Six reasons why the 2011 draft Murray- Darling Basin Plan fails

Transcription

1 Six reasons why the 2011 draft Murray- Darling Basin Plan fails Jamie Pittock Australian National University, Australia Discussion Paper 1105 December 2011 This article provides an assessment of the draft Murray- Darling Basin Plan released in December The author identifies six major reasons why the draft Plan is inadequate: failure to include climate change adaptation, failure to identify environmental trade- offs, planned degradation of important wetlands, reliance on environmental works and measures, subsidisation of irrigation infrastructure, and, planning for delayed implementation. The Global Water Forum publishes a series of discussion papers to share the insights and knowledge contained within our online articles. The articles are contributed by experts in the field and provide original academic research; unique, informed insights and arguments; evaluations of water policies and projects; as well as concise overviews and explanations of complex topics. We encourage our readers to engage in discussion with our contributing authors through the GWF website. Keywords: Murray- Darling Basin plan; Murray; Darling; climate change; environmental flows; irrigation. When the draft Murray-Darling Basin Plan was published I awarded it 4 out of 10, even though it proposes to reallocate 2,750 GL per year on average to environmental flows, a quarter of current water diversions. Here is my assessment of six black marks against the draft Plan. 1. Failing to include climate change adaptation It is extraordinary that, in a part of the world unusually vulnerable to climate change, a government can propose a plan with no specific measures to deal with likely climate change impacts, despite having the scientific data to do so 1. A drier Basin is anticipated with a changing climate and there is risk of a dire reduction in runoff into the rivers of the southern basin as has been experienced in south west Australia in the past 40 years. CSIRO forecasts for 2030 include a dry extreme of a fall in surface water availability of 37%, leading to an ecologically catastrophic 69% loss of river outflows. Suggested Citation: Pittock, J. 2011, Six reasons why the 2011 draft Murray- Darling Basin Plan fails, GWF Discussion Paper 1105, Global Water Forum, Canberra, Australia. Available online at: reasons- why- the draft- murray- darling- basin- plan- fails/

2 During the Millennium Drought, average Basin inflows fell by 40% and the River Murray essentially stopped flowing to the sea between The Authority could sustain freshwater ecosystem health through climate change by: (1) reallocating water permanently to the environment; (2) ensuring that adequate water is allocated for ecosystems each year, as opposed to the greater share that currently goes to irrigation in dry years; and (3) revising the Plan regularly (as the Authority proposes) 2,3. However, the Authority s earlier proposal to reallocate 3% of water to the environment for adaptation to climate change has been dropped. The Authority states that the Plan itself represents adequate climate change adaptation but this is a reckless way to manage a known risk. Water entitlements should change in proportion with climate induced changes in water availability. 2. Failing to identify environmental trade-offs Under the Water Act, the Basin Plan must ensure that adequate water is available to conserve key ecological assets and maintain key ecological functions and ecosystem services. The trade-offs between conserving the environment and consumptive water uses are value judgements that societies as a whole and governments in particular must take. These decisions should be taken transparently and with the best available understanding of the consequences of alternative decisions, a test that the proposed Plan fails. There are thresholds of water flow in the Basin, below which, key parts of the freshwater ecosystem fail. Many of these are known and include the frequencies of inundation of the Basin s extensive, low gradient floodplain wetlands that are needed to keep key elements like floodplain forests alive and to enable finicky waterbirds to breed 4. Despite the availability of such models, these were not used by the Authority to assess how much of the Basin s wetlands the proposed water allocations will keep alive 1 and there is considerable evidence that the 2,750 GL/yr reallocation is inadequate to maintain the health of extensive areas of wetlands 2,5,6,7. In finalising the Plan, the Authority must use the best available science to make trade-offs transparently. 3. Degrading wetlands of international importance While societies may exercise a value judgement over the extent to which they trade off consumption of water versus conservation of freshwater ecosystems, Australia foreswore this choice with respect to its listing of sixteen sites as Wetlands of International Importance under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. Under this treaty, Australia is obliged to

3 maintain the ecological character that these wetlands exhibited when they were designated at different times over the past thirty years. The Water Act draws its constitutional authority in large part from faithful implementation of this treaty. Ramsar wetlands in the Basin include the Coorong, Lakes Alexandrina, and Albert site, areas that encompass the estuary of the River Murray, as well as major floodplain forests along the River. These wetlands have been considerably degraded from a lack of adequate freshwater inflows; causing the deaths of tens of thousands of hectares of floodplain forests. One of the clear obligations of the Basin plan is to reallocate the 4,000 7,600 GL/yr of additional water needed to meet the scientifically established water flow thresholds that would keep the sites in good ecological health 2,5,7. The draft Plan s 2,750 GL/yr reallocation proposal is inadequate and needs to be increased to 4,000 GL/yr or more. 4. Relying on environmental works and measures In order to cut the amount of water used to sustain the Basin s freshwater biodiversity, the Authority proposes to rely more on environmental works and measures small scale engineering works that spread smaller volumes of environmental water further. This is risky for the environment in a number of respects: (1) it relies on good day to day management; (2) there is less room for error with less water and state governments have demonstrated that, in tough times, they will revoke agreements and reallocate environmental water for consumption; (3) it fragments the riverine environment with levees, channels, and weirs, blocking fish passages and drying out wetland; and (4) it risks exacerbating changes to soil and water quality, for instance, by increasing salinity levels in isolated floodplain wetlands. Preliminary research shows that for three Ramsar sites subject to previous environmental works and measures in The Living Murray program, only 39.2% of the135,700 hectares of wetlands would be regularly inundated. These works may establish a path dependency whereby too little water is allocated to the environment to flood the remaining areas in breach of the Ramsar Convention. I argue that there is a high risk of such measures failing to sustain wetlands with climate change, and that a suite of complementary measures need to be implemented in the Basin Plan to spread risk; including conservation of remaining freeflowing rivers and reoperation of water infrastructure to reduce its environmental impacts 8.

4 5. Subsidising irrigation infrastructure The Authority proposes to subsidise farmers to rebuild irrigation infrastructure to save water and reallocate a portion to the environment. While superficially this appears attractive, detailed examination reveals major drawbacks to this policy 2,9,10,11. First, much of the wasted water actually percolates back to the rivers so the saved water may be double counted water efficiency measures that increase water available to agriculture may reduce water for the environment an efficiency trap. Second, this means of recovering water for the environment is much more expensive than voluntary purchases of water entitlements. Third, many irrigators have invested their own funds in improving their water use efficiency such that government subsidies for those that have not are rewarding poor performance and are anti-competitive. Finally, government subsidies for irrigation infrastructure are in breach of the 1994 Council of Australian Government microeconomic reform settlement that upgraded the formerly government operated schemes, corporatized their management, and gave irrigators a windfall by marketising their water entitlements so that in future they would be economically independent. The Federal Government should therefore redirect its $5.8 billion allocation for water infrastructure renewal to better measures for implementing the Plan. 6. Delaying implementation In the political trade-offs in negotiations between the governments, the Federal Government capitulated to state government demands that implementation of the Basin Plan by state institutions be passed in from 2019 to While a few years grace for preparation may be warranted, this farcical delay into the distant political future of urgently needed reform raises doubts as to whether the Plan will ever be enacted in the proposed form. The Plan implementation date should be moved forward to 2013/14. It would be easy to accept the Authority s compromise Plan as better than the status quo. However, that would condemn the environment, irrigators, and the broader community to years of uncertainty and loss experienced in other Australian natural resource industries, like forestry, where one inadequate reform inevitably lead to another as the lack of sustainable management failed to resolve the underlying problems 12. I cannot abide the draft Plan because it is an abrogation of so many principles of good government policy: evidenced-based policy making, adhering to international law, conservation of matters of national

5 environmental significance, preparing for climate change, risk management, fair economic competition and users pay. In this respect the Authority s proposals for the Basin are a model: an example of what not to do. References 1. Young, W.J. et al. (2011), Science Review of the Estimation of an Environmentally Sustainable Level of Take for the Murray-Darling Basin, Final report to the Murray-Darling Basin Authority, Canberra, CSIRO. 2. Pittock, J. and Finlayson, C.M. (2011), Freshwater Ecosystem Conservation in the Basin: Principles versus Policy, in Basin Futures: Water Reform in the Murray-Darling Basin, Connell, D. and Grafton, R.Q. (eds.), ANU E-press, Canberra, pp Schofield, N. (2011), Climate Change and its Impacts Current Understanding, Future Directions, in Basin Futures: Water Reform in the Murray-Darling Basin, Connell, D. and Grafton, R.Q. (eds.), ANU E-Press, Canberra, pp CSIRO (2008), Water Availability in the Murray-Darling Basin, Report from CSIRO to the Australian Government, Canberra, CSIRO. 5. CSIRO (2011), A Science Review of the Implications for South Australia of the Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan: Synthesis, Adelaide, Goyder Institute for Water Research. 6. MDBA (2010), Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan: Overview, Murray-Darling Basin Authority, Canberra. 7. Pittock, J. et al. (2010), Changing Character: The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and Climate Change in the Murray-Darling Basin, Australia, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 27(6): Pittock, J. and Finlayson, C.M. (2011), Australia s Murray-Darling Basin: Freshwater Ecosystem Conservation Options in an Era of Climate Change, Marine and Freshwater Research, 62: Grafton, Q. and Hussey, K. (2007) Buying Back the Living Murray: At What price?, Australian Journal of Environmental Management, 14(2): Grafton, R.Q. (2011), Economic Costs and Benefits of the Proposed Basin Plan, in Basin Futures: Water Reform in the Murray-Darling Basin, Connell, D. and Grafton, R.Q. (eds.), ANU E-Press, Canberra, pp Productivity Commission (2010), Market Mechanisms for Recovering Water in the Murray-Darling Basin: Final Report, Productivity Commission, Canberra. 12. Buckman, G. (2008), Tasmania s Wilderness Battles: A History, Allen & Unwin / Jacana Books, Crows Nest. About the author(s) Dr. Jamie Pittock is a researcher at the Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University. His current work includes developing research programs that link Australian and southern African expertise to improve management of river basins, green water and agriculture. He is also Program Leader for the Australia and United States Climate, Energy and Water project of the US Studies Centre and ANU Water Initiative. Prior to joining the Australian National University, Dr. Pittock was International Director for the WWF global freshwater program on conservation of wetlands, water use in agriculture, and river basin management. About the Global Water Forum The Global Water Forum (GWF) is an initiative of the UNESCO Chair in Water Economics and Transboundary Governance at the Australian National University. The GWF presents knowledge and insights from some of the world s leading water researchers and practitioners. The contributions generate accessible and evidence-based insights towards understanding and addressing local, regional, and global water challenges. The principal objectives of the site are to: support capacity building through knowledge

6 sharing; provide a means for informed, unbiased discussion of potentially contentious issues; and, provide a means for discussion of important issues that receive less attention than they deserve. To reach these goals, the GWF seeks to: present fact and evidence-based insights; make the results of academic research freely available to those outside of academia; investigate a broad range of issues within water management; and, provide a more in-depth analysis than is commonly found in public media. If you are interested in learning more about the GWF or wish to make a contribution, please visit the site at or contact the editors at globalwaterforum@gmail.com. The views expressed in this article belong to the individual authors and do not represent the views of the Global Water Forum, the UNESCO Chair in Water Economics and Transboundary Water Governance, UNESCO, the Australian National University, or any of the institutions to which the authors are associated. Please see the Global Water Forum terms and conditions here. Copyright 2012 Global Water Forum. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivative Works 3.0 License. See to view a copy of the license.