THE 2012 ENERGY CRISIS AND THE LESSONS LEARNT IN VRA

Transcription

1 2013 THE 2012 ENERGY CRISIS AND THE LESSONS LEARNT IN VRA KM Section/P&SM Department Volta River Authority 01-Jan-13

2 THE 2012 ENERGY CRISIS AND THE LESSONS LEARNT Introduction Power generation in Ghana was faced with many challenges in 2012, beginning with minor load shedding from January 2013 to August 2013, mainly due to irregular gas flow from West African Gas Pipeline Company Limited (WAPCo). The load shedding became more intense when WAPCO submarine gas pipeline got damage by the anchor of a ship on August 28, The situation resulted in the complete shutdown of Sunon Asogli Power Plant (SAPP). This compelled VRA to run its thermal plants mainly on light crude oil instead of natural gas. Interruption in gas supply resulted in increased importation of light crude oil above planned quantities by VRA, thus increasing the cost of power generation. As a result, the negative impact of gas supply on SAPP and VRA Thermal Plants, throughout the year, resulted in intense load shedding of power throughout the country. West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) has now been repaired, recommissioned and back in operation. The Force Majeure notice earlier issued in the wake of the pipeline incident, August 28, 2012 was formally lifted on 11 th July 2013 and WAPCo resumed gas transportation on July 12 th, Lessons Learnt in VRA on Power Crisis 1

3 Challenges of the load shedding Public image of VRA was at its lowest as the public could not distinguish ECG and GRIDCo from VRA. Communication between VRA S engineers, operators, the Executive and corporate communication team did not flow well. This resulted in the distortion of facts put in the public domain. Also communication complications between VRA, GRIDCo and ECG operations resulted in irregular schedules of load shedding. For instance if GRIDCo asked that a load of 100 Mw be shed, ECG will shed 150. In such cases many more people had their lights off than expected. Another challenge was that ECG somehow hid behind the load shedding to do their maintenance activities instead of planning them. Also the public seem not to know the difference between ECG, GRIDCO and VRA this became evidence from the interaction with the public during the educational activities undertaken during the load shedding exercise. Generation reliability was challenged by hydro and gas uncertainties. Beyond the base load, the mid-merit and merit load was challenged by gas supply reliability from Nigeria. What did we do well? There was collaboration between VRA, ECG, GRIDCO, SAPP and others, in some ways. After Action Review processes were also taking into consideration. Generation reliability and transmission reliability was able to complement to resolve the load shedding problems. Lessons Learnt in VRA on Power Crisis 2

4 The Future Despite the mistakes that have been made, some things can be done to improve VRA s prospects for the future. Ghana should encourage private-sector investment and development of new generating capacity to decrease the risk of shortfalls in supply. The problems with the electrical infrastructure and the natural-gas pipeline and storage system must be addressed. Ultimately, the system should be much less dependent on political decision making. The crisis is over for now, but there is a potential for future crises, particularly if VRA s action is affected by political dispensation. Lessons learnt in VRA Irregular supply of gas to Thermal plants has the potential of adversely affecting system reliability therefore steps should be taken to keep adequate inventory of LCO. Steps should be taken to ensure effective transfer of Plant Operation from Natural gas to LCO firing, made for thermal units that run on both gas and LCO to ensure reliable power generation. Steps should be taken to ensure system voltage stability to reduce system losses For VRA to do well in crisis management, steps should be taken to improve and sustain communication between VRA, ECG and GRIDCo to forestall contradictory reportage on occurrences in the course of crisis. For instance, the team put together by the ministry of energy during the crisis was splendid, however it appears the team s activities has faded as a result of improvement in Lessons Learnt in VRA on Power Crisis 3

5 supply. VRA should work towards the Ministry taking steps in to sustaining activities the team. This will lead to reactive management of generation and supply issues before crisis set in. Demand side management (energy conservation) appliance efficiency, load management. Conservation of electric power is one good step to managing energy crisis effectively. If the public are sensitized to conserve power in their homes, there might not be the need to shed load, considering the amount of load that was being shed during the crisis. VRA must take steps on its own to improve and sustain education on power conservation for the public. This can be done through media visits to VRA operational areas, documentaries on VRA s operations, public lectures and a closer relationship with the public. VRA should take steps to develop a strategy that will strengthen its communication relationship with the public, to make them conversant with VRA s operations. This will enlighten the public about what VRA does, so they can put distinction between GRIDCO, ECG and VRA s operations. VRA should take steps to improve its public image. These can be done through rebranding of the whole organization, staff attitude and image and how staff conducts themselves outside of the Organization s setup. To ensure coherence and efficiency in the development and implementation of generation projects, it is important to develop comprehensive procedures for the procurement of new capacity in a transparent and competitive manner. Lessons Learnt in VRA on Power Crisis 4