State of New York Department of Public Service. Summary of Complex Complaint About Safety at the Northport Power Station

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1 State of New York Department of Public Service Summary of About Safety at the Northport Power Station In my capacity as the Administrative Law Judge assigned to the National Grid/KeySpan merger and the KEDNY/KEDLI gas rate cases, I recently received a complex complaint. The complaint was lodged by Mrs. Denise Knudsen who temporarily lives at 120 Cherry Street, Northpoint, New York Mrs. Knudsen can be contacted by at: natral72@yahoo.com or dknudsen@suffolk.lib.ny.us. She is married to Mr. Erik Knudsen, who was a maintenance mechanic and then assistant control operator (ACO) at the Northport Power Station in the period December 1991 through December Mr. Knudsen now receives long-term disability, and permanent workers compensation benefits based on his occupational disease involving multiple chemical sensitivity and toxicity as per the New York State Workers Compensation court decisions. Mr. Knudsen is said to be in chronic, excruciating pain. It is an understatement to say that the lives of this couple and their four young children have been dramatically and negatively changed. When everything Mrs. Knudsen says is boiled down, she clearly has two key concerns. The first is that she wants compensation far in excess of the workers' compensation and permanent disability benefits now being received. She and her children, for example, no longer have medical insurance. The family s income has been reduced substantially and their two homes had to be sold. While I am very sympathetic to her plight at a personal level, I advised her that I am almost certain that this Department could not provide her with any relief on these topics. My understanding is that she will continue to consult on them with the family's attorney.

2 The second key concern, and the focus of this summary, is that many of the conditions that led in whole or in part to Mr. Knudsen s toxic exposure continue, making it unsafe for others who work at the facility and, in some instances, for those who live or work near the facility. The Knudsens feel that the information they are providing is completely up to date based on contacts with persons who continue to work at the Northport Power Station. Specific examples of toxic exposures and some other areas of concern include the following: 1. ACOs are required to have radio communication at all times with the operators and supervisors while on shift. ACOs must work around an operating boiler in an enclosed space in instances when the ventilation system is in disrepair and where no breathing apparatus or protective clothing are provided due to the high cost. At times the boiler would run positive in a negative draft boiler; meaning that there would be boiler flames coming outside of the inspection doors. In many instances this creates extreme heat exposures, minimizes oxygen, and creates noxious smoke throughout the facility. This is said to lead to inhalation of toxic vapors. 2. Crude oil and separate waste oil strainers that are dirty have to be cleaned continuously. In a prior period of time, this was done by placing either type of strainer basket into a metal garbage can with holes made in the bottom for air flow; placing newspaper and No. 2 oil on top; and igniting all of the above inside the facility. This created an abundance of smoke. Upon a safety suggestion made by Mr. Knudsen prior to his termination by KeySpan, the procedure was changed so that cleaning now takes place in a permanent metal compartment with it s exhaust piped into the bottom of the ash pit hoppers. Nevertheless, fumes still spill into the power plant. -2-

3 3. There are also small waste oil holding tanks in units 2 & 4, next to the elevators, which emit vapors because they are not sealed correctly. 4. The elevation 19 vapor extractors from the oil compartments on all units discharge a hot mist of oil. Vapor from this is drawn into the building by the indoor negative draft. This creates direct exposure for all employees throughout the plant. 5. Other than natural gas delivered by a pipeline, the facility mainly burns other fossil fuels such as No. 6 crude oil. These deliveries are claimed to be allowed to contain up to 10% waste products. Northport Power Station also burns waste oil. Waste oil is delivered by trucks and stored in a separate tank. Testing of both these types of fuel oil deliveries is said to be inadequate based on observations by employees. Samples of crude oil are taken from the top layers, and never the bottom. Waste oil is not tested unless complaints are made by ACOs when discovering unexplained contaminants such as hypodermic needles, small metal-like pellets and other wastes discovered in the strainer baskets during cleaning. Supervisors claim that some of the waste oils are coming from the Hicksville holding tanks or other KeySpan-owned facilities where they allege to be testing such waste oils. However, they decline to provide evidence of test results when requested by employees. 6. Unmarked dirty 55 gallon drums of industrial waste products are randomly brought by company trucks, and also from onsite, for ACO s to pump the materials from these drums into these holding tanks, then pumped into the boiler to burn off, creating further inhalation of noxious vapors. -3-

4 7. ACOs must sometimes stand on top of the large crude oil storage tanks during deliveries with a flash light, aiming into the dark tank through an inspection port, in order to observe when the tank is full above allowable capacity, and to give instructions that a delivery be concluded. This practice, called gauging the tanks, results in the inhalation of toxic fuel vapors, and noxious fuel mask vapors from what is known as the perfumers (mercaptans). The need to use radio communication bars the use of a breathing apparatus. It is claimed the vapors are so strong that members of the surrounding community call the control operators at the Northport Power Station, and other government agencies to complain of the strong odor. People in the community have suffered headaches, nausea, sinus irritation and difficulty breathing as a result. Some hazardous spills are said to have been cleaned up surreptitiously. 8. Research and development or sample products are frequently used as fuel oil additives and to clean condensers, leading to employee exposure to unknown toxins. 9. The fan rooms for each of the four units move fresh air from the outside to the inside of the Northport Power Station. However, chemicals are also stored in some of the fan rooms, and throughout the four units, including in leaking containers. This results in tainted indoor air. The magnitude of this problem increases when the containers are wet and whenever welding is ongoing using materials such as nickel, aluminum, titanium and galvanized steel. 10. The rear pass, located on elevation 81 inside the plant, is an area where air is preheated to enter the boiler. ACOs must walk through asbestos that has fallen off duct work in disrepair. At times, these employees bump into the duct work with hardhats on, due to the poor lighting and -4-

5 minimal space, resulting in asbestos falling on to them. Ash hoppers are also in this area, which contribute hazardous particulates and heavy metals to the air breathed. 11. A separate building, referred as the morgue by the power plant employees, is where the precipitators are located. This is another part of the plant in which ACOs routinely work. However, the area is heavily contaminated with ash particulate matter, boiler gases, dead birds, and a large amount of avian fecal material. 12. Workers are exposed to toxic fumes during all fuel truck deliveries, from engines left idling. There are many other rooms with blocked ventilation or no ventilation in various spaces (including underground spaces) located at the Northport Power Station s property. This results in extreme inhalation exposures from built-up vapors and fumes. In addition to these types of general problems at the plant, it also appears that Mr. Knudsen was exposed to toxins in two other circumstances. 13. In March 1999, Mr. Knudsen was doing his routine work requirements by the switchgear room where there was a 4,180-volt explosion. An A-1 maintenance mechanic employee was fatally electrocuted in this explosion, which blew out the lights, and melted equipment, creating many hazardous fumes. The employer blamed the deceased employee for the explosion. All three operators working that night, including Mr. Knudsen, were never immediately treated for inhalation/toxic exposure and all ACOs have since experienced serious health problems. -5-

6 14. At one point in time, Mr. Knudsen performed a lighting survey which included mercury vapor lights in place at the facility and, thereafter, removed and replaced damaged mercury lamps. Also, old mercury switches located in all four units would often break. The implication is that this led to exposure to mercury. Gerald Lynch February 20,