Risk Management- From Natural Disaster to Economy. HE Ichiro Fujisaki, Ambassador, Japan to the United States

Transcription

1 Welcome Address: Risk Management- From Natural Disaster to Economy HE Ichiro Fujisaki, Ambassador, Japan to the United States Opening Remarks Hirotaka Sugawara, Director Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Washington Office Keynote Speech Akito Arima, Chancellor, Musashi Gakuen/Former Minister of Education, Science Sports and Culture /Former President, The University of Tokyo Frank N. von Hippel, Professor, Princeton University HE Ichiro Fujisaki Summary Ambassador Fujisaki opened his remarks with the fact that it has been one year since the March 11 disaster. The American people often ask him what the Japanese people are thinking and he has to say that some people say we have made a huge progress some people say we haven t. The opinion can vary but as for the psychology of people it is very difficult to sum it up as one. We are currently on the recovery road and this would not be possible without the assistance of the American people and he thanked them greatly for that. Without the assistance this road to recovery would not be possible. In reflection of what happened after the March 11 disaster Ambassador Fujisaki has been thinking there are four P s that are important. The first P is for prediction however this is not perfect. We must attempt to predict future advents but we must also understand that in some cases we might be wrong. This is why the second P is for preparation. No matter what we must always be prepared for the absolute worst because it is impossible for us to predict everything. The third P is for promptness so there is an immediate response to every situation. We are now reviewing how we responded and whether it was prompt. The fourth P is post incidence review. This is important to assessing how we can better respond to future natural disasters. The risk management symposium is important when drawing lessons and learning how to react to things better. After this statement the Ambassador thank the organizers for creating such an important event that will prove useful in the future. Hirotaka Sugawara Dr. Sugawara s opening remarks began with the reflection of the previous forum held with other prominent institutions in DC regarding the March 11 disaster. This Risk Management Symposium held in conjunction with USJI is the third event focusing on how we can learn from the Tohoku great earthquake. USJI 1

2 For this symposium the theme will involve natural disaster, technology related disaster and economic crisis. Our goal is to understand what happened so we can better prepare oursleves for the next disaster. Natural disasters cannot be avoided but can be predicted and prepared for. In the past there have been several examples for each of these categories for the different types of disasters. Natural disasters have included the Tohoku earthquake and the Katrina catastrophe that took place in Technology disasters include such incidents like the Fukushima nuclear crisis and the BP oil spill in the gulf. Economic disasters include the 2008 economic crisis and the 1980s crisis in Japan. Both the US and Japan have had to navigate through similar challenging circumstances and this workshop will serve as a resource for facilitating what we have learned from the previous disasters. To help prepare the audience for the next speaker Dr. Sugawara gave an introduction to the science behind the March 11 disaster. This included the explanation of how the energy of the tsunami is measured and the magnitude of an earthquake. Through measuring the energy we know the tsunami produced more energy than was normally consumed in the US for a year. The power of the tsunami varies on the depth of the Ocean. If the depth of the ocean is shallower the higher the way will be. In terms of magnitude, Dr. Sugawara noted that there has never been an earthquake with a magnitude of ten. Though previous records have shown earthquakes have had a gradual increase in magnitude from one major earthquake to the other. Therefore we should prepare ourselves for the possibility of a magnitude ten earthquake. In terms of the nuclear fall out the government of Japan had accurate data from the early stage to be able to predict such a disaster would happen. It was not the earthquake that caused the explosion but the damage caused by the wave. The fallout happen because of a hydrogen explosion and the primary problem was that the government did not provide a speedy recovery. The U.S. nuclear watchdog agency was very critical towards the response provided by the Japanese government but this analysis was meant for U.S. citizens. Since there was so much criticism coming from abroad Japanese citizens were beginning to doubt their government. The Fukushima disaster highlighted the fact the government needs to provide a speedy recovery and maintain confidence among the people. The final point Dr. Sugawara spoke on was the economic crisis that has fallen on both Japan and the United States. This is another kind of disaster with different variables but can cause almost the same kind of devastation. In approaching the one-year anniversary of the Tohoku earthquake we need to look at how Japan will make an economic recovery. The question is will there be another Japanese depression? Professor Arima Professor Arima began his presentation expressing his sincere gratitude for all the help given to the victims of the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. As USJI 2

3 we embark on the discussion of how to prepare for the next disaster our thoughts and prayers are will those who have suffered and died. Sixteen thousand people perished and over three thousand remain missing. As of now no deaths have resulted from the nuclear catastrophe but this might change in time. Giving a rough estimate, 130,000 homes were completely destroyed and 240,000 homes were partially destroyed. Four nuclear power plants and twelve thermal power plants were damaged. Overall the estimate course of damage this disaster has caused is roughly around eight billion dollars. Today Professor Arima will speak about the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant. At the Fukushima Daiichi plant the protective infrastructure was struck by the pacific earthquake and the accompany tsunami. The Tsunami was measured in excess of fifteen meters. It is necessary to mention that Daiichi was willing to withstand a tsunami of maximum height. The statuses of the six reactors were active before the earthquake and the tsunami. After the incident reactors 1-3 went into automatic shut down. In turn this preventive measure did not allow the reactors to cool down thus leading to an explosion. A two-step cooling operation was performed but did not prevent the nearby area from being contaminated. The area within a twenty kilometer radius was declared a no go zone and entry was prohibited. A decontamination initiative was taken. In retrospect what caused the accident to become more severe was the inadequate coordination between the central disaster countermeasures headquarters and the onsite operators. Other factors that led to the tragedy were the inadequate conditions, insufficient mobilization of experts and people required at the early stages. Professor Arima commended the actions taken by the employees who did their best to prevent the severity of the situation become worse. The conditions were imaginable and the employees were able to continue their most important work. Without the tsunami the reactors would have been sustainable and there would have been no problems. What caused the accident was the tsunami that engulfed the facility fallowing the earthquake. There have been many studies into the 869 earthquake and was well understood there was a chance of a large earthquake taking place on the North East coast. No one on these studies thought the Fukushima area would have had such high tsunamis. After the earthquake people claimed they knew this could happen but the prediction was too late. The natural disaster revealed the weaknesses of nuclear power plants in Japan. The action plan must be reviewed to ensure the establishment of a system that is functional even during the most severe of accidents. There have not been enough countermeasures adopted for tackling the phenomenon of the tsunamis that potentially accompany an earthquake. Adequate safety measures based on the active utilization of the PSA method to pinpoint and eliminate the failing of nuclear power plants must be adopted. USJI 3

4 To ensure we are ready for the next disaster we need to promote research in nuclear safety to build a foundation of safety measures. Comprehensive research plans must be reviewed and reconstructed with the aim of achieving improved safety. In conclusion we have a responsibility to our predecessors and to the future of the world to continue to achieve further advancements in nuclear safety Frank Von Hippel Dr. Von Hippel s presentation focuses on nuclear fuel cycle policy. What links the fuel cycle to nuclear weapon development is the enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium from spent fuel ( reprocessing ). Uranium enrichment and reprocessing were originally developed during WWII to produce highly enriched uranium (Hiroshima) and plutonium (Nagasaki). Uranium enrichment today is used mostly to produce low enriched uranium (3-5% U- 235) for nuclear power reactors. Dr. Von Hippel s primary focus is on the reprocessing phase in the fuel cycle. Unlike uranium enrichment, reprocessing is not necessary and not economic for the current generation of nuclear power plants and most countries do not do it. France, Japan and the UK are the three countries that have large reprocessing plants. The UK recently decided it that it will terminate its reprocessing program and France could do so as well if s a Socialist-Green Coalition is elected. Reprocessing is of a concern because it makes plutonium available for potential weapons use. Plutonium in spent fuel, which after 10 years, is protected by gamma fields produced mostly by cesium-137. Even 50 years after discharge, doses from the LWR fuel assembly are lethal after thirty minutes and remote processing behind thick walls is required to recover the plutonium. But,after separation, plutonium can be handled in lightweight containers and can be processed in a glove box. Making plutonium accessible by reprocessing is therefore a major security concern. Today Japan is the only non-weapon state that reprocesses. After India used nominally civilian reprocessing to acquire nuclear weapons, the US began questioning the previous US policy of promoting reprocessing worldwide. Today, in negotiations with the US, South Korea is demanding the same rights to reprocess and enrich as Japan. Since reprocessing is unnecessary and costly, it is slowly being phased out. Separated plutonium, a legacy of the Cold War and the breeder reactor dream, has become a disposal problem. Mostly it is being disposed of in light-water reactor fuel. Japan has built a new $27 billion reprocessing plant. Operating the reprocessing plant will increase the cost of electric power in Japan by more than $2 billion per year or about $90 billion over 40 years. Recycling the plutonium in reactor fuel will not significantly decrease that cost. The alternative is to store the spent fuel. Interim storage of the 32,000 tons of spent fuel to be reprocessed at Rokkasho would cost about 25 billion dollars. USJI 4

5 Interim spent fuel storage is the standard approach for managing spent fuel. In the US, the reinforced-concrete air-cooled storage casks are stored outside. Germany places the casks in thick-walled protective buildings. Most countries store the spent fuel at the reactor sites. The Fukushima disaster has now dramatized that storage of spent fuel in pools is not necessarily safe and dense-packing the pools has made pool storage more dangerous than it needs to be. The original intention was that spent fuel would only spend a few years in a pool before being reprocessed but now the practice is to store more than 20 years of discharges in these pools. The utilities are resistant to moving back to open racking because buying more storage casks for the older fuel that would be moved out of the pools would cost about 0.05 cents/kwh generated from the fuel not much but cumulatively on the order of $60 million per reactor. In summary, most countries are moving away from reprocessing. We are down to a small list of countries, including Japan, that plan to continue reprocessing. But reprocessing in any country is an international security problem because of the dangers that separating plutonium creates. USJI 5