Managing spent fuel in the United States: The illogic of reprocessing (report on

Transcription

1 Managing spent fuel in the United States: The illogic of reprocessing (report on Frank von Hippel, Princeton University Co-chair, International Panel on Fissile Material Congressional Staff Briefing on The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)!& Nuclear Waste Reprocessing& Finding a Viable Solution for Nuclear Waste, Rayburn H.O.B. 2362B, April 4, Percent of U.S. Spent Fuel is at sites of Operating Reactors It was supposed to be shipped to Yucca Mountain, starting in 1998 It won t be shipped to Yucca Mountain before 2017, at the earliest. As the spent-fuel pools fill up, older spent fuel is increasingly being stored in dry casks on the sites. Soon, 2000 tons/year!200 casks/yr (2 per reactor-year) costing $ million/year, (including personnel and costs at sites without reactors). The utilities are suing the government for these costs. But plenty of space for and negligible hazard. No need to panic. 2

2 Interim storage, French style. DOE appears to have accepted AREVA s proposal (Congress has not) that U.S. separate & recycle plutonium once in mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and store the spent MOX fuel at the reprocessing plant -- as in France. (Areva builds the plants.). LEU Fuel MOX Fuel Water-cooled reactors Spent MOX Fuel Spent LEU fuel storage MOX Fuel fabrication plant plutonium Spent MOX fuel storage Reprocessing Plant Radioactive waste Radioactive uranium Problems: Increases wastes, increases cost of nuclear power and increases risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. 3 Increases Costs: According to the French Government, Transforming LEU spent fuel into MOX spent fuel doubles cost of disposal Report to the Prime Minister [of France]: Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power Option, (2000) 4

3 Reprocessing by itself costs ten times as much as dry-cask storage La Hague reprocessing plant. Square mile, $20+ billion capital cost (overnight), $15 billion decommissioning cost (Japan), $1+ billion/yr operational cost, vs $ B/yr incremental cost for additional dry-cask spent-fuel storage) 5 Market failure: Utilities not renewing reprocessing contracts (Countries with separated plutonium in red.) 5 Countries reprocess or plan to 13 Customer countries have quit or plan to 12 Countries have not reprocessed China (incomplete plant) 6.4 Armenia (in Russia) 0.4 Argentina 0.9 France (67%) 63.4 Belgium (home/france) 5.8 Brazil 1.9 India (?) 3.6 Bulgaria (Russia) 2.7 Canada 12.9 Japan (90% planned) 44.3 Czech Repub (Russia) 2.6 Lithuania 1.3 Netherlands (in France) 0.5 Finland (Russia) 2.7 Mexico 1.4 Russia (15%) 21.7 Germany(home/Franc/UK)20.3 Pakistan 0.4 UK (quitting) 11.8 Hungary (Russia) 1.7 Romania 0.6 Japan (France/UK) 44.3 Slovenia 0.7 Slovak Repub (Russia) 2.5 South Africa 1.8 Spain (France, UK) 7.6 South Korea 16.8 Sweden (France/UK) 8.9 Taiwan 4.9 Switzerland (France/UK) 3.2 U.S. (since 1972) 97 Ukraine (Russia) 13.1 Total (70%) Total Total

4 The proliferation risk. Separated plutonium can be carried away easily. Spent fuel self-protecting for more than a century. Separated plutonium PWR Spent fuel assembly (1000 pounds and 12 feet long) 2.5 kg Pu in light-weight container. Can be processed in a glove box. 3-4 cans enough for Nagasaki-type bomb. (Mayak Reprocessing Plant, 2004) 5 kg Pu rems/hr at 1 meter 50 years after discharge. Requires 20-ton cask to transport & remote reprocessing behind thick shielding walls to recover. 7 U.S. nonproliferation policy on reprocessing Since India used its first separated civilian plutonium to make a bomb in 1974, U.S. policy has been: We don t reprocess. You don t need to either. Very successful: No additional countries have launched civilian reprocessing in the past 30 years and several have stopped. Bush Administration proposed new policy, The weapon states and Japan will do it for you. Negative reactions. Administration is now encouraging South Korea to reprocess in violation of the 1992 Korean Peninsula Denuclearization agreement and is encouraging countries that do not reprocess to reprocess. 8

5 Country Civil Reprocessing Status Weapon status Australia Bulgaria Canada China Planning to reprocess Partner Countries in Global Nuclear Energy Partnership France Ghana Hungary Italy Japan Jordan Reprocesses Reprocesses What kind of nonproliferation initiative encourages countries that are storing spent fuel to reprocess? Kazakhstan Lithuania Poland Romania Russia Reprocesses (15%) Senegal Slovenia South Korea Ukraine U.K. Quitting reprocessing 9 Summary Reprocessing would: Exchange interim, on-site storage of self-protecting spentfuel for interim stockpiling of plutonium that can easily be removed and made into nuclear bombs. Cost ten times as much as interim dry-cask storage and twice as much as direct disposal. Provide cover for other countries to develop nuclearweapon options. Increase the risk of nuclear terrorism. 10