PHMSA Update Significant Accidents Review

Transcription

1 PHMSA Update Significant Accidents Review 2015 RRC/PHMSA Training and Qualification Conference Thursday, September 17, :15 11:45 AM - 1 -

2 What We Regulate Pipeline Miles by System Types end of CY 2012, as-of 3/7/2014 System Type Miles %Total # Operators Hazardous Liquid 185,629 7% 410 Gas Transmission 303,308 11% 953 Gas Gathering 16,728 1% 342 Gas Distribution (Mains & Services ) 2,138,676 81% 1,356 Total 2,644,341 Some Operators have multiple System Types Liquefied Natural Gas 130 Plants 203 Tanks 82

3 Categories of Incident Reports All Reported everything operators report Serious fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization, but Fire First excluded. Fire First are gas distribution incidents with a cause of Other Outside Force Damage and sub-cause of Nearby Industrial, Man-made, or Other Fire/Explosion Significant include any of the following, but Fire First excluded: 1. Fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization 2. $50,000 or more in total costs, measured in 1984 dollars 3. Highly volatile liquid (HVL) releases of 5 barrels or more 4. Non-HVL liquid releases of 50 barrels or more 5. Liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion 3

4 Serious Incidents All System Types Downward Trend Continues in 2013 Gas Transmission Dips Down to One Again in

5 Significant Incidents All System Types Slight Rise 2013 Gas Transmission Slight Rise in

6 2014 Pipeline Safety Challenges Spate of High Consequence, High Profile Accidents Multi-stakeholder interest/concern Reauthorization in about 18 months Aging Infrastructure Being Overly Amortized - Band-Aids Impact of Shale Oil/Gas: New, Reversed, Converted Pipelines Separate Rate Recovery Authorities Worried About Rates Challenges to Recruit, Train and Retain Qualified Workforce Growing Expectations for Change in a Change Averse World The World is Watching Bloggers and the Internet - 6 -

7 Top Priorities for FY 2014 Anticipate & Avert High Consequence Events by: i. Issue High Priority Rulemakings ii. Improve State Program Oversight iii.implementing Congressional Act Mandates and Recommendations iv.identify and Promote a Suite of Meaningful Performance Metrics v. Promotion of Pipeline R&D and Technological Advancement Build & Broadcast Understanding of Safety Risks by: i. Engage, Educate, and Empower the Public and ER Community (Damage Prevention, PIPA, 811, ER Training) ii. IMP-2.0 Sharpening Understanding and Communication Catalog & Curtail Highest Risks by: i. Improve Consistency, Unification and Data Driven Inspections for Federal and State Actions ii. Develop and Deploy a Pipeline Safety Workforce Management Strategy (succession planning, training, resource allocation) - 7 -

8 High Profile Accidents - 8 -

9 High Profile Accidents Marshall, Michigan (Federally Regulated) Major Crude Oil Spill Dramatically Impacted Several Communities in Michigan San Bruno, California (State Regulated) Major tragedy Unimaginable Proportions Allentown, Pennsylvania (State Regulated) Cast Iron, low pressure Excavation Damage Fatalities (State Regulated) Texas, North Dakota, Georgia to name a few Yellowstone River; Billings, Montana (Federally Regulated) Significant Oil Spill near Billings, MT Bison Pipeline; Rural Wyoming (Federally Regulated) Newly constructed natural gas pipeline - 9 -

10 High Profile Accidents Chevron; Salt Lake City, Utah (Federally Regulated) Crude oil and refined products Multiple accidents: 6/10, 12/10, 3/13 Sissonville, West Virginia (Interstate Agent) 2012 Impact to major interstate highway; questions on HCA determination Led to Congressional oversight hearing NTSB investigation Mayflower, Arkansas (Federally Regulated) Canadian heavy crude Keystone implications? Investigation pending

11 Sissonville Pipeline Incident Dec 11, 2012: Rupture of a 20 X-60 gas transmission pipeline (1967 vintage)

12 Sissonville Pipeline Incident No injuries or fatalities (thankfully) Three neighboring homes destroyed, others damaged Interstate 77 damaged and temporarily closed Three pipelines in vicinity SM diameter PIR = 495 feet SM diameter PIR = 626 feet SM-86 Loop 30 diameter PIR = 713 feet PHMSA issued Corrective Action Order WV PSC and PHMSA Investigation ongoing NTSB launched to investigate cause

13 Mayflower, Arkansas Pipeline Accident March 29, 2012: A 20 crude oil pipeline ruptured in Mayflower, Arkansas; An estimated 5,000 bbl of crude was spilled; Pipeline carrying Canadian crude oil (Wabasca) from Patoka, Illinois to Nederland, Texas; Pipeline installed in 1947/

14 Enforcement Actions Enforcement actions for accidents and incidents now regularly incorporates IM principles Operators are responsible for performing and prioritizing integrity assessments based on all risk factors that reflect the risk conditions on the pipeline segment CPF No issued to ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, LP on 11/6/2013 resulted from investigation of the Pegasus Pipeline rupture The Remedial Work Plans required by the CAO for the Pegasus Pipeline have been submitted and are under review by PHMSA

15 Issues Identified in CPF Majority of issues (8/9) involved IM regulations Did not include consideration of certain manufacturing information in their determination of risk factors (reasonably available information) Failed to declare discovery of immediate repair conditions from information received in preliminary reports from the in-line inspection (ILI) vendor (information) Risk assessments not updated as changes occur, which includes potential threat changes (MOC) failure to determine an "Identified Threat" related to Manufacturing existed on the segment, and failed to elevate the threat for risk reduction activities (MOC)

16 Observations and Concerns

17 Pipeline Infrastructure (% by Decade in USA) Decade Hazardous Liquid Gas Transmission Gas Distribution Main Service Unknown & <1920 2% s 2% 2% % 58% 1930s 3% 4% 6% 3% 1940s 8% 7% 2% 2% 47% 1950s 20% 22% 10% 8% 1960s 21% 23% 17% 13% 1970s 16% 11% 12% 14% 40% 44% 42% 1980s 9% 10% 14% 17% 53% 1990s 11% 11% 21% 22% 2000s 8% 10% 18% 21% 60% 17

18 25% Pipeline Infrastructure (% by Decade in USA) Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Vintage 55% installed prior to 1970 (182,615 miles/ 74,472 HF-ERW/50,740 LF-ERW) 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% < s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

19 25% Pipeline Infrastructure (% by Decade in USA) Gas Transmission Pipeline Vintage 59% installed prior to % 15% 10% 5% 0% < s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

20 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% Pipeline Infrastructure (% by Decade in USA) Gas Distribution Pipeline Vintage 31% installed prior to % < s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

21 % All Incidents USA Gas Transmission and Liquid Pipelines 2002 to 2012 All Other Causes Corrosion Excavation Damage Incorrect Operations Material/Weld/Equip. Failure Natural Force Damage Other Outside Forces

22 Pipe Seam Failures in USA ( ) Seam Type Gas Hazardous Liquid TOTAL % of Total DSAW Flash Welded HF ERW LF ERW Lap Weld SAW Other Total

23 DSAW Pipe Pipeline Seam Welds Lap Welded Pipe SMLS Pipe Spiral Weld SAW Pipe LF and HF - ERW Pipe

24 What are some of the integrity issues? Materials pipe and coatings Pipe material LF-ERW widely manufactured from 1920 to 1970 s PHMSA Advisory Bulletins in 1988 and 1989 EFW produced between 1930 through 1969 Seams cold welds, lack of fusion, stitched welds, hook cracks Leads to selective seam corrosion and corrosion fatigue SAW/SSAW produced in 1930 s through today as DSAW Older pipe has lack of fusion and cracking defects

25 Current Rulemakings in Process Safety of On-Shore Hazardous Liquid Pipelines (NPRM stage) NPRM moved past PHMSA ANPRM published 10/18/2010 Major topics under consideration: Assessments beyond High Consequence Areas (HCAs) Leak detection beyond HCAs Repair criteria in HCA and non-hca areas Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) Piggability of lines Reporting requirements for Gathering lines Gravity Line exception

26 Current Rulemakings in Process Integrity Verification Process Issues and alternatives under development Subject of numerous public workshops / meetings Deals with recommendations from NTSB / Hill mandates Discussed this in previous session

27 2013/14 Quality Observations

28 Construction A typical role of government is to solve problems, often through regulation Many of the construction issues we see are not solvable through added regulation The operator is solely responsible for building and operating a safe and reliable pipeline system It is vital that we develop the infrastructure to move new found resources to market in a safe and environmentally friendly manner

29 2013 Overview of Quality Issues

30 Overview of Quality Issues 30

31 HF ERW Seams

32 What caused this coating damage? Worn out pads on bending machine 32

33 Pipe on skids can move and fall. You want to park or stand where! 33

34 Welding Arc Burns Melting Water running onto weld Weld Splatter Expensive Garbage Can

35 Coating No cleaning prior to coating Improper application All Operator accepted coatings

36 No Coating Coverage 36

37 Lower-in and Backfill Rock in ditch? Pad dirt under pipe? What is being done to protect pipe from coating and denting damage?

38 Pipe laid directly on solid rock

39 Rocks against pipe (No screening for over 1 mile)

40 Backfilling How is soil being installed in ditch? Are backhoes continuously lifting soil padding over pipe without inspection?

41 Construction Damage Section of Pipe was Replaced Found by DCVG Survey-Line was in Service)

42 Bored Crossing Failed Hydro Test

43 AC Interference Currents Quick and deep Do not put off AC surveys

44 Materials Verification Good Documentation Practices

45 Serious about risk and consequences? It takes all of us

46 Construction Issues - Summary Topic Occurrences Coating* 117 Welding* 87 Excavation 20 Nondestructive testing 20 Pipe material* 12 Bending 9 Lowering in* 7 Hydrotesting 4 Design 3 Other 8

47 Most Cited Corrosion Regulations Hazardous Liquid Pipelines ( ) Part 195 Citation Number of Citations Total Civil Penalties Assessed Adequacy of Cathodic Protection 26 $163, (e) External Corrosion Corrective Action 21 $412, (c) External Corrosion Rectifiers 18 $30, (a) Atmospheric Corrosion Inspections 18 $65, Exposed Portions of Buried Pipe 16 $44, (a) Interference Currents 14 $ (a) Internal Corrosion Mitigation 13 $145, (d) Breakout Tanks 12 $51, (a) Atmospheric Corrosion Control 10 $307, (c) Internal Corrosion Inspection 9 $26,

48 Pipeline R& D Activities 2014 Awarded Projects Focus Areas: Threat Prevention Leak Detection/Mitigation & Storage Anomaly Detection/Characterization Anomaly Repair & Remediation Design/Materials/Welding-Joining/Valves Future R&D Focus Areas: Legacy Materials Damage Prevention Leak Detection Anomaly Detection/Characterization Risk Models

49 Thank you