FMCT: Prospects and Challenges from the S Asian Perspective 2010 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference

Transcription

1 FMCT: Prospects and Challenges from the S Asian Perspective 2010 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference R.Rajaraman Emeritus Professor of Physics Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Co-Chair International Panel on Fissile Materials 1

2 I thank Dr. KHLOPKOV and The CENTER FOR ENERGY AND SECURITY STUDIES for inviting me to this conference and for their hospitality. I last came to Moscow 47 years ago, and it is nice to be back again. This is an FMCT session and, as someone associated with the International Panel on Fissile Materials, I might have been expected to discuss technical matters like verification challenges etc. But I have chosen to talk about larger political issues concerning the S. Asian perspectives on not only FMCT but other arms control initiatives like CTBT and nuclear zero. I thought that may be of greater importance to this conference since that perspective is not sufficiently appreciated. 2

3 Background: A resurgence of hope, The years 2008 and 2009 saw a host of positive developments in arms control. 1. The various calls for a nuclear weapon free world : 2. The vigorous pursuit of a renewed START treaty, with prospects of a deeper cuts than the in the Bush- Putin agreement 3. The reduction by UK down to about 170 warheads and the French President s statement that France too will reduce its stockpile. 4. Obama s promise to work for ratification of CTBT in the US senate. 5. Brighter prospects for FMCT US dropping its objections to a verifiable FMCT China willing to forego linking FMCT with other issues like SOROS What seemed to be an Agreement to begin negotiations at the CD 3

4 Hopes have become somewhat dimmer now In more recent months, the euphoria generated by these developments has been somewhat dampened delays in the Obama agenda because of domestic preoccupations--the US economy, the health care bill, etc. Tasks of getting US senate to ratify both CTBT and the new arms control treaty with Russia now look much harder. FMCT negotiations still face roadblocks 4

5 S. Asian response My talk will be about a completely different family of problems confronting FMCT, CTBT, nuclear Zero etc. It has been tacitly assumed amidst the euphoria in the West over the recent arms control initiatives that other nuclear weapon nations would also take actions in unison. Unfortunately, such expectations are unrealistic in the case of S Asia, at least in the near future. While both India and Pakistan have supported the concept of FMCT, and also welcomed the push towards zero nukes, that is at a polite diplomatic level, and not supported by any actions on the ground. Why is that so? The two nations have each their own compulsions of national security. Their perceptions of where they stand in their nuclear development are quite different from those of the West or of Russia 5

6 Reasons Firstly, both countries feel that as newer nuclear powers their arsenals are still at the growing stage. There is considerable pride over having built nuclear weapons, in the face of isolation and sanctions. It is viewed a sign of technological coming of age after centuries of colonial rule. Nukes are also perceived as a status symbol, placing them higher in the world order -- a place at the high table. Unfortunately, this perception is not wrong! So India and Pakistan are not in any mood to stop, or even slow down the production of nuclear weapons or fissile materials. They feel that compared to other NW states, they have just started! 6

7 The counterbalancing concerns that are part of the motives behind the major nuclear powers desire to get rid of nuclear weapons and materials do not weigh quite so heavily for S Asians. For example, the fear of nuclear (as compared to conventional ) terrorism does not permeate their national psyche, despite recent concern over the security of the Pak arsenal. Nor is non-proliferation a major concern for them Of course, our governments will support, even now, worldwide disarmament and an FMCT regime. But they will do so with the tacit confidence that the day of reckoning is not near. In the meantime they are continuing to protect and improve their capability for producing fissile materials, assembling them into nuclear weapons and developing missiles to carry them. 7

8 How much Fissile Material do they have now? India and Pakistan each has some stocks of HEU and Plutonium. Neither country gives official statements of its the stocks of FM or the production capacities One has to make the best possible estimate using a combination of independent arms control expertise, media reports and political statements. Generally PU stocks in spent fuel rods can be somewhat more scientifically estimated, since that needs only the list of reactors in the country and their characteristics. Te rest follows from reactor physics. HEU estimates are more dependent on indirect evidence. 8

9 India s stock of Weapon grade plutonium WgPu production by the CIRUS and Dhruva reactors, consumption and balance of stocks in 2008 (in kgs) R.Rajaraman, Estimates of India s Fissile Material Stocks, Science and Global Security, vol.16 pp , CIRUS 40 MWt 1963 Dhruva 100MWt 1988 Total produced consumption balance Weapon equiv CAUTION : These are theoretical upper limits. The actuals may be lower 9

10 Reactor Gr PU and HEU India has also been producing Reactor Grade Pu in its unsafeguarded CANDU reactors. By 2008 about 14 tons of RgPu should have been deposited in its spent fuel. I don t know how much of this has been reprocessed. My guess is 4-8 tons. This Indian stock of RgrPu has been a particular concern to Pakistan, and is a reason for Pakistan s resistance to starting FMCT negotiations in Geneva In the case of HEU India has one enrichment facility. It is estimated by observers to have a capacity somewhere between 5000 to 10,000 kgswu. However this facility is believed to produce only fuel for the Indian nuclear submarine and not for weapons. 10

11 Cumulative HEU (kg). Pakistan s primary source till recently was HEU produced at Kahuta. The exact capacity of the Kahuta plant over the years is not available. Our estimates for Pakistan HEU are for different plausible capacities, ,000 SWU 30,000 SWU 45,000 SWU 75,000 SWU [25 kg per warhead] Year Zia Mian, A.H Nayyar and R.Rajaraman, Uranium Resource Constraints on Fissile Material Production in Pakistan Science and Global Security, in print 11

12 Weapon-grade Plutonium production The timeline for the Khushab production reactors suggests that Pakistan has been accumulating weapon-grade plutonium since 2000 from Khushab I. By 2010, Pakistan could have accumulated about 115 kg from Khushab I equivalent to just over 20 simple fission weapons, assuming 5 kg per weapon. The plutonium from the two new Khushab reactors could become available in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The cumulative plutonium produced in all three Khushab reactors spent fuel up to 2020 is shown in the next slide. 12

13 Cumulative Weapons-grade Pu (kg) kg/warhead Year This suggests that by 2020, Pakistan could have produced a total of about 450 kg of WgrPu in its spent fuel. 13

14 Both Indian and Pak stocks are miniscule compared to world total Worldwide HEU stocks IPFM annual report

15 Separated Pu Stock So the problem of S Asia is not the quantity of FM stocks, but, rather, the fact that in continuing to produce more, they are moving against the trends of the P5 nations 15

16 When can we expect this approach to change? India is Key to this. Pakistan is unlikely to volunteer any arms control steps until India does so. So it is up to India to take such a statesman-like lead. I believe that India may be amenable to capping its stocks, once it is convinced that its arsenal is sufficient for its stated policy of minimum deterrence India now views itself as a leading figure in the world order and a responsible nuclear power. It would not wish to go against international trends any longer than necessary, especially if by then the US-Russian arsenal also comes down significantly All this could happen in about a decade not a very long time by realistic standards Pakistan could then perhaps be persuaded to follow suit, Before that, should the P5 start some FMCT type agreement among themselves? You decide! 16 16

17 Thank You 17