Evaluation of Drinking Water Security at DoD Installations

Transcription

1 Evaluation of Drinking Water Security at DoD Installations Andrew Barton Battelle Misha Turner HQ USMC BUSINESS SENSITIVE 1

2 Presentation Overview General drinking water security issues Drinking water system security requirements USMC drinking water vulnerability assessment (VA) and emergency response plan (ERP) process Common drinking water system vulnerabilities BUSINESS SENSITIVE 2

3 Why is Water Security an Integral Part of AT/FP? 1. Government facilities are the preferred targets by terrorists; military targets are the preferred targets among government facilities. 2. Routine activities on military facilities could allow terrorist intrusions to on-base water systems. 3. Public water systems represent an easily accessible pathway for low-tech covert operations. 4. Many military facilities rely on public water supplies. 5. Evidence has demonstrated terrorists interest in attacking water systems. BUSINESS SENSITIVE 3

4 Evidence of Terrorist Intentions Feb Moroccans arrested in Rome with 10 lbs cyanide based compounds and maps of water system highlighting US embassy May man arrested in MA for threatening water supply with 5 lbs Hg July FBI issues warning based on documents recovered in Afghanistan detailing Al Qaeda interest in disrupting US water systems Dec Islamic militants with unidentified liquid arrested in Paris suburb; planning attack on public water system. August Al Qaeda website posts call to attack drinking water supplies September Jihadi terrorist plot uncovered; water resources in Great Britain and Denmark targeted BUSINESS SENSITIVE 4

5 Objectives of Attacking Water Distribution System To disrupt the delivery of potable water through: Physical damage of strategic components of the water infrastructure Chemical and/or biological contamination of the water being delivered The goals are to Cause widespread injury/death Render water unsuitable for consumption Render water unusable for manufacturing, fire fighting, hospital use, etc Compromise consumer confidence BUSINESS SENSITIVE 5

6 Potential Targets of Attack Water supplies Reservoirs and lakes, rivers, well heads, and aquifers Water treatment plants Intake lines, unit processes preand post-chlorination Water Distribution Systems Taps, hydrants, tanks/towers BUSINESS SENSITIVE 6

7 Drinking Water System Security Requirements 2002 Bioterrorism Act amended SDWA Section 1433(a) all community public water systems >3,300 people must prepare VA Section 1433(b) prepare or revise ERP DoD Antiterrorism Standards ( ) and DoD Instruction require DoD installations to conduct annual VAs Branch-specific requirements BUSINESS SENSITIVE 7

8 Approach to Preparing USMC Drinking Water VAs VA uses a combination of attributes from: RAM-W TM methodology (Sandia National Laboratory) Association of Drinking Water Administrators (ASDWA) USEPA VA guidance USEPA Drinking Water Academy National Rural Water Association (NRWA) Base-specific requirements/guidelines BUSINESS SENSITIVE 8

9 Approach to Preparing USMC Drinking Water ERPs ERP developed using: USEPA ERP guidance AWWA Emergency Planning for Water Utilities Military Handbook (MIL-HDBK) O&M of Water Systems Base-specific requirements/guidelines BUSINESS SENSITIVE 9

10 USMC VA Process - Outline Drinking water system description Threat assessment Consequence assessment Evaluation of physical protection system (PPS) Existing protection measures Existing vulnerabilities Recommended protection enhancements Resource conservation/sustainability BUSINESS SENSITIVE 10

11 VA Process - Drinking Water System Description Perform site visit Team of water system and security experts Inspection of drinking water system components Meetings with Base personnel Identify critical services Prioritize assets Determine importance based on relevance to critical services BUSINESS SENSITIVE 11

12 VA Process - Threat Assessment Judgement of the actual or potential threat to the Base based on available intelligence Develop design basis threat Most reasonable hostile action that a system s protection should design against Determine likelihood of occurrence BUSINESS SENSITIVE 12

13 VA Process - Consequence Assessment Identify undesired events Based an understanding of water system and on critical services of the Base Determine measure of consequence developed from information collected during site visit Economic loss, duration of loss, loss of fire protection, number of users impacted, number of illnesses Assign levels (high, medium, low) to each consequence depending on severity of loss BUSINESS SENSITIVE 13

14 VA Process - Consequence Assessment Compare undesired events to measures of consequence for each critical asset (i.e., storage tanks, wells, etc ) Develop summary matrix Determine overall consequence value (OCV) for each applicable undesired events Prioritize security enhancements for high OCVs Identify interdependencies (if any) BUSINESS SENSITIVE 14

15 VA Process PPS Evaluates provisions and vulnerabilities for Base-wide and water system PPS Protective barrier identification for critical assets Start from innermost point in the system (e.g., storage tank) Move outward through successive protective layers List provisions and vulnerabilities BUSINESS SENSITIVE 15

16 VA Process PPS Base-wide PPS Access control, detection and assessment, security and emergency response, employee and contractor personnel ID and clearance Water system PPS Building structural integrity, distribution system, fencing, locking devices, control and power systems, chemical delivery and storage, information protection, equipment and spare parts BUSINESS SENSITIVE 16

17 VA Process - Common Vulnerabilities Off-site water supply Privatization of water system Uncontrolled access to distribution system (e.g., BFPs, hydrants) Unsecured Test Cocks BUSINESS SENSITIVE 17

18 VA Process - Common Vulnerabilities Unsecured taps, spigots, and faucets Unlocked gates, fences, doors Lack of planning for alternate water supply BUSINESS SENSITIVE 18

19 VA Process - Common Vulnerabilities Limited awareness of cause and effect Identify critical points of failure Lack of remote monitoring (SCADA) Limited water quality monitoring Absence of distribution system maps Absence of water storage capabilities Need for resource conservation BUSINESS SENSITIVE 19

20 VA Process - Protection Enhancements Increased awareness Evaluate existing PPS and assess what upgrades can be performed Near-term (0-6 months) - Chain and lock components, install security seals, establish key control program, develop water budget, etc Long-term (>6 months) - Install lighting and security cameras, implement SCADA system, perform real-time water quality monitoring, construct distribution system model, training, etc BUSINESS SENSITIVE 20

21 VA Process - Sustainability Component Many Bases required to evaluate resource conservation Incorporate sustainability component into VA related to preservation of water supply Especially for Bases with own supply BUSINESS SENSITIVE 21

22 Sustainability Example 1 Limited aquifer supply 50 year projected lifetime at current usage Recommendations Reduce water usage by 20% Use reclaimed water for irrigation Leak detection along key transmission pipelines Install flow meters at critical locations Life of aquifer can be increased by 15 years at a minimum trend reversal possible BUSINESS SENSITIVE 22

23 Sustainability Example 2 Lack of water accountability 2 MGD produced, ~1 MGD treated at WWTP Recommendations Leak detection along key transmission pipelines Install flowmeters at critical locations Resulting benefits Reduce water production and treatment costs Extend life of aquifer Basin water conservation allocation rights preserved BUSINESS SENSITIVE 23

24 Sustainability Example 3 Water allocation issues >40% of all water used for irrigation Recommendations Automate irrigation system Implement native, drought resistant vegetation Install usage meters at all connections Resulting benefits Reduce purchased water costs Increased sustainability BUSINESS SENSITIVE 24

25 USMC ERP Water system description and hazard summary Water system roles and responsibilities Designate emergency response personnel Identify internal and external supporting agencies Establish chain of command Public/media notification Emergency response procedures (flow chart) Post emergency activities return system online BUSINESS SENSITIVE 25

26 ERP (cont.) Response sheet selection guide based on threat indicators Ties into EPA Water Security Initiative Response sheets mirror ERP flow chart and list contact information Physical Damage Customer complaints Loss of system pressure No water from tap Non-weather related flooding Outside Intelligence Notice from local law enforcement agency Notice from State authorities Notice from Federal authorities Notice from potential perpetrator Notification from concerned citizen Suspicious Activity Involving Water System Unauthorized use/tampering with fire hydrants Unauthorized tampering with backflow preventers Unauthorized connection to outside taps/spigots Unauthorized entry Water Quality Consumer complaint(s) Unusual taste (not necessarily bad taste) Unusual odor (not necessarily bad odor) Unusual appearance (variation in color or increased turbidity) Increased Incidences of Illness Notification from on-base medical personnel Notification from local hospital(s) Unusual absenteeism High Number of Unexplained Causalities Notification from on-base medical personnel Notification from local hospital(s) Notification from local law enforcement Use Response Sheet A Use Response Sheet B Use Response Sheet C Use Response Sheet D Use Response Sheet E Use Response Sheet E BUSINESS SENSITIVE 26

27 Process Application Performed initial drinking water VA and ERP at 14 USMC Bases Prepared summary report for HQ USMC Summarized Installation-wide drinking water security Outlined proposed path forward for drinking water security Conducted update of initial VA and ERP reports Reports will be updated on a triennial schedule Currently evaluating 8 additional Bases BUSINESS SENSITIVE 27