HANDLING DOWNSIZING IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES EXPERIENCES FROM THE SWEDISH PROCESS INDUSTRIES

Transcription

1 HANDLING DOWNSIZING IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES EXPERIENCES FROM THE SWEDISH PROCESS INDUSTRIES Anders Jacobsson Swedish Rescue Services Agency, NCO, Karlskoga; Downsizing is a very hot topic. Based on an inquiry made in the Swedish process industry one can conclude: All companies have carried out "downsizing" recently or are about to do it Downsizing is driven almost exclusively by economic reasons Most personnel categories are included The use of risk analyses is weak. Downsizing is a general trend in many areas and is also common in the process industry. The special feature with the process industry is that there is a strong connection to safety aspects. Downsizing can be carried out in many different ways. In its best form it is a well planned, positive, pro-active action, which is used as a tool to accomplish a desired change in an organisation in a long-term and strategic perspective, maybe even to accomplish a deeper change in the direction or the culture of the enterprise. In its poorer form downsizing is a measure used as a re-active action on acute economical problems simply to cut fixed costs and influence the economical result short term (and hopefully also long term). It is obvious that cut-downs in an organisation in most cases will lead to increased strain for the reduced organisation to keep up a sufficient safety level. Normally, the same job tasks should be distributed on fewer persons. The responsibility for each individual increases and the work load and the stress also normally increases. Thus, the cut-down can lead to increased probability for pure mistakes, and it could also lead to an increased tendency to take deliberate short-cuts in order to get the time to perform all work tasks, especially in situations when the main task is to keep the production going without delays, interruptions and disturbances. The cut-down can also easily lead to a general deterioration of the safety culture and the organisation can lose focus on safety. There will be given examples on effects of downsizing in some companies in the chemical process industry. Downsizing can be handled in various ways. Proper risk analyses of the change should be carried out. In order to give companies involved in downsizing some assistance in how suitable risk analyses can be conducted, a model has been developed including specific risk analysis methods. This will also be presented. In short it consists of Work load analysis for key categories of personnel, both to check whether the future work load will be reasonable or too high, which could jeopardize the safety of the plant and also damage the health of the individual. Emergency scenario analysis of certain serious disturbances of the production or emergency situations to see whether the available personnel can be expected to cope with the situations. Potential problem analysis of the management system for safety, health and environment to check whether this can work well also in the future situation. KEYWORDS: Downsizing, work load analysis INTRODUCTION Downsizing is a very hot topic. Based on an inquiry made in the Swedish process industry one can conclude:. Downsizing is driven almost exclusively by economic reasons. Most personnel categories are included. The use of risk analyses is weak.. All companies have carried out downsizing recently or are about to do it Downsizing is a general trend in many areas and is also common in the process industry. The special feature with 1

2 the process industry is that there is a strong connection to safety aspects. Downsizing can be carried out in many different ways. In its best form it is a well planned, positive, pro-active action, which is used as a tool to accomplish a desired change in an organisation in a long-term and strategic perspective, maybe even to accomplish a deeper change in the direction or the culture of the enterprise. In its poorer form downsizing is a measure used as a re-active action on acute economical problems simply to cut fixed costs and influence the economical result short term (and hopefully also long term). It is obvious that cut-downs in an organisation in most cases will lead to increased strain for the reduced organisation to keep up a sufficient safety level. Normally, the same job tasks should be distributed on fewer persons. The responsibility for each individual often increases and the work load and the stress also normally increases. Thus, the cut-down can lead to increased probability for pure mistakes, and it could also lead to an increased tendency to take deliberate short-cuts in order to get the time to perform all work tasks, especially in situations when the main task is to keep the production going without delays, interruptions and disturbances. The cut-down can also easily lead to a general deterioration of the safety culture and the organisation can lose focus on safety. Often the focus is on the question whether it is possible to run a plant with a decreased number of operational personnel, basically operators, and their inter-relationship with the plants and equipment through the control systems and automatic shut-down systems. However, it is important to look at the whole picture, to consider the inter-relationship between all parties in the business, and that the safety issues are seen in a long term perspective. There are also connections to such issues as burn-out. However in the following, this for each individual so important question, is only considered in relation to how it can influence the risks of the industrial activities. Of all the important aspects of downsizing this presentation will focus upon 1. Ways of carrying out risk analyses of downsizing situations. In order to give companies involved in downsizing some assistance in how suitable risk analyses can be conducted, a model has been developed including specific risk analysis methods. This is presented. In short it consists of. Work load analysis for key categories of personnel, both to check whether the future work load will be reasonable or too high, which could jeopardize the safety of the plant and also damage the health of the individual.. Emergency scenario analysis of certain serious disturbances of the production or emergency situations to see whether the available personnel can be expected to cope with the situations.. Potential problem analysis of the management system for safety, health and environment to check whether this can work well also in the future situation. 2. Examples of effects in companies where downsizing was maybe treated with too little focus. There are a number of accidents where one can suspect downsizing as a contributing factor, having created weaknesses in the defence barriers, giving rise to latent conditions. SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF DOWNSIZING Here some aspects of downsizing are listed. They may have more or less impact on how the downsizing operation should be carried out. They will be referred to, however not be treated in detail further in this paper. PHASES OF A DOWNSIZING PROJECT Several phases can be distinguished in a downsizing project Phase 1: Initiation phase (only a few people know). Phase 2: The period from the point when it becomes known that the management is planning a downsizing until the point when it is decided about the size and time plan of the cut-down. Phase 3: The period after the decision of downsizing is taken until the new organisation and the new manning formally come into force. Phase 4: Production with the new future organisation with decreased manning. all of which contain various issues regarding risks for Safety/Health/Environment. DIFFERENT TYPES OF AND REASONS FOR DOWNSIZING There are a number of types of downsizing, which will sometimes need somewhat different treatment, but normally includes similar key questions.. General reduction of the work force as a pure cost cut. Downsizing due to increased automation. Outsourcing of certain functions, e.g. maintenance, specialist functions. Reduction of maintenance programs. Reduction of training. Indirect downsizing (normally in the form of assigning extra job tasks to certain employees (special projects etc), without adding resources). EXPERIENCES OF DOWNSIZING FROM A SELECTION OF SWEDISH CHEMICAL PROCESS INDUSTRIES, AN ENQUIRY The following refers to an investigation some years ago. It is believed that the picture is still rather similar. To get an idea of the status of downsizing in Swedish chemical process industry companies and how the question is handled there, an inquiry was sent out to the members of the Association for Process Safety. All member companies with production were asked about their experiences about downsizing. 2

3 The following conclusions can be drawn from the inquiry answers: 1. All, except one, of the companies had performed downsizing during the last 5-year-period. 2. General cost cutting had been the totally dominating reason for the downsizing. 3. In most cases the downsizing had been performed as a general reduction of the work force.. Only in a few cases the downsizing had been linked to a significant change of the scope of the operations.. In little less than half of the cases there were links between increased automation of the process and the reduction of personnel. 4. The downsizing of personnel had normally been done among all categories of personnel.. Operating personnel (operators and supervisors). Maintenance personnel. Middle management (line managers). Support and specialist functions except in the site management which had only been involved in two cases.. In half of the cases there had been indirect downsizing resulting in considerably increased work load on many employees due to the fact that many extra tasks had been performed (e.g. major projects) without reinforcing the organisation. 5. A properly documented risk analysis of the proposed downsizing had only been performed in one third of the cases. 6. In the cases where a risk analysis had been performed, the analysis had focused on. the ability of the operating personnel to handle emergency situations; and. the general ability of the organisation to maintain a certain safety level, mostly done by checking if the organisation could fulfil the procedures of the safety management system long term. There were only a few cases where the work load of the personnel had been analysed from a safety point of view. 7. Risk analysis methods that were used are. for analysis of emergency scenarios mostly company own free methods with elements of What-if-analysis and Human Error analysis; and. for analysis of long term safety level normally general discussions with elements from audit methods. In those cases where a formal risk analysis had been performed it had been conducted by a group with representatives both from the employees and from the company (in a few cases with external guidance and expertise). 8. In no case had there been any risk analysis of the important transition period from today into the anticipated permanent situation tomorrow. 9. In one third of the cases there were some systematic attempt by the companies to follow up on the result of the downsizing by various measurements (overtime, sickness, incident statistics, opinion of the employees through enquiries etc.). Inquiry answers and other information showed clearly that we need tools and models for risk analysis of changes in organisations and manning. This applies for all categories of personnel and various situations for use in the process industry. It is obviously so that most companies have found it difficult to find and apply suitable tools in order to carry out risk analysis of this type of object. It can be noted that according to the Swedish legislation (as in most other countries) it is mandatory to carry out risk analysis of organisational changes and of changes in manning. EXAMPLES OF DISTURBANCES, ACCIDENTS AND MAJOR COSTS, WHERE DOWNSIZING HAS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE (SWEDEN). Explosion/fire (fatality) in fine chemicals/pharmaceutical plant.. Series of major process safety incidents, environmental releases and plant shut-down in petrochemical plant 1 (early retirement of competent personnel, major investment project, neglected maintenance). Series of major process safety incidents, environmental releases and plant shut-down in petrochemical plant 2 (big investment projects, administrative projects, loss of competent personnel by early retirement). Series of major process safety incidents, environmental releases and plant shut-down in petrochemical plant 3 (decreased maintenance, outsourcing, lost competence). Series of major process safety incidents, environmental releases and plant shut-down in petrochemical plant 4 (neglected maintenance, loss of competent personnel by early retirement, major investment project). Amalgamation of two production organisations with slimming (inorganic chemicals plant) resulted in lack of competence; re-hiring of personnel necessary. MODEL FOR RISK ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS PHASES OF DOWNSIZING GENERAL Risk analyses of changes of the organisation and/or the manning must include both long term and short term safety aspects on one hand the issue about maintaining the safety level, declared by the management, in a sustainable way, and on the other hand the question of being able to cope with acute emergency situations in a satisfactory way. Therefore a number of different risk analyses are normally needed to cover the whole concept. This is all covered in a guideline by the Association of Process Safety. Probably, it is very difficult to define clear criteria for what is a tolerable risk in connection with the risk analyses performed in downsizing situations. Normally one is left to the judgement of the risk analysis group to say tolerable or not for the identified situations in a rather subjective way. An important principle for the group to have in mind should be that the work to be done in the future should be 3

4 on a sufficiently high quality level. The employee should be well trained for his tasks, and it should be fully possible for him to perform the tasks without having to rationalise the work to be able to manage within time or to cope with certain situations. The risk analyses should also reflect the important aspect that there should be time and resources in the organisation for long term and for development work. SURVEY TYPE ANALYSIS AT AN EARLY STAGE At an early stage of a downsizing process a survey type of risk analysis of the planned change should be done. This should focus on the ability of the organisation to longterm fulfil the overall safety objectives that have been set up. Will the organisation be able to keep or even improve the desired safety culture? The guideline points at some important aspects but does not provide a detailed model for this first analysis. If the anticipated change is considered as realistic to perform, according to this analysis, one should be able to outline. A general plan for implementation. Needs for competence improvement; training. Needs for technical measures. An information plan. A program for more detailed risk analyses DETAILED RISK ANALYSES IN LATER STAGES This guideline gives guidance on how to use a model for risk analyses comprising. Work load analysis for key categories of personnel. This means, an analysis to judge whether the future work load is going to be reasonable or not. If the work load is found to be excessive the question will be: Can that lead to omissions or mistakes that can jeopardize the safety of the plant or can it harm the health of the individual?. Emergency scenario analysis of certain serious disturbances or emergencies. This is to see whether the personnel can be expected to manage the difficult situations.. Potential problem analysis of the safety (and often also health and environment) management system, to check whether this can work also in the future situation. Long-term aspects for the personnel and the plant is taken into account firstly by analysing the work load of most of the positions in the organisation and thereby checking and judging whether these will have the resources and skills needed for performing all the tasks important for safety. Secondly long-term aspects are also covered by checking that the procedures in the company management system will work satisfactorily in the future situation. For the operating personnel (operators and supervisors) this means that two types of risk analyses should be done one for the continuous work load and one for the capability to cope with emergencies or other situations with extremely high work load and other demands. The one that will be dimensioning, for the manning of the shifts e.g. depends upon the type of industry we are talking about. For a highly automated petrochemical plant the emergency scenarios are often setting the size, while for another more traditional chemical production unit it is often the total work load that is dimensioning. The analyses proper should be carried out as early as possible when the back-ground material and the decision situation so allows. The analyses could include the following:. Work load analyses for the following categories of personnel: a. Operations personnel (operators þ supervisors) b. Middle management (e.g. operations engineers, maintenance engineers) c. Support /specialist functions (e.g. process engineer, SHE engineer), It should be pointed out that the analyses regarding the work load should take into consideration the time needed for continuous training (repetition and advanced training) in order for the personnel to keep the competence, something which is often underestimated.. Emergency scenarios for. Operations personnel (operators þ supervisors). Other emergency personnel (when applicable) How many positions that should be analysed will have to be decided from case to case depending upon the planned changes. However, generally speaking, one can say that the work situation and the work activities of many of the categories of positions must be checked to show the total risk picture. A careful potential problem analysis of the ability of the organisation to maintain the agreed safety level and safety culture is important. This risk analysis should identify potential weaknesses and shortcomings which can appear in the management system when the resources are being downsized. It should give a possibility to raise the question of responsibility and authority, resources and competence in the light of the new situation. COMPOSITION OF THE ANALYSIS GROUP As in all risk analyses the result is dependent on the total competence of the group which conducts the analysis and the creativity and the willingness of the group members to go through the problems in a comprehensive and objective way. To make risk analyses of organisations and manning situations is more demanding on the ability of the group members to reach consensus in these difficult questions than in traditional technical risk analyses. Therefore there is a need for the person(s) leading the exercise to be able to take a neutral position to the work and the result. There are very high demands especially on the chairman to create a constructive and trustful atmosphere. Generally seen, the group should consist of persons who are both affected by the changes and who have good competence for contributing to a fact-based analysis. 4

5 A typical composition of an analysis group to analyse operator positions both from work load aspects and from emergency aspects could be:. Chairman (neutral, possibly external resource). 2 operators (possibly simultaneously also safety representative(s)). 1 supervisor. 1 production engineer Such a group composition can also form the basis of a group for analysing potential problem analysis of the administrative procedures which influences the safety in the longer perspective. The group can then be amended with persons with specialist competence, such as e.g. Safety/Health/ Environment manager or safety officer. Persons who have strong roles as representatives either of the company or the employees can have difficulties to stay neutral under certain circumstances, and such persons should preferably not be members of the risk analysis group proper. They will play their roles in the formal negotiations about changes of the organisation and the manning. MATERIAL There is normally not a full material available to base the risk analysis on at the time when the analysis has to be performed. However, besides an organisation chart; and a manning plan, the most important basic data that must be available in reasonable detail are the job descriptions or equivalent. This material forms the basis for all the risk analyses that can have to be performed. Sometimes one can be forced to develop certain material further in order to be able to perform the risk analysis. In that case, all assumptions have to be well documented. Material that describes what to do in situations of disturbances and emergencies is normally available already for the existing conditions. This is normally sufficient as basis for analysis also for the new manning situation. The main material needed for the Potential problem analysis are the procedures that normally form the management system (safety and often also health and environment). They can normally be used in existing form. PREPARATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ANALYSIS Besides normal preparations to nominate and invite the group and to put together the necessary material, one should also spend time in preparing the group members about the performance of the risk analysis. The reason is that there will be new methods and new considerations for most of the participating persons, as compared to technical risk analyses. The most important point about risk analyses regarding organisational and manning changes is to create an atmosphere as open, trustful and objective as possible in an often sensitive situation for many of the group members. This is normally a task for the chairman, who therefore should have a neutral position and no own interests in the results of the risk analyses. EXAMPLE OF DETAILED RISK ANALYSIS WORK LOAD ANALYSIS FOR OPERATING PERSONNEL (OPERATORS þ SUPERVISORS) General This risk assessment model aims at mapping the future work situation and work load of the operations personnel (operators and supervisors). The target is to check whether or not it seems reasonable to work long-term in this manner with maintained level of safety at the chosen production level for the plant and with the health of the individuals at good level. If the work load is very high, one can suspect that this could impact on the safety issues for the plant, and the persons themselves can be affected physically and mentally with stress factors and similar. If the result is that the personnel have the time necessary to carry out the normal tasks under normal operation and there also is time available for necessary training and other important activities, the situation ought to be accepted. The result of this exercise should be a general mapping of the work situation for an employee under different work situations. From this mapping one should also be able to read the needs for defining responsibility and authority to a large extent, to train and develop competence etc. Description of the model The model implies making a mapping of all the tasks/ activities of for instance an operator, setting the time for all these activities and summarising and finally comparing with the available time. Many work tasks are carried out every shift, others are done on a weekly or monthly basis and further others even more seldom but still on a regular basis. All these should of course be included and by standardising them to e.g. shift basis, and by assuming that they are fairly evenly spread over time, one gets a good opinion about the continuous, average load for every job. In the case of continuous shift work 24 hours a day it has turned out to be practical to look at two cases, namely work load during day time (morning shift), which normally has the highest work load, and night shift, which normally has the lowest workload but which also does not tolerate the same high pace. High work load peaks which come under extreme production disturbances, e.g. emergency scenarios, sometimes during bigger maintenance work, should not be included in this analysis. These scenarios are instead treated by preference under the next risk analysis method. It is essential to define the job tasks and their time with a reasonable amount of effort and within a reasonable amount of time. This can be done either with a relatively overall reasoning and assessment of time in broad categories something that has proved itself to work reason- 5

6 ably well in many cases or one can develop a very detailed list of tasks and activities and from these summarise and simplify into categories. Also this latter model has been used in practice and been found to work well but needs a lot more time. Which method to use will have to be judged case by case, governed by the requirements of accuracy and the desires from the employees on how detailed to proceed. Absolutely vital is that those people participating in the risk assessment should feel that the result is representative and fair. Because many job tasks are performed in parallel, there is a big risk that the time needed will be exaggerated at the risk assessment, especially if one works with a very detailed basis of data. For instance, an operator during a round in his area can perform several other tasks besides the round, which therefore must not be double-counted. It is important to correct for this fact when the summary of all job tasks is made. Finally, there is often a need to subjectively correct the first mathematical summary to a picture which everyone in the group can accept as reasonable. Job positions that should be treated in this way are primarily operators plus supervisors (or equivalent) on shift. Besides these some other can be of interest, e.g. day-time service personnel, shipping personnel etc. The presentation of the analysis can be done according to the example in attachment 1, backed-up with more detailed lists with time consumption for individual activities. Especially if the result of this type of analysis shows that the work load on a particular job is excessive, it is natural to go back to the basis of data and challenge whether the task can be rationalised or even eliminated, either by technical or administrative actions or by working smarter. Such an iterative working procedure should be regarded as normal in this type of analysis. Basis of analysis and preparations As basis for a risk assessment of this kind we need a model of the future organisation, exact number of jobs and the split of responsibilities between job positions. Even if the final manning has not been decided, one ought to have a clear organisation model to use for the sake of the analysis. Job descriptions should be there as a basis. In order to carry out the risk assessment proper in an efficient way it is advantageous if the inventory of job tasks can be performed in advance. It is suitable if the operations personnel make an inventory of all the tasks, possibly also with a rough time estimates. The group session can then be concentrated on sorting job tasks in categories (e.g. according to example above), defining time consumption for the tasks and discussing any rationalisation possibilities. Time consumption for group session This type of analysis should take in the order of 2 hours per job position (a condition is then that there is a certain prework done, normally by shift personnel). Depending on the size of the shifts this type of assessment will take one and up to a few days. Experience of the method Several assessments of this kind have been carried out in various companies. In one case a very detailed exercise was made to identify job tasks, and in all the others a more general approach was used. In all cases the method has been judged to be working satisfactorily. In essence the analysis method for other types of job positions is similar to the work load analysis for operations personnel. The difference is of course that we have other work tasks/activities and therefore other categories in the tables. It is also often more difficult to estimate the time for various tasks. However, experience has shown that it is also feasible to carry out the same type of work load analysis for most categories. ACTION ERROR ANALYSIS/HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF A SELECTION OF SCENARIOS WITH HIGH LOAD ON PERSONNEL (EMERGENCY SCENARIOS) For reasons of limiting this paper in size this risk analysis is only described very briefly. The analysis of emergency scenarios aims at mapping the conditions and possibilities for the operational personnel (mainly operators and supervisors) to cope with the extreme situations which can develop during severe operational disturbances or emergency situations. The question is: Is there in these situations an organisation with enough persons with the right competence to be able to take the plant to a safe state? Out of this analysis one should also be able to draw conclusions of the need to define responsibility and authority, need to train and increase competence. This exercise should be performed as a relatively classical action error analysis. Scenarios that could be selected are on the one hand some typical emergency situations such as a power failure, cooling water failure or a major release possibly also involving a fire. Also regularly recurring activities such as a start-up or a shut-down of the plant can be chosen for analysis. The classical action error analysis is done by following a step-by-step instruction on how an operation should be performed, simultaneously generating possible human errors or short-comings in the different steps or actions (here e.g. does not have the time, forgets, acts on the wrong object, acts in a wrong way ). A prerequisite for the method is that there is a good description/instruction of how to perform the work. As opposed to a typical action error analysis, where normally only one job position at a time is analysed, this analysis will most of the time have to include several job positions simultaneously (in emergency situations) and the inter-relationship between various job positions will be very important. The analysis starts with the instructions on how to handle the actual situation. In most cases existing instructions 6

7 are enough as a basis for the risk analysis even if the manning situation will be different in the future analysed case. In the risk analysis one has to question and judge for every phase of the development of the scenario and for every planned action according to the instruction whether there is personnel with the necessary competence available to perform the activities prescribed in order to be able to stop a starting risky course of events to develop into an uncontrolled course of events. If the analysis shows that the tasks can not be performed satisfactorily with the planned manning one has to consider if technical or other actions can be taken to compensate for the short-comings in manning. Thus, it is natural with an iterative way of working. The presentation of this exercise can be done in a traditional way according to the following: Action Error Analysis Scenario/Event: E.g. Cooling water failure Step/ Activity Consequence Actions taken/ barrier Risk evaluation Prob. Cons. Possible error or shortcoming Recommendation Resp The analysis will contain quite a few subjective judgements (as it seems) on the probability of an operator making mistakes, but there is probably no one better to make this judgement at any event than the well composed risk assessment group. Provided that the group can create the open and creative atmosphere needed for this analysis and that the leader and the group can make the scenarios and situations clear in a dynamic and concrete way for all members of the group, this risk analysis normally functions very well. A reasonable assessment is that normally about five (maximum ten) such scenarios have to be evaluated in a typical process industry. Some of them would need 2 hours, others hour. Totally we are talking of days. In the example above is written 10 % as an example under free time during day-time and 30 % during nighttime. This has been done in order to reflect the fact that in reality certain time has to be excluded from scheduled time to allow the persons some flexibility, possibility to relax somewhat, think ahead, and not be tied down all the time with scheduled tasks. In the example above there is also a line for training to mark that also this important aspect must be taken care of. The necessary further education/training for increased competence, increased flexibility etc must be secured one way or another. Sometimes this can be outside normal shift time, and should not influence this analysis, but if it is carried out wholly or partly on shift time must be included in the analysis for this. 7

8 Attachment 1 Jop Position: Operator 1 Activity Time (or part of shift) Comment Normal operation, night Normal operation, daytime Peak load (disturbances, major maintenance work) Supervision Solution of operational problems Protocol writing Round Sampling Analysis Co-ordination of maintenance Own maintenance work Administrative procedures Special tasks Training (if not outside shift) Room for other tasks Free time (certain time excluded from scheduled time) TOTAL 10 % (e.g.) 30 % (e.g.) 8