Changes in the French Regulations in the light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident

Transcription

1 Changes in the French Regulations in the light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident French approach in the European context Philippe JAMET ASN Commissioner International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally April

2 Changes in the French Regulations in the light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident French approach in the European context Contents French regulatory response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident Evolution of French and European regulatory framework European Emergency Preparedness and Response Conclusion April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: 2

3 Stress Tests at the European Level Stress Tests performed in France under the control of ASN in the framework of European Stress Tests Common Terms of reference for all European countries European approach included benchmark and peer reviews All results were made available for the public April 2016 International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally 3

4 ASN Position on Stress Tests Results (January 2012) Main conclusions No need for immediate shutdown of nuclear installations Need to increase as soon as possible facility robustness to withstand extreme situations beyond safety margins Main measures to be taken: Hardened Safety Core: limited number of material and organizational dispositions to guarantee safety functions in extreme situations Nuclear Rapid Response Force: Intervention team to take over the accident management April 2016 International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally 4

5 ASN Requirements for NPPs Hardened Safety Core Mobile devices and means of communication essential to emergency management Technical and environmental instrumentation Additional fixed equipment for each reactor: additional ultimate electricity generator diversified emergency cool-down water supply New crisis management premises Resistant to extreme natural hazards habitable during long-duration emergencies with radioactive releases April 2016 International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally 5

6 ASN Requirements for NPPs Nuclear Rapid Response Force Nuclear Rapid Response Force (FARN): specialized teams available in less than 24 hours to: take over from the personnel of a site affected by an accident deploy additional emergency response equipment Insure simultaneous intervention on all reactors of any site April 2016 International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally 6

7 ASN Requirements for Nuclear Installations other than NPPs Largely similar to requirements for NPP Adaptations to particularities of installations Definition of Severe Situations equivalent to severe accident Site approach for Emergency Preparedness Sites with very different installations operated by different utilities April 2016 International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally 7

8 Follow up of European Peer Review Approach European stress tests were peer reviewed and results were approved by ENSREG ENSREG expressed the need for National Action Plans (NAcPs) to be peer reviewed during dedicated ENSREG workshops. 2 ENSREG Workshops have been held in 2013 (initial NAcPs) and in 2015 (updated NAcPs). Follow-up on the implementation of NAcPs: still to be defined by EU Member states April 2016 International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally 8

9 Changes in the French Regulations in the light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident French approach in the European context Contents French regulatory response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident Evolution of French and European regulatory framework European Emergency Preparedness and Response Conclusion April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: 9

10 EU Legislative Framework under the Euratom Treaty Nuclear Safety Directive (2009, 2014) Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Directive (2011) Basic Safety Standards Directive ( ) Radiation protection Emergency preparedness and response April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: 10

11 Nuclear Safety Directive Safety Objectives for new NPPs Design Decommissioning Decommissioning Operation Prevent accidents In case of an accident: Mitigate consequences Avoid radioactive release - Without sufficient time for emergency measures - Requiring long lasting protection actions Commissioning Siting Construction International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally

12 Main Measures to Achieve the Safety Objectives Defence-in-depth Nuclear safety culture Safety objective Emergency preparedness and response International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally

13 Initial Assessments and Periodic Safety Reviews Initial site and installation-specific assessment Grant of a licence to construct or operate a nuclear installation Periodic safety review (at least every 10 years) Implementation of reasonably practicable safety improvements to existing nuclear installations April 2016 International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems: Sustaining Improvements Globally

14 Vienna Declaration Adopted by consensus in February 2015 by the Contracting Parties of the Convention on Nuclear Safety New nuclear power plants: Prevent accidents Should an accident occur: Mitigate possible releases causing long-term off site contamination Avoid early radioactive releases or large releases requiring long-term protective measures Existing installations: Perform, periodically, comprehensive and systematic safety assessments to identify safety improvements oriented to meet the above objective Implement reasonably practical or achievable safety improvements in a timely manner April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: sustaining improvements globally 14

15 French Energy Transition Act for a Green Growth Widening of enforcement powers New types of sanction is granted to ASN: daily penalties Enhanced Information and Transparency Strengthening of Local information committee (CLI) powers Possible participation of representatives of neighboring countries having installations located next to their borders, in the CLI meetings «Immediate dismantling» underscored Affirmation of the need for immediate dismantling in case of a nuclear shutdown ASN s oversight duty extended ASN s oversight duty does not only apply to the licensee but also to suppliers and sub-contractors April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: 15

16 Changes in the French Regulations in the light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident French approach in the European context Contents French regulatory response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident Evolution of French and European regulatory framework European Emergency Preparedness and Response Conclusion April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: 16

17 European Situation B A C D A nuclear accident occurs in country A that affects the territories of neighboring countries. All countries are fully sovereign in organizing the emergency. International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems:

18 Probable Implementation of Protective Actions A C B D April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems:

19 Reason for Lack of Harmonization National EP&R has been developed across Europe without giving great priority to cross-border issues April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems:

20 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: How to Harmonize?

21 General Objective of the HERCA - WENRA Approach Coordination of the response in the early phase of an accident between the impacted country with the aim of a coherent response across borders Approach jointly approved by HERCA and WENRA on 21 October 2014 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems:

22 Harmonization of Decision Before an accident: Enhance mutual understanding In case of an accident: Early phase of an accident (first hours): The neighboring countries do the same as the country where the accident occurred Mid-term (after the first hours): Development of a common situation report April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems:

23 Harmonized Preparation of Protective Actions in Europe (1) As shown by the Fukushima Daiichi accident, a large nuclear catastrophe anywhere in the world, including in Europe, cannot be completely excluded However, considering the safety level of European nuclear power plants and their improvements resulting from the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, it is estimated that the probability of such a catastrophic accident is very low 23 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems:

24 Harmonized Preparation of Protective Actions in Europe (2) Evacuation should be prepared up to 5 km around all nuclear power plants, and sheltering and ITB up to 20 km A general strategy should be defined in order to be able to extend evacuation up to 20 km and sheltering and ITB up to 100 km Radiation and nuclear safety Authorities should continue to promote compatible response arrangements and protection strategies in Europe April International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems:

25 Next Step HERCA-WENRA position is currently shared by radiation protection and safety Authorities only These Authorities are committed to engage discussion with their national Authorities in charge of Civil Protection, in view of the implementation of the HERCA-WENRA approach April International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems:

26 Changes in the French Regulations in the light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident French approach in the European context Contents French regulatory response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident Evolution of French and European regulatory framework European Emergency Preparedness and Response Conclusion April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: 26

27 Conclusions (1) Significant progress have been made in Europe and France, as a follow-up of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident However, significant issues remain open April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: 27

28 Conclusions (2) Post-Fukushima Daiichi accident measures: how do you balance the fixed and mobile equipment? Are they both necessary? What international actions could have prevented the Fukushima Daiichi accident? What proposals can be made for the future? Design Peer Reviews? Siting Peer Reviews? What changes should be made in safety approaches to take account of the uncertainties in predicting extreme natural hazards? April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: sustaining improvements globally 28

29 Conclusions (3) Is it acceptable to require only small safety margins for accidents that are highly improbable but have extremely serious consequences? After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, are all countries convinced that extreme accidents must be taken into account in the emergency preparedness measures? How should emergency situation preparedness be addressed in emerging countries? April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: sustaining improvements globally 29

30 11-15 April 2016 International conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems: sustaining improvements globally 30