Implications of MFE compliance with non-proliferation requirements

Transcription

1 Implications of MFE compliance with non-proliferation requirements Matthias Englert, Öko-Institut e.v. Germany

2 BLUF Bottom Line Up Front Neutron producing fusion technology will very likely be faced with questions about its proliferation resistance while it matures from experiment to a full-fledged energy option It is very important to meet the concerns of all stakeholders in a constructive and respectful dialogue There are research opportunities 2

3 International Security and Disarmament Why do states build nuclear weapons? (political science) How do states build nuclear weapons? (physics/technology) Can the spread (proliferation) be controlled? (arms control and safeguards - policy, politics and institutions) Can we get rid of nuclear weapons and how? (peace research) 3

4 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Access to nuclear weapon relevant material existing stockpiles production technologies U235 Plutonium Tritium U233 US DoE Picturing the Bomb Highly enriched Uranium Size of plutonium pit used in Nagasaki Bomb 4

5 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Access to nuclear weapon relevant material existing stockpiles production technologies U235 Plutonium Tritium U233 Significant Quantity/Mass Pu HEU Tritium IAEA 8 kg 25 kg Weapon 2-6 kg 3-16 kg 2 g 5

6 Tokamak Fusion 6

7 Starting Point Pure Fusion: - No nuclear material used under normal operating conditions Fusion-Fission Hybrid: - Nuclear material used under normal operating conditions None of the materials required are subject to the provisions of non-proliferation treaties Safeguards under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) EFDA 2005 Power Plant Conceptual Study 7

8 4 Technical Reasons a Tokamak Might be Attractive for a Proliferator 4 8

9 1. Tritium 9

10 1. Tritium Diversion T necessary for miniaturization (yield to weight ratio) Daily T-consumption in commercial facility: ~150 g/gwth T-Reserves in facility: order of kg Yearly overproduction planned in facility: one to several kg T-amount in boosted weapon: 2-3 g (unclassified <20g) Huge amounts of T handled compared to current civil market (<1kg/y) Accountancy very difficult. Not nuclear material with regard to safeguards system yet. Change has to be considered in view of large scale use, driven by technological dynamic. 10

11 2. Plutonium Production Potential 11

12 2. Very High Plutonium Production Potential 5 GWth Uranium in Alloy (Pb-17Li) 20 degree section all numbers in kg Pu/y 10 % 1 % 0,1 % 0,01 % One Blanket close to Plasma One Blanket far from Plasma <0.1 <0.10 All Blankets ,5 1,5 Complete Reactor Limited by TBR and Heat MCNPX Model of PPCS-A Geometry adapted from (Chen et al. 2003) 12

13 3. Source Material Requirements 13

14 3. Very Low Source Material Requirements even depleted uranium Fusion vs. Fission Reactor 14

15 4. Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes 15

16 4. Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes 500d 98.6% Pu d 95.9% Pu

17 Intermediate Conclusion Fusion vs. Fission Attractive High to very high Pu-concentrations Low source material masses necessary, below one effective kilogram Hard spectrum breeds weapon grade Pu even for high burnups Tritium Less attractive today Mostly international research facilities yet Clandestine operation unlikely High degree of technical sophistication High costs yet Many components not commercially available yet No broad global expertise, smaller community yet 17

18 Scenarios for Fissile Material Acquisition Declared Clandestine Break Out Diversion Facility modified Facility modified optimized Facility as designed latent capabilities 18

19 Scenarios for Fissile Material Acquisition Declared Clandestine Break Out Diversion Facility modified Facility modified optimized Facility as designed latent capabilities 19

20 Clarification Needed for Regulation 20

21 Gaps in Regulation Nearly every member state to the NPT has a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC, 153) with the IAEA - Safeguard regime is build around the presence of nuclear material - Design flow and inventory of source or special fissionable material determines frequency of inspections Gaps in regulating fusion besides no nuclear material in facility Facility Fusion plant is not a facility as defined by the IAEA where nuclear material is costumarily used One effective kilogram 10 t in total of natural uranium can be exempt from safeguards. Depleted uranium usable: vast amounts available). Enough for a significant production (low source material requirement) 21

22 Verifying the Absence The Additional Protocol Many states ratified an Additional Protocol (AP) that explicitly allows to verify the absence of nuclear material (completeness of a declaration) Still the exact status of fusion has to be legally clarified Facility: - Fusion plant not a facility under the AP. - But AP makes explicit the fact that IAEA inspectors may visit, not only declared facilities, but also locations outside of facilities If the legal implementation of fusion into international verification regimes is not clarified early, it might be a point of contestation in the future. 22

23 Safeguards Gedankenexperiment: How can I assure to you that there is no fissile material in a pure fusion plant? More specifically IAEA will ask the question: What is the needed frequency and intensity of inspections to timely detect a missing declaration? And how can efforts be minimized (win-win) What are the exact predefined procedures to come to a conclusive result? 23

24 Safeguards Research Research recommended by participants of the IAEA consultancy meeting on Non-Proliferation Challenges in Connection with Magnetic Fusion Power Plants. Report, May 2014: - Verify the absence of source or special fissionable material in fresh fusion blanket modules, during operation and after exposure in a fusion power plant. - Investigate practicality of source material being mixed with coolant or purge flow - Evaluating the possibility to replace pure-fusion test blanket modules in a fusion power plant with blanket modules designed to breed special fissionable material - Possibility to misuse other internal components exposed to high neutron fluence. 24

25 ITER ITER itself poses no proliferation risk Test blanket modules will experience no more than 0.3 MWa/m 2 of neutron fluence over ~10 years. If every 14.1 MeV neutron produced one 239 Pu or 233 U nucleus, each test blanket module (1.3 m 2 ) would produce 2 kg = 1/4 SQ of fissile material in the whole lifetime of ITER. (Rob Goldston, Princeton) But ITER could be perfect as test bed for verification (Fiss. Materials and Tritium): demonstrating best practice preparing safeguards for next generation (DEMO) 25

26 More R&D Investigate differences for Pure-Fusion vs. Fusion-Fission Hybrid How to implement safeguards by design in blanket development and into facility diagnostics? Investigate established safeguards methods and their implementation: Gamma and Neutron Spectra at different measurement positions Detection of fission products (gaseous, particle bound) by air filters and swipe samples Active neutron measurement Weighing of blankets Portal monitors 26

27 Examples for Questions Measurement and diagnostics community: where are measurements positions to detect fission products, fission gamma spectrum etc.? Blanket developers: how could absence of fissile material be verified in a blanket (neutron, gamma, etc.). What are the parameters to define inspection frequencies (blanket exchange, fissile material production potentials etc.) Remote handling and facility operation: how is blanket handled outside the reactor chamber (fabrication, transport, storage, accountancy, weighing etc.). What is necessary to minimize verification procedures? More research needed to define question 27

28 Beyond Safeguards - Proliferation Resistance Besides extrinsic institutional measures, intrinsic technical measures can enhance proliferation resistance of technology. - safeguards by design - proliferation resistance by design as early as possible Safeguards-by-Design: $ before concrete is poored $$ before radioactive contamination $$$$ after radioactive contamination Proliferation Resistance could be important for blanket design process and might influence design choices. 28

29 Self-Regulation and Code of Conducts Code of conducts Pledge for civil use of fusion. Example: International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Agreement Article 20. Peaceful Uses and Non-Proliferation [...] shall use any material, equipment or technology generated or received pursuant to this agreement solely for peaceful purposes [...] shall take appropriate measures to implement this article in an effective and transparent manner. To this end, the council shall interface with appropriate international fora and establish a policy supporting peaceful uses and nonproliferation 29

30 IAEA Consultancy Results 2013 Experts from Fusion Community, International Security, Safeguards Recommend that the IAEA considers means to achieve an inclusion into verification regime. a closer link between Safeguards/International Security and Fusion Community R&D opportunities to advance non-proliferation aspects of fusion. Recommended to report progress on DEMO Workshops Issue of Tritium monitoring warrants further consideration ITER does not represent proliferation risks Clandestine scenarios appear to be implausible 30

31 Conclusion Legal and Technical questions of verification procedures have to be investigated. Existing safeguard methods can be applied. Clear-cut criterion (no nuclear material) helps. Not an urgent task in the sense of risks, but parallel process preferable to investigate answers to possible questions in advance Connect epistemic communities (fusion community, especially ITER and DEMO), safeguards community, international organizations (IAEA, ESARDA/INMM) and economic actors (nuclear industry) Report findings back to the different communities 31

32 Fin 32

33 Backup Slides 33

34 Spectrum 34

35 Radial Flux 35

36 Breeding Structures Solubility Limited in Pb-17Li Temperature K only vol.% But TRISO particles possible Pu [g] Tubes Homog. Ratio Blanket ,9 Blanket ,5 Blanket ,3 Blanket ,8 Partitionierung & Transmutation C. Pistner Darmstadt

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