Origins of TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme

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3 Fifteen years of Assistance towards a Nuclear Safety Culture Origins of TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme Nuclear safety is considered as the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. Thus Nuclear Safety has three objectives, namely to: - Ensure that nuclear facilities operate normally and without significant risk of operating staff, general public and the environment being exposed to ionizing radiation - Prevent accidents - Limit the consequences should they ever occur. In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and disastrous economical circumstances, 11 new independent states emerged and formed the Commonwealth of Independent States, or CIS. The international community rallied to provide extensive backup, technical as well as financial, to the CIS. To this end, in 1991, the European Commission launched the TACIS programme (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) to bolster the transition toward a free market economy in these states. In this context, electricity generation was of prime importance. Some of the New Independent States (NIS) relied on Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) to generate significant proportion of their electricity, however these were of varying design, technology and age and the countries just didn't have the means necessary to ensure a level of nuclear safety respecting international standards. After the Chernobyl accident, the risks presented by nuclear facilities of Soviet Design in Central Europe and the CIS became a source of major concern to the international community. With the collapse of the Soviet Union this concern was translated into action. In 1991 the EU Member States and the EC agreed to take a collective stance on nuclear safety. They created the TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme (TACIS NSP) a framework within which various organisations in Western and Eastern Europe worked together. In the mid nineties the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) carried out a safety evaluation of the NPP of Soviet design according to international nuclear safety standards. The results of this evaluation were published in 'Safety Issue Books' which became a reference for future improvements. For fifteen years (1991 to 2006) TACIS NSP contributed to significant safety improvements of the NPP but the objectives went further, they aimed at changing attitudes and creating a real nuclear safety culture. Through TACIS NSP the EU's strategy for improving nuclear safety was further developed taking into account the G7 initiatives in the field and the IAEA's classification of design and operating risks regarding nuclear reactors. A 'Master Plan' identified 12 areas for improvement to ensure that all potential nuclear safety concerns were addressed. Over fifteen years, 1.3 billion were allocated to nuclear safety projects under TACIS. In recent years the TACIS NSP has concentrated on 8 main areas: - Design safety - On-site assistance and operational safety - Off-site emergency preparedness - Radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management - Regulatory authorities and their technical safety organisations - Control of nuclear materials (safeguards) - Conversion of nuclear military scientists to civil jobs - Chernobyl closure and the Shelter Implementation Plan 1200 individual contracts were awarded, mainly for nuclear safety projects in Russia and Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, in Armenia, Belarus and Georgia. The programme made also large contributions to international funds like the Chernobyl Shelter Fund and the Nuclear Safety Account, managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as well as to the ISTC and the STCU 44,4 % Ukraine 7,4 % Other** EU 27 TACIS Countries 48,2 % Russia ** Armenia, Belarus, Georgia

4 Some achievements - Analyses of the thermalhydraulics of the Soviet designed reactors - Generic studies concerning the embrittlement of the VVER reactor pressure vessels under neutron irradiation - Development of the Leak Before Break concept to help prevent any rupture of the main cooling lines - Creation of methodology to improve operating procedures and transferring it to Russian personnel - Supply of multifunctional simulators to all VVER440/230 and 213 type reactors in Russia and Ukraine TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme achievements Promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture Design safety Two vital elements contribute to the safe management of a nuclear plant: the plant's design and the capacity of plant personnel to cope with safety management requirements. The design of a nuclear power installation must be able to cope with situations ranging from normal operations and anticipated incidents to external events and, in the worst case scenario, an accident. In order to reduce the risk of an uncontrolled release of radioactivity as much as possible, a detailed analysis of the safety performance and capabilities of various components and systems is carried out. To reach the required safety level, several areas needed to be carefully considered: - Controlling the reactor power, - Code analysis of abnormal conditions, in particular those related to thermohydraulic phenomena, - Ageing and neutron irradiation effects, - Maintenance, Non-Destructive Testing and In-Service Inspection aspects, - Certification of nuclear equipment, - Cooling the fuel at all times, - Containing radioactive materials. On-Site Assistance and Regulatory bodies The activities under On-Site Assistance (OSA) fall into 2 categories: - Supply of hardware, covering all activities relating to equipment supply, from tendering and following-up the manufacture and installation to final acceptance (Hard OSA), - Provision of services such as training, experience exchanges, site visits to EU NPPs, management courses to develop and improve safety procedures and safety culture (Soft OSA). In parallel with the support to the nuclear operator under Hard OSA, the EC has taken efforts to enhance the Regulators and their Technical Safety Organisations (TSO) in the licensing processes. This work was called 2+2 approach. Initially the Soft On-Site Assistance efforts were rather limited but, in later projects, more than 50% of the funds were allocated to Soft OSA. As the Programme evolved, Soft OSA took a new dimension in which projects were considered from the point of view of their implementation and replication at all nuclear power plants of the fleet, and serve as a basis to start large-scale safety management programmes under the new instrument for nuclear safety assistance beyond The division of investments of the TACIS OSA programme among CIS countries is shown in the here opposite figure. Strategies for decommissioning and radioactive waste management Under the TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme, the EC funded a number of projects aimed at improving the management of radioactive waste and the decommissioning of specific nuclear installations in the CIS. The common objective of the projects was the design of processing and storage facilities for radioactive waste, know-how transfer, personnel training and equipment supply. 51 % Russia million 2 % Kazakhstan 7.06 million 5 % Armenia 19.9 million 42 % Ukraine million OSA investments per country

5 Safeguards and off-site emergency preparedness The backbone of off-site emergency preparedness is the Emergency Plan, which is compiled by the operator of the nuclear plant together with local authorities and regulators. The Plan outlines the procedures and responsibilities for alerting and mustering key personnel, identifying incident response teams, assessing risks and necessary mitigating actions, and radiation site monitoring. Speed and communication are key in any emergency situation so there must be reliable communication systems to receive the best information from the staff at the affected plant. Off-site emergency preparedness staff must also be able to understand and collate large amounts of data from radiation monitoring points and meteorological data on the prevailing winds. The objectives of off-site emergency preparedness Assistance were: - to assist in improving local, regional and national off-site emergency response arrangements in Eastern Europe (CIS) and in bringing them to an adequate level, - to improve the technical basis for the exchange of data and information in an emergency within Eastern Europe and with the EU, thus contributing to a more effective response to any future nuclear accident that may have widespread effects in Europe. International initiatives In 1995, G7 countries and the EU signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Ukraine, which offered, inter alia, support for projects necessary for the safe shutdown and decommissioning of the three units at the Chernobyl site which remained in operation after the 1986 accident. The assistance provided enabled Ukraine to shut down the last operating unit by the end of TACIS also contributed significantly to the international funds managed by the EBRD as follows: - Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) is a multilateral fund set up to finance nuclear safety projects in Central and Eastern Europe. At Chernobyl it financed in particular two decommissioning facilities: one for the treatment of liquid radioactive waste stemming from the operation of units 1 to 3 and the other for the interim storage of spent fuel used during the operation of these units. - Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF), was set up to fund the Shelter Implementation Plan, which includes the construction of the New Safe Confinement over the remains of Chernobyl NPP Unit 4. - Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), the TACIS NSP contributed the Nuclear Window of this fund for the management of radioactive waste in North West Russia. Multilateral Funds Nuclear Safety Account Chernobyl Shelter Fund Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (Nuclear Window) TACIS contribution 10% 28% 28% Some achievements Supply of iodine tablets and protective clothing, field communications, dosimeters and instrumentation Training material on off-site emergency management and a regional training centre in Obninsk Early warning systems in national emergency centres in Belarus and Ukraine (GAMMA project) Ring of detectors around several NPPs in Ukraine and Russian Federation

6 Conclusion Over fifteen years, the Tacis programme invested 1.3 billion (to international funds) in projects ranging from on-site assistance, design safety and regulatory approaches to decommissioning and nuclear waste management. It is widely recognised that the programme made a very important contribution to achieve a number of important goals: - Operational safety was improved through on-site assistance notably through a formal and regular dialogue between plant operators, regulatory authorities and their western counterparts. Several training centres were established in Russia (Russian Methodological and Training Centre in Obnisk) and in Ukraine (National Centre of Excellence for NPP Maintenance Staff Training) - Regulatory authorities were strengthened through EU technical and financial assistance and much of the necessary legal framework was put in place in the CIS to ensure their independency, although further work is still needed. - Generic design safety studies were carried out with, amongst others computer code development and benchmarking for analysis of reactor severe accident scenarios and extensive analysis of irradiation embrittlement effects. - Improvement in the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel at several nuclear sites in the CIS was achieved, particularly in the Russian Federation and Ukraine (including the shut-down of Chernobyl nuclear power plant). Strategic documents elaborated in the framework of TACIS projects have been adopted. - TACIS NSP made significant contributions to funds and projects concerning the mitigation of the consequences of the Chernobyl NPP accident. The projects which are implemented will provide a concrete answer to the ever most important catastrophe wich occurred in the nuclear sector. - Off-site Emergency Preparedness was improved by providing methodologies and equipment as required by international regulations. - TACIS NSP supported also the activities of the International Science and Technology Centre in Russia (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine (STCU) inter-governmental sister organisations that are partly funded by the EC, with the main objective of redeploying former scientists working on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programmes. The TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme, which ended in December 2006 made a very important contribution to the improvement of nuclear safety in the CIS. The safety issues, in particular those identified by the IAEA, were addressed where possible. Independent safety authorities and their associated TSOs were established or strengthened and a safety culture became increasingly apparent within the operating and regulatory organisations. The improved operating methods resulted in a general increase of plant overall availability. However this did not mean that the problems of nuclear safety had been resolved. The renewed interest in nuclear energy, for reasons of security of energy supply and as a possible means of producing electricity without contributing to global warming, brought nuclear safety to the top of the agenda. The EU Member States agreed that a successor programme in the nuclear safety field was needed. As a result, in 2007 the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) came into operation for the period The principal objective of the new INSC programme is the promotion of the nuclear safety culture and NPP safety management through cooperation with other international organisations. The INSC has to respond to a new world environment. Nuclear power has assumed a new importance in many countries because of global warming and the rising cost of energy. This new worldwide trend has raised the stakes for nuclear safety. In all these countries where nuclear power energy appears at the top of the agenda, it must be ensured that nuclear safety receives the right priority and attention. All photos are EC

7 Chernobyl Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Belarus Kursk Russia Main achievements Budget of Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF) As of June 2009 Contribution agreements to the fund: 783 million Donations: 3 million EBRD Grant: 58 million Total contributions to the fund (including donors contributions, donations and the EBRD grant): 844 million Grant Agreements concluded: 775 million Contracts awarded: 846 million Context Situated 110 km north of Kiev, the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant's (ChNPP) construction began in the 1970s. By 1983, four units were in operation, producing approximately 10 percent of Ukraine's electricity. At the time of the accident in 1986, two additional units were under construction. The nearby city of Chernobyl had a population of The accident took place on the night of 25 to 26 April 1986 during a test that went dramatically wrong due to design weaknesses and safety rules not being adhered to. Following the Chernobyl accident, some persons were evacuated from the vicinity of Chernobyl and a Shelter (sometimes referred to as sarcophagus ) enclosing the remains of Chernobyl NPP Unit 4 was constructed under exceedingly hazardous conditions. Units 1, 2 and 3 were put back into operation, raising the fear of another accident. The G7 countries and European Commission (EC) took the lead in providing assistance to mitigate the consequences of the accident. In 1995 the Memorandum of Understanding between the G7, the EC and Ukraine on the closure of Chernobyl by the year 2000 reflected this commitment. The EC has played a major role in its implementation through TACIS and, more recently, through INSC programme funds. Poland Slovakia Hungary Romania Bulgaria Rovno Khmelnitsky Moldova Chernobyl Ukraine Zaporozhye South Ukraine The Shelter Implementation Plan Black sea Novovoro The Shelter built in 1986 was not intended to be a permanent solution and, in 1997, with the strong support of the European Commission, a group of international experts from the European Union (EU), US, Japan and Ukraine finalized a multidisciplinary construction management programme known as the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP). In 1997 the G7, the EC and other donors requested the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to set up the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF) for the implementation of the SIP. In 2007, 10 years after the agreement on the SIP, a number of main tasks have been completed that made possible the start of the construction of a New Safe Confinement (NSC), the last major construction project at the ChNPP site. - Preparatory works and infrastructure development necessary for project tasks implementation - Stabilisation measures - Radiation protection, safety and monitoring system - Fuel-containing materials and waste management strategy development

8 The New Safe Confinement (NSC) is a structure that will be constructed on the site and later be slid over Chernobyl unit 4. The relevant 470 million contract awarded to the French-led Novarka consortium, which includes Bouygues and Vinci as well as German and Ukrainian firms, was signed in September Some 330 million has so far been authorised as an initial allocation for this project. Radioactive waste management The management of spent fuel and waste required a substantial effort of the international Community. The construction and operation to of the NSC and the decommissioning of units 1 to 3 will also require facilities to process and store large quantities of radioactive waste. The facilities for processing of liquid waste and storage of spent fuel are mostly funded by the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), an International Fund, also managed by the EBRD. The Liquid Radioactive Treatment Plant (LRTP) is nearing completion while the interim spent fuel storage facility has incurred considerable delays. The TACIS programme contributed to the NSA and the Commission has been very active in the resolution of technical and economical issues to achieve these projects. In parallel, the European Commission allocated some 43.5 million to the design and commissioning of an Industrial Complex for Solid Radwaste Management (ICSRM). The project was funded jointly by the Ukrainian government ( million). It involves several facilities at the Chernobyl NPP site and 17 km away, in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone: - A Solid and Liquid Waste Storage building, - A Solid Waste Retrieval Facility, - A Solid Waste Processing Facility, - Engineered Near Surface Disposal Facility. All photos are EC Technical concept for the new safe confinement Units 1 and 3 Inauguration of unit 2 in presence of the President of Ukraine V. Yuschenko (April 2009) Other EC supports The European Commission's support to Chernobyl projects is not limited to the CSF. The EC has so far committed some 470 million for Chernobyl and related projects, the majority of which from the TACIS budget. In addition to the contributions to the international funds (CSF and NSA) the European Commission funded projects to study, assess and mitigate the consequences of Chernobyl accident and provided financial support. A contribution was also made to compensate the additional cost of replacement energy following the shutdown of the last unit in operation by the end of Other projects addressed the social and regional consequences of the closure of Chernobyl and provided for power reforms in Ukraine. The design and construction of the New Safe Confinement launched in 2007, the inauguration of EC funded facilities by President Yuschenko in April 2008 and by Minister Shandra and the Head of the EC Delegation in Ukraine in 2009, marked important steps towards the transformation of the Chernobyl site into an environmental-safe area.

9 On-Site Assistance Belarus Poland Khmelnitsky Slovakia Hungary Moldova Romania Bulgaria Ukraine Black sea Russia TACIS On-Site Assistance Success On-Site Assistance Over fifteen years the objective of the TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme in the field of On-Site Assistance (OSA) has been to provide assistance to the Newly Independent States' (NIS) Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) to improve their operational safety. OSA was divided into two kinds of assistance: supply of equipment, covering all activities relating to equipment supply, from tendering up to the installation and final acceptance (Hard On-Site Assistance), and provision of services such as training, experience exchange and site visits to EU NPPs, twinning and management courses to improve safety procedures and safety culture (Soft On-Site Assistance). The assistance to the nuclear operators has been made possible by EU utilities specialised in the operation of NPPs. One of the main successes of the OSA programmes has been the transfer of information and experience between the EU Utilities, leading the OSA Teams, and the beneficiary NPPs. Through the TACIS OSA programme, 14 nuclear sites, mainly located in Russia and Ukraine, have benefited from a nearly permanent presence of experts from an EU Utility at each site for several years. The co-operation also contributed to the improvement of the relations between the NPPs and the regulatory authority, in respect of their roles and responsibilities, by favouring a licensing approach more in line with common EU practices. The immediate aims of the TACIS OSA programme were to procure and install vital safety equipment, to analyse the results of safety projects and to carry out feasibility studies for large-scale Plant Improvement Projects (PIPs). PIPs were large equipment supply projects designed to furnish important safety equipment to the nuclear power plants. These projects usually included equally large contributions financed by the Beneficiary NPP operator, such as building construction or extensive modifications to existing plant, and a close coordination was therefore required between the TACIS and Beneficiary funded components. In this way, PIPs were able to tackle some of the more substantial items of the NPP modernisation programmes, which were developed to address the identified safety deficiencies of the plant. In addition to know-how transfer in the areas of equipment procurement and project management, these PIPs were implemented following the 2+2 approach which also allowed a transfer of know-how in the EU licensing approach to both licensee and regulator in the Beneficiary country. Khmelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant. Khmelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant (KhNPP) is located in Slavutsky district of Khmelnitsky region near the Goryn River. Khmelnitsky NPP produces electricity for the western region of Ukraine. KhNPP was originally intended as a four-unit power plant with VVER- 1000/V320 reactors. The construction started in 1981 and in December 1987 the first unit (Kh-1) was put into commercial operation. The construction of the second unit (Kh-2) began in 1983 and was to be commissioned in 1991 but, in 1990, Verkhovna Rada (High Council of Ukraine) adopted a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear power plants and the construction of new energy generating facilities was halted (including Kh-2). In spite of the end of the moratorium, the construction of Kh-2 was not resumed until much later due to lack of funds. In order to compensate for the loss of electricity generation capacity resulting from the shutdown of the Chernobyl NPP at the end of 2000, the Ukrainian government foresaw a number of power replacement projects with the assistance of the international community. Within this framework, through the TACIS Programme and Euratom/EBRD loans, the EU supported the Ukrainian safety authorities, the plant operator and engineering organisations in the implementation of nuclear safety measures at Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 (K2R4) reactors, in order to ensure that the reactors would be upgraded to meet internationally recognised nuclear safety standards.

10 TACIS OSA at Khmelnitsky NPP On-Site Assistance at Khmelnitsky NPP was provided by a Spanish/French/Dutch consortium from 1997 until Later this was taken over by a Spanish/Italian consortium which is still in place. During the period , 9 projects were completed, 6 Service Contract Projects and 3 Equipment Supply Projects. At the end of TACIS, in December 2006, the implementation of 5 projects was still ongoing, 4 of them foresaw equipment supply, including the large scale Plant Improvement Project (PIP) for the upgrading of electrical equipment of the Reactor Control and Protection System and the Neutron Flux Monitoring System. The global cost of TACIS OSA at KnNPP was 23.7 million, of which about 11 million were allocated to the PIP project. To achieve its general objective, the OSA contract for KhNPP provided for: - Operational assistance activities for improving safety culture, including managerial and administrative tasks, - Development of technical specifications for equipment procurement and following-up of specific equipment supply projects. Example of successful projects Vibration monitoring system, installed within 14 months (August October 2001). Replacement of the emergency power supply batteries by upgraded ones, performed within 13 months (Sept October 2001). Khmelnitsky NPP Today In 2008, Khmelnitsky NPP generated 12 billion kwh representing 12% of the Ukrainian electricity production. Khmelnitsky-2 safety is considered by the independent experts (IAEA, WANO, TACIS, and Riskaudit) to be the best among the Ukrainian VVER-1000 fleet and in compliance with international standards. The overall objective is to expand this approach through the modernisation programme designed by the Ukrainian specialist to which the TACIS programme brings support and which might receive financial backing for its full achievement. All photos are EC

11 Waste Management Examples of projects: - St Petersburg Waste Management Centre. - Radon Waste Storage Centre. - Russian national radwaste management strategy - Safety analysis of the spent fuel processing facility at Mayak. - Improvement of Sergiev Posad Storage and Conditioning Facility. V Fonce Decommissioning and Waste Management Introduction One of the fundamental differences between nuclear power and other forms of electricity generation is the fact that a nuclear plant cannot simply be demolished when it comes to the end of its operating life. The primary concern during the work on decommissioning process is to ensure the health and safety of the general public and the workers at the site as well as protecting the environment. The removal and safe disposal of the radioactive waste produced during operation brings many challenges to the decommissioning process. Nuclear power plants are not the only installations that produce radioactive waste. Any facility that uses radioactive materials faces issues of correct processing, storage and disposal when dealing with radioactive waste. The options available for the management of radioactive waste depend on factors such as the volume, the radiotoxicity level and the economics of disposal, including processing and interim storage. The TACIS contribution to safe Radioactive Waste Disposal and Decommissioning in the Russian Federation Under the TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme, the European Commission (EC) funded a number of projects aimed at improving the management of radioactive waste. The common aim of these projects was the design of processing and storage facilities for radioactive waste, the transfer of know-how, personnel training and equipment supply. The development of nuclear waste management strategies including operational waste from the Nuclear Power Plants, adopted with appropriate political backing, remains an important objective. TACIS also funded the development of the necessary codes and standards for managing radioactive waste to conform to Russian laws, federal standards, rules and guidelines in the field of nuclear energy, as well as to international standards. In addition, an overall strategy for the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel in the Russian Federation was developed in close cooperation with Russian stakeholders. Particular attention was devoted to radioactive waste in Northwest Russia. In this region the situation of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel raises concern, in particular the decommissioning of vessels from the Northern Fleet. The Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership The Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) was established in 2001 in response to calls from the Russian Federation and the international community for a concerted effort to address environmental problems in Northwest Russia. An international fund was set up for this purpose which is managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EC committed 50 million to the fund, 40 million of which was dedicated to the nuclear window and was paid in The first task of the nuclear window of the NDEP was to develop, together with the Russian authorities and a group of independent international experts, a Strategic Master Plan (SMP). The SMP emerged as a comprehensive and harmonised work programme for the overall decommissioning of nuclear submarines and service vessels, for the management of spent fuel and waste and finally for the environmental rehabilitation of Northwest Russia. The Tacis programme contributed to a multilateral project aimed at solving the situation of the Lepse ship. The Lepse stored about 639 severely damaged spent fuel assemblies from old nuclear icebreakers in very poor conditions, 2 km away from the northern boundary of Murmansk.

12 The TACIS contribution to nuclear decommissioning and safe waste management in Ukraine In Ukraine, nuclear safety projects led to the development of a national waste management system and a national transport system for natural and low-enriched uranium. Priority was given to the solution of the specific problems of radioactive waste management at the Chernobyl site. 47 million of TACIS budget was allocated to the establishment of an Industrial Complex for Solid Radioactive Waste Management (ICSRM), which is an essential part of the Chernobyl decommissioning programme. The ICSRM comprises several facilities at the Chernobyl NPP site (Lots 0, 1 and 2) and 17 km away in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (Lot 3). Lot 0 : Solid and Liquid Waste Storage (SLWS). It is an interim storage facility for intermediate and high level long-lived radioactive waste in an existing building at the ChNPP site. This building was refurbished and modified to accommodate all the necessary equipment. Lot 2 : Solid Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) It comprises facilities for sorting solid radioactive waste of all categories and processing low and intermediate level solid waste. Lot 1 : Retrieval Facility for Solid Waste (RFSW). This facility is intended for retrieving radioactive waste of all categories from the Solid Waste Storage Silo and loading it into transfer containers to be sent to the sorting facility. Lot 3 : Engineered Near Surface Disposal Facility (ENSF) It is intended to store short-lived low and intermediate level solid waste, which meet the requirements set by the ukrainian Regulatory and Supervisory Authorities. It is a final disposal facility that will be released from institutional control after 300 years. Conclusion The TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme supported and funded a large variety of projects to assist CIS countries with nuclear decommissioning and waste management issues, drawing on international expertise and with emphasis on knowledge transfer. CIS countries are now in a stronger position to face the challenges that Nuclear decommissioning and radioactive waste management will present in the future. All photos are EC

13 Regulatory Authorities Regulatory Authorities Introduction The range of activities and responsibilities carried out by a Regulatory Authority (RA) cover, inter alia, licensing of facilities, inspection and enforcement. Independent nuclear RAs have been set up in all countries operating nuclear facilities and are key actors in ensuring that they operate safely. The RA works closely with the plant operators to ensure the respect of the safety regulations, guidelines and standards and the observance of a strong safety culture among the personnel employed within the respective organisations. The TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme was aimed at transferring European Union (EU) experience in all areas related to nuclear safety to Beneficiary CIS countries where this was deficient, notably recognising the inherent value of direct contacts and experience feedback among the nuclear operators. TACIS established from the very beginning the principle of having a Western nuclear power utility as a consultant providing On-Site Assistance (OSA). In the first implementation period of the TACIS OSA programme ( ) many tenders were unsuccessful, which caused delays and required additional efforts and expenses for procurement. The root causes included insufficient preparation of Technical Specifications (TS), delays in early stages of project preparation, inadequate local contribution and coordination which resulted in TS not in-line with Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) intended modernisation programmes. With the recognition that large projects would bring higher contribution of Western know-how than simple supply projects, in a second phase, larger Plant Improvement Projects (PIPs) were implemented, coupling supply of safety equipment with joint activities between regulatory experts. The innovative TACIS approach On site, EU utilities cooperate with the operator in the beneficiary country (Rosenergoatom REA in Russia Federation and NAEK in Ukraine) in implementing safety improvements including technical specifications (TS) preparation, supporting the NPP in the licensing process, equipment procurement, taking part in the follow-up of equipment fabrication and installation as well as in the commissioning of it. In parallel the EU Technical Support Organisations (TSOs) cooperate with the Russian Federation (RF) and Ukraine (U) regulatory authorities and their TSOs in performing the technical safety evaluations of the proposed safety improvements. Joint assessments of licensing documentation and recommendations are provided by RF/U and EU TSOs to the regulatory authorities in RF/U for decision making in the course of the licensing process. For each industrial project realised within the programme the EU and RF/U TSOs perform in parallel all stages of project review and formulate recommendations to the regulatory body following, respectively, Western and RF/U approaches. In the process, the knowledge of EU regulatory interpretation of standards and regulations, depth of analysis and methods of problem solving were transferred to the RF/U TSOs. This was done primarily by parallel work and joint discussions at each step of the licensing process as well as by hands-on training provided to RF/U experts in EU facilities. This method of joining practical tasks with theoretical studies assured high level of interest of trainee experts and provided for frequent opportunities for checking the value and extent of information gained by the RF/U TSOs.

14 Advantages General objectives of the support were: - to strengthen the capabilities of the Regulator and their TSOs; - to transfer Western licensing practice and know-how; - to provide technical support in assessment of improvement measures; - to promote a licensing process based on a technical dialogue; - to ensure the proper licensing of TACIS-funded PIPs. Beneficiaries and EU TSOs jointly addressed safety issues, performed an expert review of the safety justification submitted by the licensee and provided the regulator with joint consensus assessments and recommendations in the course of the licensing process. A successful tool The TACIS approach named as 2+2 approach proved to be a successful tool and was appreciated by the regulators and TSOs as an effective mean to support the licensing activities. It contributed significantly to nuclear safety culture transfer, notably regarding the licensing process. The European Commission's Regulatory Authorities Management Group (RAMG) advice on future assistance to the Regulators highlighted the need for continued effort on development of technical capabilities and increasing the nuclear safety to the level of internationally recognised nuclear safety standards. Focus needs to be maintained on the observance of safety culture, management capabilities, effectiveness and sustainability. Training of TSOs staff on nuclear safety remains necessary. In the Russian Federation, the implementation of TACIS 2+2 approach was launched in January 1999 within the framework of 13 projects concentrated on six NPP sites. In Ukraine, the implementation of TACIS 2+2 approach was launched in August 2001 within the framework of a project to be realized on 4 NPP sites. Example of good management: has managed to improve the coordination between the licensing support projects and related industrial modernisations for the Kalinin, Kola and Smolensk NPPs. All photos are EC

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