NATO Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming)Concept

Transcription

1 HQ NATO ACT NATO Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming)Concept Conceptual Framework for the implementation of a Bi- Strategic Command decision support tool 11/3/2011 Version 2

2 Introduction 1. Background. The effectiveness of the Alliance relies on thoroughly considered and well implemented plans, policies, and procedures crafted with an understanding of the unique strategic issues that we face. Perfection in the creation of these plans, policies, and procedures is an unrealistic goal. However, the reduction of errors in reasoning or errors in the development process would contribute significantly to our overall success. Further, while our Alliance brings together a broad range of backgrounds and opinions, for a number of reasons our processes necessarily drive towards a consensus opinion, often pushing out unique perspectives that could add greater clarity or context to a problem. The opportunity to apply alternative critical thought to a problem can offer the decision maker a broader view and possibly expose unforeseen considerations that might cause the failure of otherwise thoroughly considered solutions. This alternative analysis offers the opportunity to inject additional knowledge into a decision making process and, while not eliminating the social and cultural factors that can hamper the process, presents a viable hedge against groupthink, mirror imaging, and the numerous other traps that turn good intentions into bad planning. Alternative analysis, as described above, is an evolution of current capabilities that are generally referred to as Red Teams or Red Cells. Red Teams and Red Cells are not new capabilities. They have been performed throughout history in many different forms, under many different names, and at many different types of military, government, and business organizations. What links all of the varying definitions and applications is the understood goal of challenging the organization with critical, independent thought. Within the last decade, Red Teams have experienced a renewed and broadened interest within the United States and the United Kingdom, as these countries work to understand and fight against an elusive and unconventional enemy. It is important to note that Red Teams and Red Cells are not always the same function. Red Teams are an evolution of the concept of Red Cells, primarily an intelligence only staff supported function that presents the adversaries perspective during operations planning and war- gaming. Within the US military, the Red Team is a specially trained team that performs a wide range of analysis functions, many outside the planning process. These functions often include the presentation of the traditional Red Cell (adversary) perspective during operations planning. In July 2010, Joint Forces Command Brunssum (JFCB) Joint Assessment Branch (JAB) began researching the value of Red Teaming to their operational planning process at the request of the JFCB Director of Operations. Over the course of the next year they gained significant insight as to the function and roles of Red Teams through extensive study of existing national Red Teams and realized that such a capability provided value to not only their planning process, but other key areas as well (policy development, knowledge development, operational assessment to name a few). During this process a formal standing Red Team was established within the JAB. The Red Team was unable to efficiently execute their role due to a combination of factors including lack of understanding outside their group for the value they add to decision making processes, lack of formal NATO policy regarding the authority for their use, and lack of formal NATO methodology (doctrine) on how they should be used. In early May 2011, JFCB sent a request to ACO to study development of a Red Team Capability for NATO in order to address these issues; this request was endorsed and forwarded to ACT later that month. ACT requested and received endorsement from IMS to begin concept development for a Bi- SC Red Team capability in mid- July Aim. This concept will establish an Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming) capability within NATO. This capability will be a broadly applied methodology that supports the application of alternative, independent analysis to problems faced by the alliance either in conjunction with 1

3 existing processes (i.e. operations planning process) or as a stand- alone capability. This capability does not fill a gap but rather introduces a transformational idea that, when effectively implemented, will help ensure success from the results of decision making processes (plans, policies, procedures, etc.). While the concept builds upon existing Red Team methodology, the distinction provided by using the name Alternative Analysis allows NATO to expand this capability from the already established red team function described within operations planning and differentiate it from the vulnerability assessment capability provided by cyber- defense and physical security red teams. The name also attempts to capture the importance of critical analysis over the adversarial mind- set implied by the name Red Team, thus helping to eliminate the organizational resistance many Red Teams face. To ensure a smooth transition to this new capability a working title - Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming) - was chosen to highlight the link with existing capability while building awareness of the new term for the capability. 2. Scope. The Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming), AA(RT) henceforth, concept introduces a capability which can add value across NATO. The full benefit in the capability is only realized if the scope remains broad and flexible. The capability will encompass a methodology or skill set that is widely available, can be employed throughout NATO, and will be valuable to the outcome of a wide variety of processes, procedures, and decision making requirements. The flexibility intended in the concept will allow different organizations within NATO to employ the capability in a manner that best suits their size, responsibilities, challenges and goals. Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming) Concept 3. Definitions. Terms are important and can have different meanings depending on the context of use and the audience being addressed. Critical terms will be defined for clarity and included in the final concept and any later products produced to support the concept. The NATO Terminology Program will be used to formalize these terms and their associated definitions. Provided below is the draft definition for Alternative Analysis: Alternative Analysis is the application of critical* thought from an independent perspective. *exercising or involving careful judgement or judicious evaluation 4. Functions. A wide variety of functions can be accomplished by implementing a broad Alternative Analysis capability. Regardless of the specific function the end result is better decision making and an improved outcome. Any NATO process that works to solve a problem or arrive at a decision through planning, implementation of a procedure or development of policy will realize benefit from alternative analysis. Smooth interaction between these processes and the input provided by alternative analysis requires careful consideration and clear guidance. The value of alternative analysis is not limited only to process input. Among the most important functions: a. Improve decision making and problem solving by providing alternative perspectives, solutions, and analysis of information. b. Build a greater understanding of the variables found in the Operational Environment (OE) and stakeholders perspectives affecting planning and operations. c. Ensure correct problem identification, end states definition and assessment measures. d. Identify gaps, vulnerabilities, opportunities and faulty or unstated assumptions. e. Provide independent reviews and analysis of concepts, doctrine, procedures and processes. f. Gain a deeper understanding of Enemy/adversary/ally/neutral perspectives. g. Challenge plans from an adversary s or outsider s perspective. 2

4 h. Challenge assessments from an adversary s or outsider s perspective. i. Propose alternative strategies. j. Offer alternatives in mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, and war- gaming. s. Serve as a hedge against mirror imaging and group think by consciously applying alternative thought. 6. Principles. The functions listed above describe some of the things that AA(RT) can accomplish for an organization. However, AA(RT) is not a panacea guaranteeing the success of our efforts. By institutionalizing this methodology into the way we examine information and approach problems, we give NATO staff officers at every level the ability to gain a better understanding of the complex issues they face. The results of this methodology will represent a challenge to the organization s thinking an independent perspective. This challenge forces the development of more complete reasoning and will ultimately result in better decision making. Some of the key principles which support this concept are: a. AA(RT) provides a set of skills not a prescriptive organization. b. It is not designed to be a problem solving methodology or problem solving organization. It is designed to support problem solving. Put another way, AA(RT) is performed to support a problem owner not to solve a problem. AA(RT) is not intended to be a capability that will correct someone else s work. Procedures already exist within staffs and processes to review work that has been completed. The value of AA(RT) is in receiving an independent perspective on that work. c. The problem owner can be at any level of the staff. The methodology is not designed to be a tool only employed by the Command Group. d. The feedback that Alternative Analysis provides to a problem owner should not be widely distributed in order to prevent confusion over intent of the information and potential embarrassment that could result from divergent opinions expressed in the alternative analysis. e. Effective use of the capability requires clear doctrine that balances the necessity of defining its intent and use without hampering the independence of Alternative Analysis. f. AA(RT) can be accomplished by individual staff members, a process member (for instance a JOPG member), a group of process members, or a dedicated team of individuals assigned to a specific project. Broad application of this capability throughout different NATO commands demands flexibility in how it is organized. g. Trained facilitators will ensure appropriate understanding and application of these skills. Facilitators must be well trained in established AA(RT) methodology and have an understanding of the processes that they might be working with in order to provide the most accurate guidance for the capability. 7. Assessments/evaluations. If AA(RT) is working well, the value it provides will be absorbed into the final product or solution that was developed, i.e. a better plan, or a more thorough assessment. Therefore, assessing its worth to a process after the process is complete is difficult. Ultimately, the decision maker or problem solver who is presented with the alternative analysis product should provide an assessment of the impact of their work. However, the alternative analysis could expose flaws in the decision maker s own analysis. This could cause resentment and possibly a skewed evaluation. Leaving AA(RT) to evaluate its own worth creates the same potential for skewed evaluation. Ultimately, evaluation must come after careful consideration and consultation with all stakeholders. Continued leadership support for the capability may necessitate the occasional review of Alternative Analysis products by the commander. 3

5 8. Roles and Responsibilities. Development of this concept requires coordinated effort between the strategic commands. a. Transformation. ACT, through the Capability Development (CAPDEV) directorate, leads the development of a draft concept for Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming) capability. As part of the concept development process ACT will formulate the steps necessary for implementation of the capability. ACT will lead completion of these steps where appropriate or will coordinate with ACO for completion. ACT, through Joint Force Trainer (JFT), will determine training needs required to support the capability. b. Operational. In accordance with IMS tasking, ACO is the primary customer for this capability. As such, ACO will receive the draft concept for review and approval along with ACT. ACO will assist ACT in implementation and will provide feedback to ACT on the capability once implemented. Joint Force Commands (JFCs) or Component Commands may support experimentation during concept development. 9. Capability Elements: AA(RT) is an inexpensive tool that can be implemented with no new hardware systems, no new computer programs, and no new facilities. The DOTMLPFI framework (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability) addresses all relevant military aspects and can be used to present a way ahead that addresses follow- on activities in each area. This concept will require follow- on work to fully establish the development requirements necessary for an effective, efficient, and affordable capability. a. Doctrine. Existing NATO doctrine should be reviewed to determine recommended points for interaction with AA(RT). An AA(RT) handbook should be developed as interim doctrine that will explain the methodology and employment of the capability. Ultimately, the handbook should be developed into more formal doctrine to ensure lasting relevance and a regular review process. b. Organisation. As the concept addresses the development of a methodology rather than a dedicated team of individuals there is no need to alter existing organizational structures. Alternative Analysis Facilitators can hold that designation as a collateral billet to their primary Peacetime Establishment (PE) billet. However, ideally in the future the PE should establish room for dedicated primary Alternative Analysis Facilitators either by changing current billets or adding new ones. c. Training. A multi- tiered training effort should be established that involves detailed training for Alternative Analysis Facilitators, and broader training for leadership and staff officers to understand the capability. Training could occur at a NATO sponsored course and could include Advanced Distributed Learning for continuing education. d. Materiel. Alternative analysis is an intellectual capability that requires no significant materiel investment. Courseware for training will need to be developed. The most significant cost incurred would be in the creation of online courseware if advanced distributed learning is considered. e. Leadership. As discussed under training, leadership will need to receive training in the use and management of AA(RT). Leadership will also need to realize the importance of their support for this capability in order for the contrarian views often presented by AA(RT) to be accepted as a valuable input to the organization. f. Personnel. The appropriate PE positions must be identified and filled with qualified personnel. Trained AA(RT) Facilitators should reside in collateral billets at all commands where the methodology is employed. The size of the staff should dictate the number of Facilitators assigned. g. Facilities. The capability does not require facilities to function. However, future opportunities should not be dismissed, such as the creation of a center of excellence. 4

6 h. Interoperability. Interoperability challenges and requirements are not immediately clear and should continue to be examined throughout concept development and implementation. 10. Resources. In endorsing development of this capability, IMS outlined restrictions on the resource requirements for implementation. Specifically, such an initiative would have to be delivered within existing resources and also that ACO will make both manpower and financial headroom to provide a Red Team, should SACEUR wish to proceed once the concept has been developed. If considered within the existing PE, the year over year cost of this capability should prove minimal limited to supporting travel and training requirements for the cadre of facilitators. Implementation Implementation of the Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming) concept will require the support of leadership. To attempt a wide reaching, fundamental, positive change in the way we examine problems and information cannot be accomplished without the support, encouragement, and demands of leadership. Flag and General officers must champion the benefits of this concept and drive it through implementation. Not only will they need to support the concept, Leadership and staff officers will need to be trained in the basics of the methodology and how to employ it. Facilitators should be in place early during implementation to ensure the methodology is being actively and properly employed. Roadmap The roadmap for implementation of a coherent capability should be based on the DOTMLPFI capability elements in a logical sequence to ensure no function is left without its supporting functions. During development, the value of experimentation should be considered and on- going analysis of the concept must be continued to ensure robust capability. Considering implementation of these steps in a nearly concurrent sequence will help to ensure the capability is delivered rapidly. A suggested sequence could be: 1. Complete framework development. 2. Complete draft concept for Bi- Strategic Command review. 3. Build draft implementation plan. 4. Complete a training needs analysis. 5. Develop draft handbook. 6. Deliver final concept. Upon approval of concept: 7. Finalize implementation plan. 8. Complete doctrine review and recommend changes to incorporate AA(RT). 9. Complete training for initial facilitators. 10. Deliver final handbook (use newly trained facilitators to review before release). 5

7 11. Develop NATO specific training curriculum with the assistance of facilitators. Conclusion Alternative Analysis(Red Teaming) offers NATO a unique opportunity to apply independent critical thought to the problems we face. This independent thought will provide a deeper understanding of these problems and more confidence in the decisions that we might be faced with in resolving them. It will build heightened awareness of the biases we have in decision making, the pitfalls of working in groups, and the often skewed perspectives with which we examine information. Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming) provides a broad methodology that breaks through these barriers to good decision making and develops challenges to our organization s mind- set. By supporting and rewarding this critical independent thought, NATO can create a capability that adds value to its decision making processes and will contribute significantly to the strength of the alliance. 6