The Culture Within A Culture

Transcription

1 The Culture Within A Culture The Impact of Organizational Culture on Nuclear Safety Presented By: Jesse L. Brooks, III MSOD President, J.L. Brooks & Associates, Inc. Vice President, Tosan, Inc. 1

2 Abstract Organizational culture has a major influence on the development of a strong nuclear safety culture. There are many ways to define culture. For our purposes here, we define culture as the basic assumptions, shared values, and beliefs that guide the way employees behave toward each other and approach their work. It s the way we do things around here. There are four facets of culture: Artifacts - What we see and hear (Congruency of espoused values, structures and practices) Climate - How it feels, perceptions. Behaviors & Attitudes - Associated with values and beliefs. Assumptions - Deeply held, commonly out of our awareness. We will further explore how the general culture impacts an organization s ability to develop a strong, constructive nuclear safety culture. We will look at the attributes of a constructive culture and its relationship to performance, as well as those attributes of a constructive culture that are necessary and consistent with the development of a strong nuclear safety culture. The question that begs an answer is, Can we build a strong nuclear safety culture within a general culture that is not focused on improving the attitudes and behaviors of its workforce in a constructive way? Specifically, we will look at how cultural surveys can help us to understand assess and understand the impact a general culture has on the its embedded nuclear safety culture. We will explore how through the use of organizational culture assessments (such as the Organizational Culture Inventory or OCI), we may gain employees perspectives about the behaviors that are expected of them. Understanding these perspectives can help us to identify and reinforce the desired behaviors we seek and teach us how to shift away from those behaviors that are not consistent with a strong nuclear safety culture. We are all impacted by and assimilated into culture, to some degree, if we are to survive in an organization. Many times we are unaware of the degree to which we have been impacted and assimilated. Our work is to raise awareness about how your current culture influences your actions and decisions and ultimately, those behaviors that support nuclear safety. 2

3 The Impact of Culture on Organizational Performance Tosan, Inc. has for many years held the belief that culture can be measured and that a certain type of culture can be beneficial for nuclear power plants, in terms of their ability to sustain high performance over time and improve nuclear safety. In our work with nuclear clients, we use the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) developed by Human Synergistics International as a means to assess the Current and Ideal cultures of organizations. It is our contention that there is an ideal nuclear culture that holds high expectations for its members to manifest constructive behaviors in their approach to work and their interactions with each other. As a result, based upon our experience in working with a number of nuclear plants and organizations, INPO s Organizational Systems Department invited Tosan to partner with them as part of a long-range business objective, Strengthen the Core, a project to compare plant performance with leadership behaviors. The following is a synopsis of the methodology and results of the project: The Organizational Culture Inventory, Leadership, and Plant Performance Summary Report (INPO, 2009) As part of a long-range business objective Strengthen the Core, the Organizational Systems Department of INPO completed a project to compare plant performance with leadership behaviors. A survey, the Human Synergistics Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI), was used to assess culture. The OCI consists of 120 statements describing behaviors that might be expected of members of an organization. These statements are grouped into three categories: Constructive, Aggressive-Defensive, and Passive-Defensive. Behaviors described by OCI in the Constructive category are characterized by developing healthy relationships, working effectively with people, following policies and practices, accepting criticism, pursuing a standard of excellence, planning, knowing the business, being good listeners, resolving conflicts constructively, thinking in unique and independent ways, and involving others in decisions affecting them. Behaviors described by OCI in the Aggressive/Defensive category, are characterized by competition rather than cooperation, refusing to accept criticism, personally running everything, maintaining unquestioned authority, shifting responsibility to others, playing politics, putting things off, opposing new ideas and setting unrealistically high goals. Behaviors described by OCI in the Passive/Defensive category are characterized by avoiding confrontation, agreeing with everyone, never challenging superiors, accepting the status quo, switching priorities to please others, being good followers, and treating rules as more important than people and/or ideas. Most of the specific survey items in the OCI Constructive category are consistent with the behaviors described in the INPO document, The Leadership Fundamentals to Achieve and Sustain High Levels of Plant Performance. This document was developed by an expert panel of academic, organizational development consultants, and experienced nuclear managers. The goal of this project was to identify specific organizational and leadership behaviors that have a relationship to plant performance and update the INPO document to include or highlight these behaviors. 3

4 Methodology Twelve nuclear power plant sites participated in this project. Four sites were considered strong, five sites considered steady and three sites were considered to be challenged. The categories and plant placement were based on WANO performance indicators and INPO plant assessment ratings. Two fundamental approaches were used to analyze the data visual comparison of the graphs provided by HSI and statistical analysis. Results The results of both the visual and statistical analyses demonstrate a relationship between specific organizational and leadership behaviors and plant performance. Plants that report organizational and leadership behaviors described by the OCI as Constructive tend to have higher INPO assessment scores, a higher INPO Performance Index, and a higher Unit Capability Factor. Additionally, plants that report similar organizational and leadership behaviors have lower operating costs per Mwh, a lower number of total scrams, a lower Forced Loss Rate, a lower industrial safety accident rate, and a lower number of unplanned automatic scrams. Plants reporting organizational and leadership behaviors described by OCI as Aggressive/Defensive and Passive/Defensive tend to have the opposite results. Respondents rate the extent to which each worker is expected to exhibit a certain behavior. The rating scale ranges from Not at all (1) to To a great extent (5). The statements are interpreted as reflective of twelve styles; Achievement, Self-actualizing, Humanistic-Encouraging, Affliliative, Approval, Conventional, Dependence, Avoidance, Oppositional, Power, Competitive, and Perfectionistic. The grouping of these styles falls into three distinct categories; Constructive, Passive/Defensive, and Aggressive/Defensive. Two fundamental approaches were used to analyze the data visual comparison and statistical analysis. The visual comparison process reviewed the circumplexes provided by HSI and looked for differences between sites and groups. The circumplex results represented the entire organization as well as selected subgroups within each plant. The subgroups were by level (Senior Leaders, Supervisors, and Individual Contributors) and by function (Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering). Statistical analysis utilized a number of approaches including comparison of means, correlation, discriminate analysis, and principal components factor analysis. Correlations were between various groups of OCI items and plant performance indicators (PIs), including, the INPO assessment rating, Forced Loss Rate, industrial safety accident rate, NRC ROP Action Matrix, operating cost per Mwh, INPO Performance Index, total number of scrams, the number of unplanned automatic scrams, and Unit Capability Factor. The sites surveyed identified their current culture as Aggressive/Defensive. Factors that promote these cultural norms are that leaders tend to focus disproportionately on what people are doing rather than how people are doing. The emphasis on security oriented behavior with respect to task is driven by several factors including: lack of employee involvement, job insecurity, and are expected to do things without the necessary resources at the individual level; 4

5 methods of reinforcement and sources of power and influence at the first line supervisor level; and cultural values at the senior leader level. Aggressive/Defensive styles tend to emerge in organizations where competition is valued over cooperation and where work takes precedence over all else. Outcomes associated with Aggressive/Defensive organizations are that they experience relatively high levels of stress, role conflict, and dissatisfaction. The interactions with co-workers suffer as the organization scrambles to meet conflicting or impossible expectations and standards. Aggressive/Defensive organizations experience burn out and lose many people - including their best employees. Conclusion Using the OCI as the measurement tool, there is a relationship between organizational culture attributes, plant performance and leadership behaviors. Correlations to a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture Embedded within the General Culture Given the results of the INPO surveys, how then do high expectations for constructive behaviors have an impact of the foundations of a strong nuclear safety culture? First, it may serve to first define what is meant by a nuclear safety culture. In a recent article, The Mindset of Nuclear Safety, Dr. Marin Ignatov, a renowned consultant on nuclear safety and Anne Kerhoas, a Senior Safety Specialist with the IAEA, explain how nuclear safety depends on culture as well as good engineering practices. Dr. Ignatov goes on to define a strong nuclear safety culture as the association of three major factors: a viable management system, a widely shared awareness of nuclear hazards and widely shared behavioral norms and values. A strong safety culture can be only expected in cases where the Management System is implemented into actual behavior not because negative personal or group consequences (sanctions) are feared, but as a result of profound awareness about nuclear hazards and positive social norms, attitudes and values of management and staff. Tosan would perhaps focus this a bit more by saying that safety is the outcome of how group and individual values, assumptions, and expectations define the parameters and boundaries for behavior. If those boundaries establish a strong value for life and health, a safe work environment is the outcome and can be sustained. It is important to understand how the existing cultural foundation supports safe behavior or how existing assumptions, values, and/or expectations establish behaviors that may circumvent safety. It should be noted that Dr. Ignatov seems to conclude that organizational behaviors built on trust (Constructive) rather than fear (sanctions) are essential to a strong nuclear safety culture. This view seems to be shared by INPO, based upon its project survey results. Those attributes and expectations of a constructive general culture are absolutely in alignment with those attributes and principles that contribute to a strong nuclear safety culture, clearly articulated by IAEA, INPO and WANO. Nuclear safety then, may be further described as a mindset, supported by and manifested through specific set of measureable behaviors that demonstrate a concrete commitment to, and understanding of, nuclear safety as a nuclear organization s first priority. 5

6 The Nuclear Professional : An Intervention to Improve a Nuclear Safety Culture To more accurately demonstrate how a constructive organizational culture is required to nurture its embedded nuclear safety culture, the following summarized case study is an overview of a designed intervention with a Tosan client. The Challenge A nuclear operator experienced significant nuclear safety events at two of its fleet plants. The client conducted a comprehensive root cause analysis into the nuclear safety culture due to the level and risk associated with these events. The root cause analysis identified a number of contributing factors including: operational processes, staffing levels, job skills, a lack of business acumen, and the underlying organizational culture. Upon completion of the root cause analysis the organization then conducted additional analysis of the general culture and nuclear safety culture. The organization utilized employee interviews, focus groups, observations, and cultural surveys to conduct this analysis. The resulting data was analyzed using several highly specialized diagnostic tools including an Open Systems model, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation s (INPO) Organizational Effectiveness Principles, Objectives and Criteria and Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publication, Attributes of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture. The analysis indicated that the behavioral norms regarding both the general and nuclear safety culture were a leading factor to the events, and that their current culture was not supportive of maintaining long-term, safe performance. In addition to the necessary corrective actions required to address the causal factors of these nuclear safety events, the client was confronting two pervasive, and specific, human resource challenges within the organization. The first challenge was the turnover of an aging workforce, a systemic dilemma within nuclear power plants around the world. The second challenge was an initiative to dramatically reduce the overall corporate dependency on contract labor and increase the number of staff members. Collectively these challenges presented us with the following cultural concerns to focus on: Shift the general culture from a predominantly passive/defensive, reactive culture to a more constructive, proactive cultural style Strengthen the nuclear safety culture through greater comprehension of the definition of nuclear professionalism and commitment to the required behaviors Develop effective working relationships across generational lines; thereby, facilitating the transfer of native knowledge from the experienced workers to the new workers while increasing the levels of teamwork throughout the organization Challenge of on-boarding a large number of new employees into the workforce; gaining their understanding and commitment to behaviors supportive of a strong nuclear safety culture 6

7 The initial actions of the client were to design and implement corrective action plans to address the deficiencies of operational processes and staffing levels. Once these efforts were underway, Tosan was contacted to assist in assessing the general culture, defining a concrete picture of the desired culture, and designing and executing a plan to shift the general culture of the organization. Tosan was also asked to develop a plan to engage and strengthen employees alignment to the principles for operational nuclear safety, strengthen teamwork across departments, and to assist in the facilitation of the workforce transition and integration of new employees. Solution Tosan used a proven approach to address the client s culture change needs. We conducted a behavioral-based assessment of both the current and of Ideal cultures. This assessment consisted of administering two surveys and conducting interviews, observations, and focus groups across all levels of the organization. One survey measured the expected behaviors of the current culture and the second survey asked employees to describe the behaviors that would be required to create a strong constructive nuclear safety culture (Ideal). Finally, interviews, observations, and focus groups were used to identify concrete examples of behaviors that represented the current culture. This assessment provided a clear definition of the client s current culture, which showed high expectations for passive/defensive, reactive behaviors where employees avoided responsibility and shifted blame to others. To identify the ideal culture a second survey was given to a cross section of 50 employees, including directors, managers, and frontline workers. In addition, it was determined that engaging the frontline workers in the culture change and enhancing their understanding and commitment to behaviors consistent with a strong nuclear safety culture was critical to improve organizational performance. The next step was the delivery of a facilitated workshop for leaders at all levels throughout the organization. As well as creating alignment to the desired culture, this workshop sought to strengthen teamwork while building the skills of the leaders to successfully foster a constructive work environment and engage frontline employees. Next, Tosan tailored the same workshop to address the specific needs of the individual contributors and the frontline workers. The purpose of this workshop was to strengthen commitment to the client s Vision and constructive nuclear safety behaviors, build interpersonal relationships across generations, improve teamwork, and increase personal responsibility. The sessions were two-days in duration and had an average class size of 27 employees. The sessions consisted of developmental experiences targeting personal beliefs and behavior, teamwork, vision building, relationship building, and enhancement of employees understanding of the risks associated with the unique characteristics of nuclear power. Awareness of behavioral patterns was facilitated through the use of surveys that helped the employees see how their behavior either aligned or did not align 7

8 to the behaviors of the desired culture. The survey provided employees with personal strengths and areas for improvement, as well as a deeper understanding of how they individually aligned to the ideal culture, which resulted in personal action plans being developed by all participants. Finally, the overall workshop design included highly interactive, team-based work that promoted the idea of the nuclear professional and the development of working relationships especially in working across generational boundaries. The workshop reinforced the contribution and value of the experienced workers, challenged them to become role models of a nuclear safety culture, mentors to new workers, and it engaged the new workers to become more open to learning from the more seasoned employees. Results Participants were given course evaluations at the end of each workshop. This corresponds to Kirkpatrick s Four Levels of Evaluation Model (first level) and measures the initial reaction of the participants to the quality and delivery of the content through a five-point rating system as well as providing an opportunity to comment and offer improvement suggestions. The results from the post workshop survey achieved an overall average rating of 4.5 for the workshops. Conclusion Normally it takes two to three years to see a substantial culture change. However, key performance indicators suggest most departments in the client s organization have made gains in lowering human performance errors and industrial safety accidents. Another round of the current culture survey was completed and the results showed a statistically significant shift in the culture away from the passive/defensive style towards a more constructive style. More importantly, the organization made statistically significant improvement in the 24 behaviors associated with long-term, high performance within nuclear plants. 8