Presentation prepared for Sixth Vietnam Economists Annual Meeting (VEAM) Hue University, 19 June, 2013

Transcription

1 Presentation prepared for Sixth Vietnam Economists Annual Meeting (VEAM) Hue University, 19 June, 2013 What is PAPI? A policy monitoring tool for middle-income Viet Nam The largest nationwide governance and public administration survey in Viet Nam Second annual iteration monitoring changes in government performance Voice of Vietnamese citizens about governance and public administration experiences Since 2010 more than 32,500 citizens surveyed In 2012 alone: 13,747 citizens A provider of evidence and data to policy makers and a complement to self-assessments and other surveys 1

2 What does PAPI measure? PAPI measures how citizens experience implementation of policies, laws and regulations in six dimensions: 1. Participation at Local Levels 2. Transparency 3. Vertical Accountability 4. Control of Corruption 5. Public Administrative Procedures 6. Public Service Delivery PAPI is a barometer of performance How PAPI is constructed Collection Construction Calibration Dimension i 1 Indicator 1 Indicator n Indicator 1 Indicator n Indicator 1 Indicator n Sub-dimension 1 Sub-dimension 2 Sub-dimension n Weight s Weight s PAPI Indicators are derived from PAPI Survey of individuals in 63 provinces Dimension n Indicator 1 Indicator n Sub-dimension 1 Indicator 1 Sub-dimension n Indicator n 4 2

3 Example of Control of Corruption (Dimension 4) Construction Dimension 4: Control of Corruption Sub-dimension 1: Public Officials Sub-dimension 2: Public Services Sub-dimension 3: Employment Equity in State Agencies Sub-dimension 4: Willingness to Fight Corruption Diversion of State Funds Bribe for LURCs Informal Payment for Health Care Informal Payments for Education Bribe for Employment Nepotism for Employment Awareness of AC Law Willingness to denunciate Bib Bribe for Construction Permits Amount of Bribe for LURCs Local Gov Serious about Corruption Fight Denunciation nciation mechanism used 5 Overview of National Trends 3

4 Overall Progress: Improvement in Four Dimensions PAPI provides an overview of performance nationwide. On the positive side, rises in scores of 4 out of 6 dimensions indicate some level of improvement. Dimensions with slight improvement are control of corruption, transparency, public service delivery and accountability. Dimension sc cores (scale 1 to 10) Dimension 1. Participation at Local Levels 2011 Mean 2012 Mean Change (percentage) Dimension 2. Transparency 1.41 Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability Dimension 4: Control of Corruption* Dimension 5: Administrative Procedures Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery change Percentage Improvements in Dimension Scores (lowest, median and maximum provinces) Dimensional scores of half of the country have marginally edged higher. On every dimension the median score slightly increased in 2012 compared to On average, Vietnamese citizens experienced better local governance and public services in 2012 compared to Dimension 1. Participation at Local Levels Dimension 2. Transparency Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability Dimension 4: Control of Corruption Dimension 5: Administrative Procedures Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery 4

5 PAPI 2012 Key Findings at Provincial Level by Dimension Dashboard of Six Dimensions of PAPI 2012 HCMC TT-Hue Participation/Elections Transparency Accountability Control of Corruption Administrative Procedures Public Service Delivery BRVT Zero Perfect (Each branch size = level of dimensional performance on the scale from 1-10 per dimension) Dashboard helps identify weaknesses even in high-performing provinces. For instance,, while the most consistently high-performing province, has room for improvement on control of corruption., another top-performing performing province, demonstrates weakness in the areas of participation at the local levels and transparency. Lowest performing location, Khanh Hoa, scores relatively well on public service delivery. is another low performer, which is consistent with 2011, presents strength in public administrative procedures, but lags behind other dimensions 5

6 Mapping Differences in Provincial Performance Participation at Local Levels (Dimension 1) TP. Ho Chi Minh Civic Knowledge Opportunities for Participation Quality of Elections Contributions

7 Year-on-Year Changes in Participation at Local Levels ( ) HCMC Transparency (Dimension 2) TP. Ho Chi Minh Poverty Lists Communal Budgets Land-Use Plan/Pricing

8 Year-on-Year Changes in Transparency ( ) HCMC Vertical Accountability (Dimension 3) TP. Ho Chi Minh Interactions With Local Authorities People's Inspection Boards Community Investment Boards

9 Year-on-Year Changes in Vertical Accountability ( ) HCMC Control of Corruption in the Public Sector (Dimension 4) TP. Ho Chi Minh Limits on Public Sector Corruption Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery Equity in Employment Willingness to Fight Corruption

10 Year-on-Year Changes in Control of Corruption ( ) HCMC Perception of Corruption and Bribery in Public Sector PAPI finds that corruption and bribery remain constant problems across several sectors, and also citizens perceptions are on the rise. Citizens largely agree with statements that bribes are required to: get a job in the public sector (44% in 2012 and 29% in 2011) receive medical care (42%, an increase from 31% in 2011) get a land use right certificate (32% in 2012 compared with 21% in 2011) 50% 40% Agree Somewhat agree 30% 20% 10% 0% 30% 28% 19% 19% 16% 15% 13% 12% 9% 8% 10% 6% 14% 14% 9% 9% 8% 10% 12% 13% 7% 9% 12% 7% State Employment Construction Permits Teacher Favourism Health Care LURCs Diversion of State Funds 10

11 Bribery at Upper Bound: Worrying PAPI pioneers cutting edge methods to estimate frequency and size of informal payments in critical areas for citizens. Methodology Land Certificate Hospital Education Size Size Size Analysis Bound of Scale (VND/ Scale (VND/ (VND/student Technique Estimate (%) applicant) (%) patient/visit) /semester) Diff-in- Means Lower 17.0% 123, % 37,000 98,000 Truncated Upper 56.6% 818, % 146, ,000 Bribe requests impact a significant proportion of citizens and amounts paid are substantial when compared to the costs of other activities related to accessing those services. Bribes are evidence of an unfair playing field for citizens with different household economic conditions, especially the poor and the disadvantaged in access to public services. Citizen Perception of Six types of Corruption Zero Cao Bang No Diverting of Public Funds No Bribes for Land Title No Bribes at Hospital No Bribes for Teachers Favors No Kickbacks on Construction No Bribes for State Employment TT-Hue BRVT HCMC Perfect Similar to what was found in PAPI 2011, no province is close to the perfect star graph displayed in the bottom-left corner. Central and southern provinces seem to be better at mitigating corruption in the public sector (,,,,, Binh Dinh and ). Once again, and score closest to the perfect scores, indicating consistency in their performance on all six measures. (Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement) 11

12 Level of Nepotism at Provincial Level Zero TT-Hue HCMC BRVT Perfect (Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing that personal relationship is important and very important; Perfect =100% disagreement) Land Registry Commune Justice Officer Policeman Teacher People's Committee Bribes for jobs in the public sector are prevalent across provinces. At the national level, only 39.07% deny the need to pay bribes for public sector employment, a slight decline as compared to Apart from bribes for jobs, nepotism in recruitment of civil servants and public employees is also prevalent, as constantly found in the previous two annual surveys. This observation has been confirmed through each of the PAPI surveys over the past three years, and confirms the systemic nature of nepotism in public sector employment, even at the lowest level of government. The largest star, which is, is only one-fifths of the perfect star graph that depicts zero relationship necessary for employment. Public Administrative Procedures (Dimension 5) TP. Ho Chi Minh Certification Procedures Construction Permit Land Procedures Personal Procedures

13 Year-on-year Changes in Public Administrative Procedures ( ) HCMC Drivers of satisfaction towards administrative procedures Drivers of satisfaction towards administrative procedures: lack of respect and professionalism stand out prominently. Satisfaction Towards Public Administrative Procedures (% change from overall satisfaction) Certification Procedures -9% -12% -23% -29% -29% -35% -36% -42% -70% -50% -30% -10% No Fees Displayed Bribe Too much Paperwork Incompetent No Clear Info Deadline not achived Unrespectful No Clear Deadline -57% -60% -40% Construction Permits -16% -22% -23% -25% -6% -70% -50% -30% -10% No Fees Displayed Deadline not achived Bribe No Clear Deadline Too much Paperwork Incompetent Unrespectful No Clear Info For citizens who perceived officials as incompetent, satisf action diminished 65% with LURC. Those who perceived lack of respect were 62% less satisfied. Land Use Right Certificates -22% No Fees Displayed -32% No Clear Info -37% Too much Paperwork -39% No Clear Deadline -45% Deadline not achived -62% Unrespectful -65% Incompetent -70% -50% -30% -10% Commune Administrative Procedures -3% -5% -20% -21% -21% -25% -26% -39% -70% -50% -30% -10% No Fees Displayed Bribe Incompetent Too much Paperwork No Clear Info No Clear Deadline Unrespectful Deadline not achived 13

14 Assessment of Quality of Certification Services Zero HCMC BRVT TT-Hue Perfect (Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement) Clear Information Fees Displayed Officials Competent Treated w/respect Paperwork Reasonable Clear Deadline Deadline Met Satisfied w/service Respondents are satisfied with the certification services. National mean of this indicator is 7.14, which is close to the maximum score. Half of provinces score between 5.38 () and 7.38 (), while emerges as a best performer in this indicator. At the provincial level, more provinces see improvement in all eight criteria, as shown in the near-perfect shapes of the star graphs representing the top twenty provinces Assessment of Construction Permit Application Procedures Zero HCMC Perfect Note: Provinces listed here are those with more than 15 applicants in the total sample having applied for the construction permits (Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement) Clear Information Fees Displayed Officials Competent Treated w/respect Paperwork Reasonable Clear Deadline Deadline Met Satisfied w/service Significant variation across provinces with >15 applicants. Compared with Vinh Phuc, and, Tuyen Quang and Ho Chi Minh City are exceptionally poor. Examples: receives complaints from applicants about not publicizing application fees and not meeting deadlines. has issues with the clarity of information about procedures, fees and charges. faces issues with unpublished fees. has complaints about cumbersome paperwork and the attitude and competence of civil servants. 14

15 Assessment of LURCs Application Procedures Zero HCMC BRVT Perfect Note: Provinces listed here are those with more than 15 applicants in the total sample having applied for the construction permits (Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement) Clear Information Fees Displayed Officials Competent Treated w/respect Paperwork Reasonable Clear Deadline Deadline Met Satisfied w/service Remarkable difference across provinces with >15 applicants Poorest ten performers in all eight criteria are mostly northern provinces, with the exception of Ho Chi Minh City, and. Best performers however have uneven performance levels. Examples: seems to have weaknesses in transparency in fees and charges, and of timely service delivery. Paperwork remains cumbersome in. has made significant improvement in competence of civil servants as compared with 2011, while the province needs to enhance transparency of application fees. Assessment of Commune-level Administrative Procedures Zero TT-Hue BRVT HCMC Perfect Clear Information Fees Displayed Officials Competent Treated w/respect Paperwork Reasonable Clear Deadline Deadline Met Satisfied w/service On total quality, there is uniformity in commune level performance - relatively high level of satisfaction with these services nationwide once again performed poorly in all eight criteria measured, while Ben Tre takes over Ba Ria-Vung Tau s 2011 top position in this indicator. (Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement) 15

16 Public Services Delivery (Dimension 6) TP. Ho Chi Minh Health Education Infrastructure Law and Order Year-on-year Changes in Public Service Delivery ( ) HCMC 16

17 Drivers of satisfaction towards public services Satisfaction with District Public Hospital Services (Impact on overall satisfaction percentage) -60% -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% -51% -44% -36% -37% -18% -19% -21% -23% -7% Share beds Private pharma recommended Unreasonable wait time Disease not cured Restroom unclean No electric fans Unreasonable expenses Not treated with respect Irregular visits Health Care: Two main drivers of satisfaction are the treatment patients experience and attention received from health care providers. Satisfaction towards public primary schools (% change from very good opinions on quality) -54% -25% -16% -18% -10% -11% -12% -4% -5% -60% -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 3 shifts of classes per day More than 36 students t Irregular feedback Teachers' favoritism Classes with poor construction No free drinking water Parents not informed of school revenue Unclean toilets Unqualified teachers Primary Education: An important driver of satisfaction is about the skills and qualifications of teachers. Citizens' Assessment of District Public Hospitals Zero TT-Hue Thai Binh HCMC BRVT Tuyen Dinh Shared No shared beds bed Electric fan Clean restroom Regular visits by staff Treated with respect Reasonable expenses Reasonable waiting period Disease/Injury cured Private Pharma Satisfaction with service Poorer provinces (e.g., Tra Vinh, and ) are among the top ten performers in this indicator. Perfect Richer provinces like, Thua Thien-Hue and are among the ten lowest performers. (Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement) Among the five centrally-managed municipalities, and are among the top ten, while Ho Chi Minh City, and are among the average group. 17

18 Citizens' Assessment of Public Primary Schools Zero TT-Hue BRVT HCMC Perfect (Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement) Brick Walls Clean Toilets Free Drinking Water Less than 36 students Less than 3 shifts No favoritism from teachers Well qualified teachers Regular feedback Informed of school revenue Provinces have different strengths and weaknesses with public primary schools. Top ten provinces are from different economic development backgrounds (e.g. Quang Binh,,, and Ho Chi Minh City). Most complained about aspects in Quang Binh, whose score is closest to the perfect, are teacher bias towards school children taking extra classes, insufficient classes resulting in three shifts and crowded classes. The same weaknesses are seen in and Ho Chi Minh City. Deepening the understanding and demographic differences What type of analysis a s economists o and social scientists can do? Some examples 18

19 PAPI in Viet Nam Human Development Report

20 PAPI in Independent Academic Research An exploration of performance in treatment provinces according to pilot non-establishment of People s Councils Source: Malesky, Cuong and Tran (2012) The Economic Impact of Recentralization: A Quasi Experiment on Abolishing Elected Councils in Vietnam. Mimeo. 39 PAPI in Development Blogs Source:

21 Examples of research papers Exploring use of citizens inputs by governments Ho Chi Minh Poor Near poor Non-poor In terms of the use of citizens inputs, the officially poor group is most likely to perceive that their inputs were used. By contrast, the unofficially poor group is least likely to believe that their inputs were used by the government. This descriptive analysis initially supports the hypothesis that the local government uses unofficially poor household s inputs less than that of non-poor households, or voices of the unofficially poor is less likely to be heard than others. Source: Thang V. Nguyen, Canh Q. Le, Bich T. Tran (forthcoming) Citizen Participation in City Governance: Experiences from Vietnam. 21

22 Different Mapping: Spatial Pattern of PAPI The Northern Mountain and High Lands regions have lower PAPI, meaning low citizens experiences with governance and public administration quality. Provinces and districts in Central Coast and South East tend to have higher performance on governance indicated. Interestingly, there is a large variation in citizens satisfaction level with governance of districts within a province. Source: Nguyen Viet Cuong and Phung Duc Tung (forthcoming) Discrepancy in urban and rural governance at the disaggregated levels in Vietnam: A small area estimation approach. For more information, please visit