Table of Contents. Setting the Stage

Transcription

1 Table of Contents Setting the Stage Chapter 1: The Puzzling Asymmetry 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Some Facts 1.3 Some Principles 1.4 The Structure of the Book 1.5 Related Literature 1.6 Hybrid Firms Perfection and Symmetry Chapter 2: Profit Maximization and Control Rights 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Institutional Setting of Walrasian Theory 2.3 Control Groups and Walrasian Theory 2.4 Control Groups with Fixed Membership 2.5 Transactions between Insiders and Outsiders 2.6 A Preview Chapter 3: The Labor-Managed Firm in the Short Run 3.1 Introduction 3.2 From the WDV Firm to the SD Firm 3.3 The Labor-Managed Economy: Description 3.4 The Labor-Managed Economy: Equilibrium 3.5 Comparison with the Walrasian Economy 3.6 Ex Ante and Ex Post Workers' Control 3.7 Postscript Chapter 4: The Labor-Managed Firm in the Long Run 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Share-Goods Firm: Description 4.3 The Share-Goods Firm: Value Maximization 4.4 Collective Ownership and Rental of Capital 4.5 Rent Appropriation 4.6 What Does the Model Show? 4.7 Postscript

2 Chapter 5: The Labor-Managed Firm in General Equilibrium 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Share-Goods Economy: Description 5.3 The Share-Goods Economy: Equilibrium 5.4 Comparison with the Walrasian Economy 5.5 What Does the Model Show? 5.6 The Drèze Model of Labor Management 5.7 Postscript Imperfection and Asymmetry Chapter 6: Empirical Asymmetries (I) 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Aggregate Rarity 6.3 Industry Distribution 6.4 Comparative Statics 6.5 Objective Functions 6.6 Productivity 6.7 Wage Structure Chapter 7: Empirical Asymmetries (II) 7.1 Entry Rates 7.2 Exit Rates 7.3 Membership Markets 7.4 Degeneration 7.5 Underinvestment 7.6 Agglomeration 7.7 An Interpretive Summary Chapter 8: The Rarity of Labor-Managed Firms 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Conventional Wisdom 8.3 Theory Versus Evidence 8.4 The Alienability Approach 8.5 A Road Map Appropriation Problems Chapter 9: Imperfect Appropriation

3 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Comparative Statics 9.3 Expansion versus Contraction 9.4 Incentives for Degeneration 9.5 Incentives for Underinvestment 9.6 Sources of Imperfect Appropriation 9.7 Postscript 9.8 Appendix Chapter 10: Firm Formation with Adverse Selection 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Production Issues 10.3 Bargaining Issues 10.4 Equilibrium Organizational Form 10.5 The Plywood Cooperatives 10.6 Conclusion 10.7 Postscript 10.8 Appendix Chapter 11: Partnership Markets with Adverse Selection 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The Model 11.3 Price Determination 11.4 Property Rights 11.5 Welfare Analysis 11.6 Conclusion 11.7 Postscript 11.8 Appendix Public Good Problems Chapter 12: Collective Choice and Investor Takeovers 12.1 Introduction 12.2 The Model 12.3 Market Structure and Policy Preferences 12.4 Takeover Bids and Sustainability 12.5 Conclusion 12.6 Postscript Chapter 13: Free Riding and Employee Buyouts 13.1 Introduction

4 13.2 The Model 13.3 Welfare Maximization 13.4 Nash Equilibrium 13.5 Equilibrium and Efficiency 13.6 Conclusion 13.7 Appendix Opportunism Problems (I) Chapter 14: Transaction Cost Economics 14.1 Introduction 14.2 Conceptual Framework 14.3 The Use and Abuse of Authority 14.4 Work Organization 14.5 Efficiency and Causality 14.6 Postscript Chapter 15: Firm-Specific Investments 15.1 Introduction 15.2 The Economic Environment 15.3 Output Choice in the Capitalist Firm 15.4 Wage Bargaining in the Capitalist Firm 15.5 Equilibrium Organizational Form 15.6 Surplus Maximization 15.7 Postscript Opportunism Problems (II) Chapter 16: Asset Ownership and Work Incentives 16.1 Introduction 16.2 The Model 16.3 Equilibrium with Outside Ownership 16.4 Equilibrium with Joint Ownership 16.5 The Equivalence Theorem 16.6 Conclusion 16.7 Postscript 16.8 Appendix Chapter 17: Capital Stocks and Labor Flows 17.1 Introduction

5 17.2 The Model 17.3 Incentives in the Capital-Managed Firm 17.4 Incentives in the Labor-Managed Firm 17.5 Viability Comparisons 17.6 Some Caveats 17.7 Conclusion 17.8 Appendix Chapter 18: Honest and Dishonest Controllers 18.1 Introduction 18.2 The Model 18.3 Equilibrium without Adverse Selection 18.4 Equilibrium with Adverse Selection 18.5 Capitalist Equilibrium 18.6 Liquidity Issues 18.7 Conclusion Synthesis and Agenda Chapter 19: Breaking the Symmetry 19.1 Introduction 19.2 Appropriation Problems 19.3 Public Good Problems 19.4 Opportunism Problems 19.5 Managerial Benefits 19.6 The Rarity of Labor-Managed Firms 19.7 Theoretical Agenda 19.8 Empirical Agenda 19.9 Conclusion Chapter 20: Policy Directions 20.1 Introduction 20.2 Market Failures 20.3 Evaluation Criteria 20.4 Discouraging Investor Takeovers 20.5 Encouraging Employee Buyouts 20.6 Creating Federations 20.7 Conclusion