Managers Mobility, Trade Performance, and Wages

Transcription

1 Managers Mobility, Trade Performance, and Wages Giordano Mion (University of Sussex, CEP, and CEPR) Luca David Opromolla (Banco de Portugal, CEPR and UECE) CESifo, Munich, October 2015 Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

2 Motivation A growing literature in economics explores how the management of a firm affects its performance. Empirical studies: link between managerial practices or managers characteristics and firms (countries ) productivities. Theoretical contributions: the firm-manager nexus (matching, incentive provision, ownership, trade). Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

3 Our Contribution Look at the nexus between: Firm trade performance Managers export experience Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that managers transfer valuable export-specific knowledge when moving across firms. Furthermore, such knowledge has a very strong market-specific nature. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

4 Main Results 1 Export experience acquired by managers in previous firms leads their current firm towards higher export performance, and commands a sizeable wage premium for the manager. 2 Export experience proves to be very valuable when it is market-specific: managers with experience related to markets served by their current firm receive an even higher wage premium; firms are more likely to enter markets where their managers have experience; exporters are more likely to stay in those markets, and their sales are on average higher. 3 Export experience is as important as firm s productivity. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

5 Trade literature Our findings have important implications for the empirical trade literature. The empirical literature on the determinants of firm trade behaviour (Bernard et al., 2012) has so far focused on: productivity and selection (Bernard and Jensen, 1999, 2004) sunk costs (Das et al., 2007; Impullitti et al., 2012; Roberts and Tybout, 1997) innovation (Bustos, 2011) quality (Iacovone and Javorcik, 2012; Verhoogen, 2008) workforce composition (Muendler and Molina, 2010; Yeaple, 2005) uncertainty about demand (Arkolakis, 2010; Eaton et al., 2012) Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

6 Trade literature It is fair to say that, even when considering all of these dimensions, we are still far from matching the degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity across firms in their export participation and intensity. There are indeed many very productive or skill intensive firms that do not export at all and quite a few very unproductive or low R&D intensive firms that do sell abroad. Our results suggest that export experience brought by managers is key to draw the boundary between exporters and non-exporters as well as to pin down the trade performance of the former. Furthermore, the fact that knowledge can be transferred from one firm to another via the mobility of managers has profound implications for the way we design and estimate models of export participation and in particular for the assumption that decisions to export are independent across firms. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

7 Road Map Data. Key definitions: managers and export experience. A Mincerian wage analysis to test whether an export experience premium (for managers and non-managers) exists. Trade performance analysis. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

8 Data We merge two panel data sets: A matched employer-employee data set (Quadros de Pessoal) compulsory annual census of all firms in Portugal that employ at least one worker (currently about 350,000 firms and 3 million employees); firm-, plant-, and worker-level information; all linked coverage: , annual. A trade data set at the transaction-level, both extra-eu and intra-eu trade (exports and imports) for each transaction: firm id, year, month, value, product code (CN8), country, quantity (kilos)... coverage: Information is reliable and (quasi) exhaustive which is key to our research question. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

9 Sample period Manufacturing Single-job, full-time, years old workers, working between 25 and 80 hours per week (base plus overtime) Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

10 Key Definitions: Managers Conceptually: Identify a group of workers that is responsible for the main strategic decisions taken within the firm. Practically: Classification of workers, according to eight hierarchical levels, defined by the Portuguese law. Top two levels: Top management and Middle management. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

11 Workers Classification Level Tasks Skills 1. Top executives Firm general policy; organization of the firm; strategic planning; creation or adaptation of technical, scientific and administrative methods or processes. 2. Intermediary executives Organization and adaptation of the guidelines established by the superiors and directly linked with the executive work. Knowledge of management and coordination of firms fundamental activities; research of high responsibility and technical level problems. Technical and professional qualifications directed to executive, research, and management work. 3. Supervisors, team leaders; 4. Higher-skilled professionals; 5. Skilled professionals; 6. Semi-skilled professionals; 7. Non-skilled professionals; 8. Apprentices, interns. Hierarchical levels defined according to Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd 1978 (Lima and Pereira, 2003). Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

12 Key Definitions: Managers Conceptually: Identify a group of workers that is responsible for the main strategic decisions taken within the firm. Practically: Classification of workers, according to eight hierarchical levels, defined by the Portuguese law. Top two levels: Top management and Middle management. 6.7 percent of the workers are managers (in 2005) percent of the firms have a manager (in 2005) = 53.6 percent of exporting firms, 91.8 percent of exports, and 61.5 percent of employment of the Portuguese manufacturing industry. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

13 Key Definitions: Export Experience We can track workers over time. For each firm-year pair, we can identify the subset of (currently employed) workers that have previously worked in a different firm. We can then single-out those workers that were employed in the past by an exporting firm. We define such workers as having export experience. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

14 Key Definitions: Specific and Matched Export Experience Partition countries into 7 groups: Spain, other top 5 export destinations (Italy, UK, France, and Germany), other EU, other OECD, Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP in Portuguese), China, and the rest of the World. Two refinements of export experience. First: a worker has market m-specific export experience if he/she has export experience and market m was among the destinations served by one of the worker s previous employers. Second: a worker has matched export experience if he/she has market m-specific export experience in at least one of the markets the current employing firm is actually exporting to. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

15 Raw Data Evidence 1 Managers with export experience are paid substantially more than other managers;the premium for non-managers is much smaller. 2 There is a strong correlation between the presence of managers with export experience and firms trade performance. Note: Wage = (base + overtime + regular benefits)/(regular and overtime hours worked) Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

16 Wage Density for Managers, by Export Experience, 2005 Density (Log) Wage Without Export Experience With Matched Export Experience With Export Experience Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

17 Wage Density, Non-Managers, by Export Experience, 2005 Density (Log) Wage Without Export Experience With Matched Export Experience With Export Experience Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

18 Export Entry Rate, by Firm-type, Spain IT UK FR DE Other EU Other OECD CPLP China Rest of the World No Export Experience Specific Export Experience Export Experience Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

19 Export Continuation Rate, by Firm-type, Spain IT UK FR DE Other EU Other OECD CPLP China Rest of the World No Export Experience Specific Export Experience Export Experience Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

20 Exports Density for Entrants, by Firm-type, 2005 Spain IT UK FR DE Other EU Density Density Density (Log) Exports Other OECD (Log) Exports CPLP (Log) Exports China Density Density Density (Log) Exports (Log) Exports (Log) Exports No Export Experience Export Experience Specific Export Experience Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

21 Exports Density for Continuers, by Firm-type, 2005 Spain IT UK FR DE Other EU Density Density Density (Log) Exports Other OECD (Log) Exports CPLP (Log) Exports China Density Density Density (Log) Exports (Log) Exports (Log) Exports No Export Experience Export Experience Specific Export Experience Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

22 Wage Analysis Goal: Identifying a wage premium for export experience. Difference-in-difference approach. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

23 Difference-in-Difference Non exporter Exports to Spain and China Exports to Spain Mobility Non exporter Mobility + Experience Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

24 Wage analysis w it = β 0 + β 1 Manager it + Mobility itγ M + (Mobility it Manager it ) Γ Mm + + β 2 Experience it + β 3 (Experience it Manager it ) + + β 4 Matched Experience it + β 5 (Matched Experience it Manager it ) + + I itγ I + P ptγ P + C ftγ C + η i + η f + η t + ε it, Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

25 Wage analysis w it = β 0 + β 1 Manager it + Mobility itγ M + (Mobility it Manager it ) Γ Mm }{{} + Control + β 2 Experience it + β 3 (Experience it Manager it ) }{{} + Treatment 1 + β 4 Matched Experience it + β 5 (Matched Experience it Manager it ) }{{} + Treatment 2 + I itγ I + P ptγ P + C ftγ C + η i + η f + η t + ε it, Note: Γ M (Γ Mm ) wage variations due to (managers ) mobility β 2 + β 3 export experience wage premium for a manager β 4 + β 5 matched export experience wage premium for a manager Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

26 Wage Analysis: Other Controls I it individual time-varying observables: age, age squared, education, and tenure. C ft current firm observables: size, productivity, share of skilled workers, export status, age, foreign ownership, mean and std. dev. of both age and education of managers, industry-level exports. P pt previous firm observables: size, productivity, industry affiliation. η i (η f, η t ) are individual (current firm, time) fixed effects. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

27 Export Experience Premia for Managers (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) Export Exp. (0/1) a a a b (885.39) (631.79) (119.21) (4.61) 1-3 Yrs Export Exp. (0/1) a b (398.73) (4.95) 4-6 Yrs Export Exp (0/1) a.027 a (332.61) (27.30) 7-9 Yrs Export Exp. (0/1) a.066 a (426.73) (116.71) Matched Export Exp. (0/1) a a (83.11) (10.01) Worker-Year, Current Firm-Year, and Previous Firm-Year controls X X X X X X Worker and Firm FE X X X Observations 4,208,456 4,208,456 4,208,456 4,208,456 4,208,456 4,208,456 Number of Workers 1,276,161 1,276,161 1,276,161 1,276,161 1,276,161 1,276,161 Number of Firms 45,072 45,072 45,072 45,072 45,072 45,072 R Robust F and T statistics in parentheses: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1 full table Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

28 Export Experience Premia for Non-managers (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) Export Exp. (0/1) a a (7.96) (-0.92) (24.26) (-0.34) 1-3 Yrs Export Exp. (0/1) a (0.98) (-6.08) 4-6 Yrs Export Exp. (0/1) a a (10.61) (-2.90) 7-9 Yrs Export Exp. (0/1) a a (14.35) (-2.90) Matched Export Exp. (0/1) a (-29.01) (-1.02) Worker-Year, Current Firm-Year, and Previous Firm-Year controls X X X X X X Worker and Firm FE X X X Observations 4,208,456 4,208,456 4,208,456 4,208,456 4,208,456 4,208,456 Number of Workers 1,276,161 1,276,161 1,276,161 1,276,161 1,276,161 1,276,161 Number of Firms 45,072 45,072 45,072 45,072 45,072 45,072 R Robust F and T statistics in parentheses: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1 Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

29 Take-home Does export experience pay for a manager? Yes. The premium is substantial and grows over time. Is there an additional premium for matched export experience for managers? Yes. Just export experience: premium of 6.7 (1.5) percent when not accounting (accounting) for firm and worker fixed effects. Also matched export experience: additional premium of 5.5 (1.8) percent. Do export experience and/or matched export experience pay for a non-manager? Not really. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

30 Endogeneity: Selection For the estimated premia to have a causal interpretation we need, as is typically the case for Mincerian analyses, matching between firms and workers to be random conditional on covariates. If we consider wages w ift for all the possible firm-worker pairs this means we impose E [ε ift X ift, d ift = 1]=E [ε ift X ift ] where X ift is our set of covariates and fixed effects and d ift is a dummy taking value one if worker i is employed by firm f at time t. Though admittedly restrictive, this hypothesis is made less strong by the fact that we use a large battery of controls for worker, past employer, and current employer characteristics while accounting for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity by means of both firm and worker fixed effects. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

31 Endogeneity: Selection Furthermore, it is actually quite plausible that selection induces a downward bias of our premia which are thus to be considered as conservative. For example, suppose wages w ift reflect workers productivity and that firm f hires( the most productive worker from a set ) I. We would then have d ift =1 X ift β + ε ift max i I X i ft β + ε i ft, where 1(.) is an indicator function. Under this assumption d ift depends on both X ift and ε ift while E [ε ift X ift, d ift = 1] decreases in those components of the covariates vector X ift corresponding to a positive coefficient (like export experience) so inducing a downward bias. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

32 Endogeneity: Omitted Variables One caveat potentially applying to our analysis is that export experience might simply be a proxy for some omitted variables. For example, having being employed by an exporter could signal the unobserved ability of a manager if exporters screen workers more effectively (e.g. Helpman et al., 2010, 2012). Another possibility is that workers (previously) employed by exporters could be expected to enjoy stronger wage rises over the course of their career as would occur, given the (widely documented) productivity advantage of exporters, in the context of strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search (e.g. Cahuc et al., 2006). Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

33 Endogeneity: Omitted Variables We account for these issues in three ways. First, we use worker fixed effects to capture any time-invariant unobserved characteristic of the worker (including ability) Second, we use previous firm characteristics (size, productivity, and industry) to control for the fact that some workers are expected to enjoy stronger wage rises over the course of their career Third, we use a refined definition of export experience that is more directly linked to the actual exporting activities undertaken by the worker s previous firms i.e. matched export experience. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

34 Endogeneity: Censoring Export experience and matched export experience depend on the whole professional history of a worker. For some observations, this history is not entirely observed in our data, which exclusively covers the years 1995 to For those workers that we consider not having experience based on the observed data, it is possible that they acquired export experience before This is a problem of missing data due to censoring. To deal with this issue we use a different definition of export experience and matched export experience and explore its quantitative implications. More specifically, we impose experience to be acquired either in t 1 or t 2 and get rid of both 1995 and 1996 data. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our core findings. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

35 Trade Performance Goal: Evaluate whether export experience brought by managers has an impact on firms trade performance. We model firms entry and continuation into a specific market, as well as the value of exports conditional on entry/continuation. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

36 Trade Performance Entry fmt = 1 [Entry fmt >0], Entry fmt = δ 1 + ManExp fmt β 1 + Z 1ft Γ 1 + η 1mt + ζ 1fmt, Exports fmt = δ 2 + ManExp fmt β 2 + Z 2ft Γ 2 + η 2mt + ζ 2fmt, ManExp fmt indicates the presence of one (or more) managers with export experience or specific export experience. Z 1ft and Z 2ft are firm-year observables. η 1mt and η 2mt are market-year dummies. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

37 Trade Performance Entry fmt = 1 [Entry fmt >0], Entryfmt = δ 1 + ManExp fmt β 1 + Z 1ft Γ 1 + η 1mt + ζ 1fmt, Exports fmt = δ 2 + ManExp fmt β 2 + Z 2ft Γ 2 + η 2mt + ζ 2fmt, When considering export experience: ManExp fmt = ManExp ft, i.e. it s only firm-time varying. ζ 1fmt = η 1f + υ 1fmt, i.e. we include firm fixed effects (same for ζ 2fmt ). υ 1fmt and υ 2fmt are uncorrelated with each other and with covariates. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

38 Trade Performance Entry fmt = 1 [Entry fmt >0], Entry fmt = δ 1 + ManExp fmt β 1 + Z 1ft Γ 1 + η 1mt + ζ 1fmt, Exports fmt = δ 2 + ManExp fmt β 2 + Z 2ft Γ 2 + η 2mt + ζ 2fmt, When considering specific export experience: ManExp fmt is firm-market-time varying. ζ 1fmt = η 1ft + υ 1fmt, i.e. we include firm-year fixed effects (same for ζ 2fmt ), and get rid of firm-year observables Z 1ft and Z 2ft. υ 1fmt and υ 2fmt are uncorrelated with each other and with covariates. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

39 Remarks Identifying variation. The identifying variation for export experience is provided by its changes over time within a firm. In the case of specific export experience and firm fixed effects, identification also comes from variation in the market dimension, still within a firm; specific export experience and firm-year fixed effects identification comes from the within-firm-market variation only. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

40 Entry and Continuation Prob. Start Exporting Prob. Continue Exporting (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Unconditional Prob Presence of Managers with Export Experience Manag. w/ Export Exp (0.001) (0.002) Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp a a a a (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) Selected Controls Firm Size a a a a (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) Firm Productivity a a a b (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) Firm-Year Controls X X X X Destination-Year Dummies X X X X X X Firm FE X X X X Firm-Year FE X X Observations 201, , ,612 61,686 61,686 61,686 R Number of firms 11,489 11,489 11,489 5,363 5,363 5,363 Number of firms-years 37,212 19,208 Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1 full table Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

41 Exports given Entry or Continuation Exports Condit. Entry Exports Condit. Contin. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Presence of Managers with Export Experience Manag. w/ Export Exp (0.042) (0.012) Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp a a (0.037) (0.096) (0.014) (0.039) Selected Controls Firm Size a a (0.129) (0.129) (0.049) (0.049) Firm Productivity a a (0.049) (0.049) (0.022) (0.022) Firm-Year Controls X X X X Destination-Year Dummies X X X X X X Firm FE X X X X Firm-Year FE X X Observations 10,022 10,022 10,022 53,203 53,203 53,203 R Number of firms 4,278 4,278 4,278 4,559 4,559 4,559 Number of firms-years 7,836 17,325 Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1 full table Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

42 Take-home Entry and Continuation. One std. dev. increase in the dummy At least one manager with specific export experience translates into (0.7-2) percent higher chances to start (continue) exporting. Magnitude comparable or higher than that of productivity. No significant effect of regular export experience. Exports given entry or continuation. One std. dev. increase in the dummy At least one manager with specific export experience translates into percent higher exports, for firms that already export. Magnitude comparable or higher than that of productivity. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

43 Endogeneity: Reverse causality Does a firm hire managers with export experience to improve its trade performance or does the firm receive a positive shock and/or improve its trade performance by other means and then hires managers with export experience? In other words, how important is the issue of reversed causality in our analysis? Main answer: if they do not impact firm trade performance why are they paid more? We also provide IV estimations results while simultaneously dealing with endogeneity by means of firm-year fixed effects. More specifically, we allow υ 1fmt and υ 2fmt to be correlated with specific export experience ManExp fmt and consider as instrument specific export experience three years prior to t: ManExp fmt 3. Indeed, Roberts and Tybout (1997) show that 3 years can be considered a sufficiently long time span for the past not to matter for export activity. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

44 Endogeneity: Selection The value of exports is observed only if a firm starts or continues to export to a market. We cope with the issue of firm selection into a market by using firm-year fixed effects and market-year dummies; most of the determinants of export entry emphasized by the trade literature are either at the firm-time or market-time level. A more recent strand of the literature, including Morales et al. (2012), is exploring other determinants of firm export behavior which are truly firm-time-market specific and are related to a firm s past activity in related markets. We could certainly incorporate such determinants in our analysis to better address selection but, so far, it is not clear whether they provide valid exclusion restriction, i.e. whether they affect entry and/or continuation but not the value of exports. Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

45 Wage Analysis (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) Age a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Age Squared a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Education a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Tenure a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Manager (0/1) a a a a a a (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 2nd Firm (or later) (0/1) a a a a a a (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 3rd Firm (or later) (0/1) a a a a a a (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 4th Firm (or later) (0/1) a a a a a a (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 5th Firm (or later) (0/1) a a a a (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 6th Firm (or later) (0/1) b (0.026) (0.009) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1 Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

46 Wage Analysis (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) 7th Firm (or later) (0/1) a (0.118) (0.028) (0.117) (0.092) (0.117) (0.092) 2nd Firm (or later) manag. (0/1) a a a a a a (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 3rd Firm (or later) manag. (0/1) a a a a a a (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 4th Firm (or later) manag. (0/1) b a c c b a (0.013) (0.004) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 5th Firm (or later) manag. (0/1) a c (0.038) (0.011) (0.039) (0.029) (0.038) (0.029) 6th Firm (or later) manag. (0/1) c (0.110) (0.034) (0.109) (0.082) (0.107) (0.081) 7th Firm (or later) manag. (0/1) b a b b b b (0.273) (0.088) (0.275) (0.128) (0.259) (0.139) Firm Size a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) Firm Productivity a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Industry-Level Exports a a a a a a (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1 Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

47 Wage Analysis (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) Firm Age a a c a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) Foreign Ownership (0/1) a a a a a a (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Share of Skilled Workers a a a a a a (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Prod. of Prev. Firm (0/1) a a a a a a (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) Size of Previous Firm a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) Prod. of Previous Firm a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) Sector of Previous Firm Equal (0/1) a a a a a a (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.035) (0.001) (0.035) Sector of Previous Firm Diff (0/1) a a a a a a (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.035) (0.001) (0.035) Managers Age (0/1) a a a (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Managers Education (0/1) a a a a (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1 Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

48 Wage Analysis (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) Avg. Managers Age a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Std. Dev. Managers Age a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Avg. Managers Education a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Std. Dev. Managers Education a a a b a b (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) New Exporter (0/1) a a a b b b (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Continuing Exporter (0/1) a a a a a a (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) Exiting Exporter (0/1) a a a a a a (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Other Exporter (0/1) a a a a a a (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1 back to premia Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

49 Entry and Continuation Prob. Start Exporting Prob. Continue Exporting (1) (2) (4) (5) Firm Age (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) Foreign Ownership (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) Industry-Level Exports (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) Share of Skilled Workers c (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) Avg. Managers Age (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) Std. Dev. Managers Age (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) Avg. Managers Education (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) Std. Dev. Managers Education (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) Avg. FE Managers (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) Std. Dev. FE Managers a a (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1 back to main covariates Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60

50 Exports given Entry or Continuation Exports Condit. Entry Exports Condit. Contin. (1) (2) (4) (5) Firm Age (0.127) (0.127) (0.035) (0.034) Foreign Ownership (0.088) (0.088) (0.027) (0.027) Industry-Level Exports c c (0.123) (0.123) (0.035) (0.034) Share of Skilled Workers c c (0.080) (0.080) (0.023) (0.023) Avg. Managers Age (0.052) (0.052) (0.014) (0.014) Std. Dev. Managers Age (0.048) (0.048) (0.011) (0.011) Avg. Managers Education (0.057) (0.056) (0.015) (0.015) Std. Dev. Managers Education c c (0.046) (0.046) (0.012) (0.012) Avg. FE Managers (0.127) (0.127) (0.033) (0.033) Std. Dev. FE Managers (0.069) (0.069) (0.017) (0.017) Robust standard errors in parentheses: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1 back to main covariates Giordano Mion (2015) Managers, Trade Performance, Wages CESifo, October / 60