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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Human Development 1 Country Department 4 Africa Regional Office Document of The World Bank IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA PPFI-Q1570) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 60.0 MILLION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA FOR A SOCIAL ACTION FUND PROJECT March 30, 2006 Report No: TA

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective October 27, 2005) Currency Unit = TSh Tsh1140 = US$ 1 US$ 1 = 1.44 SDR FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS Country Assistance Strategy M&E Monitoring and Evaluation CBOs Community Based Organizations MIS Management Information System CDD Community Demand-Driven MTR Mid-Term Review CDI Community Development Initiatives NBS National Bureau of Statistics CNA Community Needs Assessment NGO Non-Governmental Organization CPC Community Project Committee PAD Project Appraisal Document CSDS Community Service Delivery Survey PDO Project Development Objective CSO Civil Society Organization PPF Project Preparation Facility CWIQ Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal DCA Development Credit Agreement PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy DMT District Management Team PSR Project Status Report EOP End of Project PWP Public Works Program GOT Government of Tanzania SSP Social Support Program HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome TASAF Tanzania Social Action Fund ICR IDA IEC IGAs KPI LGA Implementation Completion Report International Development Association Information, Education and Communication Income Generating Activities Key Performance Indicators Local Government Authority TASAF II TMU Tanzania Second Social Action Fund TASAF Management Unit Vice President: Country Director Sector Manager Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Gobind Nankani Judy O'Connor Dzingai Mutumbuka Hope Phillips Volker

3 TANZANIA Social Action Fund Project CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 9 6. Sustainability Bank and Borrower Performance Lessons Learned Partner Comments Additional Information 25 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 26 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 28 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 30 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 31 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 34 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 35 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 36 Annex 8. Borrower Implementation Completion Report 37 Annex 9. Regional Poverty and Service Accessibility Ranking 81 Annex 10. Data on indicators not reported on in Annex 1 83 Annex 11. DCA-PAD editorial inconsistencies and DCA amendments 88

4 Project ID: P Team Leader: Hope C. Phillips Project Name: Social Action Fund Project TL Unit: EASHD ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: March 30, Project Data Name: Social Action Fund Project L/C/TF Number: IDA-34090; PPFI-Q1570 Country/Department: TANZANIA Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: Other social services (40%); Primary education (30%); Sub-national government administration (10%); General water, sanitation and flood protection sector (10%); Health (10%) Theme: Participation and civic engagement (P); Other social protection and risk management (P); Social safety nets (P); Rural services and infrastructure (S) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 03/23/1999 Effective: 12/01/ /09/2000 Appraisal: 06/13/2000 MTR: 05/19/ /09/2003 Approval: 08/22/2000 Closing: 06/30/ /30/2005 Borrower/Implementing Agency: Other Partners: GOT/GOT (PRESIDENT'S OFFICE) STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Gobind Nankani Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Judy M. O'Connor James W. Adams Sector Manager: Dzingai B. Mutumbuka Dzingai B. Mutumbuka Team Leader at ICR: Hope Phillips Volker Norbert O. Mugwagwa ICR Primary Author: Ida Manjolo 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: Sustainability: Institutional Development Impact: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: S L SU S S QAG (if available) Quality at Entry: Project at Risk at Any Time: No ICR S

5 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to enhance and sustain the provision and use of resource endowments by beneficiaries, which was to contribute to poverty reduction through (i) the improvement of socioeconomic infrastructure, and basic social and economic services; (ii) the increase in capacity and skills among rural and peri-urban communities; and (iii) the creation of temporary safety-net programs for the poorest and most vulnerable sections of the communities. The PDO was clear and realistic and consistent with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), Report No TA, June 15, 1997, whose objective included poverty reduction, growth, protecting vulnerable groups, and also focused on increasing and enhancing the capacities of the communities and stakeholders to undertake sustainable development initiatives and improve socio-economic services. The PDO was also in line with the Government of Tanzania s Social Sector Strategy, October 1994, which viewed households as active participants in choosing and supporting services that offer them concrete benefits. The Project took into consideration the Borrower s decentralization agenda, and was responsive to Government s development priorities in that it was one of the major instruments of Government s poverty reduction initiatives under the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). The Project was not national, and only covered the 2 islands and 40 districts on the mainland; however, it should be viewed as complex because of the number of institutions involved at the national, district and sub-district levels. There were no co-financiers to the Project..It is noted that there are instances where the data provided in this Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is not consistent with Government s ICR; this ICR is using the results of data made available more recently from the Project. 3.2 Revised Objective: The objective was not revised. 3.3 Original Components: The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) had three components which are described below. Community Development Initiatives (CDI) would finance community demand-driven (CDD) initiatives to improve accessibility to, and delivery of, social and economic services, and to enhance capacities of the communities and local development partners. The community initiatives were to be generated through participatory rural appraisal (PRA) processes from a sub-project menu which included construction/rehabilitation of basic health care facilities, schools, boreholes, dams, latrines, shallow wells, and economic infrastructure. It was expected that special consideration would be given to vulnerable groups. Implementation would be by democratically elected community project committees (CPCs). The average cost of sub-projects was initially estimated at US$20,000; later it was changed to US$25,000, with a minimum community contribution in kind or cash of 20%. In order to respond to specific requests for support for activities to address human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) during implementation, a window (Social Support Projects-SSP) was made available under the CDI component to pilot support for vulnerable individuals working with non-governmental organizations/civil society organizations (NGOs/CSOs). An amount of US$1-2 -

6 million was ear-marked for SSPs, with the expectation that each sub-project would cost approximately US$10,000. Public Works Program (PWP) would finance labor-intensive public works as a safety net scheme in poor rural and urban areas. The objective was to provide cash income for the poor, especially women and the youth, during periods of seasonal food insecurity, by creating job opportunities while supporting community infrastructure construction or rehabilitation. This was a supply-driven component, with Districts selecting communities in which to work using criteria such as food insecurity, poverty and access to services. Sub-projects were selected from the District plans, and confirmed by the community during extended-pras, followed by the drawing up of implementation plans by District PWP teams. Beneficiaries were self-targeting through the adoption of a PWP wage rate set at 20% below the market. The average cost of a sub-project under this component was initially estimated at US$40,000; later it was changed to US$50,000, with no community contribution. Institutional Development had four subcomponents as follows: TASAF Management Unit (TMU) would provide day-to-day operational support to Districts responding to the community demands emanating from the participatory processes. Financing included incremental staff salaries, systems development, TMU operational costs, and later included costs of running the District level TASAF Offices. Capacity Building-Information Education and Communication (IEC)/Training was to create a symmetrical information environment that was to enhance the potential democratic decentralization, transparency and accountability. The IEC would sensitize TASAF stakeholders on TASAF s philosophy, methodology, the sub-project cycle, roles and responsibilities of the various actors; build a knowledge base of the lessons learnt from experiences; and build partnerships and strategic alliances amongst stakeholders. Training would (a) expose all stakeholders to the dynamics of community development and the TASAF approach; and (b) build the capacity of communities, CPCs, and District level staff to manage participatory development, including fiduciary aspects of sub-project implementation. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) (including Management Information System (MIS) was to make data available to assess the impact of sub-projects on vulnerable groups; institute a participatory M&E through a Community Service Delivery Survey (CSDS); and monitor improvements in the levels of beneficiaries use and satisfaction with TASAF services. The MIS was to be linked with the M&E and be a source of information for the overall M&E system: to collect, store, and generate information for use in measuring benefits accruing to recipient communities, in order to monitor the sustainability of the TASAF approach and community assets created with support from the Project. National Poverty Monitoring and Analysis was expected to provide support for strengthening capacity at national, Local Government Authorities (LGAs or Districts) and community levels to monitor the effects of poverty alleviation policies by developing: (a) tools for rapid community and household surveys; (b) capacity in the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to plan and - 3 -

7 implement such surveys and use of Optical Mark Reader technology (scanners) to speed-up data entry; (c) capacity in TASAF Districts to integrate execution of CSDS into CDI and PWPs; (d) an integrated annual indicators survey, using methodologies and approaches tested during the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) pilot; and (e) progressively refined tools for the ranking process and creation of poverty maps using various data sources. The components, as designed, were reasonably related to achieving the objective, and took into consideration the capacity of the implementing agency, including its administrative and financial management capacity. Lessons from a Community Needs Assessment (CNA) during the pilot of TASAF systems, emerging understanding of best practice in the design of social funds, and extensive stakeholder consultation during design stage informed the design of the components. 3.4 Revised Components: The project components were not revised. 3.5 Quality at Entry: The Project was not subjected to a performance rating by the Quality Assurance Group review. The Project objective was relevant and within the Government s overall PRS and the CAS. The environmental and social safeguards were considered, and communities were to be sensitized through the IEC strategy on how to screen sub-projects for positive and negative environmental effects of sub-project activities, and to determine and implement mitigation measures. The design identified the critical risks and mapped out minimization measures which were internalized into the Project activities and processes: for example, the emphasis on capacity building which strengthened partner institutions. There were editorial inconsistencies within the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and with the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) following agreements reached during negotiations, but these did not affect implementation as they were remedied through a revision of the Operational Manual and amendments, and did not affect the outputs or Project development outcome (see Annex 11). On the whole, a rating of moderately satisfactory seems appropriate. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: On the basis of relevance, efficacy, and efficiency, the overall rating for the achievement of objectives is satisfactory. The PDO continues to be consistent with current Government s National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, and is still relevant in terms of the most recent CAS covering (Report No TA). The Project supported (a) sustainable rural development to improve the livelihood of the majority of the poor who live in rural areas; and (b) improved social infrastructure, to improve social indicators and enhance access for the poor to essential public services. By working through Local Governments, TASAF remains aligned with the revised Local Government Act, No. 6, Secondly, the rating is based on efficacy as the Project financed sub-projects which led to (a) improved socioeconomic infrastructure and basic services; (b) increased capacity and skills among rural and peri-urban communities; and (c) employment opportunities in a safety-nets program for - 4 -

8 poor households. On average between CDI and PWP, 93% of sub-project requests were approved for funding, of which 81.9% were completed. All communities implementing sub-projects received efficient back-up services through support from LGAs during the sub-project cycle, and at the end of the Project, 90% of completed sub-projects had permanent maintenance mechanisms. The Project financed investments that created potential improved access to services for close to 2 million people. The percentage of population receiving services from constructed facilities is estimated at 89%; surpassing the target of 60% (the failure to attain 100% is because community investments in the health sector were not fully operational due to inadequate staffing and equipment see Section 6.1). Community satisfaction with services available from all investments was 78.2%, when a rapid assessment was conducted in 2005, against a target of 80% set at Project design. A total of 2,700 vulnerable persons were reached through the SSPs, and beneficiaries reported positive changes in their well-being as well as increased economic activity in the rural economy (SSP Evaluation, 2004). Beneficiaries from the PWP safety-nets sub-projects were able to smooth consumption while some even invested in capital goods (Beneficiary Assessment, 2003). Thirdly, the rating is based on efficiency, where preliminary data from an on-going cost-effective study shows that communities were able to construct infrastructure at savings of between 3% and 48% compared to alternative financiers for similar investments (see Annex 3). This finding, that communities using TASAF resources were able in most instances to build infrastructure at comparable or lower costs, is consistent with findings from other social funds in the Region. Finally, the rating is based on capacity building efforts. Training for communities and stakeholders, and the funding of investments gave communities hands-on experience in planning and implementation. The IEC program gave communities information which paved the way for them to demand accountability from the implementers. The Project was targeted to the poorer regions in the country through ranking on the basis of poverty data from The 2005 update on poverty ranking of the same Regions showed changes that correlated with the number of Districts funded by TASAF in a given Region (see Annex 9); Regions with three TASAF-funded Districts did better than those with one or two Districts. While these changes in Regional poverty rankings cannot be attributed to TASAF, it is reasonable to assume that TASAF made a contribution since it provided significant resources for community investments in these Regions. 4.2 Outputs by components: CDI (IDA US$38.0 million; Government US$1.90 million; beneficiary communities US$8.62 million). The component is rated satisfactory. The CDI reached 1,482 communities where 1,399 sub-projects were financed, against a target of 2,212. Even though this target was not reached, from these sub-projects a total of 7,212 assets were created, surpassing the planned 3,906 by 3,306 (see Annex 1). This represents an over-achievement of the outputs produced by 84%, three-quarters of which were completed on time. The range of outputs included Out-Patient Departments, teachers' houses, health workers houses, and water points. These health outputs have resulted in over 1.7 million people having improved potential access to health services (this number has been reduced to 1 million due to inadequate staffing and supplies), over 116,000 children with improved access to learning environments, and over 2,000 teachers and health workers with improved accommodation, especially in the rural areas

9 Many community sub-projects had to be given further funding to make them functional in line with sector norms, which often led to the provision of services to more people as the outputs were larger with more facilities (water, toilets, desks, etc.). The definition of functionality varied from District-to-District, resulting in some communities constructing five double classroom blocks, or whole primary and secondary schools. The average cost of a sub-project rose by an average of 31% as functionality led to bigger sub-projects, fewer communities being reached, and community contributions falling from 20% to 18%. Women s participation in CPCs met the target set at 50%. SSPs piloted under the CDI component responded to requests for income generating activities, vocational skills training, response to HIV/AIDS, and early childhood development. All SSPs were in the rural areas, while 87% of the other CDI sub-projects were rural and the balance urban. The time required to access safe water sources is reported to have been reduced from 3 hours to between minutes, thereby making more productive time available to women and girls. Over 600 women from these water sub-projects were trained in operation and maintenance. PWP (IDA US$15.0 million; Government US$0.75 million). The component is rated satisfactory. TASAF financed 305 sub-projects (94% in the rural areas) which covered 581 communities, surpassing the target by 77%, with 85% of the sub-projects completed on time against a target of 90%. Furthermore, a total of 113,646 direct beneficiaries were reached against a target of 32,800. The very high demand for unskilled work in areas targeted with PWP led community leaders to reduce the period of employment from 10 to 5 months which produced many small sub-projects with more people being employed. Female beneficiaries accounted for 47% of the total (exceeding the target); the share of unskilled labor in the PWP funds disbursed was 41.3%, with 226,333 person-months of unskilled employment provided to the poor under this component. Institutional Development (IDA US$7.0 million; Government US$0.50 million). The overall rating for the component is satisfactory. The component met its Key Performance Indicator (KPI) targets, except for the reports from the District and national level, which were typically available after two weeks, instead of one week; poor communication with remote Districts, inadequate equipment, and often unreliable electricity led to these delays. Six studies were carried out and disseminated to stakeholders. TMU sub-component. The performance of TMU had mixed results. On the positive side, it supported participatory planning processes to facilitate linkages between local governments, NGOs/CSOs, and the private sector when responding to community demands. The TMU processed disbursements to 74.4% of the sub-projects on time. Districts were supported with a qualified TASAF accountant, and there were national-level program officers for backstopping. Against these accomplishments there were major short-comings: the TMU changed the approach after the Operational Manual was revised by insisting on the use of PAD indicative Project targets as annual caps on sub-projects which could be funded; inadequate review of sub-projects without always ensuring their compliance with sector norms, especially in education; resistance to purchase off-the-shelf software to improve data management; a case of mis-procurement; inability - 6 -

10 to produce accurate cash flow projections; and accounting and internal control issues in 38% of the audit reports (which included ineligible expenditure against the DCA, and allowances not receipted by payees). Capacity Building-IEC/Training sub-component. The number of people trained exceeded the KPI targets. The IEC Assessment (2004) indicated that there was 100% awareness about TASAF throughout the country. IEC also contributed towards the development of accountability by both the LGAs and the CPCs towards communities. M&E (including MIS) sub-component. Data was collected on KPIs, guidelines were issued on M&E report preparation, and quarterly and annual reports were produced. The project was able to collect information on KPIs (Annex 1) as well as information on other indicators (Annex 10) which formed the basis of an M&E system. The MIS for M&E was partially computerized, with data collected from the Districts being consolidated at TMU. The Financial Management Accounting System between Districts and TMU largely remained paper-based due to delays in the Government roll-out of Platinum software to the Districts. This gave rise to difficulties in data capture, assessment of Project performance, and monitoring benchmarks in the sub-project cycle; all of which created uncertainties on the financial status of TASAF as it drew to a close. National Poverty Monitoring and Analysis sub-component. Of the planned activities, only one was carried out with TASAF funding: creation of capacity in TASAF Districts for integrating participatory M&E through the CSDS into CDI and PWP components. Work on CSDS was done only as a pilot and it did not go beyond the training of trainers stage due to limitations in its application at the community level. The NBS did not implement its obligation under the Memorandum of Understanding to implement most of the activities under this sub-component. It is noted that shortly after TASAF effectiveness, the Government established a fairly elaborate poverty monitoring system under the Office of the Vice President; it is possible that this is the reason for NBS s decision to pull out of the arrangement. Ratings for the Achievement of objective/outputs of the components. The Project was not expected to contribute to macro, financial, sector policies, or public sector management. On the basis of the physical outputs under CDI and PWP, as well as unskilled wages paid out under sub-projects financed under the PWP, the physical outputs are rated substantial. Institutional development is also rated substantial (see Section 4.5 for the rationale). Achievements on poverty reduction and gender were substantial: the Project targeted communities in the poorer regions (see Annex 9 for positive changes in ranking for regions with TASAF-funded Districts), and female participation in CPCs was 50%, and 47% of the beneficiaries under PWP were female. On the basis of community interest in applying for, contributing to, and implementing sub-projects, participatory demand-driven development is rated high. Because of capacity building at central level, District level, and community level (where people were trained, communities implemented CDI sub-projects, and Districts managed the PWP), capacity building of stakeholders is rated substantial. Although the outputs of components did not specifically include measurements for achieving environmental or private sector development, there were modest contributions to both: over 20,000 private individuals participated in CPCs which procured goods and services from the private sector, and forms were available and communities - 7 -

11 were trained in sub-project environmental impact assessments and formulation of mitigation measures; however their rigorous application was limited. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: An economic rate of return was not calculated at appraisal. An assumption was made that communities are rational economic actors and that their choices reflect the greatest return for their time, labor and materials. In addition, the CNA indicated community willingness to make cash and in-kind contributions to interventions that reflected their priorities. Sector distribution of sub-projects reflected community priorities and at the end of Project, 56% were in education, 23% in health, 15% in water, and 6% in socioeconomic infrastructure under the CDI component. Communities on average made a contribution of 18% towards CDI sub-projects. Communities were able to construct these facilities with savings of between 3 and 48% compared to infrastructure put up by other financing sources (Annex 3). 4.4 Financial rate of return: No financial rate of return was calculated for the project at appraisal. 4.5 Institutional development impact: The institutional development impact is rated substantial. At the community level, the Project contributed to empowering communities to realize their potential in harnessing available local human and material resources for their own development. A total of 22,687 CPC members were trained in sub-project implementation (procurement, financial management, environmental impact and mitigation, report-writing, reporting back, etc.). Communities also demonstrated their capacity to target the vulnerable with suitable interventions. Village Councils were trained on implementation, and IEC spelled out stakeholder roles during implementation, thereby enhancing accountability and transparency at the community level through regular reporting on activities (Beneficiary Assessment, 2003). At the Local Government level, TASAF supported LGAs capacity enhancement activities to accompany funds disbursed to communities under CDI and to LGAs under PWP. A total of 732 implementers were trained in various fields. TASAF provided PRA training to LGA staff, which strengthened the District planning framework by including communities in the setting of priorities and in detailed costing of sub-projects. At the national level, a TASAF National Steering Committee included civil society representatives, demonstrating Government s willingness to work with civil society. The Project strengthened partnerships between LGAs, NGOs, communities and the private sector (as suppliers of goods and services), to improve service delivery. The institutional arrangements for TASAF were directly linked to the decentralization governance structure. The Project strengthened national and Local Government systems in Project implementation by using an Operational Manual that has been adopted by other Projects supporting activities at the District and community levels; this is part of mainstreaming TASAF approaches into Local Government systems. TASAF s experience with sector norms and standards has demonstrated the importance of having well-developed bills of quantities for use at the District and community levels; a priority for effective sector devolution. Lessons from the Project were used by Government when preparing service guidelines for use by the stakeholders in the implementation of TASAF II

12 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: Material cost increases. Frequent price increases for construction materials and transportation costs affected sub-project budgets, which contributed to increased costs of sub-projects over and above the initial budget allocations. This had a negative impact on the number of sub-projects which could be financed. There is anecdotal evidence that the cost of materials also increased as a result of demand created by sub-project procurement activities, especially in communities where there was only one or two suppliers. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: Equipping and staffing health facilities. The Tanzania health sector has experienced difficulties staffing and/or equipping health facilities, including those built with TASAF support (see Section 6.1). Of the 328 health facilities supported by TASAF, 45% (149 facilities equivalent to 11% of total CDI sub-projects) have inadequate staff and/or supplies. This means that communities cannot access adequate services from facilities in which they have invested their money, time and labor. The short-term community planning horizon was initially poorly synchronized with medium-term district and national planning, leading to delayed provisions of recurrent funding for community-built health facilities when these were ready for commissioning. In response to this concern, the Ministry of Health has indicated that recurrent costs for all facilities are included in the 2005/06 budget. Failure to expeditiously roll-out Platinum. Government insistence that TASAF use Platinum (the software selected for financial management at District level), and the subsequent delays in its roll-out led to delays in receiving information which could have been used by TMU and IDA for decision making. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Slow management response. TMU s failure to take corrective action on findings from audit reports relating to inadequate internal controls and budgeting systems, as well as its refusal to use off-the-shelf software while waiting for the Platinum rollout, affected the ability of the TMU to provide real time data on sub-project financing, which would have allowed the TMU to more accurately monitor its financial position. This unavailability of information was more apparent at Project closure than at the beginning (see Section 4.l). 5.4 Costs and financing: The Project was to be financed by US$60 million from IDA, US$3.15 from Government, and US$8.62 million from in kind or cash community contributions (community contribution is reported under co-financiers in Annex 2). A Project Preparation Facility (PPF), which utilized US$925,000 out of US$1.2 million allocated, financed a CNA and piloted sub-projects in 17 communities. Price and physical contingencies in the Project cost by component table in the PAD amounted to approximately 21% in recognition of the demand driven nature of the Project, and the difficulty in knowing a priori the exact split between the CDI and PWP components. As noted above, DCA amendments were required to more accurately reflect the anticipated expenditures. An amount of US$39,200 was cancelled as a result of mis-procurement at TMU, an exchange rate gain of US$1.69 million was realized, and at the end of the Project IDA disbursed US$

13 million. The expenditures by disbursement categories were by and large in line with the original estimates. In analyzing the financing by components, the actuals in both CDI and PWP sub-projects were lower than the original estimates (by US$3.46 million and US$2.1 million respectively). Government contribution exceeded the original estimate as a result of the exchange rate gains. The Institutional Development component disbursed US$7.25 million above the original estimate; funds for this came from the CDI ($3.46 million), PWP ($2.1 million), and exchange rate gain ($1.69 million). The CDI and PWP amounts ($5.56 million) to cover the cost of six CDI/PWP Program Officers, 42 TASAF District Accountants and various sub-project supervision costs at District level, originally costed under the CDI and PWP components, were charged to the Institutional Development component on advice from Financial Management colleagues. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Sustainability is rated likely. TASAF enjoyed political support from the highest levels in Government as well as commitment from communities. As a consequence, a follow-on Project with national coverage (TASAF II) was requested and became effective in The Government s National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (June 2005) notes that TASAF is one of the major poverty reduction instruments supporting communities to participate in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Two studies, an Impact Evaluation of TASAF and an Implementation and Cost Effectiveness Study under TASAF I, are under way and will provide useful information on TASAF development impact. TASAF operated within the decentralized structure of Local Governments and supported capacity building through training implementers at District and community levels, including CBOs/NGOs. Training of CPCs and PWP beneficiaries through hands-on experience enhanced community capacities beyond levels identified in the CNA. Community participation at all stages and levels engendered social cohesion and ownership of the development process; demonstrated by the level of community contribution and adherence to the sub-project cycle. Since most of the infrastructure is constructed by the communities and then handed over to the sectors upon completion, responsibility for maintenance rests with the sectors; one would expect that these assets will be maintained to the same standard prevailing in a District. Health facilities constituted 23% of CDI sub-projects, with 45% of them not fully staffed and supplied at the close of TASAF. In recognition of the challenges facing community funded health facilities, there was a slow-down in the approval of new health facilities after the mid-term review, and TASAF II will not finance any new health facilities. There are plans by LGAs to establish Community Health Funds, and, so far, 40 such funds exist to supplement Government recurrent funding for the health sector; but it is too early to judge their effectiveness. Most investments (56%) went to the education sector where School Parent-Teachers Committees have a long history of collecting funds from parents for school maintenance and to finance other running costs to supplement Government budgets. Some School Committees, having been trained in maintenance, can more effectively use the funds set aside in the capitation grant to the school from Central Government for maintenance. The water sector, in which Community Water Committees (responsible for

14 operation and maintenance of water assets) always set up a water fund before they can receive funds for water investments, received 15% of TASAF resources. Furthermore, 629 women in Community Water Committees were trained by the Project as caretakers for TASAF- funded water sub-projects. With respect to the transport sector, there are no formal mechanisms for community roads maintenance, but most TASAF roads link remote communities to markets; it is expected that these are likely to be maintained by communities and LGAs. The SSPs supported activities which communities would normally manage on their own, and members have been trained in business management and have savings accounts from which to draw funds if necessary. Environmental and social mitigation measures were implemented by communities. Continued capacity enhancement will take place at District level, and within TASAF, to facilitate communities with environmental and social aspects under TASAF II where safeguards have been more fully integrated into the Operational Manual and the sub-project cycle processes. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: The design of TASAF II is based on the understanding that as more Districts meet fiduciary criteria set out under a national Local Government Reform Program, the management of TASAF funds will be taken over by LGAs, and future community financing will be through Government budget systems. Through TASAF II, Village Governments will receive development funds and lay the foundation for them to become more active service providers within a decentralized framework. An assessment of the convergence between TASAF II and the Bank-funded Local Government Support Project (LGSP) is planned for the TASAF II mid-term review. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Bank s lending performance is rated satisfactory. The Bank quickly responded to the Borrower s request for a social fund, preparation was participatory, and piloting of activities provided valuable lessons for Project design. The Project design was coherent, in line with the CAS, and took into account the country s National Poverty Reduction Strategy itself based on a participatory approach to addressing poverty issues. The Project was identified in February 1999, pre-appraised in April 1999 and appraised in April A total of five missions were undertaken by Bank teams with a good skills mix. The Project was negotiated in June 2000, approved by the Board in August 2000, and became effective in November The Bank granted the Government s request for a PPF to undertake a CNA, and to test out the proposed approach (processes, procedures and implementation arrangements), and community capacities in 17 communities. By appraisal, there was sufficient information from the pilots to glean lessons and to demonstrate how the proposed mechanisms were working. As part of the preparatory activities, the Bank also consulted widely with communities, stakeholders, and donors. A financial management analysis and procurement assessment of the implementing agency was carried out, risks were identified and appropriate mitigation measures were put in place. An environmental analysis was undertaken and recommendations with respect to mitigation measures were included in the sub-project cycle. Inconsistencies, presented previously, between PAD and the DCA were addressed in the Operational Manual and did not affect implementation or outcome

15 7.2 Supervision: The rating for supervision was challenging, with satisfactory performance in most aspects, and better performance required in a few aspects; and as a consequence the rating given is moderately satisfactory. Between effectiveness and the closing date, 11 implementation reviews were undertaken. All reviews received input from procurement and financial management staff, whether their work was undertaken during or prior to the reviews. The reviews included the requisite skill mix except for the environmental and social safeguard specialists who were not included in the latter part of the Project life. In addition to the need for inclusion of the environmental specialist, the only other shortcoming was that challenges faced by the TMU with respect to financial management should have been detected earlier. The reviews were sufficiently resourced; documentation was comprehensive and appropriate guidance was provided to the client. Examples include (a) the provision of a window through which support to the vulnerable could be provided having noticed that HIV/AIDS requests were not getting support through the CDI component; (b) recommendation that a review of already funded sub-projects be undertaken to ensure that sector norms (functionality) were followed and ensure service delivery to the beneficiary communities; (c) emphasizing the need to track the use of environmental checklists, implementation of mitigation measures, and building capacity at community level; (d) supporting the establishment of a new directorate to ensure quality control of Project operations; and (e) supporting the redeployment of Program Officers to TMU after noticing that they were not being effectively used and supported at the regional level. The placement of a Bank staff in the Country Office during the final year of implementation enhanced the follow-up which the team was able to provide. In 2003, TASAF was one of the Projects selected for an audit by the Bank Internal Audit Department, wherein weaknesses in procurement and financial management were identified. Records indicate that the team responded to these recommendations in subsequent missions. A thematic supervision mission on environment and social safeguards was carried out in March 2005, which recommended strengthening the review team to include an environmental and social safeguard specialist, and supervision of environmental and social safeguards through capacity enhancement of the TMU and District level staff. This recommendation is being implemented under TASAF II, and it is expected that having a Lead Environmental Specialist in the Bank Country Office will further enhance capacity building efforts. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: The overall Bank performance is considered satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: Preparation by the Borrower is rated satisfactory. His Excellency, President Benjamin William Mkapa of the United Republic of Tanzania, visited Malawi in 1998 where he was impressed by the Malawi Social Action Fund which was financing communities to build schools and clinics, while providing cash transfers to the poor, and providing support to the vulnerable. As a consequence, the President requested the World Bank to send a team to design a similar fund in Tanzania. Government took the lead in preparing the Project concept, actively participating in all the stages of preparation, and producing all the required documentation from pre-appraisal

16 through to effectiveness in a timely manner. Government organized stakeholders workshops, meetings and study tours to existing social funds, which allowed for participatory consultations in the Project design process. A CNA was carried out to inform the Project design, and, as noted above, piloting took place to test out the procedures and process, which brought out lessons that fed into the Project design. An environmental analysis was carried out on the pilot sub-projects which met the Bank s safeguard requirements and provided the basis for designing the processes to mitigate potential environmental impact. In order to complement the decentralization process which expected to lead to community empowerment, the proposed institutional arrangements for implementation by Government formed an integral part of the Local Government Reform Program because of its participatory nature. 7.5 Government implementation performance: Government implementation performance is rated satisfactory. Government continues to support the poverty alleviation agenda as articulated in its PRS, and its commitment was demonstrated through the provision of required counterpart funding. TASAF was an autonomous body under the oversight of the National Steering Committee which provided policy guidance to the TMU. Implementation of sub-projects was supported by the District, which, in addition to providing contributions directly for the sub-projects, also contributed to the Project by providing staff, transport, and office space. The one area where periodic conflicts arose was between the Village Council and the CPCs, since the implementation arrangements of the Project was silent on the role of village governments; this has been addressed in the design of TASAF II. Due to the geographic dispersion of the Project s coverage, and the thoroughness of the auditors, delays were encountered in the provision of audit reports to the Bank. 7.6 Implementing Agency: The team also found this rating to be a challenge. If taken as a whole, the performance might be rated satisfactory; however, on the basis of fiduciary issues which surfaced toward the end of implementation, the implementing agency, is rated moderately satisfactory. TMU s financial management got worse in the last nine months which led to both Project management and financial management being rated unsatisfactory by the Bank. There were challenges of internal controls. The Government integrated computerized financial management system only worked at the centre; Districts used a manual system which led to delays in financial reporting. The bulk of procurement was carried out satisfactorily at community level by CPCs, but the Bank declared mis-procurement in the amount of US$39,200 in one case at the TMU level. By not acting as a facilitator, who obtains norms and standards for use by Districts and communities, the TMU missed an opportunity to ensure sub-projects adhered to existing norms and standards. The TMU undertook a number of activities in order to improve quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the Project. These included: (a) setting up a Systems and Capacity Building Directorate after the mid-term review; and (b) carrying out studies in order to further improve delivery mechanisms. During implementation, the TMU was sufficiently staffed, with the initial Executive Director being in post until three months before the closing date; in the final year of the Project two Directors left the organization, and their positions were filled by staff from within the organization on an acting basis. As the senior staff focused on the preparation of TASAF II, their work was undertaken by acting staff who may not have received the requisite guidance from their colleagues. This state of affairs contributed to some of the challenges during the final year of implementation

17 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: The overall performance of the Borrower is rated satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned IEC is a powerful tool: An effectively implemented IEC strategy facilitates communities to implement sub-projects successfully because they receive timely, consistent, and accurate information on Project processes and procedures. A strong IEC initiative also helps to improve mutual accountability between stakeholders and contributes to an improved governance structure that is a key to community empowerment. It stimulates latent community capacities by expanding the role of Village Governments. A nation-wide IEC program has been planned under TASAF II, with a greater use of the print media to provide community-level reference materials. Field-based Norms and Standards are helpful: A Project like TASAF, with a CDD approach, involves many actors in implementation, which is greatly facilitated if norms and standards, including operational bills of quantities, are available at District and community levels. For TASAF II, Government has formulated Community Service Guidelines to assist Village Governments; it has created a Sector Experts' Team to provide technical guidance to Local Governments on sector norms and standards for community-level investments. The Team will also address the identified problem of inadequate consultation between TASAF and the sectors (i.e., health facilities established with inadequate staff and equipment). Accountability is vital: Accountability of CPCs to the Village Government was strengthened; and elected Local Government machinery was made responsible for sub-project approvals upon advice from their technical staff. The Project strengthened village-level institutions, especially the Village Council, and created a better climate for Community Management Organizations to emerge. The community procurement process enabled communities to learn by doing while remaining accountable through established Project rules. Community Score Cards have been introduced into TASAF II as tools to systematically assess accountability trends at the community-local Government interface. Harmonize documentation: As with any project, harmonizing various documents reduces confusion. There is a tendency by implementers to rely heavily on the PAD as a guide, rather than using the legal agreement, which is binding. The team for TASAF II invested time in harmonizing the PAD with the DFA; and supported the TMU in harmonizing the OM with the DFA while incorporating lessons from the preparation of TASAF s ICR. Strengthening M&E system: The preparation of this ICR has generated lessons which have improved TASAF II organizational structure. The multiple points for production and distribution of information, with weak managerial oversight in TASAF, have been addressed by the creation of a Directorate of Operations and Systems. Under TASAF II, District Accountants from TMU will cover more than one District and have been given a capacity building role - with a greater focus on systems audit and monitoring

18 Sustainability enhanced: Supply-driven targets in TASAF were removed in TASAF II by removing annual targets in the PAD, and giving Local Governments more responsibility to work with communities in the Project. Given the shortage of health manpower, the construction of new health facilities is on the negative list of community investments under TASAF II; emphasis has been put on activities that communities can undertake to increase service access and contribute to the attainment of specified Millennium Development Goal indicator targets rather than construct more physical assets. TMU weaknesses addressed: Procurement was strengthened by putting a Specialist under the Executive Director, to work with a procurement committee. Financial management shortcomings were addressed by separating disbursement from management as a way of streamlining operations; and Internal Audit Unit was elevated to a Directorate level to improve the oversight function. By revisiting the design of the organization (i.e., reducing its operational role and strengthening its monitoring function while putting as much operational responsibility on Village and Local Governments as possible), TASAF II will continue to build capacities at the grass roots level. Local Government Reform Program fiduciary criteria were adopted as important criteria for the gradual transfer of resource management from TMU to Local Government Authorities as TASAF II is integrated into Local Government systems. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency:

19 The United Republic of Tanzania / President's Office TANZANIA SOCIAL ACTION FUND Telephone: S82-84 Far ail: info@rasaf.org Website: WWW. tasakoq Old Kilwd Malit& Road P.O. Box 9381 Dar Es Salaam T'mia In reply please quote: Rej No: TSF/GEN/T/98/14 Dafee: 22 March 2006 Country Director. The World Bank, DAR ES SALAAM, Dear Madam, Re: OFFICIAL SUBMISSION OF ADDENDUM TO GOVERNMENT ICR--;4ND COMMENTS. TO IDA IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT OCR) Kindly refer to the above mentioned subject and your letter dated 30th December 2005 regarding the extension of period for which the Government was to submit comments regarding the IDA ICR. The requested meeting was held between IDA Team and Government Team represented by TMU staff and discussed in line with &e proposed agenda. The Minutes of the Meeting are attached herewith for your reference. With regard to the Addendum to the Government ICR, the Government does not see the reason for withdrawal of its ICR. The Addendum is attached and should replace Tables 1 to 5 of Annex 1. In this case, the Government ICR should be read dong with the submitted Addendum. The comments to the IDA ICR are as they were submiped previously with amendments made after the meeting between the IDA and Govement Teams. They are attached herewith for your reference. We anticipate continuous cooperation in poverty reduction efforts through the initiatives that directly target beneficiaries at grassroots level.... S. B. Likwelile EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 16-

20 Specific Comments to IDA ICR S/No Issue TMU Comments 1. Original Objective (Section 3.1) Two different Project Development Objectives are presented in the two documents; PDO in the revised Operational Manual (OM) is the one which was addressed during implementation; which should therefore be the one to be referred to in the ICR 2. Average cost of sub project (Section 3.3) 3. Inconsistencies within the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and Development Credit Agreement (DCA) (Section 3.5) 4. Functionality under CDI sub projects (Section 4.2) The indicated average cost of CDI and PWP sub projects, that is US$ 20,000 and US$40,000, respectively, was applicable before the OM was revised; After revision of OM, ceiling of sub projects approved at district/island level were US$25,000 and US$50,000 for CDI and PWP, respectively. NSC was approving sub projects whose value exceeded that ceiling The inconsistencies within the PAD and DCA cannot not be considered editorial, as it can be noted even Project Development Objectives presented in the two documents are different; Revision of the OM departed from the design, for instance, number of outputs (communities to be reached) were changed. Aiming to meet earlier-on stipulated outputs was regarded as managing demand Definition of functionality was provided by respective sectors and not districts. Due consideration was to be given to the role played by other partners in provision of similar assets/facilities was overlooked In view of existence of many players in development including host LGA, other IDA projects, bilateral and multilateral agencies, NGOs and private sector, it was not expected that TASAF alone, certainly not within the spirit of community ownership and sustainability, would be able to finance everything to make all facilities functional, since such achievement would require much resources and more time 17

21 4. Functionality under CDI sub projects (Section 4.2) 5. PWP wages (Section 4.2) Definition of functionality was No further comment provided by respective sectors and not districts. Due consideration was to be given to the role played by other partners in provision of similar assets/facilities; this was not to be overlooked In view of existence of many players in development including host LGA, other IDA projects, bilateral and multilateral agencies, NGOs and private sector, it was not expected that TASAF alone, certainly not within the spirit of community ownership and sustainability, would be able to finance everything to make all facilities functional, since such achievement would require much resources and more time. The share of PWP unskilled labour in No further comment the PWP funds disbursed was 41.3% and not 36%. The percentage is calculated based on the amount disbursed to sub projects which was US$ 11,024, and not total disbursements spent under category 2 (PWP); IDA contribution of US$ 12.9 mil. to PWP reported in Government ICR included disbursement to sub projects, cost of E- PRA and preparation of sub projects as well as contribution of 25% of TAOs salaries. The amount disbursed to sub projects was US$ 11,024, as reported in the April-June 2005 Quarterly Report

22 S/No Issue TMU Comments IDA responses 6. TMU TASAF was designed to meet set See explanation in S/No 3. Sub-component: outputs; TMU planning was aimed at TASAF was a demand-driven Use of PAD Project outputs (Section 4.2) achieving stated outputs; Revision of OM departed to some extent from the earlier design, particularly on the number of outputs operation and the supply of targets by TMU to Districts were turning it into a supply-driven operation; where the centre gave targets, districts applied them, and communities could not request for sub-projects above that target even if their needs were greater. There was concern that this supply-driven approach was just stretching the project to last the four years rather than respond to community demands. IDA team attempts to persuade TMU to change the approach failed. 7. TMU District Steering Committees, Pemba No further comment Sub-component: and Unguja Steering Committees and Approval of sub National Steering Committee were projects - (Section 4.2) responsible for approval of sub projects; TMU was facilitating the process 8. Purchasing of off-the-shelf software to improve data management (Section 4.2 and Section 5.3) The Government decision was to use Platinum, TASAF being a Government Project was expected to use the same software; Procedure for purchasing of off-the-shelf software is the same as when procuring other products; it also required customization and backlog data capture, hence its acquisition would not have solved the problem immediately; Delay in acquiring Platinum is largely attributable to time taken by IDA to give No Objection. TMU had to wait for about a year to get IDA s No Objection for sole sourcing the software (request for No Objection was made in July 2001 while clearance to sign contract was provided in May 2002). Then there was the task of capturing of backlog data, data cleaning and reconciliation. The sole source was the problem our procurement team had with Platinum, hence it took the IDA team a long time to obtain the necessary clearance

23 Specific Comments from TASAF with IDA responses S/No Issue TMU Comments IDA responses 1. Original Objective (Section 3.1) 2. Average cost of sub project (Section 3.3) 3. Inconsistencies within the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and Development Credit Agreement (DCA) (Section 3.5) Two different Project Development Objectives (PDO) are presented in the two documents; PDO in the revised Operational Manual (OM) of 2003, is the one which was addressed during implementation; which should therefore be the one to be referred to in the ICR The indicated average cost of CDI and PWP sub projects, that is US$ 20,000 and US$40,000, respectively, was applicable before the OM was revised; After revision of OM, ceiling of sub projects approved at district/island level were US$25,000 and US$50,000 for CDI and PWP, respectively. NSC was approving sub projects whose value exceeded that ceiling. The inconsistencies within the PAD and DCA cannot not be considered editorial, and as noted even the Project Development Objectives presented in the two documents are different; Revision of the OM departed from the design, for instance, number of outputs (communities to be reached) were changed. Aiming to meet earlieron stipulated outputs was regarded by IDA as managing demand The PDO in the PAD (page 2) has different wording from that in the DCA (schedule 2, page 14). In revising the OM, the teams tried to harmonize the two by (a) stating the objective from the PAD, and (b) amplifying it with a definition of "resource endowments" and "socioeconomic infrastructure" from the DCA. The US$25,000 for CDI and $50,000 for PWP were provided for in the DCA (Schedule 4 paras 8(a) and 11(a)). The OM was revised to bring it into line with the DCA since the PAD at negotiation had estimates of $20,000 and $40,000. The revision of the OM and other handbooks was in the spirit of the DCA, which provides for their "amendment from time to time, in consultation with the Association, and such term includes any schedules of the Project Manuals" (para (p) page 3 of DCA referring to Manuals in Schedule 4 para 1(b)). Such consultations took place at a meeting held in Zanzibar between IDA team and TMU when implementation was being hampered by the many interpretations in TMU and Districts on what the OM provisions meant. 20

24 S/No Issue TMU Comments IDA responses 4. Functionality under CDI sub projects (Section 4.2) Definition of functionality was provided by respective sectors and not districts. Due consideration was to be given to the role played by other partners in provision of similar assets/facilities; this was not to be overlooked In view of existence of many players in development including host LGA, other IDA projects, bilateral and multilateral agencies, NGOs and private sector, it was not expected that TASAF alone, certainly not within the spirit of community ownership and sustainability, would be able to finance everything to make all facilities functional, since such achievement would require much resources and No further comment 5. PWP wages (Section 4.2) more time. The share of PWP unskilled labour in the PWP funds disbursed was 41.3% and not 36%. The percentage is calculated based on the amount disbursed to sub projects which was US$ 11,024, and not total disbursements spent under category 2 (PWP); IDA contribution of US$ 12.9 mil. to PWP reported in Government ICR included disbursement to sub projects, cost of E- PRA and preparation of sub projects as well as contribution of 25% of TAOs salaries. The amount disbursed to sub projects was US$ 11,024, as reported in the April- June 2005 Quarterly Report No further comment 21

25 S/No Issue TMU Comments IDA responses 6. TMU Subcomponent: TASAF was designed to meet set See explanation in S/No 3. Use outputs; TMU planning was aimed at TASAF was a demand-driven of PAD Project outputs (Section 4.2) achieving stated outputs; Revision of OM departed to some extent from the earlier design, particularly on the number of outputs operation and the supply of targets by TMU to Districts were turning it into a supply-driven operation; where the centre gave targets, districts applied them, and communities could not request for sub-projects above that target even if their needs were greater. There was concern that this supply-driven approach was just stretching the project to last the four years rather than respond to community demands. IDA team attempts to persuade TMU to 7. TMU Subcomponent: Approval of sub projects - (Section 4.2) 8. Purchasing of off-the-shelf software to improve data management (Section 4.2 and Section 5.3) District Steering Committees, Pemba and Unguja Steering Committees and National Steering Committee were responsible for approval of sub projects; TMU was facilitating the process The Government decision was to use Platinum, TASAF being a Government Project was expected to use the same software; Procedure for purchasing of off-theshelf software is the same as when procuring other products; it also required customization and backlog data capture, hence its acquisition would not have solved the problem immediately; Delay in acquiring Platinum is largely attributable to time taken by IDA to give No Objection. TMU had to wait for about a year to get IDA s No Objection for sole sourcing the software (request for No Objection was made in July 2001 while clearance to sign contract was provided in May 2002). Then there was the task of capturing of backlog data, data cleaning and reconciliation. Reasons for the delay are clarified in Government ICR. change the approach failed. No further comment The sole source was the problem our procurement team had with Platinum, hence it took the IDA team a long time to obtain the necessary clearance. 22

26 S/No Issue TMU Comments IDA responses 9. NBS s decision to pull out: (Implementation of Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire, CWIQ and Community Service Delivery Survey, CSDS) (Section 4.2) 10. Borrower Performance: Implementing Agency (Section 7.6) There is no official communication that NBS pulled out; NBS was expected to administer CWIQ for several stakeholders including TASAF. There was no adequate financial commitment to operationalize it. TASAF alone had no enough funds to operationalize it; CSDS was piloted, IDA recommended a different tool known as Community Score Card (CSC) to be used during TASAF-II. - Senior staff focus on the Preparation of TASAF-II did not contribute to some challenges of final implementation; - Acting staff were provided with guidance were free to make consultations with senior staff. The Community Score Card was a recommendation when the NBS- TASAF collaboration was not forthcoming. The M&E specialist working on the NBS issue had a meeting with TMU and NBS early in the implementation of the project, and reported that the NBS was no longer able to: MOU with National Bureau of Statistics. The NBS has not yet decided whether it will incorporate an annual monitoring survey into its household survey program. If it decides not to, TASAF will need to amend the current MOU accordingly (with its implications for the DCA) - Aide memoire of July 2002 No comments. 23

27 S/No Issue TMU Comments IDA responses 11. Strengthening M&E System (creating Directorate of Operations and Systems) Section 8 The decision to create a Directorate of Operations and Systems is a controversial one which seems to have originated from TTL. The structure is different from the one that was negotiated and also different from the organigram presented in the PAD; Revision of TASAF- II organigram was done after the Project was negotiated; The structure is different from one which was the basis of the approved Procurement Plan; Revision of the organigram was done without consulting the Government Project Preparation Team (PPT); A few months experience of operationalizing the new structure has shown that the proposed structure creates unnecessary bureaucracy and affects the pace of implementation; Accordingly, Executive Director and TTL agreed to split the Directorate as an interim measure. The revision of the OM after negotiations was to make sure that it was aligned with the DFA and that it was taking on board lessons from the ICR (which was being prepared). The option had been to delay the design of TASAF II until the ICR was done, or to design TASAF II and take on board TASAF I lessons as these were learnt. The former Executive Director and the team revising the OM met with IDA team members and agreed that a Directorate of Operations and Systems would address many of the data management challenges that he had faced. When the new Executive Director came on board, he raised concerns, and the IDA team agreed that after trying to work with Managers instead of one Director for a six-month period, the Executive Director could propose to the IDA team a different configuration. The OM is considered a 'living document' to take on board any learning done by the team; hence the DFA provision that it " may be amended from time-to-time with the concurrence of the Association, and such term [of OM] includes any schedules thereto" (para (t) page 3). Schedule 4 para (1) extends the OM to specifically include the Service Guidelines in Community Participation (and the IDA team agreed with the TMU to allow UN agencies to make comments on these guidelines after negotiations as the OM was being finalized). It is not possible to have a final OM by negotiations without leading to major delays; and Government was very anxious that TASAF II be designed with speed - IDA responded, but it meant there were significant revisions to the OM as lessons from TASAF I became available. 24

28 (b) Cofinanciers: Not applicable (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): Not applicable 10. Additional Information None

29 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR1 Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of projects to have permanent maintenance mechanisms 100% 90%, the remaining 10% are health facilities not operational due to lack of staff and necessary equipment. Percentage of communities provided 100% 100% with efficient back-up services Percentage of population getting 60% 89% services from the constructed facilities Percentage of communities satisfied by the available services 80% 78.2% Output Indicators: Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR1 Actual/Latest Estimate Community Development Initiatives No. of communities reached under community subprojects ,482 applications received, 1,399 funded and implemented. Assets created, 7,212, exceeded 3,906 planned by 3,306. % sub-projects completed 90% 83.3% % of women on CPC 50% 50% Public Works Program No. of communities reached under safety net projects No. of beneficiaries reached 32, ,646 % of women benefiting 40% 47% % projects completed within budget and on time 90% 85.2%

30 Institutional Development No. of implementers trained at district and national levels including NGOs and CBOs; and 22,687 CPC members at community level No. of beneficiaries trained 40, ,646 PWP beneficiaries No. women trained 50% 51% (of implementers trained) % of increase attendance at 30% 100% awareness meetings (annual) % of women in CPCs 50% 50% % of population aware of 0% 100% TASAF (annual growth) Days to produce reports after 7 15 target date Days within which to effect disbursement after application

31 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of Appraisal Component US$ million US$ million Community Development Initiatives (Sub-Projects) Public Works Program (Sub-Projects) Institutional Development Total Baseline Cost Physical Contingencies 3.59 Price Contingencies Total Project Costs Total Financing Required Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB Community Other N.B.F. Total Cost Participation Community Sub-Projects 34.5 (34.5) (34.5) Public Works 13.8 (13.8) (13.8) Equipment, furniture, supplies and vehicles 1.7 (1.7) 0.6 (0.6) 0.7 (0.7) 3.0 (3.0) Consultant services, training, workshops, 4.7 (4.7) (4.7) studies and audits Operating Costs 4.1 (4.1) (4.1) Total (IDA Share) (1.7) (0.6) (48.3) (9.5) (60.0)

32 Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) Procurement Method Expenditure ICB NCB Community Other N.B.F. Total Cost Category Participation Community Sub-Projects (34.54) (34.54) Public Works (12.90) (12.90) Equipment, furniture, supplies and vehicles 1.44 (1.44) 0.96 (0.96) 0.20 (0.20) (2.60) Consultant services, training, workshops, 6.88 (6.88) 6.88 (6.88) studies and audits Operating Costs 4.77 (4.77) (4.77) Total (IDA Share) (1.44) (0.96) (47.44) (11.85) (61.69) Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of Appraisal IDA Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. Community Development Initiatives (Sub-Projects) Public Works (Sub-Projects) Institutional Development TOTAL

33 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits Comparison of Construction Cost of TASAF with that of other Organizations Project Donor Cost $ 000 TASAF Cost $ 000 Classroom PEDP 6,889 4, Classroom AXIOS 5,920 4, Teacher s House AFRICARE 7,733 6, Dispensary and Staff house AFRICARE 20,226 14, Staff house AFRICARE 9,100 7, Dispensary Japanese Embassy 61,000 32, Water Borehole Ministry of Water 50,000 40, Shallow Well RWSS 3,000 2,915 3 Earth Road (Labor based) LDF/UNDP/ UNCDF 8,319 4, % TASAF Savings Exchange Rate: US$1: Tsh1,100 Source: November 2005, Preliminary data from the on-going TASAF CDI and PWP Implementation and Cost Effectiveness Study

34 Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Month/Year Count Specialty Identification/Preparation 2/9/ TEAM LEADER (1); SP SPEC (1) 4/28/ TEAM LEADER (1); OP ANALYST (1); SR STATISTICIAN (1); COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALIST (1); INFO ANALYST (1); PROGRAM OFFICER-SOCIAL SECTORS (2); FMS (1); PROC ANALYST(1); PARTICIPATION/COMMUNIT Y BASED DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST (1); SP SPECIALIST (1); CONSULTANT (1) 10/5/ TEAM LEADER (1); PARTICIPATION/COMMUNIT Y BASED DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST (1) 12/8/ TEAM LEADER (1); PARTICIPATION/COMMUNIT Y BASED DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST (2); OP ANALYST (1); KNOWLEDGE & LEARNING OFFICER (1); SP SPECIALIST (1); PROGRAM OFFICER-SOCIAL SECTORS (2); DISBURSEMENT (2); FMS (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1) Appraisal/Negotiation 4/17/ TEAM LEADER (1); PROGRAM OFFICERS-SOCIAL SECTOR (2); COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALIST (1); SR STATISTICIAN (1); INFORMATION ANALYST (1); OP ANALYST (1); ECONOMIST (1); SP SPECIALIST (1); PARTICIPATION/ COMMUNITY BASED Performance Rating Implementation Progress Development Objective

35 Supervision DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST; PROC ANALYST (1); FMS (1); DISBURSEMENT (1) 11/27/ TEAM LEADER (1); IEC S S SPECIALIST (1); INSTITUTIONAL DEV. (1); ECONOMIST, PWP (1); PUBLIC HEALTH (1); PROCUREMENT (1); DISBURSEMENT (1) 03/09/ TEAM LEADER, SR. SP SPEC S S (1); LEAD STAT (1); SR. PH SPEC (1) 09/14/ TTL/SP SPEC (1); S S COMMUNICATIONS SPEC (1); HEALTH SPECIALIST (1); OP OFFICER (1); PROC SPECIALIST (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT (1); CONSULTANT (1); FMS (1) 07/05/ TTL, SR. SP SPEC. (1); S S CO-TTL, SR. HEALTH SP. (1); SR. COMMUNICATIONS SPEC. (1); INFO OFFICER (1); OP OFFICER (1) 10/18/ TEAM LEADER, SP SPEC (1); S S OP OFFICER (1) 6/20/ TTL/SR. SP SPEC (1); SR. S S COMM SPEC (1); SR. INFO OFFICER (1); OP OFFICER (1); INDIG KNOWLEDGE (1); FMS (1); SR. PROC SPEC (1); EDUC SPEC (1); SR. PH SPEC (1); CONSULTANT (1) 2/27/ TTL, OP. OFFICER (1); S S INSTITUTIONAL/POLICY(1); M&E, MIS (1); INFRASTRUCTURE (1); SSP (1) 4/29/ SR. COMMUNIC SPEC (1) S S 10/8/ TTL, SR.OPERATIONS OFF S S (1); SR. SP SPEC. (1); SR. INFO OFFICER (1); PROC ANALYST (1); SR. PROC SPEC (1); SR. FMS. (1); PROG ASST (1); SR. PROG ASST (1) 12/10/ SR SP SPEC (1); FMS (1); DISBURSEMENT (2): PROG S S

36 ASST (1); CONSULTANT (1) ICR 04/08/05 6 TTL/SR. OP. OFFICER (1); PROG ASST (1); SR. SP SPEC (1); SP SPEC (1): PROC ANALYST (1): FMS (1) S S (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation N/A 125 Appraisal/Negotiation Supervision ICR Total

37 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Participatory Demand Drive Development Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Capacity building of stakeholders (community level; CPCs; LGAs; NGOs; CBOs; TMU

38 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU

39 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 1. Project preparation documents 2. TASAF I PAD 3. Back to Office and Aide Memoires 4. Project Annual and Quarterly Reports 5. Evaluation of the Social Support Program in the Pilot Districts of Bukoba Rural, Kibaha, Shinyanga Rural and Meatu by Unique Consortium of Services Ltd A Model for Determining a Self Targeting Wage Rate final Report by Business Care Services Ltd. 7. Environmental Analysis of TASAF funded subprojects April-May Environmental Assessment of TASAF supported subprojects (June 2003) by EPCON Biotech Consultants 9. Impact Assessment of IEC in TASAF Operation Areas Assessment of Capacity Building Districts in Subprojects Management in the Context of Norms and Standards APEX Engineering Co. Ltd. 11. Beneficiary Assessment in TASAF Operation Areas 2003 by Data Vision International (T) Ltd

40 Additional Annex 8: Borrower s Implementation Completion Report UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA PRESIDENT S OFFICE IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (ICR) For Tanzania Social Action Fund (2000 to 2005) Dated June 16 th