OSHA S SILICA RULEMAKING, WHAT FOUNDRIES NEED TO KNOW. Thomas Slavin

Transcription

1 OSHA S SILICA RULEMAKING, WHAT FOUNDRIES NEED TO KNOW Thomas Slavin Slavin OSH Group, LLC.

2 Presentation Overview Background on Silica Rulemaking Key Issues for Foundries Health risk Technological feasibility Economic feasibility Standard provisions What happens next Q&A

3 Respirable Crystalline Silica RESPIRABLE THORACIC Respirable: 4 micron Thoracic: 10 micron INHALABLE Inhalable: 100 micron Size (diameter) in microns 3

4 Respirable Crystalline Silica Crystalline forms: quartz cristobalite tridymite Amorphous forms: glass, diatomaceous earth Vitreous forms Fused silica (SiO 2 )

5 Respirable Crystalline Silica Current PEL formula is for total respirable dust containing silica (quartz) Dust PEL = 10 mg/m 3 (%Quartz + 2) New PEL is for quartz only 100 µg/m 3 of quartz Lake sand is 95% quartz Respirable foundry dust is 15% quartz PEL = Permissible Exposure Limit µg/m 3 = micrograms per cubic meter 5

6 Proposal Highlights Lowers quartz PEL by 50% from 100 to 50µg/m 3 Cristobalite PEL already at 50µg/m 3 Construction PEL at 250µg/m 3 Contains several ancillary provisions Air monitoring, medical tests, training Regulated area Prohibits sweeping and compressed air Dismisses rotation and respirators as suitable control methods

7 Key Regulatory Issues What OSHA Needs to Show Health risk- Is there a need for a standard? Will a standard lower risk? Technological feasibility Is compliance possible? Is measurement accurate? Economic feasibility Will business impact be acceptable?

8 Silicosis Deaths and Death Rates This is a Great Public Health Success Story 8

9 OSHA Risk Estimates Uses other silicosis plus other diseases (lung cancer, renal disease) to establish risk OSHA analysis faulted for Study selection bias (omits many foundry studies) Data selection bias Model selection bias Model uncertainty bias Model over-fitting bias Confirmation bias Investigator bias Specification errors Threshold smoothing and shifting bias Uses models that cannot detect threshold Every Bias in the Book?

10 Vermont Granite Shed Studies Attfield and Costello (2004) 5414 workers 201 lung cancer cases Through 1994 Excluded highest exposure group Incomplete worker status follow up Inaccurate exposure assessments Inaccurate worker categories Lung cancer risk OSHA relies on Vacek (2011) 7052 workers 356 cases Through 2004 Included all exposure groups 162 workers assumed alive in 1994 were actually dead 5204 more exposure measurements Job assumptions corrected No lung cancer risk OSHA rejects 10

11 Bottom Line on Health Risk Dramatic reduction in silicosis cases No evidence of lung cancer or other diseases without silicosis Evidence of threshold above 100 mg/m 3 for all effects Improved compliance could eliminate residual risk BUT OSHA has considerable discretion in interpreting health risk data Comforting to us...but NOT compelling to Court

12 Key Foundry Issue: Technological Feasibility One gram of silica sand (same as artificial sweetener packet) would generate exposure level above proposed PEL in space the size of football field 13 feet high

13 Key Foundry Issue: Technological Feasibility Definition of compliance - What does meeting the proposed PEL mean? 1. All employers all of the time (OSHA enforcement) 2. Most employers most of the time (OSHA proposal) 3. Any employer ever (OSHA feasibility analysis) Many foundries use definition #2 Measure of confidence needed

14 Compliance in OSHA PEA vs. Compliance in Real World Proposed PEL Number of Samples Compliance B A OSHA PEA Feasibility Exposure Levels OSHA PEA considers control to be feasible if case study (A) was ever able to achieve proposed PEL; Compliance requires assurance that PEL is met with some level of confidence (B). 14

15 GM Defiance Foundry Current PEL Proposed PEL

16 Does this show feasibility? Proposed PEL

17 GM Saginaw Data 622 samples ( ) Geometric mean = 22 µg/m 3 25% exceeded proposed PEL (50 µg/m 3 ) 13% exceeded current PEL (100 µg/m 3 ) 5% exceeded 200 µg/m 3 What mean level must be achieved to be in compliance?

18 Foundry Exposure Data From study by R.C. Scholz, 2014 Mean is 46 mg/m 3 but 16% of samples exceed 115 mg/m 3 18

19 OSHA Feasibility Analysis Uses Wrong Target OSHA issues citations if any exposures exceed PEL, even if mean is below PEL To be confident that proposed 50 mg/m 3 PEL is met 84% of time, mean exposure must be below 20 mg/m 3. (much lower to reach 95% level) Engineering control target must be 20 mg/m 3 or less. OSHA feasibility conclusion based on wrong target. 19

20 Control Capability ISO 9 Clean Room Could Exceed Proposed PEL ISO Cleanroom Standards Class Silica Mass >=0.1 µm >=0.2 µm >=0.3 µm >=0.5 µm >=1 µm >=5 µm µg/m3 ISO maximum particles/m 3 ISO ISO 3 1, ISO 4 10,000 2,370 1, ISO 5 100,000 23,700 10,200 3, ISO 6 1,000, , ,000 35,200 8, ISO 7 352,000 83,200 2, ISO 8 3,520, ,000 29, ISO 9 35,200,000 8,320, , Exceeds Proposed PEL 20

21 Control Capability Overstated OSHA assumes that engineering controls will produce same reduction in all operations OSHA treats controls like recipes in a cookbook that have never been tried before Foundries have extensive experience with virtually every control discussed: ventilation, enclosure, vacuuming, nonsilica sand, etc. None have magic powers to reduce silica below proposed PEL throughout the industry Some listed controls (e.g. pneumatic sand transfer systems) cause more problems than they solve Some controls (e.g. sand substitution) cannot be used in all operations 21

22 Adding Control Capability Cleaning and finishing example (IV-170) 69% reduction in one foundry with downdraft ventilation No evidence of continued performance Assumes same reduction for all exposed operators Many foundries already use downdraft Controls chosen for optimum applicability in one situation 67% reduction for precleaning Silica due to burned in sand, not dirty castings Most foundries already preclean Additive approach (90% total reduction) not warranted Subtracts additional 38 µg/m 3 for reduced background Fully effective additive assumption is not appropriate

23 OSHA Uses 18 Case Studies to Demonstrate Technological Feasibility Isolated data points taken out of context Case studies actually show: Controls often unsuccessful ( for current PEL) Control are more difficult (several iterations) Implementation often takes several years It is reasonable to expect that on any particular day an overexposure to silica could occur. OSHA area director referring to sample result used by OSHA to show feasibility of compliance with proposed PEL

24 Technological Feasibility Bottom Line 1. Despite extensive, expensive and sincere efforts, many foundries find it difficult to reliably meet the current PEL for certain operations and will not likely be able to meet the proposed lower PEL. 2. Cases used to show feasibility, show opposite 3. Real world compliance target (continuous control) is much more difficult than the test used in OSHA s feasibility determination (occasional control) 4. Traditional control methods may not be capable of clean room level dust control 24

25 Economic Feasibility 25

26 Widely Different Cost Estimates Annualized Cost (incremental) Annual Cost as percent of revenue Annual Cost as percent of profit OSHA URS/ Environomics $44 million $2,200 million 0.2% 9.9% 4.8% 276% 26

27 Economic Feasibility How Can Estimates Be So Different? 1. Marginal cost error Assumes no greater cost to achieve 50 than 100µg/m 3 Industry estimate is 5 times more to get to 50µg/m 3 Room cooling analogy 2. First Time Success Error Assumes control works perfectly the first time Cases show lengthy multi-step process 3. Under 50 error No costs counted to reduce exposures below 50µg/m 3 May need to reduce exposures to 15 or 20µg/m 3 27

28 Economic Feasibility How Can Estimates Be So Different? 4. Discounted cost No cost for 2/3 workers exposed above current PEL Assumes no additional cost to go from 100 to 50 Assumes no costs under Per worker calculation Divided costs of controls by number of workers (typically 4) assuming each control would protect 4 workers Employees may operate multiple machines No cost for automated operations 6. Understated costs Ventilation at $5/cfm Industry experts estimate $20 plus $7 make up EPA estimates $5 to $40 (2 million cfm to 5000 cfm) 28

29 Economic Analysis Unit Costs & Quantity Understated HEPA Vacuum OSHA Assumption: 15 gallon HEPA Vacuum $3,495 initial cost $1,009 annual cost Foundry: 2 cubic yard 40 HP system with HEPA filter ($45,000 initial cost plus $15,000 hoses and attachments) 29

30 Abrasive Blasting Case Study Several steps documented in case history Replaced shot blast machine and ventilation ($107,000 for used machine) Covered and ventilated conveyor from shakeout Added skip buckets to load shot blast Covered conveyor next to shot blast Added enclosure and ventilation to shakeout exit Added ventilation to skip bucket enclosure OSHA cost estimate for abrasive blast operator $1,349 per worker for improved maintenance (based on $8,000 Norton blast cabinet)

31 7. Controls Listed but Not Costed (Only 24 of 46 controls costed) Substitution of Non-Silica Sand ($2 billion) 3 million tons of silica sand/yr times extra $700/ton Pneumatic Sand Transport System ($150 million) If used by 25% of foundries Production downtime to clean before beginning maintenance ($300 million) Professional cleaning ($1 per sq. ft. plus $400 million downtime) Automated Knock-Off Isolate Pouring & Shakeout in Separate Room Precast Refractories Didion drum to clean scrap for furnace operators Non-silica core coatings Low silica refractory Automated abrasive blast to pre-clean castings before finishing Wet methods 31

32 7. Omitted Costs Many costs and controls are omitted entirely Discussed in technological section but omitted from economic section E.g. Precleaning castings $1349 for maintenance* but nothing for blast unit *based on $8000 blast unit Missing operations Cut off saws Torch cutting Arc Air operations Ductwork, engineering design, and installation EPA modeling and permitting Upgrading baghouses to BACT if required 32

33 8. Other Errors 10 year replacement cost assumption lowers annual capital cost (replacement needed more often in abrasive environment) Profit calculation used inflated profit number years used (pre-recession) Industry profit based on firms reporting profit; did not include those reporting loss ISO/CEN sampling change lowers PEL by 20-30% 33

34 OSHA Proposed Standard Specific Provisions Regulated Area Contaminated Clothing Prohibit Sweeping & Compressed Air Methods of Compliance Monitoring Compliance Dates

35 OSHA Proposed Standard Regulated Area Demarcate areas where overexposures exist and require respirators for anyone inside Unmanageable - Based on TWA exposure of employees who may move around vs. concentration in an area (e.g. maintenance worker who spends part of time on office) Unnecessary Adds no protection Costly - Increases number of people in respirator program (engineers, quality, material handlers, maintenance)

36 OSHA Proposed Standard Contaminated Clothing Grossly Contaminated is not defined Refers to visible dust NOT respirable Study (Exponent) shows no appreciable exposure from dirty clothing When entering or leaving regulated area: Clothing change Vacuuming clothing (8 minutes) Blow off booth (30 sec cycle) - $11,000 (cost not included)

37 OSHA Proposed Standard No Sweeping or Compressed Air if Contribute to Overexposure Not defined; but referred to as prohibition in question 66 Restriction on air wands for cleaning floor, rafter blow down may be reasonable Cleaning molds, patterns and core machines may be difficult and hazardous (put worker in danger zone) Automated processes (e.g. molding machines) may not be able to function Wet methods not suitable and may be dangerous (rust, molten metal hazard)

38 OSHA Proposed Standard Methods of Compliance Must use engineering controls, even if NOT effective Employee rotation prohibited as control (may be used for other reasons) Respirators are NOT allowed as a control, but required until controls are effective Removed exemption for respirator as control for exposures less than 30 days

39 OSHA Proposed Standard Exposure Monitoring New monitoring requirements Quarterly monitoring for every employee above PEL Semi-annual monitoring for every employee above action level (25mg/m 3 ) Full shift samples If no new information is to be learned, the requirement is unproductive & punitive Other sampling options (e.g. real time monitoring, area mapping) may provide information on sources and controls Waste of resources that could help with controls

40 OSHA Proposed Standard Compliance Dates Effective 60 days after final rule announced Only 1 Year to install engineering controls Ignores potential permitting issues Ignores time to design & implement controls Ignores fact that accurate air sampling not available; labs have 2 years to meet accuracy requirements

41 WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? 41

42 Background on Silica Rulemaking OSHA spent years developing proposal 2012 SBREFA panel 2013 September- Published proposal (Only 152 Days to analyze proposal and comment) 2014 March - Hearings June - Post hearing comments (OSHA Data dump to docket early June) August 18 - Post hearing briefs (docket now closed) Entering dark period OMB must review final standard Dr. Michaels expects final rule by 2016

43 Foundry Industry Response Strongest industry response, according to OSHA Foundry members provided valuable data, and resources AFS made detailed review of OSHA assessments and analysis of costs AFS economic and technological arguments remain largely uncontradicted in record

44 End Game Options? 1. OSHA listens Maintains current PEL with ancillary provisions Foundries still have challenge to meet current PEL (especially with change in size criteria) Option: redefine PEL as being mean exposure 2. OSHA ignores Tries to meet political target OMB approval hurdle Court challenge (overturn or force revision) 3. Compromise 50 µg/m 3 PEL but allow respirators below 100 More time to come into compliance 44

45 Is There Room for Congressional Action? Budget drop funding Pressure to conduct updated SBREFA review Ask National Academy of Sciences to study measurement and health risk issues Oversight of flawed process

46 Getting Ready in the Meantime Exposure assessment Variability and confidence Source evaluation Operational review size up the impact and need for court challenge Compressed air Sweeping Regulated area

47 Questions?? More Information: Thomas Slavin Slavin OSH Group, LLC