The IAEA Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Process (SCCIP) Making safety culture tangible

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1 The Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Process (SCCIP) Making safety culture tangible International Atomic Energy Agency

2 Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Process (SCCIP) The Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Process provides comprehensive support to Member States including Training to perform safety culture self- assessments Support in developing an effective and sustainable safety culture improvement programme 2

3 SCCIP Takes time and commitment The overall goal with SCCIP is to support the receiving organization in its capacity building of practical, systematic and systemic safety culture continuous improvement. The safety culture self-assessment training should be seen as an investment, not a cost as it provides: A team of internal safety culture experts; A team of change agents and; High quality safety culture assessment results. The experience of implementing SCCIP it that most of the trained personnel have a technical educational background, but after the first assessment the team develops sustainable knowledge of why people and organizations behave the way they do. In short they have tapped into the behavioural and social sciences and gained knowledge which is needed to proactively be equipped to catch declines and improve in safety culture June 2013

4 Basis for SCCIP in the Safety Standards GSR Part 1: National policy and strategy Requirement 1: National policy and strategy for safety 2.3 (g): The promotion of leadership and management for safety, including safety culture. Requirement 19: The management system of the regulatory body The management system of the regulatory body has three purposes: (3) The third purpose is to foster and support a safety culture in the regulatory body through the development and reinforcement of leadership, as well as good attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety on the part of individuals and teams Requirement 29: Graded approach to inspections of facilities and activities In conducting inspections, the regulatory body shall consider a number of aspects, including: Management systems Safety culture

5 Basis for SCCIP in the Safety Standards DS 456 (Draft GSR Part 2) Requirement 13: Continuous improvement of safety culture All individuals in the organization, from senior management down, shall demonstrate leadership by promoting safety. A normative framework based on international best practices shall be described in the management system to promote and support a strong safety culture. Requirement 14: Assessment of leadership and safety culture. Senior management shall regularly commission independent assessments and provide for self-assessments of safety culture and leadership.

6 s Approach to Safety Culture Continuous Improvement the Foundations Culture is seen as something we can influence, rather than something we can control Culture work needs to encompass the whole organization not only as a top-down process To effectively assess safety culture, multiple methods must be used (interview, survey, focus group, observations, document review) a survey is not enough Edgar Schein s well established iceberg metaphor helps to understand and how to continuously improve safety culture observe visible aspects (artefacts and behaviour, above surface ) and; interpret this information to reveal the cultural reasons behind (found in attitudes, values and basic assumptions, below surface ) For safety culture improvement, the emphasises human interactions (shared space) including trust, mindful communication, learning attitude, inquiring attitude, selfaccountability, diversity, self-reflection etc. Artefacts, Behaviour Attitudes Values Basic Assumptions

7 Objectives of training within SCCIP Organizational capacity building through enhancement of the understanding of: Safety culture and the value of safety culture assessments; How improvement in safety culture can enhance safety performance thorough several positive synergies; and Everyone s roles and responsibilities in cultural work. To provide knowledge and practical skills in SCSA methods, based on current international research and practices in the nuclear community. INLEP Module June 2013

8 Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Process Senior management workshop Senior Management Safety Culture Workshop 3 DAYS Relationship between safety culture and enhanced safety performance Role of safety culture assessments for improving safety culture Roles and responsibilities of senior management in cultural improvement work Competencies and skills needed in team to be trained to perform safety culture self-assessment ( Safety Culture Ambassadors, STEP 2) supporting senior management in selecting an effective team 8

9 Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Process SCSA Training Safety Culture Self Assessment Training 2 WEEKS (separate) Train a cross-functional, cross-hierarchical team ( Safety Culture Ambassadors ) to Perform high quality safety culture self-assessment applying the established Safety culture assessment methodology Develop and implement effective safety culture improvement activities Training weeks separated enhances learning output and allows for course reading in between Bridging session in the end to ensure alignment between team and senior management OUTCOMES: Team of Safety Culture Ambassadors who are equipped with practical tools and knowledge to perform safety culture assessments 9

10 Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Process Performing SCSA SCSA performed by safety culture ambassador team Tailored support missions to support organization in doing safety culture self-assessment depending on need of individual organization OUTCOMES: Final self-assessment report and Safety Culture Improvement Program 10

11 s Approach to Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Never ending journey Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Creation/amendment of safety culture continuous improvement programme Implementation of improvement activities Periodic safety culture assessments performed by Safety Culture Ambassadors 11

12 Course material is based on Safety Standards and Safety Culture publications Social, Organizational and Behavioural sciences Past experiences- and external Safety Culture expert knowledge and experience of Safety Culture Self Assessment training approaches and materials

13 Methodology for Training Learning-by-doing Core set of lectures based on the safety standards and science; Further illustration by specific examples through Application set presentations; Interactive exercises on how to apply the four of the five data gathering methods e.g. observations, interviews, questionnaire and focus groups; Performance of a mini-self-assessment based on a case study. Fake data are provided to the trainers to extract cultural facts, perform descriptive and normative analyses and communicate the results; Fostering of a good shared space and; In parallel a process of team-building is facilitated to assure effective implementation and high quality assessment results.

14 Implementation of SCCIP SCCIP support has been provided at Kozloduy NPP Belgoprocess NV Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) Laguna Verde NPP Senior management safety culture workshops have been provided to a long list of organizations

15 Feedback from participants "Safety Culture" was at the start a very abstract and rather new world for me. In a job where you think very rationally it is not common to think about behaviours and habits of people. You just go with the flow. By this course I've learned that by taking some distance and by being neutral you see things different. Nancy Reusen, Supervisor Production Management, Belgoprocess Before participating in this workshop, I was aware of the problem of a weak "Questioning Attitude" in TEPCO and wanted to find a solution to it. Through this workshop, ( ) my outlook towards this problem broadened. My attention turned to the lower portion of the iceberg. The importance of conversation was one of the things I realized. Shinichi Kawamura, General Manager of Nuclear Asset Management Dept., TEPCO 15

16 Feedback from participants Before the start of the SCSA project in PNRA, I was just aware about the definition of safety culture which states that safety culture is the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in the organization but I did not know about the actual meaning of this definition. However after passing through different steps of SCSA project like participation in workshop, collecting data by using five tools (interviews, focus groups, survey, observation, review of documents), participation of descriptive analysis of data by bubble diagram in connection with the underline assumptions (cultural aspects) with the help of the support mission, now I am confident and will be able to conclude some solid, valuable and understandable outcome for further improvement in the organization. Muhammad Sadiq, Directorate of Policies & Procedures, PNRA 16

17 Feedback from participants [I]t has been a great opportunity to reflect about all the information we got, how to understand culture and go deeper to really understand how the organization is driven. I learned new techniques to do things differently, think outside the box and that I need to listen to my colleagues to have a shared understanding. Ariadna Bazan Limón, Independent Unit of Safety Engineering, Laguna Verde 17

18 Safety Culture Assessment Methodology International Atomic Energy Agency

19 Prerequisite for Assessment of safety culture GS-G-3.5 Safety culture self-assessement should: Include the entire organization Several different self-assessment tools should be used (e.g. interviews, focus groups, questionnaires, observations and document reviews) A designated team representing all organizational levels and functions at the installation should carry out the self-assessment A specialist in safety culture should be included in the team The self-assessment team should receive training The self-assessment team should summarize the results and identify areas for improvement and may suggest actions to be taken The results should be reported to the management at an appropriate level A follow-up assessment should be performed The independent assessment of safety culture should follow a similar approach

20 Prerequisite for Assessment of safety culture GS-G-3.5 The independent assessment of safety culture should follow a similar approach as self-assessment The independence and qualification of the members of the assessment team should be considered crucial for the success of the assessment The team should be staffed with sufficient diversity of experience and should include specialists in behavioural science, with knowledge of statistical methods of analysis The independent assessment team should aim at identifying strengths and areas for improvement

21 Prerequisite for Assessment of safety culture GS-G-3.5 Safety culture multi-disciplinary expertise Anthropology Organizational theory Social Psychology Sociology Leadership and management theory Cognitive science Psychology Human Factor Engineering Resilience Engineering Organizational Factors ITO (interaction between Individuals, Technology and Organizations) Basic knowledge; Nuclear technology, nuclear organizations, regulatory framework

22 The Safety Culture Assessment Methodology Using several assessment methods Interviews

23 Concept of Culture and Safety Culture The concept of culture is descriptive The concept of safety culture is normative

24 Descriptive/Normative Descriptive must come before the Normative! Descriptive Normative is Based on data and a theory of culture Being evaluative in the descriptive stage can lead to exclusions Being descriptive helps to pick up weak signals Being descriptive means having a broad agenda for dialogue should Based on data, a theory of culture and a norm It sets standards for behaviour and values It is related to practices known to lead to safety It focuses on certain limited aspects of the organization

25 Descriptive analysis Descriptive analysis: Images of culture

26 Normative analysis Safety culture is not a culture; it is a normative interpretation of a culture Normative, evaluative analysis Descriptive Analysis: Images of culture Cultural themes Cultural Themes Cultural Themes Cultural Themes Cultural Themes Cultural facts Cultural facts Cultural facts Cultural facts Cultural facts Interview data Survey data Focus group data Document data Observation data

27 Summary The Safety Culture Continuous Improvement Process provides comprehensive support to perform safety culture self- assessments developing an effective and sustainable safety culture improvement programme, incl. The safety culture assessment methodology applies 5 data collection methods, and separates the normative and descriptive analysis process

28 Thank you for your attention