Nuclear Proliferation and the Civilian Fuel Cycle. Nuclear Renaissance and International Peace and Security

Transcription

1 Nuclear Proliferation and the Civilian Fuel Cycle The 9 th ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues Nuclear Renaissance and International Peace and Security 2-3 December 2010, Jeju, Republic of Korea Kory Budlong Sylvester Los Alamos National Laboratory 1 I would like to begin by thanking Director Kimura for his invitation to participate in this meeting and discuss this timely topic with such a renowned collection of speakers. It is fitting that we are here today to discuss the nuclear renaissance in the Republic of Korea (ROK). While nuclear power may be experiencing resurgence elsewhere in the world after a long period of stagnation, the Korean experience has been one of steady growth. This work has culminated in the emergence of the ROK as an international supplier of nuclear reactor technology. This is a significant technical and industrial accomplishment which they should take great pride in. I congratulate my fellow panelist, Dr. Song, and 1 The views expressed are the author s own and not those of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the National Nuclear Security Administration or the Department of Energy. 1

2 the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, for their many contributions to this effort, which are well known in nuclear engineering and related fields around the world. Nuclear Realities The subject of this session is so-called proliferation resistant fuel cycle technology. Concerns over the relationship between peaceful nuclear power and nuclear proliferation have been near the top of the international agenda in recent years. Many countries have made proposals to increase the reliability of the international market for nuclear fuel, thus avoiding the necessity to develop sensitive indigenous facilities. Nuclear fuel banks, multinational facility ownership, backup supply arrangements and other mechanisms have all been put forward. In his speech in Prague in April of last year, President Barak Obama has called for a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation aimed at producing security benefits. These and other related initiatives have been designed to deal with the inherent dual-use nature of nuclear power technology, in particular the sensitivities surrounding enrichment and reprocessing technologies. It has long been understood that the same nuclear technology that is used to produce electricity, can be misused to produce weapons-usable material. The laws of physic have not been kind to us in this regard. 2

3 This technical reality is not unique to nuclear power. It is a feature in other sensitive fields such as biology and missile technology. Here I am reminded of a quote from President John F. Kennedy when he was asked to explain the difference between the peaceful Atlas space launch vehicle that put American John Glenn into orbit and an Atlas missile aimed at the then Soviet Union as part of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. He answered simply Attitude. While the technical relationship between nuclear power and nuclear weapons is not as close as the one JFK referenced, nuclear attitudes do matter. Nuclear Attitudes Focus on the reliable fuel services initiatives I mentioned previously underscore the fact that while the technical potential for misuse is ever present, precisely how a given fuel cycle is implemented can serve to minimize concerns. International cooperation is essential. It is through transparency, as well as the nature and context of fuel cycle development, that confidence is provided. When states develop nuclear technology at a pace consistent with their energy needs, and in a manner consistent with peaceful uses, confidence is increased. It is worth noting that the benefits of international cooperation are not limited to security. There are economic, safety, environmental and other benefits as well. Just as every country does not need their own enrichment and reprocessing facility, they do not need 3

4 their own geologic repository. Regional approaches to fuel supply, distribution, and disposition can provide tangible benefits to all participants while meeting nonproliferation objectives. We can and should seek to capitalize on such opportunities when they present themselves. In this context, it is interesting to note that the United States has acted as both a supplier and recipient of reliable fuel cycle services. The U.S. has blended down 17.4 metric tonnes of highly enriched uranium to create a fuel bank to support a fuel assurance mechanism. In its role as a consumer, two new enrichment facilities are being built in the United States through contractual arrangements with foreign suppliers. Measures have been taken to black box the underlying centrifuge technology. While the US is a nuclear weapon state, and this approach is largely for proprietary concerns, it is an example that can be repeated elsewhere. Technical Solutions Technical approaches aimed at solving the associated proliferation problems of nuclear power have been sought since the beginning of the nuclear age. The Acheson-Lilienthal report of 1946, which had Robert Oppenheimer as a co-author, dealt with the issue of managing this disruptive technology to the benefit of society. It included a discussion of denaturing fissile material so as to render it less useful for weapons. This approach has continued through the intervening years and remains of interest today. Over the past several decades, many different configurations of the nuclear fuel cycle 4

5 have been considered in an effort to minimize potential proliferation impacts. The issue of proliferation resistance appears in the Nonproliferation Alternative System Assessment Program (NASAP) and in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. More recently, the U.S. Department of Energy examined a range of fuel cycle approaches in its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program. Along with radioactive waste management, the potential proliferation impacts of these alternatives was an important programmatic consideration. These efforts, as well as other fuel cycle proposals, have sought to drive a decisive wedge between the peaceful atom and its weapons uses. The results have not eliminated the need for institutional measures. While addressing some concerns, international safeguards and physical protection standards must remain high. It is worth noting that the nonproliferation assessment drafted for GNEP program, pointed to the importance of the fuel cycle architecture in assessing overall proliferation impacts. Specifically, security benefits could be realized if the nuclear waste treatment capabilities produced under the program would enable spent fuel take-back arrangements to be concluded. Such services could help control spent fuel arisings around the world and be used to minimize the number of sensitive reprocessing facilities. 5

6 It should not be surprising that proliferation proofing the fuel cycle has proven to be technically difficult. In many cases, expectations with regard to such efforts have been set too high and often poorly articulated. This leads to misunderstanding and confusion amongst analysts and engineers alike. A simple example can be used to illustrate this point. Considering only nuclear reactors, if the act of proliferation is taken to mean the acquisition of sufficient material for one or a few nuclear devices, then any operating power reactor has more than ample amounts of plutonium in its inventory to support the task. Designing a commercial fuel cycle that does not involve significant amounts of weapons usable material is simply not possible. Altenatively, when some speak of proliferation they are referring to the utility of the civilian fuel cycle as part of a functioning weapons complex. Some reactors are wholly impractical or unsuitable for serial plutonium production. For example, pressurized water reactors (PWRs), with sealed pressure vessels, are not designed to be shut down frequently and refueled. In this context, there are significant differences between fuel cycle and facility choices. If you were an engineer designing a plutonium production complex, your first choice would not be a PWR and proliferation resistance, in this context, takes on a different meaning. 6

7 Safeguards by Design So what are reasonable expectations to have when considering the relationship between fuel cycle design and proliferation? What prospects are there to modify fuel cycle technologies in ways that are more secure? Making nuclear facilities more safeguards friendly is a more reasonable goal and one where tangible progress can be made. International safeguards as applied by the IAEA attempts to provide timely detection of any facility misuse. While the goal is the same for every facility type, this standard is more difficult to achieve in some facilities than others. Careful facility analysis and design modifications can be used to eliminate difficult to detect proliferation scenarios. Innovative safeguards systems can also be developed to improve safeguards performance and reduce costs. This approach has taken on the name Safeguards by Design and is receiving a great deal of attention at the IAEA and within the nuclear industry worldwide. Such approaches are particularly important in more complex facilities such as large reprocessing facilities where relatively easy to track, individual fuel assemblies are transformed into various dissolved solutions. Being able to understand plant design and operation, and improving the IAEA s ability to independently verify those operations over time, is an important design goal. We can expect to see improvements in this area with general developments in industrial process controls and on-line instrumentation. Again, the objective is to limit the ways in which a facility could be misused, forcing a proliferator to employ methods that would give clear indications of its actions. 7

8 So far I have focused my remarks on steps that can be taken to prevent proliferation by a nation state. Impeding the actions of a dedicated proliferator, who has complete knowledge, access and control of a facility that it owns, is obviously a difficult challenge. Clever facility and process design may have a more decisive impact in countering terrorist threats. Even if an external adversary has some level of knowledge about the facility, it will not have the same degree of freedom to manipulate events as the facility owner. Altering the layout of the facility can make access to nuclear material extremely difficult and hazardous. Altering the composition and concentration of materials used in the process can reduce their attractiveness while reducing the likelihood of a successful theft attempt. The situation is further improved when one considers the more limited resources and technical capabilities of a subnational actor. Improving the inherent theft resistance of facilities should be a priority in future nuclear fuel cycle design. Latent Capabilities There is another reason for the international community to take collective interest in how nuclear power is deployed globally. The acquisition of sensitive enrichment and/or reprocessing can be used as part of a strategy of a so-called latent proliferation. In this scenario, facilities that are technically challenging, expensive and difficult to construct and operate are built under the guise of a peaceful energy program only to be redirected to weapons uses at a future date. The weapons capability is therefore a latent one, ready to be activated at a time of a proliferant s choosing. 8

9 Latency has credence in an arms control context as well. If future agreements lead to lower numbers of weapons in existence, the latent ability to produce more will become of greater concern. Having a limited number of sensitive facilities in place that were designed from the outset to be transparent and simplify verification efforts will support arms reductions as well nonproliferation goals. We should seek to minimize the number of sensitive nuclear facilities globally and where they do exist, they should meet the highest standards of safeguards and security. Closing A global expansion of nuclear power will not invariably lead to an increase risk of proliferation. There is no evidence that states pursue nuclear weapons simply because they have the capability to do so. Yet the nuclear renaissance presents a unique opportunity. Given the age of a significant fraction of nuclear facilities, over the course of the next decade or two, our collective actions will define the shape and composition of the global fuel cycle for the next years. It is an opportunity that we should not miss. 9