Section 1: Introduction
|
|
- Brice Foster
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991) By Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom Presented by Group von Neumann Morgenstern Anita Chen, Salama Freed, Jian Zhai, and Liming Zheng Notation C(t)=cost B(t)=benefit of principal V(t)= net asset gain of agent t=effort contributed by agent w(x)=wage a=income/price of an agent x=information signals β=intercept of the linear wage function r=measurement of agent s risk aversion =arbitrary function of effort CE=certainty equivalence =covariance matrix K= pool of potential personal activities A=subset of allowable tasks out of personal tasks K I= task assignment variable Section 1: Introduction This paper discusses a principal-agent model contextualized to the work environment. Unlike previous papers, which were limited to agents who only performed a single job task, Holmstrom and Milgrom introduce agents whom are responsible for a variety of tasks. Keeping in line with previous models, Holmstrom and Milgrom also assume a risk-averse employee (or agent), which results in job incentives that sometimes force the agent to bear unwanted personal risk and costs. This assumption then brings up the issue of how an employer (or principal) can motivate an agent to perform a particular given some degree of risk-aversion. In theory, job design should play an important part in controlling and motivating incentives for agents. However, one-dimensional models previously had issues explaining why job contracts sometimes omit explicit incentive clauses, a counter-intuitive result given the assumption of risk aversion. What distinguishes Holmstrom and Milgrom s model is that either the agent has multiple dimensions to his or her job OR, that the principal assigns multiple tasks to a particular agent(s).
2 This important feature comes from the linear nature of Holmstrom and Milgrom s principalagent model (an idea that was originally proposed in their 1987 paper). The linearity property ensures that changes in compensation in one task will have effects on how an agent will allocate attention to other tasks. Other central ideas discussed are: 1. How asset ownership affects incentives under different employment schemes (e.g. firm employment vs. independent contracting). 2. When firm employment is preferable over independent contracting (and vice versa), 3. How to determine the optimal limits of mixing business with pleasure. As we will see, this limit is again dependent on whether an agent s job tasks are difficult to measure by the principal. 4. And a sketch of how to optimally divide up tasks amongst two agents. Section 2: The Linear Principal-Agent Problem Assumptions: 1. Costs are a strictly convex function 2. Benefits are strictly concave and accrue to principal 3. Principal is risk-neutral 4. Agent is risk-averse; risk aversion is measured by r 5. Agent s utility function is exponential 6. Agent s wages are a linear function of job performance 7. Agent makes a one-shot choice of how he allocates effort during employment (e.g. agent can see his performance before acting). First introduce a principal who hires an agent for a job. This agent has a vector of efforts or actions denoted as The agent s utility is gained from making wages. In order to earn money, the agent must exert effort at a personal cost, C(t). The agent also creates a vector of signals x, which is defined as following: so that is some concave function and each ε is normally distributed. Here, signaling will indicate how much effort the agent is putting into his/her work. Hence we have that the agent s wages are a function of x. We can substitute the previous equation into the agent s expected utility.
3 u(ce)=e{u[w( where utility 1 is an exponential function u(w)=-e -rw. Recall that the certainty equivalence (CE) is the level of compensation that the agent would require to be indifferent between a risky asset (the expected income). If we have that wages are linear, then Because w(x) is a function of t, we can rewrite the principal s expected profits in terms of t: so or equivalently, under the linear compensation scheme. If we aggregate the principal and agent s certainty equivalences, we can get the following sum: where the third term is the risk premium on the agent s wages. Now let s denote the optimal incentive scheme as: (1) Subject to the condition that t maximizes: (2) Equation (2) says that given the incentive scheme, the agent will pick an effort t that maximizes his utility. This type of constraint is generally called the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC). The solution to (1) will be some optimized pair (a,t)*,which comes from the feasible set of employment contracts characterized by (t,a,β). Interactions among Tasks Suppose we have that so that. Then the ICC becomes 1 Note that utility is an exponential function and is written as u(w)=-e -rw. This relationship implies that the agent has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Recall the definition of absolute risk aversion: A(w)= so in this case, the agent has A(w)=r. The implication of CARA then is that the agent s risk aversion is independent of wealth effects. While this assumption is not the most realistic, it is often included in principalagent problems for mathematical convenience.
4 (3) where the i s indicate the partial derivatives with respect to each t. Now we take the crosspartials, first of income w.r.t. to effort. Using the inverse function theorem, we can also find the cross partial of effort w.r.t. income: (4) We can substitute (3) and (4) into (2) and we come up with: (5) where B is the vector if the first derivatives of B 1. B n and I is the n x n identity matrix. This equation is another rearrangement of the ICC. Note that we don t usually consider the crosspartials of B since there may be complementarities in the agent s costs which feed directly into the optimal incentive payment scheme. Example: consider a teacher who teaches both basic and advanced thinking skills. Suppose that advanced thinking skills are unobservable to the principal. So we have 2 tasks, one which is observable and one which is not unobservable. Let s call them t 1 and t 2, respectively. Then the signal vector becomes: (6) If we take that the errors of t 1 and t 2 are independent and that t 2 has infinite variance, then we can use equation (5) and find that the ICC becomes: (7) ] This tells us that if t 1 and t 2 are complements, then the teacher has incentive to allocate more effort into teaching basic skills (the sign on the cross-partial C 12 will be negative). In the general case for substitutes, given some t i, the principal would have to reduce incentives for other activities (if t i is unobservable, as in the example) or by providing more reward for t i.
5 Section 3: Allocation Incentives for Effort and Attention Assumptions 1. Again, we have risk neutral principals and risk averse agents. 2. Working may be pleasurable under some amount of time. Missing Incentive Clauses in Contracts Description of the model: let denote the time spent on the unmeasurable performance and be the time spent on the measurable performance, so. However, the unmeasurable performance is very important, e.g. B if. Proposition 3.1: In the home construction model, the efficient linear compensation rule pays a fixed wage and contains no incentive component ( ), even if the contractor is risk neutral. Proof: The proof in the paper is not completely right, for that, if, agents will set, the situation will be like the case of a fixed payment,. However, if these two sorts of efforts are not completely substitutes, the conclusion remains. Implications of this proposition: if some effort is both important and hard to measure, to stimulate agents by incentives on measurable effort is to encourage them ignoring the others. "Low-Powered Incentives" in Firms Description of the model: let denote the time spent on the behaviors generating receipts and be the time spent on the effort on increasing the net asset value. Thus, let the expected gross profit from the enterprise be the sum of two parts,, where B represents the expected net receipts and V the expected change in the net asset value. The enterprise has two types of organizations: the one where the principal owns the capital is called employment regime. The other is the independent contract regime in which the agents own the assets. In the general case, we can assume that B and V are increasing and concave functions, and the capital gain has a white noise part. Furthermore, denote:
6 . Proposition 3.2: Assume that, Then, the optimal employment contract always entails paying a fixed wage ( ). Whenever the independent contracting relation is optimal, it involves "high-powered incentives" ( ). Furthermore, there exist values of the parameters r,, and for which employment contracts are optimal and others for which independent contracting is optimal. If employment contracting is optimal for some fixed parameters (r,, ), then it is also optimal for higher values of these parameters. Similarly, if independent contracting is optimal, then it is also optimal for lower values of these parameters. Remarks: The inequality condition means that spending time on both activities is better than only focusing on single activity. This proposition not only shows the optimal choice of payments under different organizations, but also provides a qualitative description of the conditions under which different regimes are applied. Intuitive Proof of Proposition 3.2: It is obvious that principal should not stimulate employee to focus on single activity, for that the inequality condition holds. In case of the independent contract regime, if no incentives, agents will spend all the time on pursuing capital gains and leave principal nothing. Hence, the principal would always choose. If the risk is so large or the agents is extremely risk averse that the profit improvement cannot offset the loss of utility caused by the uncertainty, the risk neutral principal would rather choose certain payments and keep asset in his own hands. On the other hand, if the risk is not large or the agents are willing to take some level of risk, the other type of regime is optimal. However, this is not a strict proof, and neither is the paper s proof. I will leave this in the presentation.
7 Section 4: Limits on Outside Activities Assumptions 1. Constant returns to time for improving performance measurement and benefit to principals. Assume the agent has an infinite pool K={1,,N} of potential activities that only benefit the agent and not the principal. The principal controls these whether the agent can perform these activities during business hours by allowing them (where the task is or excluding them (. The agent can perform the set of allowable tasks A as much as desired. The benefits to the agent can be described as: (8) ) ) Assuming constant returns to time for profits and improving performance, we can describe them as: (9) We are interested in determining the commission rate α and what tasks in K should be allowed in subset A. This will be done by first fixing the commission rate α and setting A(α) based on that, then finding the best α. Stage 1: Fix the commission rate α and find A(α) (10) (11) with first order conditions of and Our first order conditions reveal that the time the agent spends on all tasks and the time the agent spends on personal tasks is not related to A, the tasks allowed. Therefore, if the number of tasks increases, with a fixed α, the agent will spend more time on personal tasks and less time on the principal s tasks. As such, the agent stands to gain while the principal stands to lose )
8 The optimal set of allowable tasks, illustrated in figure 1, is: (12) (Note the strict inequality here. Even if the gain to the agent and the cost to the principal are equal, the principal reserves the right to restrict that task.) Figure 1 Proposition 3 tells us that, assuming α allows for t(α)>0: The agent should be allowed those tasks A(α) such that, or those in which the agent s average product is strictly greater than the principal s marginal product. Increasing an agent s commission rate means that the list of personal tasks allowed to that agent increases as well. o Responsibility and authority go hand in hand. When the employee is financially more responsible for his performance, it is easier to give more freedoms.
9 o In the extreme case, when the error term in the performance metric is zero, the agent will be able to engage in any personal tasks desired, because there will be perfect measurement of performance. o Note also that the marginal cost of the employee of spending time on work is reduced by excluding private tasks. If we exclude one task for not meeting the previously noted criteria, then we should exclude all tasks where the average product does not exceed the marginal product. o This shows the social value of personal activity and the likelihood that it will be excluded are not necessarily closely related. o Note on the graph that even though there is higher value in task 2, it is excluded, and it invites more excess attention. Stage 2: Determining the optimal choice of α Proposition 4, assuming t(α)>0), says: The best commission rate is given by ] where o The employee s responsiveness to increased incentives increases as the set of allowable tasks increases (because dt/da is a function of a summation of A times the inverse marginal productivity of personal tasks. o So it is best to raise commission in response to the increase in allowable tasks make the stakes higher if you allow more personal freedom. o An increase in one leads to an increase in the other. If the error in performance measurement decreases due to a decrease of the variance of the agent becomes more risk averse, the principal can relax the set of allowable tasks and increase the commission rate. o There will be more restrictions on an employee s personal tasks as long as performance is not able to be accurately and precisely measured. Any task that will be excluded from first best arrangement (where personal benefit does not outweigh benefit to the company) should be excluded from other arrangements as well (second best)
10 Section 5: Allocating Tasks between Two Agents Assumptions 1. There are two homogenous agents 2. Personal costs of agents are convex 3. The principal can group jobs in any way and all tasks are considered small Holmstrom and Milgrom describe the model in this section as a first pass attempt at studying the optimal grouping of tasks. So while the model is incomplete, it still provides valuable insight into this problem. Here, two propositions are proved under ideal conditions: 1) Proposition 5: It is never optimal for the two agents to be jointly responsible for any task k. 2) Proposition 6: There is a NEGATIVE trade-off between incentives (here, we consider attention) and risks (here, we consider hard to measure tasks). We want to minimize the objective function of the two agents: ( t 1 ) t ) ( 2 Subject to: ( t i ), i=1, 2 And incentives constraints: We have the Lagrangian equations: And ( ( t i ) if ( t i ) if
11 (21) Caveats to the Proposed Model As previously mentioned, the principal can group jobs in any way and we consider all tasks as small. However, when tasks require a certain amount of time to be completed and vary in size, the need to minimize costs might lead to a reverse conclusion. Some other problems with the model include: 1) The error term of measurements in tasks is assumed to be independent. While this is mathematically tractable, Holmstrom (1982) shows a positive relation between errors will reduce risk premium. Thus in the incentive domain, this model is incomplete. 2) Requirement of equal substitutes in the agent s cost function and excludes the possibility of complementary relation in activities. 3) Agent focus one job of all the time, but in reality, issue of job rotation is an important aspect of job design. Another Example on this Topic Prendergast (2002) 2 mentions that in a more risky environment, given the assumption of reliable reports, there is a POSITIVE relation between risk and output based payment. 2 See The Tenuous Trade Off of Risk and Incentives (JPE 2002) by Canice Prendergast.
1. Introduction. Key Components of Model. Multidimensional Tasks
Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design By Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991) Modigliani group: Belen Chavez, Yan Huang, Tanya Mallavarapu, Quanhe
More informationAll-or-Nothing Monitoring
All-or-Nothing Monitoring Rui R. Zhao October 2007 forthcoming in AER Department of Economics, University at Albany - SUNY, BA 110, 1400 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12222 (e-mail: rzhao@albany.edu).
More informationUsing this information, we then write the output of a firm as
Economists typically assume that firms or a firm s owners try to maximize their profit. et R be revenues of the firm, and C be the cost of production, then a firm s profit can be represented as follows,
More informationAdvanced Microeconomic Analysis, Lecture 7
Advanced Microeconomic Analysis, Lecture 7 Prof. Ronaldo CARPIO April 24, 2017 Administrative Stuff The midterm exam will be returned next week. I will post a new homework, HW #3, on the website later
More informationLinear Incentive Contract with Different Types of Agents KANGSIK CHOI
THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH Working Paper Series No. 85 Linear Incentive Contract with Different Types of Agents by KANGSIK CHOI March 17, 2004 KAGAWA UNIVERSITY Takamatsu, Kagawa 760-8523 JAPAN
More informationSupporting Prices and Convexity. Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2012/9/12 (Lecture 1, Micro Theory I)
and Convexity Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2012/9/12 (Lecture 1, Micro Theory I) Overview of Chapter 1 Theory of Constrained Maximization Why should we care about this? What is Economics? Economics is the study
More informationPublic Economics by Luca Spataro. Market failures: Externalities (Myles ch. 10. sections 4.4, 5, 7.2 & 7.3 excluded)
Public Economics by Luca Spataro Market failures: Externalities (Myles ch. 10. sections 4.4, 5, 7.2 & 7.3 excluded) 1 Introduction Connection between agents outside the price system The level of externality
More informationECON 500 Microeconomic Theory MARKET FAILURES. Asymmetric Information Externalities Public Goods
ECON 500 Microeconomic Theory MARKET FAILURES Asymmetric Information Externalities Public Goods Markets can and do fail to achieve the efficiency and welfare ideals that we have presented thus far. Asymmetric
More informationContingent and Non-Contingent Rewards in the Employment Relationship *
Contingent and Non-Contingent Rewards in the Employment Relationship * Gilbert L. Skillman Department of Economics Wesleyan University Middletown, CT 06459,USA e-mail: gskillman@wesleyan.edu Abstract Recent
More informationNotes on Intertemporal Consumption Choice
Paul A Johnson Economics 304 Advanced Topics in Macroeconomics Notes on Intertemporal Consumption Choice A: The Two-Period Model Consider an individual who faces the problem of allocating their available
More informationPERFORMANCE, PROCESS, AND DESIGN STANDARDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
PERFORMANCE, PROCESS, AND DESIGN STANDARDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION BRENT HUETH AND TIGRAN MELKONYAN Abstract. This papers analyzes efficient regulatory design of a polluting firm who has two kinds
More informationProf. Bryan Caplan Econ 812
Prof. Bryan Caplan bcaplan@gmu.edu http://www.bcaplan.com Econ 812 Week 8: Symmetric Information I. Expected Utility Theory A. How do people choose between gambles? In particular, what is the relationship
More informationGame Analysis on Economic Risks of Lack of Innovation in Industrial Transferring Regions
Association for Information Systems AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) WHICEB 014 Proceedings Wuhan International Conference on e-business Summer 6-1-014 Game Analysis on Economic Risks of Lack of Innovation
More informationChapter 5: Variable pay or straight salary
Chapter 5: Variable pay or straight salary University Professors get a straight salary which is not even based on age (may be considered high or low, depending on your point of view). Should we introduce
More informationThe 2x2 Exchange Economy. Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2013/10/2 (Lecture 8, Micro Theory I)
The 2x2 Exchange Economy Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2013/10/2 (Lecture 8, Micro Theory I) Road Map for Chapter 3 Pareto Efficiency Allocation (PEA) Cannot make one better off without hurting others Walrasian (Price-taking)
More informationThe 2x2 Exchange Economy. Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2012/11/21 (Lecture 2, Micro Theory I)
The 2x2 Exchange Economy Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2012/11/21 (Lecture 2, Micro Theory I) Road Map for Chapter 3 Pareto Efficiency Cannot make one better off without hurting others Walrasian (Price-taking) Equilibrium
More informationChapter 3 Investment in Skills (Theory of Human Capital Education and On-The-Job Training) Economics 136 Julian Betts
Chapter 3 Investment in Skills (Theory of Human Capital Education and On-The-Job Training) Economics 136 Julian Betts 1 Main Questions 1) What determines optimal amount of education people obtain? 2) What
More informationFIRST FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM OF WELFARE ECONOMICS
FIRST FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM OF WELFARE ECONOMICS SICONG SHEN Abstract. Markets are a basic tool for the allocation of goods in a society. In many societies, markets are the dominant mode of economic exchange.
More informationApplied Welfare Economics
Economics Monika Köppl - Turyna Department of Economics ISCTE-IUL Summer 2014/2015 Introduction We will have lectures and problem solving sessions (usually one per two lectures) Attendance is generally
More informationCambridge University Press Modeling Monetary Economies, Second Edition - Bruce Champ and Scott Freeman Excerpt More information.
Part I Money IN PART I we develop and learn to work with our most basic model of money, applying it to the study of fiat and commodity monies, inflation, and international monetary systems. In studying
More informationQuestion # 1 of 15 ( Start time: 01:24:42 PM ) Total Marks: 1 A person with a diminishing marginal utility of income: Will be risk averse. Will be risk neutral. Will be risk loving. Cannot decide without
More informationField Exam January Labor Economics PLEASE WRITE YOUR ANSWERS FOR EACH PART IN A SEPARATE BOOK.
University of California, Berkeley Department of Economics Field Exam January 2017 Labor Economics There are three parts of the exam. Please answer all three parts. You should plan to spend about one hour
More informationPh.D. MICROECONOMICS CORE EXAM August IMPORTANT. You are expected to adhere to the following guidelines in completing the exam:
Ph.D. MICROECONOMICS CORE EXAM August 2009 This exam is designed to test your broad knowledge of microeconomics. There are three sections: one required and two choice sections. You must complete all three
More informationECON 5113 Microeconomic Theory
Test 1 February 3, 2017 1. Let % be a consumer s preference relation on a consumption set X R n +. Suppose that x 2 X. (a) Define the sets (x) and (x). (b) Show that (x) \ (x) =?. 2. Suppose that a consumer
More informationA MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF PAY-FOR- PERFORMANCE FOR A HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTION
Page 13 A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF PAY-FOR- PERFORMANCE FOR A HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTION Matthew Hathorn, Weill Cornell Medical College John Hathorn, Metropolitan State College of Denver Lesley Hathorn,
More informationUniversity of California, Davis Date: June 24, PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D. DEGREE. Answer four questions (out of five)
University of California, Davis Date: June 24, 203 Department of Economics Time: 5 hours Microeconomics Reading Time: 20 minutes PREIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D. DEGREE Answer four questions (out of
More informationIn the Name of God. Sharif University of Technology. Microeconomics 2. Graduate School of Management and Economics. Dr. S.
In the Name of God Sharif University of Technology Graduate School of Management and Economics Microeconomics 2 44706 (1394-95 2 nd term) - Group 2 Dr. S. Farshad Fatemi Chapter 13: Adverse Selection,
More informationRationing Poor Consumers to Reduce Prices
Rationing Poor Consumers to Reduce Prices Simona Grassi Ching-to Albert Ma Max Weber Fellow Department of Economics European University Institute Boston University Villa La Fonte, Via Delle Fontanelle,
More informationThe Core Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Maximizationty
The Core Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Maximizationty Econ 2100 Fall 2017 Lecture 14, October 19 Outline 1 The Core 2 Core, indiviual rationality, and Pareto effi ciency 3 Social welfare function
More informationEconomics of Strategy Fifth Edition
Economics of Strategy Fifth Edition Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer Chapter 16 Performance Measurement and Incentive in Firms Slides by: Richard Ponarul, California State University, Chico Copyright
More informationTechnical Appendix. Resolution of the canonical RBC Model. Master EPP, 2010
Technical Appendix Resolution of the canonical RBC Model Master EPP, 2010 Questions What are the causes of macroeconomic fluctuations? To what extent optimal intertemporal behavior of households in a walrasssian
More informationChapters 1 and 2 Trade Without Money and A Model of Money
Chapters 1 and 2 Trade Without Money and A Model of Money Main Aims: 1. Answer following two questions: Why money is used as a medium of exchange? How and why money improves allocations in an economy and
More informationTheory Appendix. 1 Model Setup
Theory Appendix In this appendix, we provide a stylized model based on our empirical setting to analyze the effect of competition on author behavior. The general idea is that in a market with imperfect
More informationPARETO-IMPROVING CONGESTION PRICING AND REVENUE REFUNDING WITH ELASTIC DEMAND
PARETO-IMPROVING CONGESTION PRICING AND REVENUE REFUNDING WITH ELASTIC DEMAND Xiaolei Guo, Odette School of Business Cross-Border Transportation Centre University of Windsor Hai Yang, Department of Civil
More informationCryptoeconomics of the Loki network
The problem of incentivising service nodes in the Loki Blockchain network Brendan Markey-Towler 1 11 July 2018 Abstract Loki is a Blockchain network oriented toward the provision of privacypreserving services
More informationHarvard University Department of Economics
Harvard University Department of Economics General Examination in Microeconomic Theory Spring 00. You have FOUR hours. Part A: 55 minutes Part B: 55 minutes Part C: 60 minutes Part D: 70 minutes. Answer
More informationWRITTEN PRELIMINARY Ph.D. EXAMINATION. Department of Applied Economics. University of Minnesota. June 16, 2014 MANAGERIAL, FINANCIAL, MARKETING
WRITTEN PRELIMINARY Ph.D. EXAMINATION Department of Applied Economics University of Minnesota June 16, 2014 MANAGERIAL, FINANCIAL, MARKETING AND PRODUCTION ECONOMICS FIELD Instructions: Write your code
More informationEcon 792. Labor Economics. Lecture 6
Econ 792 Labor Economics Lecture 6 1 "Although it is obvious that people acquire useful skills and knowledge, it is not obvious that these skills and knowledge are a form of capital, that this capital
More informationQuality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth. Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine April 4, 2007
Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine April 4, 2007 The Conventional View innovation along quality ladder, driven by short-term monopoly power fixed costs
More informationWelfare Economics. The Edgeworth Box. The Basic Theorem. Some Basic Assumptions
Welfare Economics The Edgeworth Box The Basic Theorem The basic theorem in welfare economics: A market, exchange, economy will achieve efficient resource allocation. We intend to show the basics of that
More information1 Competitive Equilibrium
1 Competitive Equilibrium Each household and each firm in the economy act independently from each other, seeking their own interest, and taking as given the fact that other agents will also seek their
More informationUnit 2: Theory of Consumer Behaviour
Name: Unit 2: Theory of Consumer Behaviour Date: / / Notations and Assumptions A consumer, in general, consumes many goods; but for simplicity, we shall consider the consumer s choice problem in a situation
More informationAdvanced Microeconomic Theory. Chapter 7: Monopoly
Advanced Microeconomic Theory Chapter 7: Monopoly Outline Barriers to Entry Profit Maximization under Monopoly Welfare Loss of Monopoly Multiplant Monopolist Price Discrimination Advertising in Monopoly
More informationEcon Microeconomic Analysis and Policy
ECON 500 Microeconomic Theory Econ 500 - Microeconomic Analysis and Policy Monopoly Monopoly A monopoly is a single firm that serves an entire market and faces the market demand curve for its output. Unlike
More informationChapter 8: Exchange. 8.1: Introduction. 8.2: Exchange. 8.3: Individual A s Preferences and Endowments
Chapter 8: Exchange 8.1: Introduction In many ways this chapter is the most important in the book. If you have time to study just one, this is the one that you should study (even though it might be a bit
More information1.. There are two firms that produce a homogeneous product. Let p i
University of California, Davis Department of Economics Time: 3 hours Reading time: 20 minutes PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D. DEGREE Industrial Organization June 30, 2005 Answer four of the six
More informationLecture Notes, Econ 320B. Set # 5.
Lecture Notes, Econ 320B. Set # 5. Martin Kaae Jensen February 15, 2009 Correspondence: Martin Kaae Jensen, University of Birmingham, Department of Economics, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK. E-mail:
More informationEcon190 May 1, No baseball caps are allowed (turn it backwards if you have one on).
Heather Krull Final Exam Econ190 May 1, 2006 Name: Instructions: 1. Write your name above. 2. No baseball caps are allowed (turn it backwards if you have one on). 3. Write your answers in the space provided
More informationOn the mode of Competition as a Collusive Perspective in Unionized Oligopoly
On the mode of Competition as a Collusive Perspective in Unionized Oligopoly Minas Vlassis * Maria Varvataki Department of Economics, University of Crete, Gallos University Campus, Rethymnon 74100, Greece
More informationIncentives in Supply Function Equilibrium
Discussion Paper No. 2014-38 September 29, 2014 http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2014-38 Please cite the corresponding Journal Article at http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2015-5
More informationBuyer Heterogeneity and Dynamic Sorting in Markets for Durable Lemons
Buyer Heterogeneity and Dynamic Sorting in Markets for Durable Lemons Santanu Roy Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. October 13, 2011 Abstract In a durable good market where sellers have private
More informationWRITTEN PRELIMINARY Ph.D EXAMINATION. Department of Applied Economics. Trade, Development and Growth. June For students electing
WRITTEN PRELIMINARY Ph.D EXAMINATION Department of Applied Economics Trade, Development and Growth June 2013 For students electing APEC 8702 and APEC 8703 option Instructions * Identify yourself by your
More informationECO401 Current Online 85 Quizzes Question Repeated ignore In Green color are doubted one
ECO401 Current Online 85 Quizzes Question Repeated ignore In Green color are doubted one Question # 1 of 15 ( Start time: 01:24:42 PM ) Total Marks: 1 A person with a diminishing marginal utility of income:
More informationEconS 527 Homework 3 Answer Key. Consider a consumer with Cobb-Douglas utility function
EconS 527 Homework 3 Answer Key 1. Consider a consumer with Cobb-Douglas utility function over two goods a) Find the Walrasian demand function for goods and. The Lagrangian of this UMP is then The first
More informationManagerial Economics Prof. Trupti Mishra S. J. M. School of Management Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
Managerial Economics Prof. Trupti Mishra S. J. M. School of Management Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay Lecture - 2 Introduction to Managerial Economics (Contd ) So, welcome to the second session
More informationA Note on Expanding Networks and Monopoly Pricing
A Note on Expanding Networks and Monopoly Pricing Jean J. Gabszewicz and Filomena Garcia CORE Discussion Paper 2005/95 Abstract We obtain explicitly the optimal path of prices for a monopolist operating
More informationGeneral Equilibrium for the Exchange Economy. Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2013/10/9 (Lecture 9, Micro Theory I)
General Equilibrium for the Exchange Economy Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2013/10/9 (Lecture 9, Micro Theory I) What s in between the lines? And God said, 2 Let there be light and there was light. (Genesis 1:3,
More informationMarkets and Values. The Evolution of Intrinsic Motivation. Tim Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak. November 2015
Markets and Values The Evolution of Intrinsic Motivation Tim Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak November 2015 Besley & Ghatak (LSE) Markets and Values November 2015 1 / 26 Motivation Many commentators e.g. Durkheim,
More informationLecture 10: Price discrimination Part II
Lecture 10: Price discrimination Part II EC 105. Industrial Organization. Matt Shum HSS, California Institute of Technology EC 105. Industrial Organization. (Matt Shum HSS, CaliforniaLecture Institute10:
More informationUmbrella Branding Can Leverage Reputation, but only with Market Power. May 19, Eric B. Rasmusen
Umbrella Branding Can Leverage Reputation, but only with Market Power May 19, 2012 Eric B. Rasmusen Dan R. and Catherine M. Dalton Professor, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Kelley
More informationWeek 4 Consumer Theory
Week 4 Consumer Theory Serçin ahin Yldz Technical University 16 October 2012 The Consumer's Problem We view the consumer as having a consumption set, X = R n +. His preferences are described by the preference
More informationManaging Decentralized Inventory and Transhipment
Managing Decentralized Inventory and Transhipment Moshe Dror mdror@eller.arizona.edu Nichalin Suakkaphong nichalin@email.arizona.edu Department of MIS University of Arizona Fleet Size Mix and Inventory
More informationOnline shopping and platform design with ex ante registration requirements
Online shopping and platform design with ex ante registration requirements O A Florian Morath Johannes Münster June 17, 2016 This supplementary appendix to the article Online shopping and platform design
More informationThe Basic Spatial Model with a Single Monopolist
Economics 335 March 3, 999 Notes 8: Models of Spatial Competition I. Product differentiation A. Definition Products are said to be differentiated if consumers consider them to be imperfect substitutes.
More informationMicrofoundations and General Equilibrium. Before beginning our study of specific macroeconomic questions, we review some micro
Microfoundations and General Equilibrium I. Introduction Before beginning our study of specific macroeconomic questions, we review some micro economic theories and the general equilibrium approach to economic
More informationEstimating Discrete Choice Models of Demand. Data
Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Demand Aggregate (market) aggregate (market-level) quantity prices + characteristics (+advertising) distribution of demographics (optional) sample from distribution
More information1.. There are two complementary goods that are consumed together (each individual good
University of California, Davis Department of Economics Time: 3 hours Reading time: 20 minutes PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D. DEGREE Industrial Organization June 22, 2004 Answer four of the six
More informationIntroduction to Economics for Integrated Modeling
Overview Introduction to Economics for Integrated Modeling Michael Brady Assistant Professor and Extension Economist School of Economic Sciences Washington State University March 15, 2012 Introduction
More informationOn Optimal Tiered Structures for Network Service Bundles
On Tiered Structures for Network Service Bundles Qian Lv, George N. Rouskas Department of Computer Science, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 7695-86, USA Abstract Network operators offer a
More informationViability Analysis of an Enterprise I
IJAMT 71 Viability Analysis of an Enterprise I Charles Andoh, University of Ghana Business School, West Africa Abstract The study derives the conditions for the profitability of any enterprise. So long
More informationVertical Differentiation in Monetary Search-Theoretic Model: Revisited. Chia-Ying Chang Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
Vertical Differentiation in Monetary Search-Theoretic Model: Revisited Chia-Ying Chang Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand May, 2005 Abstract Quality levels have been widely discussed in the
More informationLearning by Observing
Working Papers in Economics Learning by Observing Efe Postalcı, zmir University of Economics Working Paper #10/07 December 2010 Izmir University of Economics Department of Economics Sakarya Cad. No:156
More informationPositive self-image and incentives in organizations
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Positive self-image and incentives in organizations Luís Santos-Pinto Universidade Nova de Lisboa 3. September 2003 Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3141/ MPRA
More informationLesson-28. Perfect Competition. Economists in general recognize four major types of market structures (plus a larger number of subtypes):
Lesson-28 Perfect Competition Economists in general recognize four major types of market structures (plus a larger number of subtypes): Perfect Competition Monopoly Oligopoly Monopolistic competition Market
More informationLecture notes development
Lecture notes development Kalle Moene April 23, 2018 Remarks on land and land distribution Unequal land holdings give rise to land rental markets Land rental markets can be inefficient Two sources of inefficiency:
More informationEcon Microeconomics Notes
Econ 120 - Microeconomics Notes Daniel Bramucci December 1, 2016 1 Section 1 - Thinking like an economist 1.1 Definitions Cost-Benefit Principle An action should be taken only when its benefit exceeds
More informationInequality and the Organization of Knowledge
Inequality and the Organization of Knowledge by Luis Garicano and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg Since the seminal work of Katz and Murphy (1992), the study of wage inequality has taken as its starting point a
More informationSolutions to Final Exam
Solutions to Final Exam AEC 504 - Summer 2007 Fundamentals of Economics c 2007 Alexander Barinov 1 Veni, vidi, vici (30 points) Two firms with constant marginal costs serve two markets for two different
More informationYour use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
Resource Extraction, Uncertainty, and Learning Author(s): Michael Hoel Source: The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn, 1978), pp. 642-645 Published by: RAND Corporation Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003604
More informationI. An Introduction to Externalities and Market Failures. II. Externalities. EC 441: Handout 5A: Externalities and Solutions
I. An Introduction to Externalities and Market Failures A. The first part of the course addressed how a governments efforts to raise its revenues and its associated pattern of expenditures affect private
More informationTask Assignments and Incentives: Generalists versus Specialists
Task Assignments and Incentives: Generalists versus Specialists Suraj Prasad January 17, 2009 Abstract I develop an agency model of job assignments where jobs differ based on the breadth of tasks. A tradeoff
More informationSHORT QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR ECO402
SHORT QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR ECO402 Question: How does opportunity cost relate to problem of scarcity? Answer: The problem of scarcity exists because of limited production. Thus, each society must make
More informationCriticism of Indifference Curve Theory
Criticism of Indifference Curve Theory In today s lecture we will discuss about criticisms of Indifference curve theory. The objective of this lesson is to find out, or to learn about the defects of Indifference
More informationTopic Compensating Differentials. Professor H.J. Schuetze Economics 370
Topic 4.3 - Compensating Differentials Professor H.J. Schuetze Economics 370 Compensating Differentials Refers to the wage differentials that exist in equilibrium to compensate workers for undesirable
More informationmovement of goods and labor. According to Hatton and Williamson (2005), average industrial
III. EDUCATION, INSTITUTIONS, MIGRATION, TRADE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TALENT III.I. Introduction In the modern world, a number of recent political developments have intensified the free movement of goods
More informationRevealing Preferences Graphically: An Old Method Gets a New Tool Kit
Revealing Preferences Graphically: An Old Method Gets a New Tool Kit By Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Douglas M. Gale, and Shachar Kariv* Because uncertainty is endemic in a wide variety of economic circumstances,
More informationSupplimentary material for Research at the Auction Block: Problems for the Fair Benefits Approach to International Research
Supplimentary material for Research at the Auction Block: Problems for the Fair Benefits Approach to International Research Alex John London Carnegie Mellon University Kevin J.S. Zollman Carnegie Mellon
More informationPh.D. MICROECONOMICS CORE EXAM January 2018
Ph.D. MICROECONOMICS CORE EXAM January 2018 This exam is designed to test your broad knowledge of microeconomics. There are three sections: one required and two choice sections. You must complete both
More information8. Consumption, uncertainty, and the current account
8. Consumption, uncertainty, and the current account Index: 8. Consumption, uncertainty, and the current account... 8. Introduction... 8. The deterministic case...3 8.3 Optimal consumption under uncertainty...4
More informationOshoring in a Knowledge Economy
Oshoring in a Knowledge Economy Pol Antras Harvard University Luis Garicano University of Chicago Esteban Rossi-Hansberg Stanford University Main Question Study the impact of cross-country teams formation
More informationDiscussion of Nonfinancial Performance Measures and Promotion-Based Incentives
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00276.x Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 46 No. 2 May 2008 Printed in U.S.A. Discussion of Nonfinancial Performance Measures and Promotion-Based Incentives MICHAEL GIBBS
More informationP rofit t (1 + i) t. V alue = t=0
These notes correspond to Chapter 2 of the text. 1 Optimization A key concept in economics is that of optimization. It s a tool that can be used for many applications, but for now we will use it for pro
More informationWhen the M-optimal match is being chosen, it s a dominant strategy for the men to report their true preferences
Econ 805 Advanced Micro Theory I Dan Quint Fall 2008 Lecture 19 November 11 2008 Last Thursday, we proved that the set of stable matchings in a given marriage market form a lattice, and then we went very
More information1.1 A Farming Example and the News Vendor Problem
4 1. Introduction and Examples The third section considers power system capacity expansion. Here, decisions are taken dynamically about additional capacity and about the allocation of capacity to meet
More informationWork Practices, Incentives for Skills, and Training
Work Practices, Incentives for Skills, and Training Suraj Prasad and Hien Tran June 15, 2012 Abstract We study a worker s incentives to acquire skills that cannot be verified by a third party. We do this
More informationDuopoly Competition Considering Waiting Cost
Duopoly Competition -..-- Considering - Waiting Cost Duopoly Competition Considering Waiting Cost Nam, Ick-Hyun Seoul National University College of Business Administration March 21, 1997 1. Introduction
More informationPh.D. MICROECONOMICS CORE EXAM January 2019
Ph.D. MICROECONOMICS CORE EXAM January 2019 This exam is designed to test your broad knowledge of microeconomics. There are three sections: one required and two choice sections. You must complete both
More informationAn Analysis of Upstream and Downstream Interaction, From a View of Principal-Agent Relationship
An Analysis of Upstream and Downstream Interaction, From a View of Principal-Agent Relationship Boya Xu August 30, 2017 Abstract: This paper discusses pricing strategies and production of upstream and
More informationManagerial Economics, 01/12/2003. A Glossary of Terms
A Glossary of Terms The Digital Economist -A- Abundance--A physical or economic condition where the quantity available of a resource exceeds the quantity desired in the absence of a rationing system. Arbitrage
More informationLecture 3 Allocation and Distribution
Lecture 3 Allocation and Distribution Theodore Bergstrom, UCSB March 31, 2002 c 1998 Chapter 3 Allocation and Distribution The undisputed standard graduate public finance textbook when I was in graduate
More information