DGR in Ukraine : To be or not to be?

Transcription

1 DGR in Ukraine : To be or not to be? Presented by Mykola Proskura

2 CONTENTS WASTE MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION LONG-LIVED LIVED WASTE INVENTORY PRECONCEPTUAL STUDY OF DISPOSAL OPTIONS SITING & SAFETY ASSESMENTS

3 LEGISLATION 1. International Conventions: Convention on the Civil Liability for the Nuclear Hazards, 1963 Convention on Nuclear Safety, 1994 Joint Convention on Safety for SF and RW Management, Laws of Ukraine about: Utilization of Nuclear Power and Radiation Safety, 1995 Radioactive Waste Management, 1995 Health Protection from the Ionizing Radiation, 1998 Permissive Activities at Nuclear Power Utilization, 2000 Decisions Making for Nuclear Facilities Siting, Designing and Building, State Programs: State Program for RW Management, 2008 State Strategy for RW Management, Norms and Rules: Radiation Safety Norms (NRBU-97), Addendum (1997/ 97/D-2000) 2000), 2000 General Provisions on Safety for Geological Disposal of RW, 2007 Siting Requirements for RW Disposal Facilities, ю 3

4 NUCLEAR ENERGY in UKRAINE There are 4 NPPs and 15 operating reactors (2 WWER WWER-1000) as well as - 3 decommissioned reactors (RBMK-1000). Total capacity is 13,8 GW. 50% of electric power produced by NPPs. There is an intention to build additional reactors

5 The all of SO s radioactively contaminated materials (RCM) = radioactive waste Fresh and spent nuclear fuel (NF) Core fragments (CF) Fuel-containing material (FCM) Materials formed in 1986 Reactor equipment AND materials Building structures Soils within the industrial site Shelter Object Total volume = app. 630,000 m 3 Total activity = Bq (as of 2006) Volume of long-lived lived waste = 44,000 m3

6 A lot of equipment will be placed inside the Arch, i.e. lifting cranes, mechanisms and other industrial facilities. This equipment will provide dismantling, fragmentation, packing into containers and disposal of building constructions and fuel containing materials of the destroyed reactor unit. 6

7 A general view of SNFS-2 construction 7

8 Комплекс виробництв Вектор

9 Site for the complex "Vector" 9

10 Site of location of radiation contaminated technics Rosocha Rosocha 10

11 Total Waste Inventory. 11

12 Comparison of Volumes of long-lived lived RW. Total capacity of reactors and HLRW 12

13 Waste Inventory and Disposal Options A total volume of waste in Ukraine is over 3.45 Million m 3 App. 3.3 Million m 3 (96%) of waste have the accidental origin % of waste is short lived and can be disposed in the surface/near surface repositories Approx m 3 of long-lived lived waste must be disposed in the geological repository 95 % of total volume of long lived waste are localized in ChEZ Problems: Classification should be improved Waste properties should be studied/estimated in more detail 13

14 LONG-LIVED LIVED WASTE INVENTORY 1) SF RBMK-1000: 2396 t 2) SF WWER-1000: 0 to 8200 t (depend on future SF management strategy) 3) Vitrified HLW after WWER SF reprocessing: app.100 to app.1350 m 3 (depend on future SF management strategy) 4) LL L/ILW from NPP operation: app. 300 m 3 5) LL L/ILW after NPP decommissioning: app m 3 6) Fuel containing materials from the Shelter: app. 600 m 3 7) LL L/ILW from the Shelter (debris): app m 3 8) LL L/ILW from the Storages in the ChEZ: app m 3 TOTAL = 2400 t of SF RBMK and to m 3 of HLW and LL waste, as well as - to 8200 t of SF WWER (admittedly) More then 90 % of long-lived lived waste (by volume) is located within Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (ChEZ)

15 International Recommendations on Classification of RW [IAEA, GSG 1, 2009]. 15

16 Graphic Presentation of New Scheme of RW Classification (Volume activity/radioactive half-life). 16

17 Comparison of existing and proposed classification of RW concerning waste disposal costs (Existing classification / Proposed classification) Economic Effect, 17

18 Concepts of Radioactive Waste Geological Disposal. 18

19 Concepts of Deep Geological Repository BOREHOLE REPOSITORY (VDH): depth = m only for SF & HLW & FCM from Shelter main input to safety = geological medium Disposal technique = [SKB: R-00-35] MINED REPOSITORY (KBS-3V): depth = m for all types of waste main input to safety = canister Disposal technique for SF&HLW = [SKB:TR-99-06] Disposal technique for LL L/ILW = [Nagra: NTB 02-05] 05] COMPARISON CRITERIA: Long term safety Technical features Time Cost TACIS Project U4.03/04, 19

20 Comparison of DGR Types [SKB: TR 01-17, 17, TR 01-18, 18, R & NIREX: N/108]. 20

21 Preliminary Investigation ( ) There are all types of suitable formations in Ukraine for geological disposal of waste: Crystalline rocks Ukrainian Shield Salts Dnepr- Donetsk depression, Donetsk basin, For-Carpatian and Trans-Carpatian Clays For-Carpatian [TACIS U 4.02/93, 1996]. 21

22 Investigated Territory, Methods Investigated territory = Chernobyl exclusion zone and adjacent areas ( 9000 km 2 ) Scale = 1: (with detailed elaboration of some sub-area up to 1:50000) Why in the ChEZ? Acceptable geology Lack of population Nuclide contamination Short transport routes Security (physical protection) Advanced infrastructure Methods = Analysis of existing data: Airborne and space images Geology Hydrogeology Drilling Geophysics survey: seismics magnetics gravimetry petrophysics. 22

23 WASTE INVENTORY and DISPOSAL OPTIONS: UNCERTAINTIES for SA Absence of clear concept of disposal system (waste form, container, EBS, host formation) Disposal of SF RBMK-1000? Content of radionuclides important for SA ( Se, 99 Tc, 129 I, 135 Cs, 234 U, etc.) 14 C, Cl, Properties of packages (waste form and canisters), buffer and backfilling materials

24 SITING IN CHEZ Why in the ChEZ? Lack of population Acceptable geology Advanced infrastructure Short transport routes Security 2 1 Implementation = Method = desk study of existing geophysical survey results Results = two area for top-priority priority studying 1 Veresnia site 2 Tovsty Lis site

25 Methodology Start Siting Designing Safety Assessment Safety case. 25

26 Open Questions NTB TR H.Umeki, 2003 Waste properties -? SAFETY ASSESSMENTS: Methodology -? Codes -? SAFETY CASE Biosphere model -? Dose conversion factors -? Exposure scenarios -? Package properties -? Design, lay-out -? Materials -? WAC -? Site properties -? -hydraulic -mechanical, thermal -hydrochemical Site models -? Evolution scenarios -?. 26

27 WHERE WE ARE and WHAT WE HAVE TO DO?

28 What We Are And What We Have To Do? Ukraine Sweden Finla and. 28

29 Recommended Actions 1. Selection of the site for location of the geological repository 2. Development of the basic design for the geological repository 3. Development of capabilities in assessment performance of the proposed solutions 4. Definition of Research and Development (R&D) Plan 5. Development of technologies required for characterization of the selected site and construction of the geological repository. 29

30 SELECTED SUPPORTING REFERENCES MINISTRY of EMERGENCY Development of Methodology on Complex Geological Investigations for Siting Geological Repository, Assessment of Possibility for Long-lived Waste Disposal within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, Development of the Ukrainian State Program of Radioactive Waste Management (including Development of Geological Repository), TASIC #U 4.02/93: Site selection for radwaste disposal in Ukraine, 1996 #U 4.03/04: Development of the Strategy and Concept for State Programme for Radioactive Waste Management in Ukraine, STCU # 1396: Scientific Grounds for ChNPP Waste Disposal in Deep Boreholes, # 3187: Wastes Disposal within Eastern Part of Korostensky Massif (Field and Model Studies), IAEA # CRP T : The use of numerical models in support of siting and PA studies of geologic repositories, # INT-9.173: Training in and Demonstration of Waste Disposal Technologies in Underground Research Facilities

31 Possible Cooperation Program, methods and technologies of site investigations (including the investigations in underground research facility) Methods of crystalline rocks investigations (their mechanical, hydraulic and transport properties) Development of repository system s models Codes for processes modeling (mechanical, thermal, hydraulic, geochemical, etc.) Development of repository system s evolution scenarios Methodology of safety assessments Program of long-term site monitoring. 31

32 In general, my personal attitude to temporary storages is negative I am against temporary storages. I understand that sometimes it is necessary to store RW quickly and safely. But they are going to be buffer storages, not temporary. The buffer is before final depository. Why? Because temporary depository, bit by bit, turns into long-term depository or very longterm depository. For example, Chernobyl,...USA,Japan

33 Existing traditional technologies of conditioning RW usually result in increasing of total amount of finally disposed waste. It is possible to formulate requirements to conditioning nowadays: the volume of the conditioned waste should not be more, but has to be less, than we have nowadays; and parameters of leachability should not be worse than with technologies of conditioning of RW nowadays

34 We consider, it is necessary to study thoroughly the possibility to dispose all types of RW in the same storage in depth, including in DGR. The Ukrainian colleagues would like to participate more in international (or bilateral) projects and organizations concerning creation DGR. Everything, what I speak about concerns conditions of Ukraine!

35 Taking into account, that emergency RW in the Chernobyl zone contains significant amount of TUE, it is necessary in Ukraine to begin discussion about repositories at intermediate depth ю 35

36 So to be or not to be DGR in Ukraine? -radioactive waste and emergency waste with the increased content of the TUE exist - nuclear power industry exists and will exist -there are geological crystal objects (better ones than in Sweden, the Russian Federation, ) - scientific research is performed - there is experience of underground works -international cooperation takes place, though can be more active - there is financial mechanism, though it is often used not for financing RWM - scientific work for safety estimations is performed -the nuclear regulator exists and is interested in DGR - the national organization on RWM exists - there is part of necessary experts

37 So, why not to be? Objectively, one problem exists: it is necessary to teach state top management If to be, then what type of? \. 37

38 For today, I think, this DGR in crystalline rocks (granitoids on depth of ? m, a combination of multi level mines and borehole type. The main purpose of which is storage of highly active RW (according to new classification) and possible storage (separately or together) L/ILW The plan: detailed program of long-term works of research and all complex of works on DGR creation, coordinated/ discussed with experts ЕС, IAEA and necessity of realization, of which the state top management is aware of. So, to be?

39 Thank you for attention Iu. Shybetskyi L. Zinkevich