PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT AUDITORS ON RED FLAGS EFFECTIVENESS IN DETECTING FRAUD ON PROCUREMENT OF GOVERMENT GOODS AND SERVICES

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1 PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT AUDITORS ON RED FLAGS EFFECTIVENESS IN DETECTING FRAUD ON PROCUREMENT OF GOVERMENT GOODS AND SERVICES Nayang Helmayunita, SE, M.Sc Universitas Negeri Padang Taufiq Akbar Kementerian Hukum dan HAM Abstract This study aims to examine differences in perceptions between government external auditors and government internal auditors about the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud on procurement of government goods and services, and get the most effective red flags by external and internal government auditors in detecting fraud on procurement of goods and services government. This study contributes to the accounting literature with a comprehensive perception of the auditor on the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud in the government sector is still very limited, especially in the procurement activities of goods and services. The research design is quantitative research with sampling technique using purposive sampling method. Respondents in this study are BPK auditors as external auditors, and BPKP auditors as internal auditors. Data collection techniques by distributing questionnaires. Data analysis techniques using t-test to test the first hypothesis, and analysis of variance to test the second hypothesis. The results of this study indicate that there are different perceptions between internal and external auditors on the effectiveness of red flags in the procurement of goods and services, this study does not provide evidence that the auditor's experience has a significant effect on the auditor's perception on the effectiveness of red flags, this study illustrates that the first most perceived effective indicator to detect fraud in government procurement of goods and services according to government auditors is the volume of goods or construction is not the same or not in accordance with the requested in technical specifications. Keywords: Red Flags, Internal Auditor, External Auditor, Fraud. 430 ISBN

2 INTRODUCTION One of the most frequent sectors of corruption in government is the procurement of goods and services. The occurrence of fraud in the process of procurement of goods and services government is a result of the inappropriate procurement process with the applicable legislation. The government has actually made rules related to the process of procurement of goods / services. Presidential Regulation No. 54/2010 concerning Procurement of Government Goods / Services as lastly amended by Peraturan Presiden No. 4/1955 is the prevailing laws and regulations as a guideline in the implementation of government procurement of goods / services for officials and or committees of goods and services procurement. Despite the existence of legislation, but there are still many violations or fraud in the procurement process of goods and services. This is evident from the corruption-based corruption case data by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) as of July 2015 that corruption cases of goods and services procurement are ranked the 2nd most handled by the KPK. One of the foremost elements to detect the presence or absence of fraud on the procurement of goods and services in government is the government auditor. According to Guy (2002), government auditors are auditors working in various government agencies, both central and local governments. Government auditors in Indonesia basically work on the following three agencies: the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), the Financial and Development Supervisory Board (BPKP) and the Inspectorate at the Ministry or in the Local Government. BPK can be regarded as an external auditor because the position of BPK in accordance with the 1945 Constitution is not under the Head of Government (President). Meanwhile, the Financial and Development Supervisory Board (BPKP) and Inspekstorat at the ministries / agencies or at the local government is an agency responsible to supervise and inspect internal government activities as regulated in Peraturan Pemerintah No. 60 Tahun 2008 regarding Government Control System. So it can be said that BPKP and Inspectorate is an internal government auditor (auditor). In the Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) no. 99 which has been adopted into the Standards of Professional Public Accountants (SPAP) on the consideration of fraud in the audit of financial statements set forth in the Statement of Audit Standards (PSA) no. 70, has identified several risk factors that can be used by the auditor in performing the audit of financial statements. Risk factors are also termed Red Flags. According to DiNapoli (2008) Red flags are an unusual or different circumstance with normal circumstances. Red flags do not indicate that a person is guilty or innocent but rather a warning sign of fraud. Red Flags contained in audit standards will certainly help the auditor to detect a fraud. However, in the audit standard it is not stated which red flags are most ISBN

3 effective at detecting fraud, thus allowing for differences in perceptions among auditors in assessing the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud. Several studies have been conducted to see the auditor's perceptions of the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud. Majid et al. (2001) concluded that the indicator of misstatements in previous audits and related issues of concern concerning going concern is the most significant red flags in detecting fraud. Moyes (2007) conducted a study to see if there were any differences between external and internal auditors' perceptions of the effectiveness of red flags contained in the Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) no. 99, and it was concluded that overall there was no difference in perceptions regarding the effectiveness of red flags between external and internal auditors. Utomo (2014) conducted a study to examine the perceptions of government external auditors on the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud on procurement of goods / services, and found that fictitious work; volume and quality of goods / services not according to technical specifications; and price inflation in HPS are red flags that are perceived to be most effective in detecting fraud on procurement of goods / services. The studies that aim to see which red flags are most effective according to the auditors in detecting fraud have been largely done in the business or private sector using the red flags contained in audit standards as described previously. However, such research is still not widely conducted in the public sector, especially in government. Under these conditions it is felt necessary to conduct similar research in the government sector to see which red flags are most effectively perceived by government auditors in detecting fraud especially in the procurement of goods / services. Procurement activities of government goods / services were chosen because it is still one of the activities that contribute greatly in the case of corruption (fraud) This research is different from previous research. In this study, the red flags that will be used as research instruments similar to those used in Utomo's (2014) study are red flags contained in the Petunjuk Teknis Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan RI. Pemeriksaan Atas Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah Nomor 9/K/I- XIII.2/10/2009. Red Flags in the BPK RI Technical Guidelines is used because it is a red flags specifically related to the procurement of government goods / services. In this study other than using the external auditor government as respondents will also include the internal auditor of the government that is the auditor on BPKP as respondents. In addition, as did Moyes (2007), this study will also see whether the experience of government auditors will lead to differences in the perception of government auditors over the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud. 432 ISBN

4 Based on the description above, then in this research asked some research questions as follows: 1) Which red flags are most considered effective by the government's external and internal auditors in detecting fraud on the procurement of government goods / services? 2) Is there a difference of perception between the government's external auditor and the internal government auditor over the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud on procurement of government goods / services? 3) Is there a difference in perceptions of the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud based on the auditor's experience? LITERATURE REVIEW Procurement of Government Goods / Services According to Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram (2000: 315), Government procurement is the acquisition of goods, services, and public works in timely manner that results in best value to the government and the people. Schiavo- Campo and Sundaram (2000) also said that most countries have legal rules relating to procurement of government goods / services that contain provisions on the formal procurement process from the beginning of the process to the signing of contracts or agreements. The Indonesian government also has rules related to the process of procurement of goods / services. Presidential Regulation No. 54/2010 concerning Procurement of Government Goods / Services as lastly amended by Presidential Regulation No. 4/1955 is the prevailing laws and regulations as a guideline in the implementation of government procurement of goods / services for officials and / or committees of goods / services procurement. In clause 1 point 1 of Perpres No. 4 of 2015, it is explained that the Procurement of Government Goods / Services is an activity to obtain goods / services by Ministries / Institutions / Institution which process starts from the planning needs until completion of all activities to obtain goods / services. Perpres No. 4 of 2015 also explains that the procurement of goods / services must be implemented in accordance with the principle of procurement of goods / services that is efficient; effective; transparent; open; compete; fair / non-discriminatory; and accountable. The parties related to the procurement process of goods / services in accordance with the regulations are as follows: 1. Budget User / Proxy User (PA / KPA); 2. Committing Officer (KDP); 3. Procurement Services Unit (ULP) / Procurement Official; ISBN

5 4. Committee / Official Receiving Officer. In Presidential Regulation no. 4 at 2015 has set the stage of implementation of procurement of goods / services government. In general, the stages of procurement of goods / services is divided into 2 phases, namely the preparation stage of procurement and the implementation stage of procurement. Presidential Regulation no. 4 at 2015 also explains that the procurement of goods / services must be done electronically (e-procurement) through electronic procurement system (SPSE) and for its implementation is done by electronic procurement service (LPSE) established in every government agency. Government Auditor and Government Auditor Experience The government auditor according to Guy (2002) is an auditor working on various agencies / agencies of the central government as well as local government. The main task of government auditors is to determine compliance with laws, laws, policies, and procedures. The government auditor is responsible for auditing the executive and reporting it to the legislature. Government auditors in Indonesia basically work on the following three agencies: the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), the Financial and Development Supervisory Board (BPKP) and the Inspectorate at the Ministry or in the Local Government. The Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) is one of the state's top institutions in charge of auditing state financial management and accountability. In accordance with Article 23E of the 1945 Constitution, the Supreme Audit Board can be regarded as an external auditor of government due to the independent and independent position of BPK and not under the Head of Government (President). Meanwhile, the Financial and Development Supervisory Board (BPKP) and Inspekstorat at the ministries / agencies or at the local government is an agency responsible to supervise and inspect internal government activities as regulated in Government Regulation Number 60 Year 2008 regarding Government Control System. So it can be said that BPKP and Inspectorate is an internal government auditor (auditor). In accordance with the first generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) that audits should be conducted by persons already in training and having sufficient technical skills as an auditor. This first generally accepted auditing standard is interpreted that the auditor should have formal education, sufficient practical experience, and follow a continuing professional education (Arens et al., 2011: 42). The experience of government auditors can be seen from how many credit numbers that have been owned by the auditor. According to the Regulation of the Minister of Administrative Reform of the State Civil and Bureaucracy Reform No. 51 of 2012 states that the auditor's credit score is the unit of value of each item of activity and / or the accumulation of the value of items of activity that 434 ISBN

6 must be achieved by the auditor which is the performance appraisal as one of the conditions for appointment, promotion and / or rank. The number of credit numbers owned by a government auditor can be seen from the functional position of the auditor. According to Presidential Decree (Keppres) RI No. 87 of 1999 on the Functional Group of Civil Servant Officials as amended by Presidential Decree no. 97 of 2012, Functional Position is a position that shows the duties, responsibilities, authorities, and rights of a civil servant in an organizational unit which in the performance of its duties is based on certain skills and / or skills and is independent. Fraud and Red Flags of Fraud DiNapoli (2008) defines red flags as an unusual or different circumstance. According to Tuanakotta (2010), red flags are symptoms of fraud. Red flags do not indicate that a person is guilty or innocent but rather a warning sign of fraud. Albrecht et.al (2014) termed red flags as an indicator of fraud. According to Albrecht et al, to detect fraud the auditor should be aware of the existence of red flags and investigate whether the indicator is due to fraud that actually occurred or caused by other factors. Albrecht et al. (2014: 473) divides the fraud indicators into 6 (six) groups: (1) accounting anomalies; (2) weakness of internal control; (3) analytical anomalies; (4) excessive lifestyles; (5) unfair behaviour; and (6) information and complaints. Accounting anomaly indicators generally occur involving problems with source documents, incorrect journal entries, and inaccuracies in the ledger. Cheating occurs when there is a combination of perceived pressure, opportunity / opportunity, and rationalization. When individuals in the organization experience a lot of pressure and everything is nationalized, then at the same time the organization overrides the internal controls then the risk of fraud becomes greater. An analytical anomaly indicator is a procedure or relationship that is very unnatural or very unrealistic. Analytical anomalies include transactions or events occurring at unusual times and places, conducted by or involving persons who are or should not be involved, or who use unusual procedures, policies or practices. The vast majority of people who commit fraud are subject to financial stress. Sometimes the financial pressures are real, and sometimes the pressure is just greed. Once fraudsters meet their financial needs, they usually continue to commit theft and use the funds to improve their lifestyle. Soon after, they have a lifestyle that is higher than their true ability. Research in psychology reveals that when a person is the first time to cheat, he will be overwhelmed by the emotions of fear and guilt. Emotion is an expression of a pressure. To overcome the perceived pressure, fraudsters often exhibit unusual and recognizable patterns of ISBN

7 behavior. Although no specific behavior can indicate fraud, behavior change is an indication of fraud. Fraud is hard to detect by the auditor, because every fraudster will always hide evidence or traces of his fraudulent actions. Therefore, information and complaints are considered as an indicator of fraud (red flags) by the auditor but not as evidence of fraud. This is because the auditor needs to conduct further investigation to ensure the correctness of the information and the complaint. In government one of the most frequent sectors of fraud (corruption) is the procurement of goods / services as described previously. Red flags in every stage of the procurement process have been tried by Lyson and Ferrington (2006) in Matthew (2013: 20) as follows: a. The stage establishes the need for goods or services. Some red flags indicate this stage: - Too exaggerated in maintaining stocks for the justification of making purchases; - Selling items that are still in good condition and useful, while doing the same purchase of goods; b. Phase of development of specification of goods / services required. Some of the red flags in this stage are: -Create a specification that is only suitable for a single contractor; - Create specifications that are only suitable for one product; c. Phase before procurement socialization. Some of the red flags in this stage are: - Reason for justification that there is only one sole provider / contractor; - Technical personnel provide information in advance to one of the prospective bidders; d. Socialization of procurement; Some of the red flags in this stage are: -Restrictions on procurement to prevent qualified suppliers; - Limit the time to enter the auction, so that only people who get 'leaked' information at the beginning of the auction; e. Bid acceptance; Some of the red flags in this stage are: -Receive an offer when the auction process ends; - Falsification of documents for acceptable bids; f. After signing the contract. Some of the red flags in this stage are: -Receiving goods without inspection or re-checking; 436 ISBN

8 - No action is taken regarding supplier's non-compliance with terms and conditions of the goods specified; The Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) has also identified red flags or termed the Critical Point on the Technical Guidelines for Procurement of Government Goods / Services Procurement. Red flags can be used by government auditors to detect fraud at every stage of the procurement process. The details of the red flags contained in the BPK Technical Guideline No.9/K/I-XIII.2/10/2009 on the Examination of Government Procurement of Goods / Services Procurement. Development of Hypotheses Perceptions of External Auditor and Government Internal Auditor on Red Flags Effectiveness (Fraud Indicators) on Procurement of Government Goods / Services. Differences in information held between internal auditors and external auditors can lead to information asymmetries that result in internal auditors having more or better information than external auditors. This is in line with Moyes (2007) opinion that internal auditors have better information about what is going on within the organization than with external auditors. This condition makes internal auditors more aware of information related to indications of cheating (red flags) that exist within the organization compared with external auditors. So this makes the internal auditor will have a better perception of the effectiveness of the red flags in detecting fraud on the procurement of goods / services compared with external auditors. In addition, differences in status among government auditors (external and internal) also allow for differences in perceptions of the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud on the procurement of government goods / services. This is based on one of the factors that can affect the perception according to Robbins (2010) are the situation andworkplace. This leads to the notion that external and internal government auditors have different perceptions of the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud on procurement of goods / services, as will be tested in hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1: There are different perceptions of effectiveness flags in detecting fraud on procurement of government goods / services among external auditors and internal government auditors. ISBN

9 Experience of Government Auditor and Perception on Red Flags Effectiveness in Procurement of Government Goods / Services The experience of government auditors can be seen from how many credit numbers that have been owned by the auditor. According to the law, it is stated that the auditor's credit score is the unit of value of each item of activity and / or the accumulation of the value of the items of activity to be achieved by the auditor which constitutes the performance assessment as one of the conditions for the appointment, promotion and / or rank. So it can be interpreted that the more auditors involved in auditing activities (audits), the higher the credit score owned by the auditor. The number of credit numbers owned by a government auditor will be visible from the functional position of the auditor. Experienced government auditors (having a high credit score) will have high functional positions as well, and vice versa. According to Robbins (2010) in addition to the factors of the situation / workplace, experience factors can also affect perception. Smith et al. (2005) argue that differences in auditors' perceptions of the level of significance of red flags can be caused by several individual factors. Apostolou et al. (2001) in Smith et al. (2005) have statistically seen whether demographic factors such as the type of accounting firm, audit experience, auditor position, and others have an impact on the level of significance of a red flags according to the auditor. Moyes (2007) says that the hidden nature of fraud requires an experienced auditor and who has the expertise of using red flags correctly in order to find the fraud. So this will make the difference between auditors experienced with auditors who have not / little experience in recognizing red flags to detect fraud. Based on the above explanation, it is suspected that there is a difference of government auditor's perception toward the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud on procurement of goods / services based on the auditor's work experience viewed from the functional position of the auditor, in accordance with which will be tested on hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2: There is a difference in perceptions of the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud on procurement of government goods / services between functional positions of government auditors. In addition to testing the two hypotheses above, this research will also see which red flags items are most effectively perceived to detect fraud on the procurement of government goods / services according to external and internal government auditors by looking at the average of each red flags item. The red flags item that has the highest average among government auditors will be considered as the most effective red flags item perceived to detect fraud. 438 ISBN

10 METHODS Types of Research, Population, Sample and Respondent This type of research is a quantitative research. The population in this research is Government Auditor in West Sumtera and Jambi Province. The sample and respondents in this study are BPK RI Auditor Representatives of West Sumatra and Jambi (external auditor of government) and Auditor BPKP Representative of West Sumatra and Jambi (internal government auditor). This sampling technique using purposive sampling technique. Types and Data Collection Techniques Types of data used in this study are qualitative data and quantitative data. In this study independent variables using qualitative data and dependent variables using quantitative data. For data collection techniques that is by using / distributing questionnaires to respondents. Research Variables In this study there are two types of variables: 1. Independent Variable (X) In this research, independent variable is Government Auditor with 2 (two) categories: External Auditor and Internal Auditor (X1), and Government Auditor Functional Position with 5 (five) categories: Skilled Auditor, Auditor / First Inspector, Auditor / Young Examiner, Auditor / Examiner Madya, and Auditor / Main Inspector (X2). 2. Dependent Variable (Y) The dependent variables in this study are the most considered red flags that are effective in detecting fraud on the procurement of government goods / services (Y). Data Analysis Techniques To test hypothesis 1 we use different test of t-test. According to Ghozali (2007: 55) Different test t-test is used to see the difference or the relationship between independent variables with two categories with dependent variables (which are continuum, metric or interval and ratio). For hypothesis 2, the data analysis technique used is the analysis of variance (analysis of variance / ANOVA). ISBN

11 FINDINGS Overview of Research Objects The number of samples in this study are as many as 4 government agencies namely BPK Representative Province of West Sumatra and Jambi, and BPKP Representative Province of West Sumatra and Jambi. In the four samples were distributed questionnaires with a total of 152 questionnaires. The number of questionnaires returned was 103 questionnaires. The number of respondents who did not return the questionnaires was due to the large number of respondents who were doing the off-duty service, so up to the time limit of data collection, the questionnaires that can be collected only amounted to 103 questionnaires. Of the 103 returned questionnaires, a questionnaire that can be processed is as many as 86 questionnaires. While the rest can not be processed because the respondents did not fill in the complete questionnaire given. So the rate of his respond rate is 56.58%. Questionnaires are delivered and picked up directly at each instamsi. Descriptive Statistics Based on the result of statistical analysis, it is known that the respondent of the external auditor (in this research is the respondent who came from the BPK institution) has the highest score of 531, and the lowest value is 198, with the mean value of 445,3061. As for the respondents internal auditors (in this study were respondents who came from the agency BPKP) has the highest value of 565, and the lowest value of 189, with a mean value of Normality Test and Levene s Test Normality test results with Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test indicate the value of Asymp. Sig is 0.076, this value is above the value of α So with the results it can be said that the data is normally distributed to meet one of the assumptions of analysis of variance (ANOVA) The result of statistical test shows levene statistic value of far above 0,05. This shows that each subject group of respondents meet the same variant so that it has fulfilled the assumption of ANOVA (Hair et al, 2006). Hypothesis Testing and Discussion Hypothesis (H1) suspects that there is a difference of perception to the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud on procurement of goods and services among external and internal auditors. To test this hypothesis, an independent sample t-test was performed. Based on statistical test result, it was found that Levene Test gives F value equal to 12,537 with significance level 0,001 meaning 440 ISBN

12 significant, so this research model has variance which is not same. Thus, the value of t seen is a value with an unequal variance assumption value, ie with a t value of with a significance level of So it can be concluded that hypothesis (H1) is acceptable. Differences in the absorption of information obtained by internal auditors with external auditors, causing differences in perceiving the symptoms of effective cheating that occurred within an organization. Internal auditors have more information related to the internal state of the company, this is also because organizations are more open in providing information to internal auditors than with external auditors. So this causes internal auditors have a better perception compared with external auditors. The results of this study are similar to that of Moyes (2007) who stated that internal auditors have better information about the situation that occurs within the organization compared with external auditors. So this makes the difference in information owned by internal auditors compared with external auditors. Information owned by internal auditors will better support the intenal auditor to be aware of any indications of fraud contained within the organization. Hypothesis (H2) states that there is a difference of perception on the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud on procurement of government goods / services between functional positions of government auditors. To test this hypothesis, the analysis of variance (analysis of variance / ANOVA) was tested. Based on the results of statistical tests, the overall experience of auditors has no significant effect on auditors' perceptions of the effectiveness of red flags. The value of significance for experience is with a value of F This shows that there is no influence of the auditor's experience on the auditor's perception on the effectiveness of the red flag. So the hypothesis (H2) is rejected. To see the difference of perception of auditor to red flags between functional position of auditor can be seen based on scheffe test result. In table 8 of scheffe test results, it is known that the auditor's experience based on functional position toward the effectiveness of red flags also does not have significant value. The results of this study differ from the results of research from Apostolou et al. (2001) in Smith et al. (2005) have statistically seen whether demographic factors such as the type of accounting firm, audit experience, auditor position, and others have an impact on the level of significance of a red flags according to the auditor. In addition, this result is also inconsistent with Moyes (2007) who says that the hidden fraud nature requires an experienced auditor and who has the expertise of using red flags correctly in order to find the fraud. This may be the case because the auditor who is the respondent in this study is mostly auditors who already have certification examiners and procurement experts, but also most auditors are auditors who have attended a fraud examination training / examination with a specific purpose. In addition, the number of respondents by functional position ISBN

13 evenly, it can also affect the results of statistical tests. So that experience factor which represented by functional position in this research do not have significant influence to difference of perception of auditor toward effectiveness of red flags. The study also looks at which red flags items are most effectively perceived to detect fraud on the procurement of government goods / services according to external and internal government auditors by looking at the average value of each red flags item. Based on the results of descriptive statistical analysis in this study, obtained two fraud indicator is the most perceived effective to detect fraudulent procurement of goods / services government. The first most perceived effective indicator for detecting fraud in the procurement of government goods / services according to government auditors is that the volume of goods / construction is not the same as that required in the technical specification with a mean of Furthermore the second most perceived fraud indicator effective according to the government auditor in the procurement of government goods / services is fictitious payment with a mean of CONCLUSION Based on the result of research, it can be concluded that: (a) There is a significant difference of perception between external auditor and internal auditor toward red flag effectiveness. (b) The auditor's experience has no significant effect on the auditor's perception on the effectiveness of red flags. (c) The first most perceived effective indicator for detecting fraud in the procurement of government goods / services according to the government auditor is the volume of goods / construction is not the same / not as requested in the technical specification. This study has several limitations that can not be avoided and can affect the results of research. The limitations are: (a) This research is conducted only on auditors who work in the office of BPK and BPKP representatives of West Sumatra and Jambi only. (b) Low respond rates due to the time of the study coinciding with the time of the auditor to conduct examination of SKPD and other government agencies, so that many auditors who do not return the questionnaire due to busy. This research is expected to provide ideas for further research development. Based on the existing limitations, further research is expected to consider the following matters: (a) The sample for this study may be extended not only to BPK offices and BPKP representatives of West Sumatra and Jambi provinces only. (b) For respondents internal auditors may also use SPI members located at the Office. (c) The research time should be designed so that it does not coincide with the time the auditor checks the check, so the respond rate can be further improved. 442 ISBN

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16 Tuanakotta, Theodorus M Akuntansi Forensik dan Audit Investigatif. Salemba Empat. Jakarta. Utomo, Setio Agung Persepsi Auditor Eksternal Pemerintah Terhadap Efektivitas Red Flags Dalam Mendeteksi Fraud Pada Pengadaan Barang/Jasa. Tesis. Universitas Gajah Mada. Yogyakarta. Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 Republik Indonesia. Amandemen Ke-4. Jakarta. Wells, J. T Corporate Fraud Handbook: Prevention and Detection: Second Edition. John Wiley and Sons Inc. Widarjono, Agus Analisis Statistika Multivatiat Terapan. Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Manajemen YKPN. Yogyakarta. Yamin, Sofyan dan Heri Kurniawan SPSSComplete: Teknik Analisis Statistik Terlengkap dengan Sofware SPSS. Salemba Infotek. Jakarta. ISBN