Matthias Englert. Peaceful Fusion. Managing Possible Proliferation Risks of Magnetic Fusion Power Plants

Transcription

1 Matthias Englert Peaceful Fusion Managing Possible Proliferation Risks of Magnetic Fusion Power Plants Interdisciplinary Research Group Science Technology and Security IANUS TU Darmstadt Peaceful Fusion, DPG Annual Conference 19 March, 2014

2 Fissile Material

3 Slide adapted from J. Acton Deterrence

4 Slide adapted from J. Acton (Access to) fissile material as currency in a system of power

5 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Access to nuclear weapon relevant material existing stockpiles production technologies HEU Pu Tritium U233 US DoE Highly enriched Uranium Picturing the Bomb Size of plutonium pit used in Nagasaki Bomb

6 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Access to nuclear weapon relevant material existing stockpiles production technologies HEU Pu Tritium U233 Significant Quantity/Mass Pu HEU Tritium IAEA 8 kg 25 kg Weapon 2-6 kg 3-16 kg 2 g

7 Tokamak Fusion

8 One Path for Fusion in the 21st Century Research Reactor ITER Reactor Geometries First D-T Fusion in ITER Research Reactor DEMO Power Plant conceptual Study (PPCS-A,B,C,D...) Commercial Power Plant 2017? 2025? 2030ies 2050 Slide courtesy G. Franceschini

9 Regulation EFDA 2005, A Conceptual Study of Commercial Fusion Power Plants None of the materials required are subject to the provisions of non-proliferation treaties. D + T 4 He + n + 17,6 MeV Slide courtesy G. Franceschini

10 4 technical reasons a tokamak might be attractive for a proliferator 4

11 1. Tritium

12 Easiest Scenario: Tritium (T) Diversion Daily T-consumption and production in commercial facility: ~500 g T-Reserves in facility: ~5 kg Yearly overproduction planned in facility: ~1,5 kg T-amount in boosted weapon: ~2-3 g (for 1.6 GWel) T necessary for miniaturization (yield to weight ratio) Huge amounts of T handled compared to current civil market (<1kg/y) Accountancy extremely difficult and poor so far. Not nuclear material with regard to safeguards system yet. Change has to be considered in view of large scale use, driven by technological dynamic.

13 2. Very High Plutonium Production Potential

14 Very High Plutonium Production Potential 20 degree section 5 GWth Uranium in Alloy (Pb-17Li) all numbers in kg Pu/y 10 % 1 % 0,1 % 0,01 % One Blanket close to Plasma One Blanket far from Plasma <0.1 <0.10 All Blankets ,5 1,5 Complete Reactor Limited by TBR and Heat Inboard Shielding Outboard 90% Li-6 Module III Module IV Module II Module V Module I Blanket 4 Blanket 3 Blanket 2 Blanket 1 Module VI Blanket 1 Blanket 2 Blanket 3 Blanket 4 Blanket 5

15 Breeding Structures Solubility Limited in Pb-17Li Temperature K only vol.% But TRISO particles possible Temperatur [K] K Pb 598 K Liquid 1493 K Pb 3 U 1493 K PbU 2-Liquids 1553 K 1398 K (γ,u) 1038 K 1049 K (β,u) 918 K 941 K (α,u) Neutrons from Plasma 400 Pb at [%] Pu [g] Tubes Homog. Ratio Blanket ,9 Blanket ,5 Blanket ,3 Blanket ,8 U

16 Breeding Structures Neutrons from Plasma Homogeneous: 346 g/y in 25.2 kg U Structures: 77 g/y in 25.2 kg U in 11 rods R i x = 0 de N i ( r, t)σ i x(e)φ(e, r, t) Spectrum Flux Intensity (Self Shielding) - Check by doubling fuel rods with half radius (89 g/y) - take pure U in rods not UO2 (80 g/y) - calculate homogeneously without water (142 g/y)

17 "# /'01234'+5'62(7&+8069 "# "# H20pipes homog. fuel "# # PbLi # " $ # # %&'()*+,'-. MCNP results for blanket 2 in module II of the flux spectrum in the water filled pipes (- -), in the Pb-17Li filled blanket zones (-. -), within the fuel rods (-.. -) and the cumulative spectrum in the blanket (solid) in comparison to the homogenous mixture of all materials in the same blanket (...). MCNP model of PPCS-A fusion power plant.

18 3. Very Low Source Material Requirements

19 Very Low Source Material Requirements even depleted uranium Fusion Fusion reactor P Conc. Mass Years Conc. Bl. Conv Pu Rate [MW] [vol%] [t] in Blanket [kg/thm] [g/mwd] [kg/y] Module II Blanket Module II Blanket Module II Blanket Module II Blanket vs. Fission Reactor Reactor P B init. U Years Conc. FE Conv Pu Rate [MWth] [GWd/t] [t] in React [kg/thm] [g/mwd] [kg/y] PWR commercial France G Calder Hall Yong-byon All reactor production rates calculated according to (albright1997), data for North Korean reactor Yong-byon see (albright1994). Pu Rate has a capacity factor of 0.8.

20 Gap in Legislation

21 Safeguards on nuclear materials Nearly every member state to the NPT has a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC, 153) with the IAEA But e.g. 10 t in total of natural uranium can be exempt from safeguards. This is sufficient for up to kg of Pu production per year.

22 4. Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes

23 Plutonium Which Plutonium Isotopic Composition?

24 Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes $" &# =4&+7+ =4&#' 3456,1./ ,73/0:;5-<#2 $" &* $" &% $" &) $" &> $" &( 500d 98.6% Pu d 95.9% Pu-239 =4&*" =4&#( =4&*$ =4&* $" &' "" #"" %"" >"" $""" $%"" +,-./012 Burnup calculation with MCMATH (VESTA) for module II Blanket 2, 0.1 vol% uranium

25 Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes '($%)*+,-+.-/01/2,-*345+67%8 " 9% " 9; *CD1-E./* *CD1-E./*$ *CD1-E./*; *CD1-E./*% " 9: $"" %"" #"" &"" """ #"" <1=> Burnup calculation with MCMATH (VESTA) for module II Blanket 2, 0.1 vol% uranium

26 Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes #"" -.'/& , &$ &% &( &' &" $$ Blanket 4 Blanket 3 Blanket 2 Blanket 1 Inboard Module III Module II Module I Shielding Outboard Module IV Module V Module VI Blanket 1 Blanket 2 Blanket 3 Blanket 4 Blanket 5 =0#A ?<*5@260( =0#A ?<*5@260/ =0#A ?<*5@260' =0#A ?<*5@260# $% "" #""" #"" )*+, Burnup calculation with VESTA for module II 1 vol% uranium

27 Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes #"" -.'/& , &$ &% &( &' &" $$ $% "" #""" #"" )*+, Burnup calculation with VESTA for module II 1 vol% uranium

28 Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes #"" -.'/& , &$ &% &( &' &" $$ Inboard Module III Shielding Outboard Module IV $% "" #""" #"" )*+, "#$%&'()"*+,(-&.('&/01-23+&4&.('&),..3'3-+&-1+"'10&5'1-,"6&.'1*+,(-7 5&4C Module II Module I Module V "#$%&*(-*3-+'1+,(-&89:*6;$< 4=?$ 4=?A 4=?> 5&=B4C 5&=B=4C 5&=B==4C Blanket 4 Blanket 3 Blanket 2 Blanket 1 Module VI Blanket 1 Blanket 2 Blanket 3 Blanket 4 Blanket 5 4=?@ #== >== 4=== 4>== +,63&8)< Burnup calculation with MCMATH (VESTA) for module II

29 Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes #" Shielding ()*+",31,3'424-30,5.024/,64/,78%19.2,#, Inboard Outboard ()*+",-./0.12,31,(),3'424-30,5.024/ > = + * Blanket 4 Blanket 3 Blanket 2 Blanket 1 Module III Module II Module I Module IV Module VI Module V Blanket 1 Blanket 2 Blanket 3 Blanket 4 Blanket 5 :,#<,,,,,,,78%19.2,# :";#<,,,,,78%19.2,# :";"#<,,,78%19.2,# :";""#<,78%19.2,# " " "" #""" #"" $%&' Burnup calculation with MCMATH (VESTA) for module II

30 Excellent? Material for Weapon Purposes #" ()*+,-42-4' / %88-98%2:/3'-- ()*+,-./01/23-42-()-4' /1350, < ; * =-#> %2:/3-# =-#> %2:/3-* =-#> %2:/3-+ =-#> %2:/3-; Inboard Module III Shielding Outboard Module IV " " #" "" #""" #"" $%&' ()*+,-42-4' / %2:/3-#- Module II Module V ()*+,-./01/23-42-()-4' /1350,? > * ;-#= %2:/3-# ;"<#= %2:/3-# ;"<"#=---89%2:/3-# ;"<""#=-89%2:/3-# Blanket 4 Blanket 3 Blanket 2 Blanket 1 Module I Module VI Blanket 1 Blanket 2 Blanket 3 Blanket 4 Blanket 5 " " "" #""" #"" $%&' Burnup calculation with MCMATH (VESTA) for module II

31 Fusion vs. Fission Reactor Attractive High to very high Pu-concentrations Low source material masses necessary, below one effective kilogram Hard spectrum breeds weapon grade Pu even for high burnups Tritium Less attractive today Mostly international research facilities High degree of technical sophistication High costs Many components not commercially available yet No broad global expertise, smaller community yet

32 Intentions

33 Proliferation resistance Besides extrinsic institutional measures, intrinsic technical measures can enhance proliferation resistance of technology. - safeguards by design - proliferation resistance by design (LEU use in research reactor) Concepts R&D Engineering Construction Operation Historically mostly applied after R&D phase (research reactor conversion)

34 Safeguards ITER as test bed for verification (Fiss. Materials and Tritium): demonstrating best practice preparing safeguards for next generation (DEMO) Notice: ITER might set the precedent (large tritium handling, purely theoretical fissile material breed capacity of minor relevance) Safeguards-by-Design: before concrete is poored $ before radioactive contamination inside facility s components $$ after radioactive contamination $$$$

35 Several Conclusions

36 Conclusion Capabilities Fusion reactor almost the perfect breeder with massive latent proliferation characteristics. Fusion reactors are currently not directly covered by IAEA terms. Inclusion of fusion plants into the IAEA safeguards system necessary. Enough time to research and implement preventive mechanisms to enhance the proliferation resistance by developing safeguard procedures and by finding, if applicable, proliferation resistant designs.

37 What to do? Horizontal Proliferation - Safeguards as soon as possible ( safeguards by design ) - Proliferation resistant design on technological level and regulatory level Vertical Proliferation - Global fissile material controls (including tritium) - No virtual arsenals, disarmament below zero - Fusion-Fission hybrids are problematic. Keep Clear Cut Criterion - Selfregulation: Fusion only for peaceful purposes Slide courtesy G. Franceschini

38 Outlook, Outreach, New Research? New research challenges for fusion reactors: - Safeguards by design - Proliferation resistant design (technology design) - Tritium control - Connect epistemic communities (fusion community, especially ITER), international organisations (IAEA, EURATOM) and economic actors (nuclear industry) - Respectful dialogue between fusion researchers & engineers, non-proliferation experts, safeguards experts, fusion plant (components) designers, verification authorities and regulators Slide courtesy G. Franceschini

39 Neutron producing fusion technology will very likely be faced with questions about its proliferation resistance while it matures from experiment to a full-fledged energy option It is very important to meet the concerns of all stakeholders in a constructive and respectful dialogue

40 This article was downloaded by: [Institut Fuer Politik Geschichte], [Matthias Englert] On: 05 December 2013, At: 06:09 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: Registered office: Mortimer House, Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK The Nonproliferation Review Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: Nuclear Fusion Power for Weapons Purposes Giorgio Franceschini, Matthias Englert & Wolfgang Liebert Published online: 02 Dec To cite this article: Giorgio Franceschini, Matthias Englert & Wolfgang Liebert (2013) Nuclear Fusion Power for Weapons Purposes, The Nonproliferation Review, 20:3, , DOI: / To link to this article: PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content ) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at HSFK-Report Nr. 7/2013 Safeguarding Fusion Reactors Plädoyer für eine proliferationsresistente Gestaltung der Kernfusion Giorgio Franceschini/Matthias Englert 51st Annual INMM Meeting, Baltimore, July 11 15, UDATE st Annual INMM Meeting, Baltimore, July 11 15, 2010 POSSIBLE PROLIFERATION RISKS OF FUTURE TOKAMAK FUSION REACTORS Matthias Englert* a, Fabio Balloni b, Wolfgang Liebert b a) Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, United States. b) Interdisciplinary Research Group in Science, Technology and Security (IANUS), Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany. Abstract. Although fissile material is usually not considered when thinking of fusion reactors (except in fusion-fission hybrid concepts), they have a potential to breed nuclear weapon relevant material (Pu, Tritium) which should not be neglected. We developed a MCNPX model of the 2006 published concept A of the European Power Plant Conceptual Study to analyze the potential for Pu production in a fusion reactor. Production potentials are calculated for varying uranium content replacing the Pb-17Li alloy in different blankets of the reactor. The results show that significant amounts of fissile material can be produced even with limited amounts of source material. The production in different zones will be limited by additional heating due to fission and due to a reduced tritium breeding rate. Burnup calculations indicate that the produced plutonium is weapon usable with over 90% Pu-239 even for extremly high burnups. As the technology is and will be in development for the next decades, there is sufficient time to implement and test applicable safeguard measures or develop proliferation resistant designs. 1 Introduction It is true that in a pure fusion reactor no materials used under normal operating conditions are subject to the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty and its related safeguards system. The lack of continuous use of fertile or fissile material in a pure fusion reactor is indeed more resistant to proliferation than in fission reactors or hybrid fusion-fission reactor concepts. However the strong neutron fluxes provided in a fusion reactor could also be used covertly or in a break-out scenario to produce fissile material for weapon purposes. 1 There are some historic studies mentioning or investigating the proliferation risks of fusion power plants [3; 4; 5; 6]. Recently there is renewed interest in the topic. In [11] calculations were published for plutonium production in different blanket materials for an idealized reactor geometry. A project to investigate the impact on the current nonproliferation regime was also conducted by the European Fusion Development Agency (EFDA), although results are not published [10]. In [7] detailed plutonium and U-233 production calculations were made for the dual coolant lead-lithium blanket design proposed by the United States for the ITER fusion experiment. The authors provide a thorough analysis of proliferation risks of a research facility and assess covert or clandestine production and break-out scenarios. One conclusion is that a 1 It has to be acknowledged that large amounts of tritium will be used by the fusion reaction and have to be continuously reproduced in the breeding blankets of the reactor. Tritium is used in advanced weapon designs to boost the fission reaction with additional neutrons and enhance the efficiency of a weapon. This reduces the mass of fissile material needed to achieve a certain weapon yield. Tritium boosting is considered as one of the important steps in weapon design to minimize the size of a warhead that it is usable on e.g. a rocket. Typically only several grams of tritium are sufficient for boosting. In a large power plant several kilograms will be in the inventory and the annual production rate well beyond 100 kg. More on the proliferation impact of tritium can be found in [1; 2]. Tritium is currently not under international control. 1 "#$%&'()*&+",%-,./"/()0/%1%&'()2'&3"#)4%5'&3")235&,%-()6'.) &:+);3&<-.3=()>/?@%"@A&3B%",%()CDEE) Strong Neutron Sources - How to cope with weapon material production capabilities of fusion and spallation neutron sources? Matthias Englert, Giorgio Franceschini, Wolfgang Liebert Introduction Historically the production of plutonium for weapon purposes took place in dedicated fission reactors by irradiation of U-238 in the fuel or the reactor blanket and subsequent separation of the produced plutonium. Only within a nuclear fission reactor it was possible to provide the neutron fluxes necessary for a significant production of plutonium. However, in future other strong neutron sources such as fusion power plants or spallation neutron sources (SNS) could also potentially be used to produce fissile material for weapon purposes. In this article we investigate the potential and relevance for weapon material production in such facilities and sketch what should be done to strengthen these technologies against a non-peaceful use. The focus of this article will be mainly on fusion, but some conclusions also apply to SNS. What we propose in this article is a thought experiment in preventive arms control, or more ambitiously in anticipatory governance of future nuclear technologies. Proliferation Potential of Fusion Reactors quantitative and qualitative assessments Tritium Diversion The easiest way to use a fusion plant for nuclear weapon purposes would be the diversion of tritium, a material constantly produced and consumed during reactor operation and stored in large quantities at the plant 1. Only a few grams of tritium are enough to boost the yield of a nuclear weapon, thereby enhancing the efficiency (yield-to-weight ratio) of the weapon and allowing for its minimization. In a large gigawatt fusion power plant several kilograms of tritium will be in the inventory at any time, the daily consumption will amount to several hundred grams and the annual production rate will exceed 100 kg. It will be impossible to use material accountancy to detect the diversion of some few grams in such an environment 2. Huge Plutonium Production Potential Besides tritium diversion another possibility to use a fusion plant for military purposes is to use the tritium breeding blankets, replace a significant part of the lithium containing alloy with uranium, and breed plutonium instead. Note that the use of fertile or fissile nuclear material is not proposed in the reactor )))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) E)Current fusion reactors use deuterium and tritium as reactor fuel. Tritium is produced during reactor operation through neutron irradiation of lithium-6 targets in the reactor blanket; deuterium is supplied externally. 2 For a detailed discussion of the proliferation dimension of tritium see (Kalinowski and Colschen 1995 and Kalinowski 2004). ) E) STRONG NEUTRON SOURCES IS THERE AN EXPLOITABLE GAP? Matthias Englert* a, Wolfgang Liebert b a) Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, United States. b) Interdisciplinary Research Group in Science, Technology and Security (IANUS), Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany. Abstract. All neutron sources are capable in principal to produce weapon relevant material. A comparison of the potential to produce fissile material with reactors, spallation neutron sources and fusion plants will be presented. Possible advantages and disadvantages of the respective technologies with their completely different underlying physical processes will be discussed. One focus will be on the possible capability of fusion plants and spallation sources to produce significant quantities with less source material than what defines one effective kilogram". Furthermore the question will be raised if the corresponding technologies are adequately covered by current IAEA terms like facility" and reactor". A preliminary tentative redefinition of the term of reactor" will be proposed to encourage critique and discussion. 1 Introduction Historically the production of plutonium for weapon purposes took place in dedicated fission reactors by irradiation of U-238 in the fuel and subsequent reprocessing of the produced plutonium. Of course, if U-238 is irradiated with neutrons plutonium will always be produced. However, the production rate, the end concentration of plutonium isotopes in the heavy metal and the isotopic composition of the plutonium will vary depending the time of irradiation as well as on the spectrum and the neutron flux. There are several processes which will be able to reach fluxes as high or higher as in a reactor (> n/cm 2 s) like fusion or spallation. 1 In this article we will compare certain advantages and disadvantages of those processes to breed plutonium for proliferation purposes. 2 Pu Production in Fission Reactors In the early fissile material production programs of the official nuclear weapon states graphite moderated reactors were commonly used. Heavy-water moderated reactors were used in the programs of Israel, India and Pakistan. 2 Typically the irradiation time is short to inhibit buildup of heat producing plutonium isotopes (Pu-238) or isotopes with high neutron rates (Pu-240, Pu-242, Pu-238) which would increase technical sophistication for a weapon design. 3 1 There exist other particle nucleus reactions like Li(d,xn), which might be used e.g. in IFMIF. 2 The nuclear programs of the United States (e.g. Hanford), Russia (Tomsk-7) and China (Jiuquan) used light water cooled systems, France (G-series) and the U.K. (Calder Hall) used gas-cooling. The DPRK used graphite moderation (Yongbyon). 3 Typically more than 93% Pu-239 is used in plutonium for weapon purposes. 1

41 Fin