APPENDIX IV.D-1 Hazards Analysis

Transcription

1 APPENDIX IV.D-1 Hazards Analysis

2 Rob Carnachan Senior Project Manager Christopher A. Joseph & Associates Environmental Planning and Research 859 Steele Street Denver, CO ARCADIS G&M, Inc N. Harbor Blvd., Suite 700 Fullerton, CA Tel Fax Subject: Ponte Vista Development Hazard Analysis Dear Mr. Carnachan: The following are ARCADIS findings from a hazard analysis performed for the Ponte Vista Development in relation to the proposed LNG plant, Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, ConocoPhillips Oil Refinery and the Defense Fuel Supply Point (DFSP) located in the general vicinity of the site. The proposed Development is to be located on the eastern side of Western Avenue approximately 0.5 miles south of Palos Verdes Drive in San Pedro. The purpose of the analysis was to evaluate the potential hazards that might be associated with selected industrial and commercial facilities in the vicinity of the proposed development. Possible Hazard Events Date: Contact: Alistaire Callender Phone: ext acallender@arcadis-us.com Project Number: CA Tank Fire There have been approximately 480 tank fires reported worldwide since the 1950 s. The largest cause of fires was lightning strikes accounting for 150 of the fires. In the 1990 s and 2000 s the average number of fires was 15 per year 1. Considering the volume of tanks worldwide the risk associated with this type of incident is very low. If a fire were to occur it would most like be associated with one of the tanks. The majority of historical tank fires occurred in only one tank at the site. The closest tanks at the ConocoPhillips refinery site are approximately 1.1 km away from the site. The largest tank fire caused by lightning was in 2001 at the Orion Norco oil refinery near New Orleans, LA 2. This fire was caused by a lightning strike and caused a 270-foot storage tank to catch fire. If a lightning strike 1 Henry Persson, Anders Lonnermark, Tank Fires: Review of fire incidents , Brandforsk Project , SP Fire Technology. SP Report 2004:14. 2 Zoltan Istvan, Industrial Inferno; Fighting the Mother of All Fires. National Geographic News, February 4, Part of a Bigger Picture

3 were to occur at the ConocoPhilips refinery and cause a fire it would be limited in size by the smaller tanks used at this site. The tanks in question are at the largest 190 feet (56m) in diameter. If the entire surface were to be exposed and catch fire it would generate approximately 5,919,855 kw based on the pool fire burning rate and heat calculation specified in The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering 2nd Edition, pages 3-2 to 3-4. The heat release rate is calculated from; q' = H c *m'"*a where; H c is the heat of combustion for the fuel. m'" is the mass loss rate per unit area for the pool fire. A is the area of the pool fire. The ASD in this case for people would be approximately 135m and for structures would be 13m (Figure 1). These calculations are based on NISTIR 6546 report on Thermal Radiation from Large Pool Fires 3. As indicated by the green boxes in Figure 3, if the fire occurred in one of the outermost tanks the fire would not affect the development at all. Considering these factors a fire at the refinery would not pose an immediate danger to the planned community. 3 Kevin B. McGrattan, Howard R. Baum, Anthony Hamins, NISTIR 6546 Thermal Radiation from large Pool Fires", U.S. Department if Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, November /7

4 (Figure 1) Product Releases This is the largest risk associated with the site. The most common cause is through human error at transfer sites and from transfer points/fittings which would be in the area located next to the development on the northeast edge. The risk from human error can be mitigated through proper training and procedures being put in place and audited on a frequent basis by the operating company. This type of training and follow up should be in place in the Navy s EHS program under their process safety procedures. The transfer points/fitting issues can be mitigated through proper preventative maintenance and early warning systems. For a what-if scenario we have assumed the following for a spill at the location. First a spill of medium size occurs (The median size of spills in from a study conducted by the California State Fire Marshall (1993) regarding releases from over 12,500 km of hazardous liquid pipeline was 210 gallons.) the spill would be approximately 20 m2 and would be ignited by a nearby source. The spill could occur while transferring fuels to and 3/7

5 from tanker trucks and the underground storage tanks located in the fuel depot. The fire would generate approximately 755,083 kw in heat based on the pool fire burning rate and heat release calculation. The acceptable separation distance (ASD) for people for a fire of this type would be 80m (Figure 2). This is based on thermal radiation data from the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The ASD has been shown in Figure 3 by the blue box around the fuel depot based on the fuel spill occurring at one of the perimeter transfer points. The ASD could be less if berms, walls, or other structures are present to deflect or absorb the heat load. The ASD is based on the heat given off by a particular fuel in a fire. Heat being generated by a fire would be noticeable to people within the ASD range. The fire fighting plan in place at the site should address evacuation procedures for a fire. (Figure 2) 4/7

6 Area that would be considered the ASD in the event of a spill and subsequent ignition of a pool fire. Areas that would be considered the ASD in the event of a tank fire. (Figure 3) 5/7

7 Sabotage The possibility of sabotage is present in this day and age. Security of the site is what is typical for a fuel storage depot. The depot has a fence surrounding the grounds and is monitored by a security force. In addition, vehicle barriers are in place at the gate to prevent trucks from crashing through the gate. LNG Site At this time we are aware of a proposed LNG Import site located in Long Beach. The proposed development falls within five miles of the proposed LNG terminal. The impact of the terminal at this point is unknown. The California Energy Commission (CEC) has issued a safety advisory report for the proposed terminal and has submitted that report to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for their action. At this point the matter is under review by FERC. They need to complete a thorough Safety Analysis of the project and its impact on the surrounding communities. The FERC assessment needs to include the following: 4 o Impacts to the surrounding population, economy, and transportation network in the event of a catastrophic event. o Impacts to existing port operations and surrounding terminal operations during arrival and departure of LNG tanker vessels. o The ability of the USCG to provide the required waterway security, and if not funded to do so, the impact on the local police and fire resources. o Impacts to air traffic within the flight path above the proposed LNG facility. o Reasonable worst-case scenarios using risk and hazard analysis. o A comprehensive waterborne, landslide and air security plan developed in consultation with the City of Long Beach. o Standards for protection and implementation of the recommendations by the City of Long Beach fire and police departments to mitigate any incident related to an LNG facility. o Identification of the complete fiscal impact to the City of Long Beach resulting from any LNG facility, including cost recovery. 4 California Energy Commission - B.B. Blevins, Executive Director, Safety Advisory Report: On the proposed sound energy solutions liquefied natural gas terminal at the port of Long Beach, California, Publication # CEC , September 7, /7

8 o Impacts to the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Department of Defense resulting from the proposed LNG facility. o An assessment of the homeland security threat. The FERC report is due by October 7, This report should address all the above issues and will give a clear picture on the impact the LNG facility would have on not only the proposed development but also the existing developments within five miles of the proposed site. At this point the proposed development will not be impacted any differently than any other development located within the five mile radius around the LNG site. In Summary, the proposed development would be at no greater risk than that of any of the other residential properties located near the depot. The refinery poses little risk, the fuel depot risk is limited to pool fires and the LNG risk has yet to be identified by the FERC analysis of the proposed project. Sincerely, ARCADIS G&M, Inc. Alistaire B. Callender, Ph.D. Project Manager 7/7