Nuclear Power Status in Korea

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3 Nuclear Power Status in Korea

4 01 Operating 업무처리 24 흐름 Units 23,116MW Constructing 업무처리흐름 5 Units 7,000 MW Planning(Holding) 업무처리흐름 4 Units 5,600 MW Hanul Operating : 6 Units Constructing : 2 Units Planning : 2 Units Cheonji Planning : 2 Units Wolsong Operating : 6 Units Hanbit Operating : 6 Unins Kori Operating : 5 Units Constructing : 3 Units

5 02 KOREA Under Construction Planned(Hold) Shin-Kori 2018 Shin-Kori#4 APR Shin-Kori#5 Shin-Kori#6 APR1400 APR1400 Shin-Hanul 2018 Shin-Hanul#1 APR Shin-Hanul#2 신한울 2 APR Shin-Hanul#3 Shin-Hanul#4 APR1400 APR1400 Cheonji Cheonji#1 Cheonji#2 APR+ APR+ UAE Barakah 2017 UAE UAE UAE UAE 4 APR1400 APR1400 APR1400 APR1400

6 03 Electricity Generation 14 Others Gas 22.4% 3 Oil 2.6% 5.5% 30.0% Nuclear 161,995GWh Installed z Capacity 14 Others 13.2% Oil 3.9% 21.8% Nuclear 22,529MW 39.6% Coal 3 2 Gas 30.8% 30.3% TOTAL : 540,442 GWh Coal TOTAL : 105,866 MW Source : KPX (Korea Power Exchange, Dec.2016)

7 04 Fuel Supply A/E + NSSS Design Waste Management Equipment Supply R & D Maintenance

8 General Aspects of License Renewal

9 01 Nuclear Safety Regulatory NSSC Local Office KINS KINAC Regional Nuclear Safety Commission The public Civil Environmental Monitoring Agency KHNP * Kori, Hanbit, Hanul, Wolsong Nuclear Operation & Business MOTIE Local Government National Assembly NSSC : Nuclear Security & Safety Committee KINS : Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety KINAC : Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control KHNP : Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power MOTIE : Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy

10 02 Units Design Life(years) PHWRs 30 PWRs ( ~ 1,000 MWe) 40 PWRs (APR-1400, 1,400 Mwe) 60

11 03 Safety Public Acceptance Economic Safety Public Acceptance Economics Mandatory requirement Safety assessment and management over continued operation Local Community Government, national assembly, media Assess under Licensee supervision Consider National Energy Security and Supply/ Demand as a State-owned Company

12 04 Kori unit 1 : reached its design life in June After 10-year additional operation, went into permanent shutdown in June 2017 without second LR. Wolsong unit 1 : reached its design life in November After completing the 62 months-lasting regulatory review, restarted operation in June of 2015

13 05 ` Preparation (22M) Safety Assessment for intensive PSR Fuel Channel Refurbishment Application for LR Fukushima Accident( 11.03) ` Licensing (62M) End of Design Life( 12.11) Approval of NSSC Stress test for LR (New President s Pledge) IAEA Peer Review Countermeasure for Fukushima Accident ` After Licensing (4M) In-Service Inspection Regional Agreement Operation

14 Aging management program

15 01 Generator Corrosion Turbine Vibration Nozzles(welds) PWSCC RCS Piping PWSCC/Fatigue/ Embrittlement Pressurizer 2 nd Piping FAC SCC/ Env. Fatigue SG Shell/Nozzles SCC/Fatigue RCP SCC/Fatigue SG Tube PWSCC/ODSCC /Fatigue/Wear RPV SCC/Wear/Fatigue / Embrittlement Reactor Internals IASCC

16 02 USA CFR, Title 10, Part 54, Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power NUREG 1800, Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plant(July 2001) NUREG 1801, Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report(July 2001) IAEA Safety Reports Series No.15, Implementation and Review of a Nuclear Power Plant AMP Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.12, Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants Technical Reports Series No 338,, Methodology for the Management of Ageing of Management for Nuclear Power Plants Components Important to Safety

17 03 IAEA Periodic Safety Review (68 Items for 14 Areas) 1 Plant design 2 Actual condition of structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety 3 Deterministic safety analysis 4 Probabilistic safety assessment 5 Hazard analysis 6 Equipment qualification 7 Ageing 8 Safety performance 9 Use of experience from other plants and research findings 10 Organization, the management system and safety culture 11 Procedures 12 Human factors 13 Emergency planning 14 Radiological impact on the environment NRC s LR Regulations (77 Items for 10 Areas) Lifetime Evaluation Report (LER) 1 Scoping and Screening 2 Aging Management Review 3 Time-Limited Aging Analyses (TLAA) 4 Incorporation of Operating Experiences and Research Findings Radiological Environmental Report(RER) 1 The Proposed Action 2 General Environment Information 3 General Plant Inform. 4 Environment Consequences of the Proposed Action 5 Consequences of the Accident 6 Environment Monitoring Plan

18 04 AMP 10 Element 1. Scope of the program 6. Acceptance criteria 2. Preventive actions 7. Corrective actions 3. Parameters monitored or inspected 8. Confirmation process 4. Detection of aging effects 9. Administrative controls 5. Monitoring and trending 10. Operating experience

19 04 Aging Management Program Guideline (Plant Specific) Integrated Guideline of Aging Management Program (Standard Procedure) Aging Management Program Computer System Server Aging Management Program (Plant Specific AMPs) 1. Scope of Program 2. Preventive Actions 3. Parameters Monitored/Inspected 4. Detection of Aging Effects 5. Monitoring and Trending 6. Acceptance Criteria 7. Corrective Actions 8. Confirmation Process 9. Administrative Controls 10. Operating Experience Integrated Aging Management Program AMP DB Data Management (Basic Information, Data Analysis, etc.) Implementation Results (Test, Inspection, Examination) Input Management Browse

20 Latest Issues of AMP in Korea NPP

21 01 Function of containment liner plate(clp) Inner mold for concrete pour during construction stage Leaktight barrier for minimizing leakage of airborne radioactive materials during operation Nominal thickness of CLP in Korean PWR : 6mm

22 01 First discovery of liner plate corrosion Deterioration of coating and subsequent corrosion was observed on one of containment liner plates during the refuel outage in From the destructive examination, it was confirmed that the liner plate was penetrated by corrosion. The location of corrosion was near the upermost cold joint between concrete shell and dome. Fig. Photographs showing one of corrosion morphologies observed on a containment liner plate.

23 01 Expansion of inspection Similar area was inspected by ultrasonic test By thickness measurement, suspected area was identified Whether corrosion occurred or not was confirmed by destructive examination. Fig. Photographs showing the corrosion status of one of liner plate backsides.

24 01 Number of plants affected by CLP corrosion : 8 units 4 Westinghouse type units 2 Framatome type units 2 CE type units Operation period : about 21 to 32 years Material specifications of CLP : carbon steel JIS3106 SM41B/SM41BN ASME SA516 Gr.55 Material C Si Mn P S Fe JIS SM41B/41BN ASME SA516 Gr.55 Max 0.2 Max 0.18 Max ~ ~ ~ 0.90 Max Max Max Max Bal. Bal.

25 01 [Ref.] Darrell S. Dunn et al., Containment Liner Corrosion Operating Experience Summary Technical Letter Report Revision 1, USNRC, 2011(NRCAdams Accession No. ML )

26 01 Proposed corrosion mechanism near the cold joint The 1st stage : crevice corrosion during construction phase Fe H 2 O + 2Cl - Fe(OH) 2 + 2H + + 2Cl - Concrete low ph Autocatalytic reaction Onset of crevice corrosion H + Cl - Fe 2+ Cathode Anode Fe 2+ +2e - Fe CLP (Fe) : Cathode : Anode

27 01 Proposed corrosion mechanism near the CJ(continued) The 2nd stage : macrocell accelerated localized corrosion Construction and activation of macrocell Driving Potential > 0.25V Concrete Fe OH - Fe(OH) 2 OH - Fe 2+ Anode CLP (Fe) 2Fe 2+ +4e - 2Fe O 2 + 2H 2 O + 4e - 4OH - Cathode : Cathode : Anode Cathode e

28 01 Summary of plausible CLP corrosion mechanisms for Korean nuclear power plants Ingress of chlorides from marine atmosphere It is presumed to be responsible for all CLP corrosion cases near the CJ Corrosion initiation by crevice corrosion mechanism Corrosion may proceeds further by macrocell accelerated localized corrosion Presence of foreign objects Foreign objects of wood were identified only at two locations Corrosion may proceeds by macrocell accelerated localized corrosion Concrete voids by poor consolidation Liners can not be protected from corrosion if they are not in high alkaline condition.

29 01 CLP maintenance process(corrective action)

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