geoplatform 51

52 Recommendations: Education Educate public, especially in spill- vulnerable regions, about response Response management, scale and tradeoffs during disasters Convey concept that We don t know yet disaster Educate next generation of scientists & engineers in spill response and restoration 52

53 Recommendations: Politics Minimize potential for political interference during spill response Can this be done? Overcome misconceptions/unrealistic perceptions When the next big spill occurs.. : It already has We must be ready for the next spill.. : Unlikely to be DWH repeat They should have done that.. : Victim, perpetrator, rescuer paradigm not helpful during spill 53

54 Recommendations: R&D Numerous R&D plans in wake of DWH Human dimensions focus should not be overlooked (e.g., social & health impacts) Coordination among researchers and consortia essential Industry, gov t, NGOs, academia National/International Model for multi- stakeholder design teams Including controlled field release Translate R&D into practice 54

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56 Supplemental Slides 56

57 FOSC Fact Collection Source and Cause of Spill/Release Identification of Responsible Parties Nature, Amount & Location of Discharged/Released Material Probable Direction & Time of Travel of Discharge or Released Material Potential for a Worse Case Discharge Pathways to Human & Environmental Exposure Potential Impact on Human Health, Welfare, Safety, & the Environment Potential Impact on Natural Resources & Property Priorities for Protecting Human Health, Welfare, and the Environment Appropriate Cost Documentation ti 57

58 FOSC Notifications Higher Command / Support Agency as Per Organizational Directives FEMA for Potential Major Disaster Situations Health & Human Services (HHS) for Public Health Emergencies Natural Resource Trustees that may be Impacted Appropriate Public & Private Entities 58

59 FOSC Consultation Appropriate State & Local Officials as Outlined in the Area Contingency Plan The RRT & National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC) National Resource Trustees The Department of Interior (DOI) & Department of Commerce (DOC) When Endangered Species or Habits are Threatened 59

60 FOSC Other Considerations Site Safety & Health Public Information & Community Relations Reports, Documentation & Cost Recovery 60

61 DWH Well Blowout Put in Temporary Cement Plug 3,000ft Below Top of Well Temporary abandonment until production platform secured Positive Pressure Test Increase pressure inside steel casing and seals to be sure they are intact Negative Pressure Test Reduce pressure inside well to simulate situation after rig gone (no fluids should leak into well) 61

62 DWH Well Blowout (cont d) Positive Pressure Test Acceptable Results Negative Pressure Test Began 5 pm, April 20 Pressure repeatedly increased fluids leaking in? Decided to try again using kill line on blowout preventer (BOP) Results ok no pressure increase Likely kill line was not working properly (clogged) Decision OK to open BOP and replace heavy drilling mud in drill pipe with seawater 62

63 DWH Well Blowout (cont d) 9:15 pm Begin Adding Seawater into Bottom of Well (Annulus) ~ 9:40 pm Hissing and High-Frequency Vibration Then Mud Shooting Out of Gas Buster on Rig Then Explosion All Saved Except 11 Killed in Explosion 63

64 DWH Well Blowout (cont d) 1:30 am (April 21) DWH Rig Listing; Secondary Explosions & Fire 2:50 am (April 21) Rig Spins 180 ; GPS Dynamic Positioning Dead DWH moved 1600 ft from well 3:15 am DWH Listing Heavily, Fire Continues & Fire Boats Spraying Water on Rig 1:27 am April 22 DWH Sank Along with 5,000 ft pipe 64

65 Natural Spill Weathering Function of Environmental Conditions Warm temperatures (H 2 O, Air) Winds Oil type Sweet crude Waves Natural dispersion 65

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67 Response: Biodegradation Every Year, ~ 20 Million Gallons of Oil Enter GOM from Natural Seeps Naturally Occurring Bacteria Live in GOM Degrade Oil Constituents to Inorganic Carbon Data Suggest Rapid Biodegradation, Even at Low Temperatures 67

68 Federal Oil Budget Estimates 68

69 Will DWH Really Change Anything? Arctic Drilling Harsh environment (cold and very dark) Oil in & under ice Minimal response equipment or personnel Fragile/Unknown natural resources/ecosystem Indigenous subsistence and cultural practices Desire to drill vs. environmental preservation R&D underway, but contentious Industry, NGOs, Academia 69

70 Will DWH Really Change Anything? R&D Flash in the Pan effect for Exxon Valdez R&D Funding vs. Time $ $ e kt t o 70